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Preface and Acknowledgements  
For the first time in recent memory, acquisition reform has emerged as a significant 
topic in Presidential discourse.  While procurement surfaced occasionally as a second-tier 
issue in last fall’s debates, its importance has increased considerably in the current 
economic crisis.  The massive federal spending of recent months has highlighted the need 
for cost-savings elsewhere, and the President has announced acquisition reform as a 
priority of his Administration to help achieve those savings. 
That our new President would use his “bully pulpit” to advance acquisition reform 
should be good news for the nation.  Too often in the past, champions of reform have lacked 
the political standing necessary to bring about substantive and enduring change.  If the 
President, with his own party in control of the Congress, is unable to successfully lead such 
an effort, we may rightfully despair that anyone can. 
Of course, students of acquisition know only too well that such comprehensive 
change must be led by leaders who grasp and can address the complex interplay of 
interests and issues faced by the various institutions and organizations that make up the 
acquisition culture.  Accordingly, the discourse of today’s reform agenda must rise well 
above the “sound-bite” level of so-called “no-bid” contracts which seems to dominate the 
popular media.  Rather, the reform agenda must reflect the experiences and judgments of 
the “best and the brightest” from government, industry, and academia, many of whom are 
convened at this Symposium.  We sincerely hope that the Administration will be open to 
their voices.   
Such “informed reform” is a primary goal of the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
Acquisition Research Program (ARP).  Established in 2003, the ARP provides leadership in 
innovation, creative problem solving and an on-going dialogue, contributing to the evolution 
of Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition strategies. The program continues to grow and 
mature with the number of projects, products, collaboration opportunities and 
faculty/graduate student participation continuing to increase substantially. Our goals remain 
the same as noted below: 
• Position the ARP in a leadership role to continue to develop the body of 
knowledge in defense acquisition research 
o Over 300 published works since inception 
o Sponsoring an annual Acquisition Research Symposium, the first of 
which was held in May 2004, which draws the thought leaders of the 
DoD acquisition community. 
• Establish acquisition research as an integral part of policy-making for DoD 
officials. Some processes informed by this research include: 
o Contract close out procedures; 
o The impact of spiral development in the acquisition process; 
o Cost estimating for new design Ballistic Missile Submarine 
o Termination liability clauses for Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
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o Contractual language and context to incorporate Open Architecture in 
weapons system contracts 
o All completed research is published in full text on the ARP website, 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, allowing ready access by any and all 
parties interested in the DoD acquisition process. 
• Create a stream of relevant information concerning the performance of DoD 
Acquisition policies with viable recommendations for continuous process 
improvement.   
o The body of knowledge on the DoD acquisition process has been 
greatly increased. 
o Faculty researchers routinely give multiple presentations, in both 
national and international fora, featuring their research work—thereby 
increasing exposure to a broader audience. Typical audiences include 
the London School of Economics, the Federal Reserve and the 
International Procurement Conference. 
o With the launch of the ARP’s International Journal of Defense 
Acquisition Management (IJDAM), the ‘”reach” of our products has 
increased substantially. In addition, the IJDAM provides another forum 
in which acquisition scholars might publish and recognize the 
globalization that is occurring in the defense industry. 
• Prepare the DoD workforce to participate in the continued evolution of the 
defense acquisition process.  
o The ARP plays a major role in providing a DoD-relevant graduate 
education program to future DoD officials. Synergy between research 
conducted and course content delivered enhances both the teaching 
and learning processes. 
o The number of students engaged in focused acquisition research for 
their MBA project continues to grow dramatically.  These students 
have the benefit of being able to immediately apply their newly 
acquired acquisition skills to real-world issues. 
• Collaboration among universities, think tanks, industry and government in 
acquisition research.  
o Over 50 universities/think tanks participated in the 5th annual 
Acquisition Research Symposium as a result of a focused effort to 
create a Virtual University Consortium.   
o Emerging collaborative research efforts continue to bring new scholar 
and practitioner thought to the business issues facing the DoD as was 
demonstrated by the large response to our second Broad Area 
Announcement (BAA) in support of the OSD-sponsored acquisition 
research program. As we write this, our third BAA is being prepared 
for release. 
o The International Journal of Defense Acquisition is attracting scholars 
from the United Kingdom, Canada, Nigeria, Singapore, The 
Netherlands and Australia.  
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We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Office of Naval Air Systems Command PMA-290 
• Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Management Policy & 
Program Integration) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army  
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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The Acquisition Research Program Team 
Rear Admiral James B. Greene, Jr. USN (Ret.)—Acquisition Chair, Naval 
Postgraduate School. RADM Greene develops, implements and oversees the Acquisition 
Research Program in the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy. He interfaces with 
DoD, industry and government leaders in acquisition, facilitates graduate student research 
and conducts guest lectures and seminars. Before serving at NPS, RADM Greene was an 
independent consultant focusing on Defense Industry business development strategy and 
execution (for both the public and private sectors), minimizing lifecycle costs through 
technology applications, alternative financing arrangements for capital-asset procurement, 
and “red-teaming” corporate proposals for major government procurements.  
RADM Greene served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) 
in the Pentagon from 1991-1995. As Assistant Deputy, he provided oversight, direction and 
budget development for worldwide US Navy logistics operations. He facilitated depot 
maintenance, supply chain management, base/station management, environmental 
programs and logistic advice, and support to the Chief of Naval Operations. Some of his 
focuses during this time were leading Navy-wide efforts to digitize all technical data (and, 
therefore, reduce cycle-time) and to develop and implement strategy for procurement of 
eleven Sealift ships for the rapid deployment forces. He also served as the Senior Military 
Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) from 1987-1990; as such, he 
advised and counseled the Under Secretary in directing the DoD procurement process.  
From 1984-1987, RADM Greene was the Project Manager for the AEGIS project. 
This was the DoD’s largest acquisition project, with an annual budget in excess of $5 
billion/year. The project provided oversight and management of research, development, 
design, production, fleet introduction and full lifecycle support of the entire fleet of AEGIS 
cruisers, destroyers, and weapons systems through more than 2500 industry contracts. 
From 1980-1984, RADM Greene served as Director, Committee Liaison, Office of 
Legislative Affairs followed by a tour as the Executive Assistant, to the Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics). From 1964-1980, RADM Greene served as a 
Surface Warfare Officer in various duties, culminating in Command-at-Sea. His assignments 
included numerous wartime deployments to Vietnam, as well as the Indian Ocean and the 
Persian Gulf.  
RADM Greene received a BS in Electrical Engineering from Brown University in 
1964; he earned an MS in Electrical Engineering and an MS in Business Administration from 
the Naval Postgraduate School in 1973.  
RADM Greene received the 2009 Richard W. Hamming Annual Faculty Award for 
Achievement in Interdisciplinary Activities. The selection is based on his work in leading and 
administering the Naval Postgraduate School's Acquisition Research Program. 
Dr. Keith F. Snider—Associate Professor of Public Administration and Management 
in the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California, where he teaches courses related to defense acquisition management. 
He also serves as Principal Investigator for the NPS Acquisition Research Program and as 
Chair of the Acquisition Academic Area.  
Snider has a PhD in Public Administration and Public Affairs from Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University, a Master of Science degree in Operations 
Research from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a Bachelor of Science degree from the 
United States Military Academy at West Point. He served as a field artillery officer in the US 
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Army for twenty years, retiring at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He is a former member of 
the Army Acquisition Corps and a graduate of the Program Manager’s Course at the 
Defense Systems Management College.  
Professor Snider’s recent publications appear in American Review of Public 
Administration, Administration and Society, Administrative Theory & Praxis, Journal of Public 
Procurement, Acquisition Review Quarterly, and Project Management Journal.  
Dr. Snider received the 2009 Richard W. Hamming Annual Faculty Award for 
Achievement in Interdisciplinary Activities. The selection is based on his work in leading and 
administering the Naval Postgraduate School's Acquisition Research Program. 
Karey L. Shaffer—Program Manager, General Dynamics Information Technology, 
supporting the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business & Public 
Policy, Naval Postgraduate School. As PM, Shaffer is responsible for operations and 
publications in conjunction with the Acquisition Chair and the Principal Investigator. She has 
also catalyzed, organized and managed the Acquisition Research Symposiums hosted by 
NPS.  
Shaffer served as an independent Project Manager and Marketing Consultant on 
various projects. Her experiences as such were focused on creating marketing materials, 
initiating web development, assembling technical teams, managing project lifecycles, 
processes and cost-savings strategies. As a Resource Specialist at Watson Wyatt 
Worldwide in Minneapolis, Shaffer developed and implemented template plans to address 
continuity and functionality in corporate documents; in this same position, she introduced 
process improvements to increase efficiency in presentation and proposal production in 
order to reduce the instances of corruption and loss of vital technical information.  
Shaffer has also served as the Project Manager for Imagicast, Inc., and as the 
Operations Manager for the Montana World Trade Center. At Imagicast, she was asked to 
take over the project management of four failing pilots for Levi Strauss in the San Francisco 
office. Within four months, the pilots were released; the project lifecycle was shortened; and 
the production process was refined. In this latter capacity at the MWTC, Shaffer developed 
operating procedures, policies and processes in compliance with state and federal grant 
law. Concurrently, she managed $1.25 million in federal appropriations, developed 
budgeting systems and helped secure a $400,000 federal technology grant. As the 
Operations Manager, she also launched the MWTC’s Conference site, managed various 
marketing conferences, and taught student practicum programs and seminars.  
Shaffer holds an MBA from San Francisco State University and earned her BA in 
Business Administration (focus on International Business, Marketing and Management) from 
the University of Montana.  
A special thanks to our editors Jeri Larsen, Jessica Moon, Breanne Grover and 
Adrianne Malan for all that they have done to make this publication a success, to David 
Wood, Tera Yoder, Jordy Boom and Ian White for production, web and graphic support, and 
to the staff at the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy for their administrative 
support. Our program success is directly related to the combined efforts of many.  
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Announcement and Call for Proposals 
The Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School 
announces the 7th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium to be held May 12-13, 2010 
in Monterey, California.   
This symposium serves as a forum for the presentation of acquisition research and 
the exchange of ideas among scholars and practitioners of public-sector acquisition.  We 
seek a diverse audience of influential attendees from academe, government, and industry 
who are well placed to shape and promote future research in acquisition.   
The Symposium Program Committee solicits proposals for panels and/or papers 
from academicians, practitioners, students and others with interests in the study of 
acquisition.  The following list of topics is provided to indicate the range of potential research 
areas of interest for this symposium: acquisition and procurement policy, supply chain 
management, public budgeting and finance, cost management, project management, 
logistics management, engineering management, outsourcing, performance 
measurement, and organization studies.   
Proposals must be submitted by November 6, 2009.  The Program Committee will 
make notifications of accepted proposals by December 4, 2009.  Final papers must be 
submitted by April 2, 2010. 
Proposals for papers should include an abstract along with identification, affiliation, 
contact information and short bio for the author(s).  Proposals for papers plan for a 20 
minute presentation. Proposals for panels (plan for 90 minute duration) should include the 
same information as above as well as a description of the panel subject and format, along 
with participants’ names, qualifications and the specific contributions each participant will 
make to the panel.   





May 12 - 13, 2010  
Monterey, California 
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Primary objective is to attract outstanding researchers and scholars to 
investigate topics of interest to the defense acquisition community. The 
program solicits innovative proposals for defense acquisition management 
and policy research to be conducted during fiscal year (FY) 2010 (1 Oct 2009 
- 30 Sep 2010).  
Defense acquisition management and policy research refers to 
investigations in all disciplines, fields, and domains that (1) are involved 
in the acquisition of products and/or services for national defense, or (2) 
could potentially be brought to bear to improve defense acquisition.  It 
includes but is not limited to economics, finance, financial management, 
information systems, organization theory, operations management, human 
resources management, and marketing, as well as the “traditional” acquisition 
areas such as contracting, program/project management, logistics, and 
systems engineering management.  
This program is targeted in particular to U.S. universities (including U.S. 
government schools of higher education) or other research institutions 
outside the Department of Defense.  
The Government anticipates making multiple awards up to $120,000 each for 
a basic research period of twelve months.  NPS plans to complete proposal 
evaluations and notify awardees in early September 2008. The actual date of 
grant award will depend on availability of funds and the capabilities of the 
grants office.  Prior year awards occurred in the November – January 
timeframe. Awardees may request approval of pre-award costs (up to three 
months), or they may request adjustments in the grant period of performance. 




BROAD AGENCY ANNOUNCEMENT 
 Acquisition Research Program 
Open until 4:00 pm PDST 30 June 2009 
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Panel 11 - Lead Systems Integrators: Challenges and 
Prospects 
Thursday, 
May 14, 2009 
Panel 11 - Lead Systems Integrators: Challenges and Prospects 
9:30 a.m. –
11:00 a.m.  
Chair: James E. Thomsen, Principal Civilian Deputy, Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy (Research, Development & Acquisition) 
Discussant: Lenn Vincent, RADM, USN, (Ret.), Industry Chair, Defense 
Acquisition University 
The Role of Lead System Integrator 
Jacques Gansler, William Lucyshyn and Adam Spiers, University of 
Maryland 
Organizing for a Complex World: The Way Ahead 
David J. Berteau, Senior Adviser and Director of the Defense-





Chair: Mr. James E. Thomsen is currently the Principal Civilian Deputy Assistant Secretary (RD&A). 
His responsibilities include leadership of the acquisition workforce and systems engineering.  
Previously, Thomsen served as the Program Executive Officer for Littoral and Mine Warfare. As PEO 
LMW, he had lifecycle responsibility to design, produce, field, and support warfighting capability for the 
littoral battle space and for the Global War on Terrorism. Thomsen led seven program offices that 
comprised 224 programs—ranging from ACAT I through ACAT IV—and included several 
developmental programs that addressed urgent warfighting needs for OIF and OEF. In 2003, Thomsen 
was selected as the Executive Director for the Program Executive Office, Littoral and Mine Warfare 
where he executed the Navy’s material acquisition programs for Integrated Undersea Surveillance, 
Naval EOD/JCREW, Naval Special Warfare, Mine Warfare Surface and Aviation, Unmanned Maritime 
Vehicles, Naval Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Ashore and Afloat, and LCS Mission Modules for ASW, 
Mine Warfare, and ASUW.  
Prior to this position, Thomsen was assigned as Head of the NAVSEA Dahlgren Division’s Weapons 
Systems Department, directing over 550 scientists, engineers, technicians, and advancing key technical 
achievements in Naval Surface Weapons systems.  
Thomsen was selected as a member of the Senior Executive Service (SES) in November 1998 and 
then named as Head, Coastal Warfare Systems Department. Here, he directed all of the Littoral 
Warfare RDT&E programs at Naval Surface Warfare Center (Panama City), which included 360 
scientists, engineers, technicians, and military personnel.  
Prior to November 1998, Thomsen served as Program Manager for Mine Warfare programs, for which 
he was awarded the NDIA Bronze Medal for his achievements in Mine Warfare; Senior Systems 
Engineer for the Shallow Water Mine Countermeasures program; Project Manager for the ACAT 1D 
Joint US/UK Surface Ship Torpedo Defense (SSTD) program, for which he received the Commanding 
Officer/Technical Director Award for special achievement in technical management; and Head, Torpedo 
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Defense Systems Development Branch. He also served as the System Integration Agent in Submarine 
Torpedo Defense Countermeasure programs for PMS 415.  
In the early years of his 27-year career, he held engineering positions—including design engineer, test 
engineer, project engineer, and systems engineer for several undersea warfare programs at Carderock, 
Panama City, and NAVSEA Headquarters.  
Thomsen received his Bachelor’s degree in Ocean Engineering from Florida Atlantic University in 1981 
and his Master of Science degree from Florida State University in 1986.  
Discussant: Lenn Vincent is the Industry Chair at the Defense Acquisition University (DAU). He uses 
his Defense and Industry experience, expertise and perspective to advise the DAU management team, 
OSD, and the uniformed services on matters relative to contracting and program management issues.  
As a professor at DAU, he presents views to foster a more viable and effective defense acquisition 
management system.  He serves on various DAU advisory councils and on its academic review 
committee. Additionally, he provides independent consulting services to a variety of industry clients 
relative to procurement, contract management, logistics and supply chain management.  
As a Vice President at CACI International, Vincent was responsible for working with senior Department 
of Defense and Industry leaders to build long-term CACI relationships and to help identify solutions to 
acquisition, logistics, and financial management challenges. His strategic focus was an initiative to 
create an integrated digital environment that will extend the DoD’s automated procurement system into 
industry and into the DoD program management offices, as well as into implementation and training 
strategies for new products and service.   
As a Vice President at American Management Systems, he led a 130-member business unit 
responsible for the deployment and launch of government and industry procurement and contract 
management software solutions.  His acquisition business solutions profit center was responsible for 
implementing the DoD’s Standard Procurement System currently being used by over 23,000 
procurement personnel and for launching a commercial contract management system for industry that 
was purchased by The Boeing Company.  
Prior to entering civilian life, Vincent completed a distinguished career in the United States Navy, 
serving at both sea and ashore. He has over 30 years of broad-based and in-depth leadership and 
management experience in acquisition, supply chain management, logistics and financial management.   
When he retired on August 1, 1999, at the rank of Rear Admiral, he was the Commandant, Defense 
Systems Management College (DSMC), where he led a graduate-level DoD College with a faculty and 
staff of 300 people and an annual budget of $25 million. While in this position, he began an overhaul of 
acquisition education to include reform principles and technology-based distance learning. 
Prior to leading DSMC, Vincent had served as the Logistics, Ordnance and Fleet Supply Officer for 
Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, where he established policy and coordinated logistics requirements 
to support supply chain operations in the Pacific Fleet and Indian Ocean. 
Vincent was the Commander of the Defense Contracts Management Agency (DCMA), a diverse 
worldwide organization of 19,000 people responsible for administration and oversight of over 400,000 
contracts valued at $800 billion.  Concurrently, he also served as the senior acquisition executive 
responsible for procurement policy within the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).   
His afloat tours included Supply Officer on both USS Pensacola (LSD 38) And USS Dixon (AS 37). 
Some of his other shore-based assignments included: Assistant Commander for Contracts at the Naval 
Air Systems Command; Commander, Defense Contract Management Command International; 
Commander, Defense Contract Administration Services Region, Los Angeles; Director, Contracts 
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Director at Navy Inventory Control Point, Mechanicsburg; Contracting Officer, SUPSHIP Bath, Maine; 
and Director, Contracts Navy Supply Center, Puget Sound.  
Vincent holds a Master’s in Business Administration from George Washington University.  He also is a 
Certified Navy Material and Acquisition Professional, and is DAWIA Level III certified in both 
Contracting and Logistics. 
He is President-elect of the National Contract Management Association and serves on its Board of 
Directors and Board of Advisors. He also serves on the following: Board of Directors, Navy League 
National Capital Council; Board of Directors, NDIA Washington, DC Chapter; Board of Visitors, Defense 
Acquisition University; Board of Directors Procurement Round Table. He is also a member of AFCEA 
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The Role of Lead System Integrator 
Presenter: The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, is a Professor and holds the Roger C. Lipitz Chair in Public Policy and 
Private Enterprise in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland. He is also the Director 
of both the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise and the Sloan Biotechnology Industry 
Center. As the third-ranking civilian at the Pentagon from 1997 to 2001, Gansler was responsible for 
all research and development, acquisition reform, logistics, advance technology, environmental 
security, defense industry, and numerous other security programs.  
Before joining the Clinton Administration, Gansler held a variety of positions in government and the 
private sector, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Material Acquisition), Assistant 
Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Electronics), Executive Vice President at TASC, Vice 
President of ITT, and engineering and management positions with Singer and Raytheon 
Corporations.  
Throughout his career, Gansler has written, published, and taught on subjects related to his work. He 
recently served as the Chair of the Secretary of the Army’s “Commission on Contracting and Program 
Management for Army Expeditionary Forces.”  He is also a member of the National Academy of 
Engineering and a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration. Additionally, he is the 
Glenn L. Martin Institute Fellow of Engineering at the A. James Clarke School of Engineering, an 
Affiliate Faculty member at the Robert H. Smith School of Business, and a Senior Fellow at the 
James MacGregor Burns Academy of Leadership (all at the University of Maryland). For 2003–2004, 
he served as Interim Dean of the School of Public Policy. For 2004–2006, Gansler served as the Vice 
President for Research at the University of Maryland.  
Authors: 
William Lucyshyn is the Director of Research and Senior Research Scholar at the Center for Public 
Policy and Private Enterprise in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland.  In this 
position, he directs research on critical policy issues related to the increasingly complex problems 
associated with improving public sector management and operations, and how government works 
with private enterprise.   
Current projects include modernizing government supply chain management, identifying government 
sourcing and acquisition best practices, and Department of Defense business modernization and 
transformation.  Previously, Lucyshyn served as a program manager and the principal technical 
advisor to the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) on the 
identification, selection, research, development, and prototype production of advanced technology 
projects.   
Prior to joining DARPA, Mr. Lucyshyn completed a 25-year career in the US Air Force.  Lucyshyn 
received his Bachelor Degree in Engineering Science from the City University of New York, and he 
earned his Master’s Degree in Nuclear Engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology.  He 
has authored numerous reports, book chapters, and journal articles.   
Adam Spiers is a Graduate Research Assistant at the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise 
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Executive Summary1 
The Department of Defense (DoD) (as well as other government agencies) has used a 
strategy of contracting with a Lead System Integrator (LSI) when pursuing large System-of-
System (SoS) acquisition programs.  A SoS acquisition program involves the purposeful 
integration of individual weapon systems, along with other task-oriented assets, yielding a sum 
greater than the constituent parts.  A SoS acquisition program will typically integrate legacy 
systems with new weapons platforms; in some cases, however, a SoS program will completely 
design and integrate a new set of systems.   
A SoS is most likely to attain its potential benefits if a sole entity is responsible for 
managing the process.  In order to properly manage the risks of a SoS development, a 
responsible agent is needed to coordinate and manage the complex effort, provide commonality 
across multiple weapons platforms and ensure a common vision for the program.  
Responsibilities can include systems engineering, architecture development, cost estimating, 
element selection, and SoS validation.  This function is known as SoS integration.  Believing 
that it did not have the organic managerial capability to oversee such monumental development 
tasks, the government has employed private contractors, which have come to be known as 
Lead System Integrators (LSIs), to manage the development of selected SoS programs.  Due to 
difficulties faced by the Coast Guard’s Deepwater SoS development, Congress prohibited the 
awarding of new LSI contracts, effective October 1, 2010, to firms that supply systems hardware 
for the SoS or perform an inherently governmental function (Congress, 2008).  Despite this 
prohibition, the SoS integration functions performed by LSIs remain critical if the government 
wishes to pursue SoS engineering programs.   
The impetus for SoS development has two foundations.  First, the military has adopted a 
new fighting doctrine known as Net-centric Warfare (NCW).  NCW attempts to leverage the 
advantage of information integration by distributed “sensors and shooters” to fight more 
effectively.  NCW is characterized by complete battlefield awareness, self-synchronization of 
forces, and the overwhelming and precise application of force.  This doctrine potentially reduces 
individual weapon system requirements but raises new issues such as communication system 
vulnerabilities.  Second, many military assets are approaching the end of their originally 
intended lifespan and require replacement.  This situation is a result of a lack of military 
development during the 1990s, combined with the increase in military requirements since the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11/01.  
System-of-systems acquisition provides the crosslink between the DoD’s change of 
military doctrine and its need to modernize its current forces.  A SoS development provides the 
DoD with the unique ability to simultaneously field the full range of capabilities that it seeks in its 
next generation of military units.  The integrated nature of the SoS, centered around an 
extensive communications network, lays the groundwork for complete implementation of NCW.   
                                                
1 Research conducted at the Center of Public Policy and Private Enterprise at the University of Maryland’s 
School of Public Policy. Research partially sponsored by a grant from the Naval Postgraduate School.  
The full report is available at www.acquisitionresearch.net . 
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System-of-Systems Engineering (SoSE) offers the military two significant potential 
benefits.  First, SoSE enhances the value of the end product by purposely synthesizing the 
attributes of a group of units into something that is greater than the sum of the individual parts.  
Second, SoSE, by taking a holistic view of the project, has the potential to improve development 
decision-making by better valuing overall development tradeoffs.  In a SoS framework, the SoS 
development output is maximized, as opposed to individual assets.  In order to achieve optimal 
SoS performance within affordability constraints, SoSE requires development tradeoffs among 
the assets that comprise a given SoS.   
SoSE differs from traditional engineering in significant ways.  Traditional engineering 
seeks to optimize the performance of a single system, given specific end-requirements.  SoSE 
attempts to develop a certain overall mission capability.  SoS has two unique challenges not 
faced by traditional engineering.  First, a SoS has a theoretically infinite lifespan as elements 
come and go in the SoS as it evolves.  As long as the mission capability is supported, the SoS 
changes to continue to fulfill its role, even as the elements that constitute the SoS can be 
continuously replaced.  Second, a SoS has undefined requirements, within cost, schedule and 
technology constraints.  Without a specified end-point that encapsulates firm performance 
requirements, engineers have difficulty making explicit tradeoffs in functionality.  Traditional 
engineering practices are not adequate to develop a truly integrated SoS.   
DoD faces many challenges that may undermine effective SoS development.  DoD-wide 
challenges include greatly broadened military requirements in response to the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11; impending budget constraints, stemming from the need to increase federal mandatory 
spending programs as the baby boom enters retirement; the inadequate capability and capacity 
of the current acquisition workforce to undertake SoS development programs due, in part, to 
human resource management decisions since the end of the Cold War; and the consolidation of 
the defense industry, which has significantly reduced competition and eliminated many 
independent systems engineering firms (primarily through acquisitions by the weapon systems 
producers).  SoS-specific challenges include: an inconsistent understanding of the term SoSE 
by the acquisition workforce (including the role of cost in systems engineering analyses); the 
lack of a codified approach to SoSE, a function of the newness of the process; the 
interconnected nature of SoS development—which, if not handled properly, could lead to 
systemic failure, as disaster in one portion can have deleterious ripple effects throughout the 
entire SoS; ensuring adequate adaptability, so the SoS is flexible enough to meet future needs 
but provides enough stability to be a base for future design; the scale of development that 
necessitates the simultaneous development of a large number of assets, each of which would 
have traditionally been viewed as a major acquisition program; and, finally, budget instability, 
which is a constant challenge to DoD programs but which SoS development is particularly 
susceptible to.  
The LSI, like a traditional prime contractor, must oversee technological maturity and 
subsystem development, as well as make decisions regarding tradeoffs within the context of the 
entire program.  LSIs, however, have been given broad, government-like authority to execute 
acquisition programs that includes development of individual system requirements, contracting 
for their development and procurement, and coordination of development schedules and efforts.  
The degree of authority and responsibility given to an LSI, however, depends upon the program 
in question.  Regardless of the authority the government delegates to the LSI, the government is 
still responsible for the program and must oversee the actions of the LSI and retain final 
decision authority.   
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Although the government could potentially perform the SoS integration function, its 
acquisition workforce lacks the numbers of personnel with the required skills that this effort 
requires.  Consequently, the government chose to employ LSIs for its two largest SoS 
programs: the Coast Guard’s Deepwater and the Army’s Future Combat Systems.   
Congress has defined two types of LSI contracts.  An LSI with SoS system responsibility 
is a prime contractor that is primarily responsible for developing or producing the SoS, but which 
will subcontract much of the actual work.  In this case, the LSI is responsible for the delivery of 
the completed, integrated system to the government.  An LSI without SoS system responsibility 
is a prime contractor that is delegated government-like authority to perform what are typically 
considered inherently governmental functions.  Although Congress has defined LSI in only two 
ways, the relationship that exists between the government and its chosen LSI can vary 
considerably, depending on how the contract is structured.  
A principal fear stemming from use of an LSI is that the entity infringes upon inherently 
governmental functions.  Critics warn that by awarding LSI contracts, the government avoids its 
primary responsibility without being able to provide adequate oversight of the LSI.  Ultimately, 
they argue, the LSI has a strong incentive to take actions beneficial to the firm at the expense of 
the government’s interests—e.g., regarding make/buy decisions on elements of the system and 
shaping the architecture around the firm’s products.  Proponents of LSI believe the fears of 
critics are either unfounded or can be addressed by proper government oversight. 
This report examines two case studies of LSIs, the Coast Guard’s Integrated Deepwater 
System Project (Deepwater) and the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS), to illustrate the 
challenges and benefits of using LSI by the federal government.  Both programs have faced 
significant development challenges, especially in adapting to new requirements arising from 
post-9/11 legislation.   
The Integrated Deepwater System Program is the Coast Guard’s effort to completely 
modernize its entire service.  The program has faced many challenges, including an increase in 
required capabilities, acceleration of the program, and a natural disaster.  Deepwater has 
experienced significant cost increases and schedule slippages that have led to the cancellation 
of several components.  Due to these problems, the Coast Guard has taken over the role of LSI, 
although the Coast Guard still relies upon the original LSI for support of their program 
management.     
The Future Combat Systems, an Army brigade-modernization program, has also 
experienced cost growth and schedule problems.  In this instance, initial development problems 
were compounded by an acceleration of the delivery schedule and the need to deliver 
incremental improvements to soldiers in the field that were not previously planned.  Although the 
program has experienced some challenges, these are, in general, not attributable to the use of 
an LSI. 
These case studies have produced three key “lessons learned.”  First, although SoS 
integration is widely acknowledged as necessary to pursue SoS development, the presence of 
an LSI is not a cure-all.  The military, lawmakers and industry must limit development programs 
based upon immature technologies in order to avoid these development problems.  Second, 
while the government retained final authority rule over all important decisions, the Coast Guard 
and Army have been criticized for not exercising effective oversight of the LSI.  Third, as 
presented by the FCS case study, it is important for military and industry to establish key 
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shared-interests early in the development process.  The benefit of establishing key shared-
interests should be built upon, however, consideration of resource constraints. 
The authors of the report arrived at the following findings: 
1. The military is committed to SoS development. 
2. SoS engineering and integration is a complex undertaking. 
3. SoS development and integration is still a maturing discipline.   
4. Government does not currently have capability or capacity to perform SoSE.   
5. LSI programs have experienced technical difficulty for a variety of reasons.   
6. Despite retaining final decision authority, the government has not consistently provided 
effective oversight of private LSIs.   
7. The greatest concern regarding the use of LSI is the government’s delegation of 
“inherently governmental functions.”   
8. A potential conflict-of-interests exists for private LSIs.   
9. Unified leadership of the SoS integration affords the best chance of successful 
completion.   
The authors of this report arrived at several conclusions: 
1. The government should continue development of SoS programs that, if developed 
correctly, offer the potential for better value—more capability at equal or lower cost—to 
the military, than do individual procurements.  
2. The government must effectively partner with the private sector to adequately perform 
the LSI function. To perform its responsibilities adequately:  
a. The DoD must provide better oversight and write contracts that are better 
defined. 
b. The DoD should accelerate its efforts to recruit, hire, and retain the required 
human capital required for program oversight (and, when required, program 
management) for the challenging SoS acquisitions.    
c. The government should enforce hardware and software exclusion provisions for 
system-of-system integration contracts.   
3. Congress should modify the prohibition on the use of LSIs to permit either: (1) small-
scale limited programs for LSIs or (2) large-scale programs for LSIs that are willing to 
take hardware and software exclusions.  These pilot programs will help the DoD 
examine and evaluate strategies to fully leverage private-sector capacity while 
ensuring adequate government oversight and avoiding conflict-of-interest concerns. 
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Abstract 
This analysis discuses DoD policy for the use of Performance Incentives and Award-fee 
Contracts during System Development and Demonstration (SDD).  Both a review of the use of 
Performance Incentive Contracts since the 1960s, as well as the current policy required by the 
DoD to develop performance incentives are provided.  A performance incentive should be 
structured such that the contractor receives a profit for improved performance equal to the value 
to the government of the improved performance times the cost-sharing ratio.  This formula will 
motivate a contractor to spend no more than the government’s value to enhance performance.  
If exactly that amount is spent, the loss in profit resulting from increased cost will just equal the 
profit received from enhanced performance.  This project also shows how a similar logic can be 
extended to Award-fee Contracts.  The analysis examines alternative decision-making and 
informational structures to determine the effect on contract outcome when the performance 
incentives are structured in accordance with policy.  In certain situations, more complex 
incentive structures may be required.  However, the informational requirements to properly 
develop these more complex Incentive Contracts may be substantial. 
Introduction 
Recently, the General Accounting Office issued a report in which questions were raised 
about the role of profits in motivating defense contractors (2005). In fact, a RAND 1968 study 
was cited as evidence for this claim (Fisher, 1968).  The GAO report emphasizes that Award 
Fee pools on a particular contract are “rolled-over” from one evaluation period to the next, which 
provides the contractor with additional opportunities to obtain higher awards.  Typically, 
concludes the GAO, the final Award Fees that are received tend to be toward the high end of 
the possible range. 
In light of this report, it is appropriate to review the history of incentive contracting to 
include both the use of objectively measurable performance characteristics and Award-fee 
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Contracts.  We focus on the use of these contractual arrangements when costs are shared 
between the government and the contractor. 
This area has not escaped the notice of the academic community, and recently, a 
number of economists have suggested that the efficiency of the defense procurement process 
could be enhanced by employing new developments from the economics of information. While 
these recommendations have not yet been embraced by the procurement policy community, 
they do represent another area in which economic analysis may contribute to the efficiency of 
the defense sector.  The areas of particular interest to economists include incentive contracting, 
profit policy, source selection, and negotiation (for example, see Leitzel and Tirole (1993) and 
Bower and Dertouzos (1994)). 
Incentive contracting has probably attracted the greatest attention. Incentive contracts 
are primarily employed for the development and production of weapons systems. In the situation 
in which there are only cost incentives in the contract, the defense contractor shares some 
proportion of the contract costs with the government. Contracts, however, may also include 
performance incentives in which the profit received by the contractor varies with the 
performance level of the equipment being developed or procured.   
We begin with a brief discussion of the history of performance incentives from the 
standpoint of usage and policy, and relate these to the new developments in economic analysis.  
Then, we discuss the approach recommended by policy directives since the 1960s. Given this 
policy prescription, we show how predicted contract outcomes depend on the model used to 
describe contractor behavior. 
We then turn to Award-fee Contracts and combine performance incentives with an 
Award Fee.  Award-fee contracts are based on the subjective evaluation of the difficult-to-
measure characteristic of contractor performance.  
Performance Incentives in DoD Contracting and Economics 
The government contracted for its first aircraft with the Wright Brothers in July 1909 at a 
target price of $25,000 and a target aircraft speed of 40 miles per hour. However, for every mile 
per hour over the target, the contractor would receive an additional $2,500; and for every mile 
per hour under the target, the contractor would lose $2,500. The minimum required speed under 
the contract was 36 miles per hour. The speed achieved by the aircraft was 42 miles per hour; 
therefore, a performance incentive award of $5,000 was received in addition to the target price 
of $25,000 (Cook et al., 1967, August, p. 1).  
Interest in performance incentives, however, greatly increased during the 1960s.  The 
DoD Incentive Contracting Guide in 1962 stated:  
Perhaps no other DOD procurement policy offers greater potential rewards than the 
expanded use of performance incentives in developmental contracts. Properly 
conceived and applied, these incentives can do more than any other factor to 
encourage maximum technological progress under a single contractual effort. (p. 30; 
Sherer, 1964, p. 172)  
As a result of this guidance, contracts including performance incentives were widely 
used by the DoD during the 1960s and 1970s. Interestingly, procurement policy for performance 
incentives developed by the Department of Defense and NASA in the 1960s (and still in effect 
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today) is based on the assumption of hidden knowledge possessed by the single contractor, not 
the government.  
This example of adverse selection occurs because the contractor knows the non-
stochastic relationship between performance, q, and contract cost at the time that trade-offs are 
made, say, between cost and reliability, but the government does not.  In this situation, the 
reward received for enhanced performance, ∆q, should equal the contractor's share of contract 
costs, s, times the value to the government of the enhanced performance.  
There is a simple logic behind this performance reward. During the development 
process, the maximum the government is willing to let the contractor spend for enhanced 
performance is the value to the government of the extra performance. The government, 
therefore, is indifferent between such an expenditure and the extra performance achieved.    
Similarly, under this performance-incentive function, if the cost of enhanced performance 
is less than the value of that performance to the government, the contractor's profit would rise; if 
the cost is greater than its value to the government, the contractor's profit would fall. The 
contractor, therefore, is motivated to make the trade-off decisions that are in the interests of the 
government, even though the government does not know the cost to the contractor of the 
performance enhancement.  This approach was taught in DoD-sponsored procurement courses 
as early as 1964.1  
In October 1969, the DoD/NASA Incentive Contracting Guide explained that the above 
method achieves two important objectives, “first, it communicates the Government's objectives 
to the contractor; second, of greater significance, it establishes the contractor's profit in 
direct relationship to the value of combined performance in all areas” (p. 107, emphasis in 
original).  
As the DoD/NASA Incentive Contracting Guide has never been superseded, this policy 
remains in effect today. 
During the 1970s, attention shifted to the determination of the optimal risk-sharing 
relationship between the contractor and the government. It has been established that when the 
performance-incentive function is determined in accordance with policy, and when the 
government doesn't know the cost relationship, the contractor's share of contract costs, s, is the 
parameter that determines the optimal risk-sharing relationship between the contractor and the 
government.2   
However, the early discussions of optimal risk sharing focused on a situation in which 
there was only hidden knowledge, which has also been called subjective uncertainty.  In such 
situations, the contractor is assumed to maximize accounting profit on the contract.   The above 
analysis of risk sharing using the cost-sharing ratio during was also extended to the case of 
objective uncertainty, which occurs when there remains contractor uncertainty at the time the 
performance level is selected. In this situation, the contractor is assumed to maximize the 
expected utility of accounting profit.  This is a different level of uncertainty than that implicit in 
                                                
1 Case materials using this technique were developed by Harbridge House, Inc., in 1964. 
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the policy implications of the DoD/NASA Incentive Contracting Guide. Objective uncertainty 
occurs when the there is cost uncertainty for the contractor (as well as the government) at the 
time the trade-off decisions are made. 
The risk-sharing approach, however, raises an interesting issue. If, as many believe, the 
government is risk neutral while the contractor is risk averse, then under the assumptions of this 
analysis, it is optimal for the government to bear all the risk.  The optimal sharing ratio, s, 
therefore, equals zero. 
In the late 1970s and during the 1980s, economists addressed this issue by explicitly 
introducing the contractor’s unobservable effort level into the objective function of the contractor.  
If the government is the principal, and the contractor is the agent, then the agent’s economic 
profit is assumed to equal contractual profit less the implicit cost of effort.  Typically, the 
contractor is assumed to be either risk neutral or risk averse, and maximizes expected 
economic profit in the former situation and expected utility in the latter.3 
In addition, the contractor's effort was assumed to represent a hidden action that is not 
observed by the government, so that moral hazard is present. To address this problem, 
however, it is necessary for the government to know how this unobservable hidden action 
affects the contractor’s economic profit.  There are numerous other informational requirements, 
which, in total, may prevent this approach from becoming operational. 
In fact, while there were extended discussions of the role factors such as effort and 
extra-contractual considerations play in such contractual relationships, during the late 1960s, 
the only method of addressing this informational issue was through the use of award-fee 
contracts. In award-fee contracts, the contractor receives fees that are, in part, based on a 
subjective assessment of “development efficiency.”  The term development efficiency 
represents the many factors that provide an incentive to the contractor not to maximize 
accounting profit.  The term most frequently used is “effort,” for which there is an implicit cost to 
the contractor that is not part of accounting profit, but which affects the contractor’s decision-
making, and therefore, must be taken into account by the government.  These award-fee 
contracts have remained popular with NASA from the 1960s to the present and recently have 
been used extensively by the Department of Defense. 
DoD Policy Prescription 
We now turn to a discussion  of the method of structuring an incentive contract with the 
performance incentives advocated by the DoD.  To formalize the DoD prescription, let B(q-qT) 
equal the value to the government of the performance level developed relative to some target 
performance level, qT; and let C((q-qT),θ) equal the cost of performance to the contractor, where 
θ is an exogenous variable known to the contractor, but not the government, at the time q is 
selected. The variable θ, therefore, represents the hidden information dimension of the problem.  
The objective of the government is to maximize, by choice of q, net social benefits:  
                                                
3 One of the clearest summaries of the modern approach to incentive contracts is contained in Kreps 
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(1) Maximize B (q-qT) - C ((q-qT),θ) 
The first order condition for this problem is: 
(2) Bq = Cq, 
where the subscript equals the variable with respect to the partial derivative of the 
function.  
Let πA equal the total accounting profit received by the contractor. This total equals 
target profit, πT, plus the performance incentive function, P (q-qT), less the share of costs borne 
by the contractor, s (C-CT), where CT equals target cost. 
If the government sets P (q-qT) equal to sB (q-qT) as specified by procurement policy, 
then the contractor solves, by choice of q:  
(3) Maximize π A = πT + sB(q-qT) -  s[C((q-qT), θ) - CT] 
Equation (2), the first order condition desired by the government, is satisfied when the 
contractor solves this problem; as a result, the objectives of the government and the contractor 
are both satisfied. It is quite interesting that in this profit-maximization formulation, the optimal q 
selected by the government does not depend on s, πT, or CT. 
An important purpose of this analysis, however, is to consider objective functions that 
are more general than Equation (3), in order to determine the qualitative nature of the 
dependence of q on s, and πT under the assumption that the performance incentive function, 
P(q-qT), is structured in accordance with policy. 
First, we consider a situation in which unobserved contractor effort affects the 
contractor's economic profit.  Next, we generalize Problem (3),  augmented to include the 
implicit cost-of-effort function, to allow for contractor uncertainty at the time q is selected. For 
this situation, the contractor maximizes the expected utility of economic profit, and we consider 
both situations in which unobserved effort alternatively affects and does not affect expected 
utility.   Finally, we give recognition to the fact that the government’s program office has a 
significant amount of information about contractor effect.  This information, which may only be 
available during or at the completion of a contract is used to structure a contract which 
combines performance incentives, cost sharing and an award fee.  These contracts have been 
called Cost-plus-incentive-fee/Award-fee (CPIF/AF) contracts with multiple incentives.     
Contractor Accounting, Cost Certainty and Implicit Cost of Effort 
Following the economics of information revolution, economists now routinely assume 
that a contractor (agent) knows more about its own conditions of production and level of effort 
than does the government (principal). 
While the asymmetric information assumption probably does not hold true nearly as 
widely as economists would have one believe, it does have great deal of merit when it comes to 
the myriad trade-off decisions that must be made during weapons system development. Cost-
performance trade-offs must be made by design engineers on a day-to-day basis, and 
government contract administrators—even those who work at the contractor's facility—are 
unlikely to be familiar with these detailed trade-off opportunities that materialize during the 
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contract.  Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that there is hidden information associated 
with the contract that is known to the contractor, but not the government.  The contractor knows 
more about the nature of effort and the effect of effort on implicit cost than the government. 
With respect to the effort level of contractors, however, the asymmetric information 
assumption may be false. The contract administrators and members of the program office staff 
may know as much, if not more, about the effort of contractors than members of the company's 
leadership.  Awarding fees based on a subjective evaluation of the contractor's effort level is 
permitted in the policy directives, and we return to this issue below.  
It is, however, true that is difficult for the government to both quantitatively measure 
effort and properly specify the relationship between effort and economic profit at the time the 
contract is awarded. Therefore, we first explore the implications of the assumption that 
economic profit depends on unobserved effort. 
In the previous section, the variable θ represented exogenous factors affecting cost that 
are unknown to the government but are known to the contractor. In this section, we add the 
contractor's effort level, e, which generates an implicit cost to the contractor.  This variable, like 
θ, is not observed by the government. Unlike θ, however, e is chosen by the contractor. The 
implicit cost of effort is represented by the function h(e), where he > 0.  The implicit cost of effort, 
h(e) is subtracted from the accounting profit identified in Problem (3) to yield economic profit, π. 
The effort level also affects the observable contract cost, so the cost function is now 
expressed as C(q-qT, θ, e). We assume that Ce < 0, so that increased effort reduces contractor's 
cost; and Cqe. < 0, so that the marginal cost of performance decreases with increased effort.   
The problem faced by the contractor is now to choose q and e to so as to solve the 
following problem: 
(4) Maximize π = πT + sB (q-qT) - s[C(q-qT), θ,e) - CT]- h(e). 
The first order conditions for this problem are: 
(5) Bq = Cq, and 
(6) sCe = he. 
While Equation (5) is the government's desired first-order condition with respect to q, the 
effort level selected would not be that desired by the government.   
On the other hand, because h(e) is a social cost, this term should be subtracted from 
Problem (1), and the government's objective is for the contractor to select effort so that Ce = he: 
the marginal cost of increasing effort should equal the marginal implicit cost of effort. Because 
Ce < 0, this effectively states that the marginal benefits of effort should be equated to marginal 
implicit cost.  
This suggests that when effort affects the contracts economic profit, it is no longer 
appropriate for decision-makers to structure the incentive in the manner stipulated simply by:  
P(q-qT) = sB(q-qT). It is important, therefore, to be able to test whether contractor decision-
making is affected by the disutility of effort.  
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It is clear from Equations (5) and (6) that the optimal q does not does not depend on πT 
or CT. However, the sharing rate, s, enters Equation (6), so we must determine how the optimal 
performance level q* depends on s. Setting the total derivatives of Equations (5) and (6) with 
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Because of the second-order conditions, the bordered Hessian, |H| is greater than zero 
under our assumption that Cqe < 0and Ce. <  0,  dq* /ds > 0, as indicated by Equation (7).  We 
can also derive the fact that de*/ds > 0 because the second-order conditions require that  
Bqq - Cqq < 0. 
Therefore, when the performance-incentive function is specified in accordance with 
policy (and the unobserved effort results in contractor disutility), optimal performance, from the 
standpoint of the contractor, increases with the sharing rate. It may be suggestive to say that 
higher cost sharing by the contractor induces greater effort, which reduces the marginal cost of 
performance. Given the specified marginal benefit function, the performance level selected 
increases.  
Contractor Accounting Cost Uncertainty and Implicit Cost of 
Effort  
We turn now to an analysis of contractor decision-making under uncertainty. At the time 
the contractor picks q and e, a random variable y determines the level of cost that actually 
occurs. In other words, the contractor can select a performance and effort level with certainty, 
but the resources that must be applied to achieve the q selected with effort level e are uncertain.  
The contractor's cost function becomes C(q-qT,θ,e,y), where the random variable y has a 
known distribution. We assume Cy >  0 and Cqy > 0, so both total cost and the marginal cost of 
performance increase with the value of y that emerges, when the other arguments of the 
function are held constant. 
It might be helpful to restate the meaning of “θ,” “e,” and “y.”  The variable, θ,  represents 
exogenous factors that are known to the contractor but not the government (hidden information 
or subjective uncertainty); the variable, e,  represents the effort level selected by the contractor 
but unobserved by the government (hidden action); and the variable, y, is a random variable 
representing the uncertain effect of q and e on contractor cost, given that “θ” is known to the 
contractor (objective uncertainty). 
Also, while economic profit, π, continues to be defined in the manner described above, 
the contractor now maximizes the expected utility of economic profits, EU(π), where U is a von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. The contractor, therefore, computes the expected value 
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(9) Maximize W = EU{πT + sB (q-qT) -  s[C(q-qT), θ, y) -CT]– h(e))} 
For this problem, we obtain the following first-order conditions: 
(10) E{U' (.) [sBq - sCq] } = 0 
(11) E{U'(.)[-sCe- he]} = 0, 
where U'(.) equal the partial derivative of U with respect to π.  This partial derivative is 
evaluated at the optimal level of economic profit, π*.  It is important to appreciate that everything 
inside the brackets, {}, is inside the expectation operator. We also use ( ) to represent the 
arguments of a function, and [ ] to contain terms that multiply other terms inside the expectation 
operator. From Problem (9), we see that π* depends directly on s, πT, and CT, which are 
parameters to the contractor but variables determined by the government. 
Unfortunately, we have been unable to sign dq*/ds, or dq*/dπT, or dq*/dCT when the 
general Problem (9) applies. We can however, see from the objective function that  dq*/dCT = 
dq*/dπT.  A dollar of target profit and the contractor's share of target cost are perfect substitutes 
in the calculation of economic profit. To proceed further, we simplify Problem (9) by assuming 
that there is no implicit cost associated with effort—i.e., h(e) = 0. 
Contractor Cost Uncertainty without Implicit Cost of Effort 
The contractor's problem is to compute the expected value of utility over y and choose q 
to solve: 
(12) Maximize W =  EU{πT + sB (q-qT) -  s[C(q-qT), θ, y) - CT] )}, 
yielding the single first-order condition: 
(13) E(U'(.)[sBq -sCq] ) = 0. 
Equation (13) differs from Equation (10) because now economic profit does not depend 
on the effort of the contractor.  With a single first-order condition, we can use the rule for taking 
the derivative of an implicit function to calculate the comparative statics derivatives:  
(14a) dq*/ds = -Wqs/Wqq 
(14b) dq*/dCT = - WπT/Wqq 
(14c) dq*/dCT = -WqcT/Wqq, 
where the second-order condition ensures that Wqq < 0. 
Tackling Equation (14a) first, we obtain 
(15)  Wqs = E{U' (.) [Bq  - Cq] }+ E{U" (.) [Bq- Cq][B – C +CT]} 
The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (15) equals zero because of the first-
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Turning to Equation (14b), we obtain 
(16)  WqπT = E{U" (.) [Bq - Cq] }. 
To sign WqsT, we use Pratt' s absolute measure of risk aversion, r, where 
(17) r(.) =  -U" (,)/U(,) 
Substituting for U"(.), using Equation (17) we obtain 
(18)  WqπT = -E{r(.)U'(.) [Bq- Cq] }. 
If r is constant, then Equation (18) reduces to the first-order condition and WqπT = 0, 
implying that dq*/dπT = 0. 
Similarly, 
(19)  WqcT  = -sE{r(.)U'(•) [Bq - Cq] }. 
Under constant absolute risk aversion, dq*/dCT = sdq*/dπT.  Otherwise, the sign of  
dq*/dCT is indeterminate.  
Award Fees and Performance Incentives with Observable Effort 
Thus far, we have focused on the implications of employing government policy when the 
objective function of contractors is more complex than the basic policy assumes.  We have not 
presented the optimal incentive structures that might be employed in these situations.  The 
optimal incentive structure has only been provided for the model in which the contractor 
maximizes contract profit, and at the time cost versus performance trade-offs are made, the 
contractor has no uncertainty associated with the nature of these trade-offs.  The contractor is 
much better informed about these trade-offs than the members of the program office.  We will 
continue to employ this model, which will be augmented with an Award-fee Incentive.  Award-
fee Incentives are based on a subjective evaluation of some aspect of the contractor’s behavior 
that it is difficult to measure.  While we will continue to employ the term effort, the performance 
characteristic being evaluated should be viewed more broadly.  For example, it might be some 
characteristic of the efficiency with which engineering development is conducted. 
In this part of the analysis, we assume that contractors maximize economic profit, π, 
equal to accounting profit, πA, minus the implicit cost (or disutility) of effort, h(e).  Therefore, the 
contractor maximizes economic profit: π  =  πA - h(e). 
We now assume that government personnel in the program office and those who work in 
the contractor’s plant possess a great deal of information about the contractor’s effort and the 
disutility of this effort.  We assume, therefore, that the government has a firm understanding of 
the function, h(e), by the time the Award Fee is granted.  Furthermore, we view these implicit 
costs as social costs that the government must take into account.  
However, we continue to assume that there is an observation horizon below which the 
government does not have a great deal of information about the contractor’s behavior.  For 
example, we continue to assume that detailed trade-off information available to the contractor’s 
engineers is not known. 
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In contrast to Equation (1), the government now selects q and the now-observable e to 
solve the following problem: 
(20) Maximize B(q-qT) - C((q-qT, e ),θ) – h(e). 
The government’s first-order conditions for the Award-fee Contract follow: 
(21a) Bq = Cq 
(21b) -Ce =  he 
The contractor is given a performance incentive in the form P(q - qT), and the cost-
sharing ratio equals s.  In addition, the contractor is now given an Award Fee in the form A(e), 
where (as indicated) effort is  measurable by the government.  To maximize economic profit, the 
contractor selects q and e to solve the following problem: 
(22) Max   π = πT + P(q - qT) – s(C (q-qT, e ) - CT) + A(e) – h(e), 
and the following first-order conditions are obtained: 
(23a) Pq = sCq 
(23b) Ae – sCe = he 
With respect to q, the same condition of contractor cost certainty at the time of cost-
performance trade-offs that applies in the performance-incentive model continues to hold.  
Comparing Equations (21a) and (23a), we see that the performance incentive should be set so 
sBq = Pq.  Again, the extra reward for additional performance provided should equal the 
contractor’s share of the benefits to the government from the additional performance.  Then, the 
contractor will be motivated to spend no more than sBq for the associated incremental 
improvement in performance.  By spending this amount, the contractor will reduce economic 
profit by sCq, and both the government and the contractor will break even. If expenditure less 
than this can achieve the additional performance, both the government and the contractor are 
better off. 
If we compare Equations (21b) and (23b), we see that the following condition holds: 
(24) Ae = (1 – s)he 
The incremental award fee should equal the government’s share of the incremental cost 
of effort.  Equation (21b) shows that the contractor is compensated for the reduction in cost that 
results from additional effort.  Therefore, the remaining compensation required is shown in 
Equation (24).  One obtains the government’s desired result shown in Equation (21b).   
The achievement of this condition will not be affected by a change in the cost-sharing 
ratio.  As this ratio changes, Equation (24) indicates that the structure of the Award Fee will 
change correspondingly.    
Nor are any of the first-order conditions affected by πT or CT.  The objectives of the 




==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå======== - 20 - 
=
=
Comparative Statics Summary  
It is helpful to summarize the summary of our findings for the various models addressed.  
Models A through F assume that the contract is structured based on existing policy, and Model 
F addresses a model that is employs both performance incentives and Award Fees.  
MODEL    CONTRACTOR CHARACTERISTICS  
    A          Cost certainty during trade-offs and no implicit effort cost 
    B          Cost certainty and unobservable effort cost 
    C          Cost uncertainty and unobservable effort cost 
    D          Cost uncertainty and no implicit effort cost 
    E          Cost uncertainty, constant absolute risk aversion, and no implicit effort cost 
    F          Cost certainty during trade-offs and observable effort and effort cost 
For these models, we examined the comparative static derivatives: dq*/ds, dq*/dπT, 
dq*/dCT.  The following table summarizes the findings: 
MODEL/SIGNS  dq*/ds  dq*/dπT  dq*/CT 
    A 0 0 0 
    B +  0 0 
    C ? ? ? (= sdq*/dπT) 
    D ? ? ? (= sdq*/ dπT) 
    E ? 0 0 
    F 0 0 0 
While many of the derivative signs remain ambiguous, several results are obtained. We 
turn now to the informational requirements associated with each of the models discussed.  
Conclusions 
This analysis has focused on the relationship between the DoD policy prescription in the 
use of performance incentives and the decision-making process of the government and 
contractor.  The policy rule discussed above—that states that a performance incentive fee 
should equal the contractor’s cost-sharing ratio times the value to the government of the 
enhanced performance—is applicable when cost uncertainty is eliminated at the time the 
contractor chooses the cost versus performance trade-offs and there is no implicit cost of effort 
(Model A).  If there is an implicit cost associated with effort, and this contractor behavior is 
observed by the government, then an Award Fee can be structured that meets the objectives of 
the government (Model F). 
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Other informational situations may result in behavior that does not meet the 
government’s objectives.  While optimal incentive contracts can be constructed for these 
alternative situations (Models B through E), the information requirements may be quite 
demanding and the resulting incentive arrangements quite complex. 
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Incentive Arrangements for Space Acquisitions 
Presenter: James Gill 
Executive Summary 
Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy position of the US Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the Federal Government. 
Space Systems acquisition has experienced a paradigm shift in its approach 
toward the use of contract incentives. This shift in the use of incentives is a matter of 
tremendous importance to those who develop and buy major Space Systems, but, more 
importantly, to the industry partners that deal with the Space & Missile Systems Center. 
This shift began under the Bush Administration and, based upon initial signs, may 
accelerate under the Obama Administration. 
What are some of these changes, and what will be the impact of revising the 
government’s business strategy? In order to get some perspective on the reasons for 
the changes, it is necessary to understand the history of the use of incentives in the 
acquisition of major systems by the DoD. 
How does the DoD incentivize contractors to perform this important job?  What 
do they use to motivate performance, and how do they monitor that performance to 
ensure that this fee is truly earned?  
In the acquisition business, we face these questions on almost a daily basis.  We 
get them from the media.  We get them from the Congress.  We get them from the 
senior leadership within the Executive Branch, right up to and including the President of 
the United States. 
Why can’t we get answers to these questions? To some degree, it is because 
incentives are a part of human nature, and their effectiveness is somewhat relative. We 
use them in daily life to varying degrees of success. Would your son or daughter do 
their homework every night if you provided no incentive?  What form of incentive works 
more effectively: positive or negative? How do we know?  Some would work, some 
would not.  It seems intuitive that people respond to stimuli, both in positive and 
negative forms. 
If that is the case, then why is there even a question as to whether incentives 
motivate performance?  Perhaps the more important question goes to the effectiveness 
of the incentive applied. If we read the GAO Report entitled DOD Has Paid Billions in 
Award and Incentive Fees Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes (2005, December), the 
GAO does not believe the Department of Defense uses incentive arrangements very 
effectively.    
The discussion must depend upon the definition of effectiveness.  There is a 
difference as to the relative importance of cost, schedule and technical elements of 
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incentive arrangements to those assessing the performance of the Program Offices that 
are responsible for the acquisition of these systems.  Program Managers have tended 
to view technical performance and mission success as the more important criteria, while 
Congress looks at cost and schedule for validation on a program’s success or failure. 
On the other hand, the user wants it when he needs it and wants it to work. 
The beauty of the DoD acquisition process is both in its simplicity and its 
complexity. The President has articulated his vision of the federal contracting process 
and has stated his goals, which are consistent with the regulatory directions found in the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation.  There should be a preference for fixed-price contracts; 
cost overruns are never a good thing, and profit should be tied in some manner to 
successful outcomes. 
The simplicity of those thoughts articulated in his Executive Order (2009) 
becomes complicated in their application to major defense programs—especially major 
space systems development, which has enormous complexity and technical challenges. 
Many of these systems require pushing the state-of-the-art well beyond previous 
capabilities and into areas that have not been attempted in the past. 
Why has this issue become so important? To some extent, it has always been a 
matter of pressing urgency, but recent economic circumstances have made our ability to 
get more “bang for the buck” a national emergency. One way to add to the capabilities 
of the warfighters, while reducing the dollars required supporting them, is to more 
effectively manage the money expended in the procurement of major systems. This 
may be accomplished through a more effective use of incentive techniques. 
The GAO Report (2005, December) focused attention on the problems that the 
DoD has had in using award and incentive fees in the development and production of 
major systems. It was highly critical of the use of award and incentive arrangements and 
recommended a number of changes to the use of award-fee contracts. 
This Report was followed by a number of policy directives issued from the OSD, 
the Secretary of the Air Force, Major Air Force Commands and respective Buying 
Organizations and Program Offices. This article will focus on the impact that the GAO 
2005 Report has had on the way that the Air Force, and most specifically, the Space & 
Missile Systems Center, has addressed contracting concerns. 
After receiving direction to implement several of the recommendations of the 
GAO Report from AT&L and SAF, the PEO for Space (General Hamel) issued a policy 
directive implementing a series of changes and mandating the development of an 
Incentives Guide.  A follow-on initiative by the SMC Commander was that a course on 
incentives would be created to train the SMC workforce on the theory of Incentive 
Contracting. 
In the Air Force, there had been a preference for the use of award-fee contracts 
for a period of 15-20 years. Acquisition Plans would not be approved without the use of 
award fee as the primary incentive arrangement.  This dependency upon award fee was 
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predicated upon two basic theories: first, that fee has a significant ability to influence 
performance on the part of a contractor, and second, that award fee can be used to 
leverage performance immediately. The decision of the Fee Determining Official was 
not initially deemed to be subject to the “Disputes” remedies, so it gave significant 
leverage to the Program Manager, as Fee Determining Official, over the behavior and 
performance of the contractor. 
Why was this so important?  Well, in conjunction with the normal budgetary 
turbulence associated with the acquisition of a program worth billions of dollars, the era 
of acquisition reform had turned over responsibility for development to the contractors, 
often through the use of an approach known as Total System Performance (or Program) 
Responsibility (TSPR).  TSPR was a natural outgrowth of several factors, not the least 
of which was the “Peace Dividend” and the resultant reduction in the DoD workforce. In 
order to save dollars, the concept of TSPR allowed the government to eliminate many of 
the positions that were linked to the “Oversight” of contractor performance.  It also 
eliminated the need for many of the “overly demanding” specifications and standards 
that industry had suggested for many years were not necessary and were overly 
burdensome. 
The concept of “Insight not Oversight” was a mantra that was repeated almost as 
a solution to all of the problems that were associated with the development of major 
DoD systems.  Unfortunately, it became apparent that without this oversight, many of 
the processes that had contributed to the technical successes were no longer utilized. 
The initial reports on systems such as SBIRS were overly optimistic and did not 
recognize the problems that were being experienced until hundreds of millions of 
overrun dollars had been incurred. 
The incentive structure (award fee) was designed to give the government the 
opportunity to monitor performance and to provide direction, especially to those 
programs experiencing cost, schedule and technical problems.  The Award Fee Review 
Board would evaluate performance against the Award Fee Plan and distribute each 
award fee based upon the contractor’s performance.  The GAO Report (2005, 
December) indicated that this approach did not always result in successful acquisition 
outcomes as anticipated. 
Accordingly, under a “Back to the Basics” approach, there has been a move 
away from the CPAF paradigm. The shift in approach has taken SMC to a slightly 
different strategy.  There is now an emphasis upon ensuring successful outcomes 
though the use of more mission-success initiatives and of more objective criteria both in 
CPIF arrangements and when appropriate, within the Award Fee itself. 
To facilitate this shift, the Incentive Guide was published March 2007, and the 
first Incentives course was held in November 2008.  The basics of incentive contracting 
has not changed; the emphasis on utilizing the correct strategy for each acquisition is 
now a mandatory requirement for all Acquisition Strategy Plans.  Leadership now 
requires a cogent use of a number of incentive techniques when managers are 
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formulating the strategy for the development of major systems.  File documentation 
reflects the degree of analysis that was used in formulating the incentives approach. 
So what is the change? The change will most likely be one of emphasis.  This 
emphasis has manifested itself in several ways, the first of which highlights the nature of 
the relationship between the government and the contractor. Since the onset of the 
Acquisition Reform period, the concept of teaming has been the norm.  The Integrated 
Program Team demonstrates the concept as a practice, with the members of the team 
working toward a common end: delivery of the system. 
The focus on Incentive arrangements is now one of accountability and outcome-
based arrangements.  How will this translate into contract language?  It is likely there 
will be a shift in the payment of incentives; they may become more back-loaded, giving 
the government the opportunity to see what the outcome will be prior to payment of 
much of the fee.  A second possibility would be a form of payback in which fee already 
paid will be tied to the eventual successful demonstration of the program.  This 
approach has been used in the past, most notably by NASA to varying degrees of 
success.  It does cause some accounting issues for contractors in the manner in which 
they are able to book profit. 
Other areas that are under consideration include the use of negative incentives.  
These may be used to offset positive incentives such as on-orbit satellite incentives.  
We have used these in the past, and the results have been mixed.  Most of the satellite 
systems have exceeded their life expectancy, but that begs the question as to how 
reasonable were the initial requirements against which the incentives were based? 
The most apparent consequence of the shift in policy is that there will be some 
difficulty in getting approval for the use of CPAF-type arrangements with subjective 
criteria.  This, in itself, is not a bad thing.  It is reasonable to challenge any approach 
that does not use a firm-fixed-price type of contract. The FAR requires it.  In the arena 
of major space systems, there can be a broad spectrum of contract types and incentives 
that should be considered before deciding upon a specific type. 
These include the cost-plus-award-fee type of contract. It may certainly be 
reasonable to advocate this type of arrangement for the development of high-risk/ high-
reward type of programs.  The supporting rationale should stand up to close scrutiny by 
reviewing bodies.   In some cases, we have been able to find more objective criteria that 
can be used to show that performance has been accomplished; such data contribute to 
supporting the desire for outcome-based incentive expectations. 
There has also been a shift in the approach to the development process in two 
ways: first, a return to the basics—including a more vibrant systems engineering 
process, a more diligent cost-estimating approach and more oversight on the contractor.  
In conjunction with these changes, we will be tying the earning of fee to cost, schedule 
and performance criteria, in part through a more robust earned value system. One fault 
in the acquisition reform process is the lack of visibility into performance that had been 
available to the government through the Cost Schedule Control System Criteria 
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(CSCSC) prior to the reform period.  Earned Value is a high-emphasis program for 
tracking contractor performance, and incentives may be tied more closely to this system 
in the future.  The caveat to this approach is the potential for gaming by the contractor, 
a fix for which could be the payback mentioned earlier. 
Another initiative that has been implemented is the use of Block upgrades.  This 
is a form of evolutionary acquisition in which higher-risk technology is not incorporated 
into the system until it has been demonstrated through the use of risk-reduction efforts 
phased into the system in later iterations.  This may impact incentives, as it should 
reduce the program risk from a technical standpoint and allow for better cost and 
schedule predictability.  This reduced risk should allow for a high confidence in 
predicting contract parameters and may allow for different incentive structures. 
So what else lies ahead for contract incentives?  It seems likely that more 
accountability will be incorporated into new incentive arrangements. There will be some 
pressure to use more fixed-price arrangements.  The use of negative incentives will be 
more prevalent.  Consistent with recent legislation, there will be a push to define what 
constitutes minimum performance against which no fee will be earned.  If award fee is 
used, objective criteria should be developed.  Performance-based work statements 
should help define the criteria against which fee may be evaluated and paid. 
This brings about a question as to incentives for a service-type activity. There 
has been a great deal written concerning the appropriate use of incentives (most 
notably contract type) for major systems.  There has been less written with regard to the 
use of incentives for service-type effort.  Space systems have historically been oriented 
toward supply type of deliverable end-items.  We launched space vehicles that were 
delivered as hardware (Atlas, Titan, and Delta) and accepted delivery of these rockets.  
Now, we are launching via service-type contracts, buying a delivery of a satellite into an 
orbit. 
As the DoD shifts from supplies to services, it becomes even more important to 
define incentives for these services.  We have found that future business opportunities 
are at least as important as fee to these types of arrangements. 
But the key question is how will the new Administration put its stamp on the 
incentives process?  As the new leadership assumes its role, we are certain to find out 
more, but it is safe to bet that there will be some change in the near future.  The 
fundamental philosophy will remain the same: a quality product, delivered on time, for a 
reasonable profit.  The devil will be in the details. 
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Abstract 
“Other Transactions” (OT) Authority permits a form of contracting for research, 
development and conducting prototype projects which is an alternative to military contracting 
under the Defense Acquisition Regulations and related statutes and regulations. This research 
shows that OT contracting can produce results better, more cheaply and more quickly than 
contracting under FAR. Moreover OT contracting has proved to be attractive to commercial 
firms that traditionally have spurned DoD R&D business and it has the potential to greatly 
expand the industrial base available to DoD. OT contracting has been limited by a number of 
factors. DoD acquisition personnel are generally poorly equipped to engage in free form OT 
contracting. OTs have also been restricted by a broad misperception of their potential and risks 
involved. There has been a tendency to restrict OTs to a niche role and to impose restrictions by 
regulation and statute. DoD could benefit greatly by expanding its use of OTs and recognizing 
them as an equal alternative to traditional contracting.   
Introduction 
Depending on who is doing the looking, a view of today’s defense acquisition landscape 
might engender a variety of reactions. Some like Dr. Pangloss in Voltaire’s Candide might see a 
system that, despite some imperfections, is the “best of all possible worlds.” Others might see a 
cumbersome, arcane, virtually irrational system and ask “why?” Yet others foresee that with 
strong leadership, changes in culture, a “can-do attitude,” and relatively minor changes in laws 
and regulations, a much improved system could be established. They ask “why not?”  
The “best of all possible worlds” view asserts that the defense acquisition system has 
resulted in the United States military operating world-class weapons systems in virtually every 
category. How can you argue with that, they challenge. The counter argument is that defense 
systems cost too much, take too long, and though technically sophisticated, often do not 
actually meet the needs of the current operating environment. Moreover, US adversaries access 
commercially available technologies and incorporate them into makeshift weapons, and we are 
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hard pressed to keep up with rapidly changing threat environments. In the “why not” category is 
the argument that the US knows the weaknesses of the defense acquisition system. The 
weaknesses have been repeatedly studied over the decades, and they have resisted numerous 
reform attempts. It is clear that leadership and vision, culture change, getting rid of the 
deadwood (both unnecessary regulation and business as usual “just say no” personnel), and 
learning and incorporating the skills needed in the globalized, commercial market-place are the 
essentials to creating an acquisition system that meets 21st Century needs. 
This research explores whether an alternative method of contracting available to the 
DoD (“Other Transactions”) can be instrumental in answering why not have a rational 
acquisition system that leads to culture change and accesses a globalized, commercial market 
in order to satisfy defense needs. Can “other transactions” attract commercial companies (“non-
traditional contractors”) to participate in defense programs either on their own or in collaboration 
with traditional defense contractors? What are the obstacles to achieving that result? Will 
achieving that result solve significant problems of the defense acquisition process? Are there 
additional benefits from “other transactions” such as integrating the innovation of commercial 
firms with the experience of defense primes in major systems acquisitions? 
Today’s Challenges: Innovation and the Rapid Transition of 
Technology to Defense Capabilities 
The Response to the Current Threat Environment 
In the first decade of the 21st Century, the USS Cole was attacked in a foreign port; the 
United States was attacked on its own soil and was engaged in hot wars that evolved into 
counter-insurgency/nation-building operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and responded to a 
variety of other contingencies. The national security challenges of the period looked very 
different than those America faced in the Cold War or early post-Cold War period. The force 
structure, training and equipping of the US military all had to change to meet these new 
conditions.   
The acquisition system was challenged by several new trends. One was the increased 
presence of civilian contractors going in “harm’s way” to provide essential support to deployed 
military forces. Another was the prevalence of rapidly developing so-called asymmetrical 
threats. In Iraq, insurgents accessed readily available abandoned or imported munitions and 
combined with commercially available technologies created improvised explosive devices (IED). 
IEDs became characteristic of the conflict in Iraq, inflicting many American casualties and 
wrecking unarmored or lightly armored vehicles. A variety of suicide bombing techniques 
required new ways to ensure the security of military personnel and installations. The possibility 
of cyber-attacks on increasingly net-centric operations constantly looms as a potential 
catastrophic threat. Challenges such as understanding “human terrain” and battlefield forensics 
require skill sets and technology that may not be the strong suit of either military or defense 
industry professionals.   
How did the Department of Defense acquisition system react to these new challenges? It 
inched away from business-as-usual and extemporized. The IED threat was met by the creation 
of Joint IED Defeat Organization and a Joint IED Defeat Fund (more than $4 billion in FY 2008). 
In addition to organizations previously established to rapidly demonstrate and transition new 
capabilities (e.g., Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations and Joint Technology 
Demonstrations within USD for AT&L), new offices, projects and funding lines outside the 
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traditional acquisition process proliferated. A number of these were created within the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD), while others were created within the Military Departments. 
Within OSD, one of these was the Rapid Reaction Technology Office. The military services had 
funding elements (and corresponding program offices) titled Rapid Equipping Soldier Support 
(Army), Rapid Technology Transition (Navy), and Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Program (Air 
Force). By some counts there were two dozen of these “rapid” or “agile” acquisition or transition 
programs. One term applied to these offices and programs (“Heinz 57”) suggested there were 
even more than that. In addition, alternatives to the main requirements process were created 
(e.g., Joint Urgent Operational Needs process and Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell) and budgeting 
alternatives (e.g., JIEDDO transfer account) were created.  
It is not the purpose of this research to assess the effectiveness of the numerous 
rapid/agile acquisition programs that exist as partial alternatives to the formal acquisition 
system. The continued existence of these organizations once supplemental war funding and 
immediate threats in Iraq and Afghanistan diminish is uncertain. The mere existence of so many 
alternative programs is evidence that the traditional system is not deemed to be either rapid or 
agile or able to meet critical needs of troops in combat.     
Globalization and the Commercial World 
Some argue that the western world is in a post-industrial era, an information age. 
Whether that is a proper characterization or not, it is clear that even in what were once called 
third-world countries industrialization and information technology are proceeding apace. 
Thomas Friedman (2005) pointed out that we are living in an increasingly “flat” world. Internet 
access and other forms of communication technologies are on the increase. Even adversaries 
in remote regions can make use of modern technology.  
US adversaries not only have access to information and communications technology. 
They also have access via the commercial market place to products that can become 
asymmetrical military threats. In the fight against IEDs, it was found that some devices 
incorporating simple garage-door opener technology could be adapted to detonate explosives. 
Once simple threats were countered, US adversaries accessed more sophisticated technology. 
Even unmanned aerial vehicles can be purchased commercially. 
Commercial technology is not only a threat but it is an opportunity. Industrial research 
and development involves billions of dollars of investments. Much of it is relevant to defense 
systems. Civil-military integration policy exists in law (USC, 1988). It is one of those policies 
more often honored in the breach than in the observance. The contracting regulations state a 
preference for commercial products and non-developmental items.1 However, when it comes to 
integrating commercial technologies and systems into weapons systems, the DoD has generally 
done a poor job (Defense Science Board, 2009, pp. 9-14). “Commercial” in this sense implies 
the products and technologies of commercial industry in the general industrial base and global 
economy—in contrast to products developed by the defense industry under government 
imposed regulations, standards and processes.    
                                                
1 Federal Acquisition Regulation or FAR (Title 18 Code of Federal Regulations) 12.101(b), policy for 
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The Government Accountability Office has pointed out that the DoD has an opportunity 
to improve its processes of transitioning technology into fielded systems and capabilities by 
learning from the best practices of commercial industry (GAO, 1999). Again, “commercial 
industry” is the broader industrial base (unconstrained by government imposed procurement 
regulations and processes). Commercial industry tends to launch new products only when they 
embody relatively mature technologies. Cycle-times between improved versions of products are 
relatively short, often a few years or even months compared to DoD cycle-times of several 
years.2    
Innovation 
The evolving nature of national security threats and challenges combined with 
globalization and commercialization of high technology products and services means merely 
being good at what the DoD has been good at in the past is no longer good enough. If, like Dr. 
Pangloss, the DoD is comfortable with the acquisition world as it is, it will surely end up between 
a rock and hard place. One aspect of the problem is dealing with an uncertain future in which 
the nature of threats cannot be forecast in advance and in which threats change quickly. This 
requires not only a rapid acquisition process but one where innovation (including innovations in 
products and capabilities not traditional to DoD) takes place. This need for a vibrant “innovation 
cycle” should make the fast cycle-times of commercial industry as well as that industry’s huge 
investments in research and development very attractive to the DoD. Unfortunately, so far the 
DoD has not implemented a truly effective strategy to emulate the commercial sector nor to 
leverage its investments through mutually beneficial collaboration. Secretary of Defense Gates 
has articulated the need to be “more innovative” and “bold” in meeting emerging threats but the 
challenge to actually do it is daunting (Erwin, 2008). 
The System for Acquiring Defense Capabilities 
“Big A” and “Little A” Acquisition 
It is common in speaking of the defense acquisition process to distinguish “Big A” 
acquisition from “Little A” acquisition. The big acquisition process encompasses (1) 
requirements generation primarily exemplified by the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) in the formal process; (2) the budget planning and oversight 
process under the Planning, Programming and Budget Execution (PPBE) process; and (3) the 
contracting process under DoD Instruction 5000.2 and the Federal Acquisition Regulation. The 
third area is “acquisition” in the narrow sense (Little A) a primary focus of which is the actual 
process of buying goods and services (procurement) but also includes testing and other 
functions.  Describing the acquisition system as divided between “Big A” and “Little A” may have 
value but there are many inter-dependencies between processes that fall within one part of the 
                                                
2 It has been argued (by the Packard Commission among others) that the DoD’s unreasonably long 
acquisition cycle is a central problem leading to many other problems (Ward & Quaid, 2006, p. 14). The 
same article points out that the automotive industry reduced its average development cycle-times from 
nearly eight years to less than two years in the thirty years before the turn of the century. During the same 
period DoD development cycle-times rose from as low as five to six years (Air Force and Navy) to eight to 
ten years for all services (p. 16).  
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system and another. Thus, while this research focuses on a contracting method (“other 
transactions”), it should be kept in mind that contracting techniques affect, and are affected by, 
requirements processes and budget processes.    
The Defense Industry 
Before World War II, the defense industry was relatively small. The government had its 
own arsenals and shipyards dedicated to developing and producing weapons. Industrial firms 
also supplied many of the military’s needs, but few of them relied solely or primarily on the 
military as their principal market. During World War II, major industrial firms were mobilized to 
supply the weapons needed by the military. After the war, most of the firms that had been 
converted to defense production returned to their former lines of business. As the post-war 
period chilled into a Cold War, a specialized defense industry began to emerge. It supplied the 
high tech weaponry and technology that was then unique to the military–jet engines, nuclear 
materials, sophisticated electronics, advanced materials, and radar, for example.  
Today, few areas of high technology are unique to the military, and the non-military 
commercial sector invests in research and development and introduces or upgrades innovative 
products rapidly. A comparison of DoD research and development contract awards as reported 
in Federal Contract Reports (and other sources) with industry segment leaders (as identified in 
Fortune magazine) shows that top firms receiving DoD RDT&E awards are not leaders in any 
industry segment except defense and aerospace. Moreover, leaders in high-tech industry 
sectors other than defense and aerospace receive little if any DoD RDT&E funding. They do, 
however, make major investments in R&D. This and other evidence shows that the defense 
industry is segregated from the broader national industrial base (Spreng, 2008).3 This 
segregation is not based on specialized technology needs of the defense industrial base but on 
government-unique business practices imposed on defense companies via the DoD acquisition 
system. This is the reason why the decline in defense spending at the end of the Cold War 
resulted in a consolidation of the defense industry. Defense companies were generally not in a 
position to diversify into commercial markets because they were burdened with government-
imposed business practices that made them non-competitive in the commercial marketplace 
(Gansler, 1995, pp. 23-24; Daly, 1994).  
The DoD recognizes the value of dealing with a broader industrial base and often tries to 
take advantage of existing commercial systems or emerging commercial technologies that can 
be adapted to defense purposes. However, in doing so, the DoD often requires the commercial 
supplier to partner, typically in the subordinate position of subcontractor, with a traditional 
defense contractor familiar with DoD contracting procedures. This approach has resulted in 
some recent high profile failures that have been studied and documented by the Defense 
Science Board (Defense Science Board, 2009). DoD’s imposition of government-unique 
requirements has been demonstrated to add to program costs, while the utility (benefit 
                                                
3 Robert Spreng (former President, Integrated Dual-use Commercial Companies) has conducted and 
published the results of many similar comparisons and other related research since the 1990s. See for 
example, Spreng, R. (1995, February). Commercial firms are conspicuously absent from top defense 
contractors. National Defense, p. 3. 
 =
=
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå======== - 32 - 
=
=
compared to cost) of many government-unique business practices are open to question.4 Many 
of the government-unique requirements are imposed in the contracting process and appear in 
contract specifications or terms and conditions, including those mandated by contracting laws or 
regulations.   
Research Findings—General 
“Other Transactions”—Background 
There is a long history of the military resisting new ideas, concepts and technologies. 
Napoleon’s preference for the smooth bore musket over the rifle, the Navy’s reticence to fund 
the construction of the Monitor, or the years it took the Army to contract with the Wright brothers 
to demonstrate the aeroplane are historical examples. In the latter case, the inflexibility of the 
applicable contracting regulations proved to be part of the problem. A partial fix to the inflexibility 
of the contracting statutes, when applied to research, development and purchases for 
experimental purposes, came with enactment of the Air Corps Act of 1926 and later with 
emergency exceptions to the general procurement laws in place for the duration of World War II. 
A more comprehensive solution came in 1947 with enactment of the Armed Services 
Procurement Act. The promised flexibility of that statute was soon restricted by narrow 
implementing regulations (today embodied in the Federal Acquisition Regulation and its 
supplements) and additional legislation (Nagle, 1992, pp. 468-471). In 1958, additional flexibility 
was sought and resulted in an alternative approach under the Grant Statute. As implemented, 
however, this non-procurement authority was restricted to basic and applied research with 
academic and non-profit research institutions.  
An important milestone was reached in 1958 with enactment of the National Aeronautics 
and Space Act. Section 203 (c) of that statute authorized a variety of contractual actions 
including: “such other transactions as may be necessary.” In addition to utilizing the basic 
contracting laws, NASA used this alternative authority selectively to enter into a variety of 
innovative contractual relationships with the interpretation that the contracting laws did not apply 
to “other transactions” (usually referred to as “Space Act agreements”). The first active 
communications satellite was actually privately owned and developed at no expense to NASA, 
which launched the satellite on a reimbursable basis for AT&T. The technical reports on Telstar 
that the author delivered to NASA looked exactly like technical reports delivered under a 
government procurement contract. The relationship between NASA and AT&T became a model 
for a class of “other transactions” called launch service agreements. Over the years, NASA has 
found many applications for “other transactions” structured as funded, unfunded or reimbursable 
arrangements.  
In the late 1970s, the enactment of the Federal Grant and Cooperative Act distinguished 
purchasing under the basic contracting laws (“procurement”) from grants and cooperative 
agreements (“assistance”). Procurement (purchasing goods and services for the direct benefit 
                                                
4 Lovell et al., (2003). An Overview of Acquisition Reform Cost Savings Estimates, RAND summarizes a 
number of reports estimating the added cost of government-unique requirements at 10% to 50%. A 
Coopers & Librand report (The DoD Regulatory Cost Premium: A Quantitative Assessment, 1994), 
probably the most disciplined in methodology, placed the added cost at 18%. Both the Lovell study and a 
GAO report, Efforts to Reduce the Cost to Manage and Oversee DoD Contracts (GAO/NSAID-96-106), 
indicated that DoD’s acquisition reform attempts had done little to reduce the regulatory cost premium.   
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and use of the government) was regulated by contracting statutes and acquisition regulations. 
Assistance (supporting and stimulating a recipient for a public purpose) was regulated by Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) circulars and certain non-procurement statutes. NASA took 
the position that its “other transactions” constituted arrangements outside both systems. OMB 
concurred. NASA continued to enter into Space Act agreements not subject to the procurement 
laws and regulations, statutes such as the Bayh-Dole Act (patent rights), or the OMB circulars 
covering assistance relationships.  
DoD “Other Transactions” 
In 1989, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) sought and 
received authority to enter into “other transactions” (OTs) to support basic, applied and 
advanced research. This authority could be used when standard procurement contracts and 
grants were not feasible or appropriate. This criterion posed little difficulty considering the 
subject matter of the authority (basic, applied and advanced research), since such activities, 
while mission oriented, are seldom executed for the primary purpose of acquiring goods and 
services but have motives such as the acquisition of knowledge, establishing standards or 
proofs of concept, engendering scientific collaboration and other purposes. Equal cost sharing 
was not a requirement but was to be considered to the extent practicable. This practicability 
standard was not an inhibitor when flexibly applied by DARPA but tended to become applied 
bureaucratically when the authority extended beyond DARPA.  
In 1994, DARPA received additional authority to carry out prototype projects directly 
relevant to weapon systems using “other transactions” which were not subject to cost sharing 
and could be used even if a procurement contract was feasible and appropriate. Unlike the 
original authority which had a dual-use character and was also aimed at expanding the defense 
industrial base the prototype (or “Section 845”) authority was specifically aimed at defense 
contractors and prototyping defense systems. This has been broadly misunderstood and 
subsequently resulted in an amendment in 2000 that required cost sharing or the involvement of 
non-traditional defense contractors (very narrowly defined) before a Section 845 project was 
authorized.5 Section 845 could be used in situations in which a standard procurement contract 
was typically used; it is an alternative to a procurement contract. 
Congress has been inconsistent in its support for “other transactions.” The original 
DARPA authority was, after a trial period, made permanent and expanded to the DoD as a 
whole. Section 845 authority was expanded to the military departments but subsequently 
encumbered with the restrictions noted above. In 2004, Congress again expanded the authority 
by authorizing a non-competitive award of a follow-on production contract after a competitively 
awarded Section 845 prototype project. Section 845 and the follow-on production authority have 
never been made permanent and are subject to sunset provisions. There have been high-level 
endorsements of OTs within the DoD on several occasions, but the “bureaucracy” does not 
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know quite how to deal with them and has written regulations that arguably restrict the potential 
flexibility of OTs.6  
Types of “Other Transactions” 
Under OT authority a variety of contractual arrangements can be structured. Many OTs 
look similar to procurement contracts or research grants with the distinction that certain terms 
and conditions mandated by contracting or assistance regulations are not applicable and in 
those areas mutually beneficial terms and conditions can be negotiated unfettered by “one-size 
fits all” rules. 
This is not a very imaginative use of OT authority, but it is potentially important in 
situations in which the recipient of the OT is a traditional defense contractor familiar with FAR-
based contracting and the primary value of the OT is avoiding flow-down requirements that 
would be unattractive to a potential subcontractor familiar with commercial practice or a venture 
capital-supported start up company to whom FAR-based contracting is either unfamiliar or 
unattractive. 
Beyond the use of OTs outlined in the preceding paragraph, the authority has been used 
in some creative and innovative ways. Forms of competition invented for particular programs or 
a class of programs can be structured unconstrained by contracting statutes and regulations. 
OTs have been used to structure joint funding arrangements where the DoD and industrial firms 
pool their funds to sponsor third parties in research that addresses common problems. 
Innovative systems produced through government research funding that the government is 
unable or unwilling to use as an operational system can be commercialized, and the 
government can gain the benefit of its investment through access to the commercial product 
(and potentially receive payments as a result of successful commercialization). A variety of 
consortia arrangements can be formulated to bring together a sufficient mass and variety of 
intellectual power to address difficult problems. Consortia thus formed need not have a “prime 
contractor” when formed via an OT. Prototype projects can be formed when the industry “team” 
is a true team and leadership of the project changes as it proceeds through various phases and 
when one performer may have the skills necessary to manage a particular phase. Several OT 
consortia have been formed to bring together expert capabilities in particular fields of technology 
(highly energetic materials; robotics; chemical, radiological and biological threats) and have 
been able to respond to emerging threats or opportunities by getting new projects started in 
days rather than weeks, months or years.  
Critics of “Other Transactions” 
It is worth noting that OTs have their critics. The author met with DoD’s senior official for 
procurement and acquisition policy last summer. During the course of that meeting, the official 
stridently and authoritatively asserted that the three most wasteful acquisition programs in the 
Department’s history were Section 845 OT programs, citing C-17, LPD-17 and FCS. Two were 
                                                
6 High-level endorsement—for example former USD (AT&L) Paul Kaminski personally signed an 
innovative OT, and, more recently, John Young heartily endorsed an “Open Business Cell” that among 
other things would specialize in OT contracting. Regulations—the DoD Grants and Agreements 
Regulatory System; and, “Guidelines” for Section 845 agreements issued by the Director, Defense 
Procurement and Acquisition Policy. 
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actually conducted as traditional procurement programs, not OTs. The third, FCS, was a 
troubled program that was initiated as an OT. However, analytical studies of that program 
concluded its problems had nothing to do with being conducted as an OT, and in fact, the 
program benefitted from initially being conducted as an OT. It turns out that the vociferous and 
inaccurate denunciation of OTs witnessed by the author was not an isolated incident. The 
author interviewed a GS-15 former employee of that office who had been brought in to oversee 
OT policy. The employee related that on arrival his supervisor greeted him with diatribe against 
OTs, citing Arsenal Ship as the prime example. That program is included among the case 
studies below. It was a well-executed program that was cancelled for reasons having nothing to 
do with its being conducted as an OT.    
The DoD Inspector General’s office has issued reports on OTs that contain criticisms of 
OTs of varying degrees of substance. Generally these criticisms fail to demonstrate an 
understanding of OTs; and, the essence of the criticism is usually that OTs are not business as 
usual and their use is not justified. The IG reports often contain a comment that the traditional 
system has “served us well.” They never state that there is a financial cost to operating under 
the government-unique rules of the traditional system. They also fail to note the isolation of the 
defense industry caused by government-mandated business practices. Finally, IG criticism 
follows a consistent trend in which the IG has been dubious of acquisition reform in general.7 
One of the most highly publicized critics of OTs was Kenneth F. Boehm, chairman of the 
National Legal and Policy Center who, in March 2005, testified before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee concerning Boeing’s OT agreement in the Army’s Future Combat System 
(FCS) program. Boehm’s testimony was filled with examples of abuse, a litany of statutes from 
which OTs are exempt, and the abuses that could occur. A careful reading of the testimony 
shows that Boehm’s numerous examples of abuse (the Darleen Druyun case included) were not 
specifically related to the FCS OT agreement. In fact Boehm merely cited examples of 
“safeguards” from which an OT might be exempt. Boehm never testified to any connection 
between his examples of abuse and the actual OT agreement. One gets the distinct impression 
from his testimony that Boehm never actually read the OT agreement. If he had conducted an 
intellectually disciplined and forthright inquiry, he would have known that the FCS OT contained 
nearly one hundred FAR clauses, and the issues he raised were more hypothetical than real 
and in the FCS context his testimony was bogus. In contrast, the witness from the Government 
Accountability Office (Paul L. Francis) found problems in the FCS program but did not include 
the OT agreement among them. Moreover, a study of the FCS OT agreement by David R. 
Graham for the Institute for Defense Analyses found a number of benefits flowing from the 
agreement, among which were the ability of Boeing to deal with innovative companies that 
might not have participated in FCS under a procurement contract. 
Most credible research studies of OTs have found multiple benefits of OTs and few if 
any negatives. However, one research paper sponsored by the Naval Postgraduate School did 
find that the version of OTs called Technology Investment Agreements (TIA) had generally 
                                                
7 An example of the DoD IG anti-acquisition reform position is Derek Vander Schaaf, (1995, August 3).  
Debunking myths of acquisition reform.  Prepared testimony before US House of Representatives, Small 
Business Committee. An example of an IG report is DoD. (2001, March 19). Management of the 
commercial operations and support savings initiative (DoD IG, D-2001-081).  
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failed (data to FY2000) to attract the participation of for-profit commercial firms (Tucker, 2002).8 
Subsequent research shows, that to the extent this finding was accurate for the period 
reviewed, it is no longer valid (data to FY2006) (Ablard et al., 2007, pp. 2-15). Moreover the 
finding in the Naval Postgraduate School paper is inconsistent with earlier studies of OTs (prior 
to the use of the TIA terminology).  
In addition to outright criticism, some studies of OTs have noted concerns about OTs 
raised by government personnel. The most commonly identified concerns are government loss 
of intellectual property rights, absence of cost standards, and unavailability of metrics for 
success. These and other concerns remain essentially theoretical, as they have not been 
documented as actual problems by knowledgeable personnel who have participated in the 
execution of OTs. All are issues that can be intelligently dealt with in the negotiation process. 
Research Findings—Case Studies  
Maritime Fire Support Demonstrator (MFSD) 
Originally called Arsenal Ship, the MFSD program was a joint DARPA/Navy Section 845 
prototype project to demonstrate massive precision fire support (up to 500 vertical launch cells) 
as well as a variety of acquisition reform techniques.9 The demonstrator ship was to be capable 
of being converted to a fully operational fleet asset and of becoming the lead ship for a fleet of 
up to five additional ships. Technically, the ship was to have on-board or off-board control via 
Cooperative Engagement Capability; was to demonstrate new approaches to damage control; 
and was to reduce cost of ownership through innovative maintenance and operating procedures 
and an exceedingly small crew size. A Unit Sailaway Price ($550 million for the production 
vessels) was established, and all technical decisions had to be made in the context of both the 
established acquisition cost and projected lifecycle cost. Starting from award of five concept 
development phase agreements in July 1996, the program was on track to have the test article 
in the water, ready for testing, in October 2000 when it was cancelled at the end of 1997. 
According to the Arsenal Ship lessons-learned report,  
[The] process being followed by Arsenal Ship demonstrated a 50% reduction in 
acquisition time for the design portion of the ship compared to the traditional 
approach[…] This was primarily enabled by using an industry led acquisition [approach] 
operating under Section 845 authority, with industry having full trade space and 
responsibility for the design.  
The “price as established” trade-off technique spurred innovation and drove down 
acquisition cost, albeit at some added risk. Summarized findings from the lessons-learned 
report include that an industry-led design competition could be more meaningful than a 
government analysis of alternatives. Industry proved to be fully capable of designing a complex 
                                                
8 Data collected for DoD’s FY 2006 report to Congress on OT’s (Via DD form 2759) showed 91% of 116 
Section 845 OTs had involvement by a total 185 non-traditional contractors (under a very narrow 
definition of non-traditional).  
9 The primary sources for this case study are Hamilton (1997) and the author’s personal knowledge of the 
program and interaction with program participants. Charles Hamilton (RADM., USN, Ret.) reviewed and 
provided comments on this case study. 
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Navy ship. Minimum government direction was a key factor in success. When unique industry 
teaming arrangements are encouraged, adequate time is needed for industry team formation 
and growth (teams with “cradle to grave” capabilities were required). Section 845 permitted “try 
before you buy” for Navy ships with no time lost to full production. 
In light of the foregoing brief summary, one might ask: if Arsenal Ship was so great, why 
was it cancelled? With the death of Chief of Naval Operations ADM Jeremy Boorda early in the 
program, Arsenal Ship lost its chief proponent within the Navy. Arsenal Ship was revolutionary. 
It was (according to Norman Polmar) the first truly new concept in warships since the ballistic 
missile submarine. The potential capabilities of Arsenal Ship competed with the submarine 
navy, which was then seeking to establish new roles, and the aircraft carrier force, which 
believed it had the primary role of providing support to expeditionary ground forces. One can 
speculate that Arsenal Ship was viewed as a threat by some of the Navy’s key submarine and 
air admirals (or merely closely associated with their former nemesis ADM Boorda), as well as a 
number of other vested interests. A relatively small shortfall in one year of Arsenal Ship’s 
funding profile provided an opportunity to terminate the program. More generously, perhaps, the 
Director of DARPA ascribed the failure to correct the funding shortfall to Navy mismanagement 
of the budget process. 
In the wake of the cancellation of Arsenal Ship, it is well to remember that the Navy’s 
Program Executive Officer (Ships), RADM Charles S. Hamilton, stated at this conference a few 
years ago that the Arsenal Ship experience revolutionized the way the Navy thinks about 
warship design and development. In addition, the Arsenal Ship program left many other 
legacies, including a more affordable and more capable Mark 41 Vertical Launch System. Both 
acquisition approaches pioneered with Arsenal Ship and a large amount of technology 
developed under the program found their way into subsequent Navy shipbuilding efforts. 
Despite its cancellation, Arsenal Ship proved to be an excellent value.    
Future Combat System (Early Phases) 
FCS is a major Army modernization program. Following some initial work done by 
DARPA, the Army continued FCS as a Section 845 OT before transitioning it to traditional 
contracting.10 FCS joins an array of manned and unmanned systems connected through a 
common communications network, allowing a flexible and modular response to threats in 
complex environments.  
The FCS OT allowed for fast progress to be made in concept development and enabling 
technologies while a competition to select a lead systems integrator (LSI) was undertaken. Prior 
to selection of the LSI, notable innovation was observed through the efforts of non-traditional 
contractors—especially iRobotics and Austin Information Systems. The OT proved very 
adaptable to program changes that occurred frequently because of tradeoffs and the evolving 
nature of the huge and multifaceted program. The degree of involvement of the Army user 
community was unprecedented. Rapid prototyping and development of manufacturing 
capabilities occurred. Commercial technologies in existence and under development were 
effectively transitioned into the program. FCS is currently transitioning important capabilities to 
ground forces in action in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
                                                
10 Sources for this study include the LMI report (note 17), App. C 12-14; testimony in Senate hearings; 
conversation with a program participant, and GAO and IDA reports referred to in the “Criticism” section of 
this paper and helpful comments by Hon. Claude Bolton, former Assistant Secretary of the Army. 
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A deficiency in this program was a profound need for training of Army acquisition 
personnel unused to the flexibility of Section 845 contracting. Another problem was the LSI 
selected for FCS was Boeing—which was soon being highlighted as a poster-child of corruption 
in the defense industry. The association of Boeing with the Army’s highest profile development 
program and its execution under an OT resulted in bad publicity and an unjustified correlation 
between OTs and unethical conduct by defense contractors. This has had a profound negative 
effect on the perception of OTs.  
Case Study—Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (JUCAS) at DARPA 
DARPA, the Air Force and the Navy combined to develop a system of highly capable 
unmanned combat air vehicles networked through a common operating system.11 These 
vehicles are to penetrate deep into high-threat environments, be survivable and constitute a 
persistent combat capability. The program involved major defense companies, Boeing and 
Northrop, as well as significant roles for non-traditional contractors.  
Cost was reduced in this program because both major contractors organized their efforts 
as IR&D projects (allowed under OTs: government payments off-set IR&D balances), 
eliminating general and administrative expenses; facilities capital and cost of money; fee; and 
reducing labor and material rates by about 15%. In addition Boeing invested about $300 million 
in the effort. Cost was also saved because the streamlined management and change-order 
processes adopted were estimated to reduce schedule by more than a year.  
The flexibility of the OT helped attract non-traditional companies to the project. Some 
were unique, including a supplier of composite materials whose main line of business was 
manufacturing surfboards. In the case of Northrop Grumman non-traditional companies 
provided essential capabilities. The differing nature of the participants and highly innovative 
nature of the project operating at close to the state-of-the-art resulted in adjustments in 
industry’s position on intellectual property matters. The OT could accommodate flexible IP 
arrangements. 
The project was financed through payable milestones, which both improved cash flow 
and focused the project on key technical accomplishments. Milestone payments incentivized 
contractors to achieve observable results at less-than-estimated cost. Milestones were modified 
in the light of experience. This type flexibility would have been difficult to achieve under a FAR 
contract with inflexible contract line item numbers.  
As in FCS, a need for training and culture change was noted, in this case by both 
government and industry personnel. Government personnel tried to regulate in a business-as-
usual mode rather than to collaborate in a manner consistent with the vision of the program’s 
leadership. Unlike FCS, there was inadequate effort devoted to identifying and engaging the 
potential user community. 
In 2005, DARPA was confronted with a problem created by Congress. The original 
JUCAS OTs with Boeing and Northrop were nearing the end of their terms. As a result of an 
amendment to Section 845 in 2000, new Section 845 agreements would require either 1/3 cost 
sharing or an upfront determination that non-traditional contractors (defined in an exceedingly 
                                                
11 Sources for this study include the LMI report (note 17), App. C 1-3; the author’s personal knowledge of 
the program and interactions with both government and industry participants.  
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narrow fashion) would be “significantly” involved in the program. Since cost sharing was unlikely 
and an a priori determination of significant non-traditional involvement could not be made for the 
next phase of the program, DARPA planned to award a traditional procurement contract for that 
phase. The program successfully transitioned from the DARPA joint program office to Air Force 
leadership before that occurred. The subsequent history of the program under the Air Force is 
not part of this case study.    
Chemical, Biological and Radiological Technology Alliance (CBRTA) 
The CBRTA was part of a multifaceted consortium (National Technology Alliance) 
authorized by Congress to inject commercial technologies for security and defense needs.12 It 
consisted of thirteen commercial firms and academic institutions, awarded under an OT 
agreement, with 3M leading the consortium in an administrative capacity. The National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) acted as executive agent and provided the contracting 
support.  
CBRTA afforded the government access to a reservoir of intellectual talent consisting of 
thousands of the best and brightest scientists and engineers employed by the CBRTA-member 
companies and institutions. Projects were initiated as a modification to the basic agreement and 
were in the form of task orders. Because industry could formulate a program plan in response to 
a government need in a matter of days (potentially hours), work could begin under an approved 
plan almost as quickly. Work could be performed by members of the Alliance or subcontracted if 
the requisite expertise existed outside CBRTA companies.  
Administrative costs were funded separately from R&D efforts. Most projects were 
funded as time and materials efforts, while others were either cost-reimbursement or fixed-price 
milestones. The government obtains the leverage of industry investment—which was often five 
or ten times that of the government in many of the technologies supported by CBRTA member 
companies. Project time was shortened due to the reduced need for cost and pricing data, 
elimination of a formal engineering change process, and simplified terms and conditions with 
suppliers—all due to the fact that the OT instrument included these terms and conditions.     
This type of consortium embraces non-traditional participants both as members of the 
consortium and also in the subcontract role. OT allows flexibility in intellectual property and 
freedom from government-unique requirements such as hourly timecard reporting and DCAA 
compliance, which would be absolute nonstarters for many of the companies and scientists 
involved in CBRTA projects.  
The CBRTA operated as a highly successful program for several years. It was a 
potential model that could be applied to many technology areas relevant to DoD needs.  
However, chemical, biological and radiological technology was not a main interest of its 
executing agent, the NGA (CBRTA funding came primarily from agencies other than NGA). A 
supportive NGA director early on was succeeded by a director uninterested in CBRTA. Even 
                                                
12 Sources for this study include Daly et al., CBRTA: Six Years of Operation, (briefing Aug. 2008); the LMI 
report (note 17), App. C 7-8; and, conversations with program participants. Richard Kuyath, counsel, and 
George Sundem, contracting officer, of 3M Company, provided helpful comments on this case study. 
Review and additional comments were provided by Kathleen Harger, former Assistant Deputy 
Undersecretary of Defense (Innovation & Technology Transition). 
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more disheartening to industry and damaging to the previous efficiency of CBRTA was the 
assignment of a new NGA legal counsel in an oversight role who lack a background in OTs to 
oversee CBRTA. Agreement modifications were subjected to legal reviews that took much 
longer than previously. This attitude seemed to infect Agreements Officers responsible for 
administering the OT. Issues between CBRTA and the government that had previously been 
raised and resolved were reopened, and the government (new legal counsel) took a more 
restrictive view than previously held. As of this writing, the CBRTA agreement has expired with 
faint hope that it will be resuscitated. A highly successful program with virtually unlimited 
potential to provide the government with novel solutions has been allowed to lapse.  
Hummingbird Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
The A-160 Hummingbird UAV is a rotor-craft built by Frontier Systems, a small non-
traditional contractor.13 It incorporates revolutionary rotor technology and is intended for 
reconnaissance; surveillance; target acquisition; communications relay; and precision resupply 
missions in autonomous operation. It has long endurance and can fly thousands of feet higher 
than conventional helicopters. Hummingbird has successfully undergone flight tests and is 
under active consideration for use in a number of operational applications. 
The Section 845 OT proved to be very cost-effective. It enabled dealing with the small 
commercial firm and, particularly, held down cost in the early R&D phase. Cost savings 
additionally accrued through time savings in both the pre- and post-award phases and as a 
result of the streamlined changes process. This work would not have occurred under a FAR-
based contract. Frontier Systems would not have accepted such a contract. 
Particularly important in this case was flexibility in intellectual property, especially patent 
rights, as Frontier has patented inventions related to its revolutionary rotor technology. The 
flexibility of an OT to accommodate the needs of a performer with specific needs or 
revolutionary ideas of importance to DoD was demonstrated in this project.  
This was a case where an OT was essential to gain access to a technology controlled by 
a small, non-traditional contractor. An acquisition team well-schooled in OT contracting was 
critical to successfully dealing with this contractor. Business-as-usual or on-the-job training 
would not have worked in this case. This may be a case where the follow-on production 
authority provided by Congress in 2004 (or a modified version of it) would prove particularly 
useful.   
Dual-use and Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiative (COSSI) 
The previous case studies have highlighted individual Section 845 OT programs.14 Major 
successes have also been achieved in broad programs involving hundreds of agreements, 
including DoD’s dual-use technology programs (originally the DARPA-led Technology 
                                                
13 Based on LMI report (note 17), App. C 5-7. 
14 Based on Gray et al. (1996). Dual use research project report. Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for 
Policy Studies; LMI report (note 17), App. C 9-11; the author’s personal involvement in these programs 
and conversations with program participants; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (and former 
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Reinvestment Project) and COSSI. The dual-use programs used the original (10 USC 2371) OT 
authority, and COSSI was executed using a combination of the original authority and Section 
845 OT agreements. The interesting thing about both the dual-use programs and COSSI is that 
despite achieving a record of success, both have been allowed to fade away. Although vestiges 
of both programs persist, neither exists as a coherent entity. When programs are successfully 
piloted at the Office of Secretary of Defense level, there is no guarantee of their 
institutionalization or continued existence when they are transitioned to the military departments. 
Business-as-usual attitudes and the budget priorities of the individual services seem to trump 
innovative approaches, opening the technology base to new entrants, and cost savings. 
DARPA’s success in promoting dual-use technologies (those with both commercial and 
military applications) through cost-shared collaborations with commercial firms using OT 
contracting was such that it led a distinguished panel under retired Marine General Al Gray to 
recommend the dual-use approach as the DoD’s primary means of undertaking new technology 
developments. Other reports also found that these OT programs were highly successful. 
COSSI was a program started in 1997 that aimed to reduce operations and support 
costs by replacing (often expensive and outdated) military-specific components in DoD systems 
with components adapted from commercial products or technology. The program was premised 
on the DoD funding the modification, testing and adaptation of the commercial component for 
military needs on a cost-shared basis, while the commercial partner gained the promise of a 
fixed-price procurement if the savings was successfully demonstrated. Since OT production 
authority did not exist, COSSI was designed to use FAR Part 12 commercial item contracts for 
the follow-on procurement. COSSI was successful in the sense that documented OS cost 
savings exceeding the government’s R&D investment were realized, and eventually the 
program attracted considerable participation by non-traditional firms. However, the DoD’s 
credibility suffered when, contrary to program guidelines, it refused to grant a preferred position 
to the cost-shared developer and either went out competitively to procure the improved 
component (often from a traditional defense contractor) or opted not to procure the improved 
item despite demonstrated cost savings. Eventually, COSSI died as a major program but 
episodically serves as a model that is put into use by various DoD components.  
In both the dual-use programs and COSSI, flexibility in intellectual property rights and 
streamlined business practices were important to attracting commercial firms. These programs 
were competitive in nature, but the competitions held were more informal than competitions 
under Part 15 of the FAR and generally resembled the broad agency announcements.   
Research Findings—Surveys and Data Collection 
Data Sources 
This part of the report summarizes and analyzes data collected via interviews, surveys, 
and other means. It includes research undertaken by a five-person team from the Logistics 
Management Institute led by John Ablard. This team included three members with many years 
of experience in DoD acquisition and assistance, including significant experience with OTs 
(aided by researchers experienced in survey techniques and statistical analysis). This team 
conducted interviews with twenty-six individuals representing industry and government and 
including both executives and program personnel. All persons interviewed had recent (as of 
2007) experience with OTs. In addition, the responses to thirty questionnaires sent to 
government program managers and agreements officers were recorded and analyzed. In total, 
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the responses to the questionnaire represented experience on forty-six OT programs with some 
individuals having experience on more than one program. There was overlapping coverage by 
more than one respondent on some programs. The data collected by the LMI research team 
has been made available to other researchers, but as of this writing has not been formally 
released.  
Another compilation of data summarized below was collected by Robert Spreng—the 
recently retired president of an industry association (Integrated Dual-Use Commercial 
Companies or IDCC) consisting of large commercial firms with significant R&D budgets that 
wish to collaborate with the DoD on R&D but which do not want to be subjected to onerous 
government-imposed requirements that are inconsistent with their normal business practices. 
Speng’s data comes from two sources. Spreng has accessed and analyzed: (1) publically 
available information (his methodology is described in published articles cited in the footnotes) 
and (2) data from surveys of IDCC-member companies.  
A final Section includes insights from interviews and surveys personally conducted by 
the author. This is supplemented by notable data uncovered during the author’s literature review 
that is not reported elsewhere in this paper.  
LMI Research Data 
The top-level findings of the LMI research team were: (1) Persons with experience in 
using prototype (Section 845) and research OTs (TIA’s) viewed them positively; (2) effective use 
of OTs offers benefits to R&D program managers as well as contracting officers; among the 
benefits attributed to prototype OTs are streamlining, flexibility, performance improvements, 
schedule reductions, and cost reductions; (3) use of OTs has given the DoD access to for-profit 
companies that traditionally do not do R&D business with the federal government; these entities’ 
participation either alone or in consortia has been of significant value; (4) use of OTs is most 
effective in research and prototyping efforts or in certain programs developing manufacturing 
technology; and, (5) understanding and acceptance of OTs within the DoD needs to be 
improved so that the full benefits of these instruments can be realized.  
Nearly two-thirds of respondents to the questionnaire stated that OTs reduced pre-award 
cycle-time, while nearly a quarter said it had no effect and a small minority said it caused an 
increase. Among those saying there was a decrease in pre-award cycle-time, there was 
unanimity that the administrative simplicity of OTs resulted in reduced time. Three-fifths of the 
respondents identified freedom from FAR competition standards, and an equal number thought 
project partners working together efficiently resulted in quick development of a research plan. 
Among the small number of respondents noting an increase in pre-award cycle-time, the 
unfamiliarity of offerors with OT contracting and time-consuming negotiations over intellectual 
property were identified as reasons by all respondents. 
About three-fifths of respondents stated that use of OT authority reduced post-award 
program execution time; about two-fifths said it had no effect. Primary reasons given were: 
reduced administrative burden allowed more focus on technical research goals; minimum 
internal systems compliance requirements accelerated process; flexibility to restructure and 
make mid-course corrections created an efficient work environment; and lack of flow-down 
clauses sped up the process. About four-fifths of respondents stated that overall (pre- and post-
award) OTs resulted in significant or moderate time reductions in their programs. Most of these 
(63.3%), however, thought the time reductions were only moderate. 
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Nearly three-fourths of respondents attributed cost reductions to the use of OT authority 
(compared to 6.7% saying OT increased cost). The top reason given was that tradeoffs allowed 
better use of available funds. Other top reasons were that shortened cycle-times reduced 
overall program cost; there were fewer non-value added activities; and use of cost sharing. In 
addition to reduction in current project cost, more than half the respondents stated use of the 
OT would result in reductions in future acquisition and support costs for their programs. With a 
single exception, the remainder of respondents thought use of an OT would have no effect on 
program costs.  
In the area of performance of the systems or products resulting from their OT projects 
half the respondents said OT authority resulted in significant improvements in performance. 
Forty percent identified moderate performance improvements, while the remainder saw no 
impact on performance from using an OT.  
More than four-fifths of respondents said that OTs had a positive impact on various 
aspects of the team relationships and practices. No respondents identified any negative 
impacts. Positive influences were found in relationship building among team members; focus on 
technical aspects of the program; management and control of the program; and other practices. 
More than 90% of respondents found that OT authority resulted in a streamlined and 
flexible program. Reasons given included various accommodations of commercial practices 
including flexibility in negotiating technical data, computer software license rights; various 
auditing and cost practices; and, elimination of flow-down clauses. Another top factor was ease 
in making changes. 
When asked to access the overall impact of OT authority on their projects 46.7% 
responded that it had a significant positive impact; 50.0% said it had a moderately positive 
overall impact; and one respondent (3.3%) said no impact. In addition, more than three-fourths 
of respondents answered affirmatively to the question, “Did use of OT authority allow 
development of program/s that may not otherwise have occurred?” These general findings, as 
well as many of the specifics derived from the survey of government personnel, were reinforced 
by information derived from interviews of government and industry personnel.     
The survey responses summarized above are all the more remarkable in light of 
additional information LMI derived from its interviews. In nearly all the programs profiled in the 
interview process, a deficiency in training on OTs was noted. The deficiency sometimes related 
to both government and industry personnel and sometimes only to government personnel. In 
one major program, it was identified as “a compelling need.” Thus the benefits of OTs identified 
in the LMI study were documented despite the fact that these programs may not have been 
conducted by well-trained government personnel nor executed up to the full potential of OTs. 
IDCC Research Data 
Beginning in the early 1990s, Robert C. Spreng has conducted a series of studies 
showing the profound divide between the large defense contractors that receive the vast 
majority of DoD RDT&E awards and leading US industrial firms that receive little or insignificant 
DoD R&D funding. Spreng found that a handful of defense contractors account for half of the 
total DoD RDT&E awards, while adding a few more brings the total to three-quarters of all such 
funding. Of hundreds of top industrial firms (Fortune 500 or 900 firms in Business Week R&D 
Scoreboard), 92% receive little or no DoD research and development funding.  
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A review of the data sources that Robert Spreng has assessed provides details that are 
consistent with what former Defense Secretary William Perry and many other knowledgeable 
observers have said: namely that many technology areas the DoD depends upon—such as 
electronics, semi-conductors, and computer software to mention a few—have equivalents in the 
commercial sector, and there is no need to maintain defense-unique capabilities in those areas. 
However, ending reliance on defense-unique industrial capabilities requires that the DoD be 
able to access the equivalent commercial market.   
IDCC has analyzed some of the government contracting practices that discourage their 
members’ participation in government R&D programs or constitute barriers to entry. In a 2006 
survey of IDCC member companies, eight of the top fifteen barriers identified related to 
intellectual property and three identified barriers to the way the government handled costs. In a 
2008 survey, seven of the top fifteen barriers related to intellectual property and two were cost 
related.  
Some of the issues identified were intellectual property rights/proprietary data concerns 
including trade secrets; Buy-American provisions/concerns with foreign technology/production; 
cost accounting standards; pass through requirements; profit policy; overhead policy; cost or 
pricing data; documentation; audit rights; and contract dispute resolution. Other issues were 
operational in nature such as awareness of business opportunities; work specification problems; 
government oversight problems; and billing problems. Many of industry’s concerns flow from the 
requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (or parallel provisions contained in 
assistance regulations). Other issues were related to the attitude and culture of government 
personnel involved in R&D contracting.  
The IDCC has recommended expanded use of OTs as a way to address many of the 
concerns of its member companies. IDCC has noted that many government contracting 
personnel are not familiar with OTs or even with potential flexibility under the FAR with regard to 
matters such as technical data. The IDCC recommends the establishment and thorough training 
of a cadre of contracting officers who understand innovative contracting and are prepared to 
accommodate key imperatives of commercial companies. The IDCC has noted that typically 
their companies will not be prime-contractors and therefore the DoD needs to structure changes 
that will permit the participation of IDCC companies as subcontractors. Commercial firms such 
as IDCC member companies recognize the need for them to partner with traditional defense 
primes in order to participate in platform-centered defense systems acquisitions. They are 
willing to do this if appropriate terms can be structured.  
Government policies embodied in legislation promote civil-military integration (10 USC 
2501) and a preference for commercial products (10 USC 2377), but the years of IDCC efforts 
to open DoD R&D contracting to primarily commercial high-tech companies indicates these 
policies have been less than fully honored by the DoD in its approach to systems acquisition.  
Other Research 
In discussions with the former Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Industrial 
Policy), it became clear to the author that IDCC companies do not have a monopoly on seeing 
barriers to entry in the government contracting system. Moreover, there is not just a single 
barrier or set of barriers to entry. Numerous interactions with representatives from companies 
and industry associations convinced the ADUSD (Industrial Policy) as well as the author that 
depending on the company or industry segment the barriers differed. Thus, no single magic 
bullet or tweak of the system will suddenly open up government procurement contracting to 
 =
=
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå======== - 45 - 
=
=
much broader participation. The entire system is too arcane, prescriptive, and inflexible to be 
broadly attractive. As one expert observer noted, it is inconceivable that a rational person or 
committee of rational people charged with devising a contracting system for the federal 
government would possibly come up with our current system (Nagle, 1992, p. 519).  
An example of a barrier caused by a single government requirement provides an 
informative illustration. According to the government contracts counsel of a major commercial 
company (multi-$billions in sales; in excess of $2 billion annually in R&D), his company created 
an accounting system compliant with government Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) so that it 
could receive government cost reimbursement contracts. The company was attracted to 
government R&D business due to patriotic motives, as well as to obtain government funds to 
expand its research capabilities, and also as a possible way to expand its markets (at 2% of 
sales, the government was already its largest single customer). With its CAS accounting system 
in place, the company was awarded and performed a number of DoD cost-reimbursement 
research contracts. The company’s ability to obtain government contracts soon declined as its 
key scientists refused to write proposals for work that would require them to be subject to 
government requirements for hourly time reporting. The same scientists were, however, willing 
to do work under an OT without hourly time reporting. The notion that hourly time reporting was 
a sore point among highly motivated scientists was confirmed by the response to a survey 
question circulated by the author. One respondent was the executive director of an electro-
optics industry association whose previous experience included management at a start-up 
company, work as a DARPA program manager, and attorney at law! He pointed out that 
experiments do not always fit into neat eight-hour segments. Hourly time reporting to a highly 
qualified scientist who is paid an annual salary seems articificial and redundant. In a variation on 
this theme, legal counsel for a large, highly innovative company advised the author that it was 
motivated to seek government R&D funding for the same reasons mentioned above. His 
company investigated setting up a CAS-compliant accounting system and made the 
determination that it was not worth the expense and effort involved. One additional variation on 
this theme was given in the 1990s by Martin-Marietta’s Norman R. Augustine who included lack 
of “commercial accounting” in reasons why defense firms could not diversify into the commercial 
marketplace. Multiply this one example many dozens of times and one gets the Gordian knot of 
government contracting. Yet, OTs like Alexander’s sword can unravel the conundrum.   
 The author was present at a 2008 briefing by an experienced program manager 
presented to an Office of Secretary of Defense task force that was considering funding a major 
prototype project involving a highly innovative airship application and that was seeking an 
appropriate program office to execute the program. The program manager represented one of 
the military Service’s major development and contracting commands and had been asked to 
contrast a FAR-based approach with an OT approach. The program manager was supported by 
experienced contracting officials. The way the presentation was made suggested that the 
program manager had a superficial and stereotyped view of OTs and seemed to have difficulty 
understanding why anything other than business as usual made sense. Later it also came to 
light that getting management approval for an OT approach from that command would be a 
“hard sell.”  
There have been many reviews or research studies of OTs conducted since the 1990s. 
Examples of the small minority of reports that have been critical have been mentioned in the 
section on criticism in this paper. The vast majority of studies have found benefits flowing to the 
DoD from OTs, with any risks being either minor, manageable or both. Once OTs graduated 
beyond DARPA, a general deficiency in training and expertise in negotiating and executing OTs 
has been noted. Inaccurate perceptions, general misunderstanding, and false allegations about 
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OTs have become common among both policy makers and personnel potentially responsible for 
executing OTs. The LMI research has been highlighted in this paper because it is a recent and 
disciplined study of the subject. Its findings are generally consistent with many earlier studies.15 
The IDCC data is also of interest. Unfortunately, it merely represents views of companies that 
are interested in, and relatively educated about, potential pitfalls of doing business with the 
DoD. One respondent to a survey question circulated by the author pointed out that many 
companies including highly innovative companies supported by venture capital never consider 
doing R&D business with the DoD. Among many companies, DoD contracting has a reputation 
for being unthinking, bureaucratic and limited to companies that are “usual suspects.” 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Utility and Potential 
OTs have demonstrated that they can be a better, faster, cheaper way to conduct 
defense research, development and prototype projects compared to using procurement 
contracts. They have demonstrated outstanding utility and benefit to DoD projects in basic, 
applied and advanced research; prototype projects relevant to weapons and weapons systems 
and, in distinctively innovative transactions. They are potentially applicable to transactions that 
have not yet been conceived. Far from being a niche authority, OTs are capable of being a fully 
acceptable alternative approach for many of the Department’s science, technology and 
prototype projects. The potential of OTs to transition successful prototype projects seamlessly 
into production is limited under current legal authority. Amendments to Section 845 enacted in 
2000 are inconsistent with original legislative intent and unduly restrictive.   
It is recommended that the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics) direct that DoD guidance on OTs for research and prototypes be revised to assure 
that OTs are considered a mainstream authority fully equal to FAR contracting and assistance 
instruments. Such guidance should clearly indicate research OTs may overlap the “assistance” 
category but are not confined by it. Guidance on both research and prototype OTs should stress 
their flexibility and minimize unnecessary regulatory restrictions. Delegations of authority to 
exercise or approve the use of OTs should be issued to effectuate vigorous use of OTs. 
It is recommended that Congress repeal the 2000 amendment to Section 845 and 
restore it to its original intent. In lieu of complete repeal limitations on Section 845 should be 
substantially modified. If retained the definition of “non-traditional” contractor should be changed 
to a company whose main focus of business is in markets other than the DoD. Dollar amounts 
for approval requirements for OTs should be repealed. Follow-on production authority should be 
simplified.  
                                                
15 Studies go back to the early 1990s, e.g., Nash et al. (1995). Participant views of other transactions.  
Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses; several have been conducted by RAND, e.g., Smith et al. 
(2003). Assessing the use of other transactions for prototype projects. National Defense Research 
Institute; and include research done at NPS, e.g., Wong & Liu. (2008).  Analysis of the transitioning 
opportunities for non-traditional contractors under other transactions authority (MBA Professional Report). 
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
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A primary way to get innovative commercial companies involved in major defense 
programs is via subcontracts. Many commercial firms are unwilling to participate in defense 
procurement when flow-down clauses under the FAR system impose unattractive business 
practices on them. Many of the same firms will accept OT arrangements. The likely significant 
participation of a non-traditional firm as currently narrowly defined may not be known up front, 
so many programs will be initiated as FAR contracts under current limitations to Section 845. 
Once initiated as a FAR contract, mandatory flow-down of FAR conditions will discourage 
participation by innovative commercial companies. 
Pending legislative changes to Section 845, it is recommended that USD (AT&L) direct 
the military departments to authorize parallel OT agreements to be used to enter into 
relationships with commercial (“non-traditional” broadly defined) firms that might contribute to a 
defense project that is being conducted with a defense prime contractor under a procurement 
contract. Consistent with policies endorsing the modular open systems approach (and 
incremental and spiral developments), opportunities should be sought for including commercial 
firms in prototype and development programs. Parallel OT agreements closely integrated with 
the main development procurement contract should be funded with any available funds 
including funds originally allocated to the prime contract.  
Training and Education 
The defense contracting workforce has primarily been trained in following a set of 
prescriptive rules that potentially inhibit developing initiative and good business judgment in 
order to craft transactions advantageous to the DoD while honoring the interests of the DoD’s 
industrial partners. In significant measure, the acquisition workforce is woefully ill-equipped to 
engage in free-form OT contracting. Both DoD acquisition policy offices and the DoD acquisition 
education community have failed to provide leadership, incentives and recognition to enable the 
acquisition workforce to better utilize OTs. Top-level leadership has been absent or insufficient 
in matters of education and training.  
It is recommended that USD (AT&L) engage (through a mandated high-level conference 
or other means) OSD and service acquisition policy offices, senior acquisition executives, and 
other key acquisition leaders so as to dispel prevalent misinformation on OTs and initiate 
leadership education on OTs. The services and defense agencies should initiate OT training 
and create centers of excellence on innovative contracting emphasizing OTs. The Defense 
Acquisition University should create a significant on-campus series of courses on innovative 
contracting emphasizing OTs. DAU online training modules on OTs should be substantially 
revised and should emphasize the potential flexibility of OTs and how to handle non-standard 
situations rather than reinforce “look it up in the book” education.   
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Chair: Mr. Christopher A. Miller currently serves as the Program Executive Officer Command, 
Control, Communictions, Computers and Intelligence (PEO C4I). In this capacity, he has oversight and 
responsibility for acquisition and lifecycle management for assigned C4I programs.   
Miller, a native of Nashville, TN, received his Bachelor of Arts degree from Vanderbilt University through 
the Naval Reserve Officer Training Program. Upon commissioning in the United States Marine Corps 
and completion of The Basic School in Quantico, VA, Miller served as Intelligence Officer for various 
Marine Aviation Commands. In this capacity, he gained his experience in military intelligence and C4I 
leadership.  
Miller left active duty status in 1999 to work for Booz Allen Hamilton in San Diego, CA. While a 
consultant, Miller worked on numerous command and control programs for the Navy and was integral in 
coordinating the Year 2000 transition for the Navy's command and control programs.  
In 2001, Miller returned to government service at the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
(SPAWAR), where he provided technical and systems engineering leadership. He led the development 
of a common Windows 2000 PC software baseline to replace current legacy Microsoft NT baseline. 
This software baseline is now the foundation of the Navy's largest tactical network, known as 
Information Technology 21 (IT-21). 
In 2004, Miller joined the PEO C4I staff and served in the positions of Technical Director and Director of 
Modernization. In these roles, he provided technical leadership and oversight for C4I program execution 
and fielding. His major accomplishments include leading a cross-service effort with the United States 
Air Force to establish guidance for implementing the Net-centric Enterprise Solutions for Interoperability 
(NESI)—which was the PEO's first overarching guidance effort and a key enabler for delivering 
network-centric C4I capabilities. He also led the development of the first consolidated fielding plan and 
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Modernization Concept of Operations (CONOPS), which defined and implemented the PEO's 
modernization planning, design and execution processes. 
Discussant: Mr. Michael Dettman serves as the Associate Technical Director (Policy & Guidance) for 
the Program Executive Office for Command, Control, Communications, Computers & Intelligence (PEO 
C4I), responsible for developing net-centric warfare capability engineering guidance and for the 
establishment of Naval Open Architecture policies within the command.  
Dettman earned a Bachelor of Science degree from Pennsylvania State University in 1992 before 
beginning a four-year tour of duty in US Naval Intelligence.  He served with SEAL Delivery Vehicle 
Team II and aboard USS Boxer (LHD-4), where he gained experience in military intelligence and C4I 
systems.  Dettman left active duty in 1997 and joined Titan Systems in San Diego, CA, as a consultant, 
where worked on numerous Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance programs for the Navy. 
In 2000, Dettman returned to government service at the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center–
San Diego.  He led the integration and test of a US Navy Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities 
(TENCAP) program, which successfully transitioned to the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support 
Systems (JDISS) Joint Program Office.  The JDISS suite provides Combatant Commanders with an 
integrated collection management capability. 
In 2004, Dettman joined the US Central Command’s J2 Intelligence Director’s staff for Information 
Management to provide technical leadership, manage warfighter requirements for C4I system 
development and serve as the Command’s representative to the Joint Staff Intelligence Functional 
Working Group (IFWG).  He led a cross-service implementation with the US Army’s All Source Analysis 
System–Lite (ASAS-L) and the Global Command & Control System–Joint (GCCS-J) Integrated Imagery 
& Intelligence (I-Cubed) systems, which successfully facilitated the secure exchange of critical 
intelligence across the multiple security domains in the US Central Command Area of Responsibility.  
He also led the integration and test effort to ensure Forward Operating Base (FOB) tactical intelligence 
reporting was accurately and efficiently synchronized with the Modernized Integrated Database (MIDB). 
In June 2006, Dettman returned to San Diego as the PEO C4I Associate Technical Director for Policy & 
Guidance, where he led the net-centric transformation by directing the Net-centric Enterprise Solutions 
for Interoperability (NESI) initiative, in partnership with the US Air Force and the Defense Information 
Systems Agency (DISA).  Additionally, he has served as the command’s Naval Open Architecture 
Enterprise Team (OAET) Action Officer and worked closely with each of the command’s program 
offices to ensure that the Naval Open Architecture Strategy is executed in an enterprise fashion. 
Dettman is a member of the Defense Acquisition Workforce and has received several awards for his 
service, including the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal, US Army Program Manager for 
Intelligence Fusion Award, US Central Command Information Management Award and the SPAWAR 









==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå======== - 51 - 
=
=
Outcome-driven Service Provider Performance under 
Conditions of Complexity and Uncertainty 
Presenter: Kevin S. Buck co-leads research of web services performance in tactical environments 
and stakeholder-driven performance management.  He provides investment and portfolio 
management support to Government sponsors.  Buck has a BS in Marine Transportation from the 
U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, an MS in Industrial Administration, and an MBA.   
Author: Diane P. M. Hanf co-leads research of web services performance in operational 
environments.  She provides modeling and analysis, software acquisition, and test and evaluation 
support to Government sponsors.  Hanf has Bachelor’s degrees in Electrical Engineering, Wire 
Communications Technology and Business Administration and an MS in Systems Engineering. 
Abstract 
While Service-oriented Architecture (SOA)1 can help organizations share resources and 
leverage economies-of-scale, it can increase acquisition complexity (e.g., multiple new/different 
relationships to manage) and uncertainty (e.g., nature/magnitude of future service demands).  
Given this additional complexity and uncertainty, MITRE developed a performance management 
framework to help Government organizations measurably: 
 Articulate SOA outcomes and identify outcome drivers; 
 Define SOA technical and acquisition performance metrics through the application of 
Return-on-Investment (ROI) principles and monitor performance as a comparison of 
current delivery to initial ROI expectations; 
 Translate SOA objectives into contractor performance management mechanisms. 
This paper describes applying ROI analysis principles for SOA performance 
management, creating Service-level Agreements (SLAs) to articulate agreements between the 
Government and external service providers, and managing SLAs through a governance 
framework (Hanf & Buck, 2009, March). 
This white paper highlights key findings of research undertaken by The MITRE 
Corporation (MITRE) and the resulting recommendations for (1) applying Return-on-Investment 
(ROI) analysis principles as the foundation for more effective performance management of 
Government Service-oriented Architecture (SOA), (2) creating comprehensive Service-level 
Agreements (SLAs) to articulate agreements between the Government and external service 
providers, and (3) managing SLAs through a governance framework (Oakley-Bogdewic & Buck, 
2009; Hanf & Buck, 2009, March 25).  As illustrated in Figure 1, MITRE’s recommendations 
address the additional managerial complexity and uncertainty that SOA objectives and 
proposed solutions often create. 
                                                
1 SOA is an architectural style that guides all aspects of creating/applying business processes through 
service packaging and defines/provisions the Information Technology (IT) infrastructure (Newcomer & 
Lomow, 2005).  
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Figure 1. Key Aspects of MITRE’s Research 
1.0  The Importance of Performance Management  
Mechanisms are currently not consistently in place within the Federal Government for 
programs to identify key stakeholders, quantitatively articulate stakeholder needs, and 
quantifiably assess, on a timely basis, whether stakeholder needs have been satisfied.  The 
new Administration is currently focused on a key symptom of such improperly functioning 
mechanisms: lack of transparent accountability. President Barack Obama explained:   
My Administration is committed to creating an unprecedented 
level of openness in Government.  We will work together to ensure the 
public trust and establish a system of transparency, public participation, 
and collaboration. Openness will strengthen our democracy and 
promote efficiency and effectiveness in Government.  Government 
should be transparent.  Transparency promotes accountability and 
provides information for citizens about what their Government is doing. 
 Information maintained by the Federal Government is a national 
asset. My Administration will take appropriate action, consistent with law 
and policy, to disclose information rapidly in forms that the public can 
readily find and use. Executive departments and agencies should harness new technologies to 
put information about their operations and decisions online and readily available to the 
public. Executive departments and agencies should also solicit public feedback to identify 
information of greatest use to the public. (2009) 
  Over the past year, lackluster demonstration of effective Government performance has 
resulted in the establishment of new regulations/requirements that compel agencies to more 
frequently and credibly communicate the value delivered by Government programs in exchange 
for funds provided by stakeholders.  The requirement for a Performance Improvement Officer is 
one of the provisions of an executive order signed on November 13, 2007, to compel agencies 
to derive better results from their programs.  Agencies will now be required to demonstrate 
robust performance management efforts, including the development or improvement of strategic 
plans and aggressive and accurate measurement of progress in achieving overarching 
performance goals.    
Current reporting requirements for programs and expenditures will likely be more closely 
scrutinized for realism, consistency, accuracy, and alignment with strategic objectives.  The 
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Comptroller General asks federal programs and agencies to improve performance management 
by:  
 Comprehensively reassessing what the federal government does and how it does it: 
reconsidering whether to terminate or revise outdated programs or services 
provided. 
 Reexamining the beneficiaries of federal programs: reconsidering who is eligible for, 
pays for, and/or benefits from a particular program to maximize federal investments. 
 Improving economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of federal operations: capturing 
opportunities to reduce costs through restructuring and streamlining federal activities. 
 Attacking activities at risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement: focusing on 
minimizing risks and costs. (Mihm, 2000, July 20) 
Regardless of whether government programs operate in Information Technology (IT)-
intensive environments or not, there is increasing momentum toward sharing of resources, 
solutions, and risks across government organizations/Agencies.  While this trend supports 
leveraging synergy, reducing stovepipes/redundancy, and economies-of-scale, it often 
increases acquisition complexity (e.g., multiple new and different relationships to manage) and 
uncertainty (e.g., nature and magnitude of future demands for supplies/services that are 
currently being acquired).  Given the increased emphasis on transparency and accountability for 
Federal government expenditures to our ultimate stakeholders (e.g., the taxpayer) in an 
environment with increased acquisition complexity and uncertainty, foundational steps that we 
recommend include: 
a) Understanding an organization’s own performance with respect to its stakeholders’ 
expectations,  
b) Finding ways to effectively communicate performance in the right form and at the 
right time to ultimate stakeholders.  This allows for expectations to be effectively 
managed and/or course corrections to be accomplished before resources are 
unnecessarily expended for too long on objectives that are no longer worthwhile or 
on solutions that will not succeed, and  
c) Establishing mechanisms to readily re-calibrate performance needs/expectations as 
the future becomes less uncertain.   
We discuss the following recommendations in the context of an SOA environment: 
 Application of an ROI-based performance management framework to support 
sponsors in aligning operational and contract-related performance metrics with 
monetizable and non-monetizable costs, benefits, and risks deemed critical for 
achievement of desired outcomes, 
 A performance execution process based on SLAs as a key means of communicating 
and monitoring performance, and  
 An SLA governance framework that enables decision-makers to manage SLAs as an 
on-going re-evaluation of what performance matters to stakeholders. 
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2.0  SOA Performance Management 
As Federal Government agencies transform their enterprises to be service-oriented, a 
disciplined process to effectively and efficiently manage both operational 
and service provider performance has yet to be widely embraced.  In the 
absence of such a process, program and portfolio managers are often 
challenged to clearly and measurably connect SOA stakeholder needs, 
desired outcomes, and operational, technical, and service provisioning 
performance.  As is 
illustrated in Figure 2-1, 
SOA is an architectural 
approach used to build 
solutions that contain a 
set of services, service 
consumers, service producers and service 
contracts (Logan, 2008).  
 
 
Figure 2-1. The SOA Construct 
Through Government case observations and investigation of methodologies successfully 
employed within commercial industry, the MITRE research team developed a performance 
management framework—discussed later and shown in Figure 4-1—which guides framework 
users (e.g., multiple SOA participants in different stages of the SOA lifecycle) through key 
decisions that will need to be made in effectively and efficiently managing performance of SOA 
implementations.  The SOA (Newcomer & Lomow, 2005) performance management framework 
helps Government portfolio/program managers and system/performance engineers: 
 Measurably articulate expected SOA outcomes and identify outcome drivers, 
 Define and monitor technical and acquisition performance metrics through the 
application of Return-on-Investment (ROI) principles and the on-going comparison of 
current delivery to initial SOA ROI expectations, and 
 Effectively translate operational and overarching government SOA performance 
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MITRE’s recommendations target critical challenges associated with the increased 
complexity and uncertainty that are often created by SOA. They also mitigate the risk of 
measurement overload (i.e., “losing the forest for the trees”) by providing a mechanism to derive 
vital and coherent outcome-focused metrics.  These critical challenges are summarized in the 
paragraphs that follow:      
Expectations of Savings without Analysis 
For Government agencies and programs that have made decisions to adopt SOA, robust 
and repeatable methods for effectively and efficiently managing performance over the lifecycle 
have not emerged.  For many Federal Government organizations, there is a mindset that, 
because SOA is mandated, rigorous investment analysis/management is not necessarily an 
urgent requirement.  The expectation that SOA will save money has resulted in already 
decreasing funding profiles for programs, increasing the criticality of developing and applying 
methodologies that result in selection of cost-effective strategies and solutions.  These 
methodologies should directly relate to fulfilling stakeholder needs, closing capability gaps, and 
achieving multiple outcomes.   
Understanding the SOA Lifecycle 
One challenge in effectively managing SOA performance is the lack of relevant SOA 
lifecycle performance benchmarks that Government programs can leverage to determine 
realistic SOA outcomes and performance thresholds.  This lack increases the degree of 
uncertainty regarding what can realistically be expected from SOA.  The current lack of 
benchmarks is primarily a symptom that (a) many sponsors are still in the initial planning or 
development stages with SOA and do not have on-going, steady-state results to share yet, and 
(b) those organizations that do have steady-state performance results often consider the 
information to be proprietary, requiring close-hold.  In the absence of meaningful benchmarks 
from referent organizations, alternative methods must be implemented by sponsors to evaluate 
performance of the potentially substantial investments in SOA that will be undertaken by 
numerous participants in SOA (e.g., SOA developers, service producers, and service 
consumers).   
Measuring Non-fiscal Returns 
Our research confirms that SOA expected returns are not always fiscally driven (e.g., 
compliance with law and regulation or loss of life is more important in many cases), and the 
SOA construct seeks to align mission and investments that involve promoting a service-oriented 
culture.  As a consequence, the research team proposes an expanded definition of ROI, to 
include return on closing capability gaps that are targeted by an SOA implementation that 
includes non-monetizable value propositions such as compliance with law and regulatory 
mechanisms, avoidance of loss of life and customer (e.g., government user or citizen) 
satisfaction.  This definition is illustrated in Figure 3-1. 
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Figure 3-1. ROI Analysis Considerations for SOA 
Expectation Management 
Application of the expanded ROI methods, in an on-going performance management 
program, involves comparison of actual tangible and intangible results realized from selected 
SOA investments to realistic, initial investment expectations.  Initial expectations, in and of 
themselves, should reflect an incremental comparison of proposed SOA investment returns to 
those anticipated should current approaches be continued (i.e., the status quo, or “do nothing” 
case).  The value of ROI analysis for an on-going performance management program must be 
balanced against the resources required to perform the analysis and will also greatly depend 
upon the ability of Government sponsors to effectively characterize initial expectations from 
SOA in measurable terms.  According to ZapThink Research, “only by understanding the full 
range of SOA value propositions can companies begin to get a handle on calculating the ROI of 
SOA” (Schmelzer, 2005). 
Effective SOA Management Can Be Resource-intensive 
Application of ROI principles for SOA performance management will likely increase 
resources devoted to planning and monitoring efforts.  ROI analysis can be a relatively 
resource-intensive effort, and the research team has developed an approach to streamline the 
process (i.e., “ROI Lite”). This approach involves adoption of an Early Warning System that 
focuses on more frequent assessment of the “vital few” leading indicators of success/failure.  
Assessments take the form of variance analyses for key ROI variables (e.g., acquisition costs) 
and less frequent re-visiting of the overall ROI analysis itself (only required when variances are 
significant and suggest that either performance needs to be improved or re-baselining is 
necessary). 
ROI Analysis SOA investment
option
- List of priorities
- List of relative desirability
- Comparative customer satisfaction ratings
- Balanced Scorecard ratings
- Number of votes "for" and "against"
(1)  What are the social consequences?
(2)  What are the strategic implications?
(3) What is the effect on employee morale?
(4)  What are the political ramifications?
(5)  Stoplight matrix of risk assessment
Investment costs and benefits 
can be quantified, but not 
accurately monetized?
(e.g., customer satisfaction)
Investment costs and benefits 
can be monetized, but not 
easily?
(e.g., productivity)
Investment impacts cannot be 
accurately expressed 
monetarily?





Investment costs and benefits 
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Integrating Multiple Perspectives 
Another challenge in effectively managing SOA performance is the multitude of 
conflicting viewpoints regarding key SOA outcomes and which particular SOA-driven benefits 
can realistically be pursued.  This is often the result of confusion in benefit-related terminology 
(e.g., “flexibility” and “time savings”) and of differing stakeholder needs.  For instance, a primary 
benefit expected from SOA is the ability to expose services for potential re-use by other 
Government entities, which is typically an enterprise viewpoint; however, an executing program 
viewpoint could realistically be that the expected benefit from SOA relates to garnering flexibility 
to quickly respond to a change in the environment.  Since SOA supports the exposure of 
services with the intent of reuse, challenges also include the need to manage multiple inter-
Governmental and public-private performance relationships and uncertainty associated with 
future service demand and performance requirements. 
Establishing Stakeholder Targets 
The importance of addressing multiple SOA viewpoints, numerous stakeholder needs, 
and the uncertainty associated with the nature and magnitude of future service demand each 
increase the complexity associated with acquiring necessary services and capability from other 
Government entities and commercial industry.  Methods that address these limitations, 
challenges, and pressures for more effective and efficient SOA lifecycle performance 
management have not been widely adopted within Government settings.  Such methods are 
fundamental to determining whether both SOA business (e.g., cost savings through reuse) and 
technical (e.g., flexibility to meet operational needs) targets are being met in a mission-needs 
context and to manage a more complex stakeholder, provider and consumer environment. 
3.0  Applying Service-level Agreements (SLAs) to Manage SOA 
Service Provisioning 
Service-level Agreements (SLAs) have been a highly 
recommended and time-tested way (in some environments) to 
establish performance-related agreement between service providers 
and consumers (other methods, such as Memoranda of Agreement, 
are typically applied for service provider relationships between 
Government entities) (GSA, DoD, NASA, 2005).  And, effective 
application of SLAs can help address some of the challenges 
identified in Section 2.0 (e.g., expectation management, integrating 
multiple perspectives, and measuring non-fiscal returns).  An SLA is 
a formal, negotiated agreement between two parties.  It is a contract 
between customers and their service providers, and it records the 
common understanding about service features such as priorities, responsibilities, and 
guarantees.   
The main purpose of the SLA is to articulate agreements reached on the level of service 
to be provided.  For example, it may specify levels of availability, serviceability, performance, 
operation, or other service attributes, such as billing and even penalties in the case of violation 
of the SLA (“Service level agreement,” 2007).  SLAs have been applied for almost two decades 
by fixed-line telecom operators as part of their contracts with corporate customers.  More 
recently, some Information Technology (IT) enterprises have adopted the idea of using SLAs 
with their customers to allow for comparing delivered versus promised quality of service (2007). 
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Application of Service-level Agreements (SLA) is a recommended, but not required, 
method to describe performance expectations for services that are acquired by the Government 
from an external (i.e., commercial industry) service provider, and the use of SLAs is prevalent 
when services are acquired using Performance-based Acquisition (PBA) techniques. 
3.1  Government Experiences in Applying SLAs 
Government agency experiences with applying SLAs for managing contract performance 
objectives have been mixed.  In some instances, when SLAs have been applied and 
performance objectives are not effectively achieved, the primary reason for failure is that the 
SLAs that were initially created were not consistently applied, maintained, and updated (as 
necessary) throughout the contract period of performance.  In other instances, SLAs fail to 
support effective performance management because they are managed individually and without 
sufficient consideration of how all SLAs supporting a particular contract relate to one another to 
achieve overall outcomes.   
SLAs are often exclusively applied as a transactional and computer-generated 
communication of performance status, which minimizes their inherent power to form binding 
agreements between parties who may have competing agendas.  When efforts are undertaken 
by the Government to leverage SLAs as a means of achieving and maintaining meeting-of-the-
minds between a service provider and consumer, they are often difficult to enforce because of 
how and when the SLAs were connected to contractually oriented provisioning agreements.   
Administration of SLAs often becomes overly resource-intensive, and Government 
agencies are sometimes motivated to simply replace SLA monitoring efforts with other, 
potentially less authoritative, monitoring approaches.  Alternatively, Government organizations 
can simply become so involved in SLA administration that they understandably lose sight of 
performance interdependencies and exactly what performance really should be measured to 
achieve desired outcomes. 
While challenges associated with effective and efficient Government SLA application 
have existed for many years, the advent of SOA and increased pressures for agile service 
provisioning in web-enabled environments has added new and more pervasive challenges.  In 
these service-oriented environments, managing delivery against desired outcomes is complex 
and multi-dimensional, e.g., SLAs may be nested and may be dependent on separate 
application, hosting, and communications/networks performance needs.  The nature and 
magnitude of future service demand is frequently unclear.  And, capabilities will likely be jointly 
created and maintained by numerous internal and external organizations. The Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and other government procurement policies can likely 
accommodate service-oriented provisioning needs, but comprehensive guidance is not available 
to support Government organizations in establishing SLA monitoring systems that effectively 
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3.2  Increasing SLA Effectiveness 
To increase the effectiveness of SLAs, they should state in measurable terms: 
 The service to be performed and outcome expectations, 
 Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and the level of service that is acceptable for 
each, 
 The manner by which service is to be measured and how “success” is defined, 
 The parties involved and the responsibilities of each, 
 The reporting guidelines and requirements, and 
 Incentives for the service provider to meet the agreed-upon target levels of quality. 
Figure 3-2 illustrates recommended relational SLA elements. 
SLA Element Description
2.1 CONTEXT 
Purpose/Background Description of what the SLA has been designed to accomplish 
Stakeholders Identifies who cares about this performance and what they care most about 
Service Interdependencies Explains how the SLA and work scope fit into the entire supply chain 
2.2  SCOPE OVERVIEW 
Business Scope and Objectives A high level description of the SLA’s business objectives 
2.3  SERVICE DESCRIPTIONS 
Service Descriptions Detailed description of the services being provided through the agreement 
2.4  KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
Service Levels/Performance 
Metrics 
Required performance and how service is to be delivered 
Data Requirements Data to be provided by the contractor to enable performance monitoring 
Security Management Security issues relevant to services provided 
Workload Constraints Highest expected level of service demand.  Degradation schedule if excessive 
demand 
Severity and Priority Levels Severity levels for service interruption/degradation; service restoration 
priorities 
2.5  ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Roles and Responsibilities Mutually agreed upon roles along with corresponding responsibilities for each 
team member 
2.6  RECOURSE/REWARD SCHEME 
Excused Performance Conditions under which the contractor will not held to the Absolute KPIs 
Escalation Procedures What actions to take if service delivery is not satisfactory 
Service Level Bonuses/Penalties Consequences for failing to meet Absolute KPIs; rewards for superlative 
performance 
2.7  REPORTING GUIDELINES AND REQUIREMENTS 
Required Performance Reports Vendor’s performance reports to be delivered to government 
Update Procedures How, how often, and by whom, SLA should be updated 
Issues Management Procedures Responsibilities for surfacing and resolving problems/issues 
2.8  GLOSSARY 
Glossary of Terms Written to minimize misinterpretations 
  
Figure 3-2. Recommended Relational SLA Elements 
Key SLA lessons learned that should be considered include: 
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 Agree to existing service levels: Some Government agencies agree that the 
required service levels will be set at existing performance.  Doing so preserves the 
current service that the new contract was designed to improve (Delaney, 2004). 
 Agree to agree on service levels: Some Government agencies agree to work out 
service levels after contract award (2004).  However, once the contract is signed, the 
deal team often breaks up, and the provider may not be incentivized to subsequently 
agree to challenging service levels. 
 Agree to fix service levels at initial provider performance: Some Government 
agencies, with no basis for setting service levels, agree to set them at whatever 
levels the provider can achieve during the initial months of the contract.  This can 
give the provider an incentive to hold down service levels during those initial 
transitional months, that is, during a potentially volatile time in the contract term 
(2004).  
 Set the appropriate incentives: Some Government agencies overlook the idea that 
the provider will "manage to the money."  For example, in a call center contract, 
agencies might set a service level of "answer 90% of calls within two minutes" 
without realizing that they are, in effect, telling the provider to ignore any call that's 
gone over two minutes in favor of one that could still be answered in two minutes 
(2004).  
 Don’t ask for the moon: Government agencies should be careful about requiring 
unnecessarily high performance commitments.  Providing better service may require 
the provider to use, for example, redundant systems, excess capacity and better 
technology (2004). 
 Realize less is more: Government agencies should make SLAs simple and familiar. 
 Make SLAs measurable and actionable: Agencies should only collect data upon 
which they are going to base decisions; they should then pre-set the actions that will 
be followed if metrics do not hit targets. 
 Detail the unusual areas and boiler plate the rest: “Must-haves” should be 
articulated in the contract itself. 
 Describe methods for withholding/reducing fee: Loss of business/productivity is 
rarely compensated directly by a service provider.  Typically, a rebate proportional to 
the shortfall of the service vs. the payment is provided by the service provider in 
future performance evaluation periods.  SLAs typically include escalation procedures 
and conditions under which the provider will not be held responsible for service 
failings. 
 Incorporate contract language that allows SLAs to be changed: This language 
should tie to milestones as SLA changes may impact cost/schedule. 
Key reasons for failure of SLAs include: (a) The Government lacks well-defined 
requirements at the time of Request for Proposal (RFP) issuance, and (b) When 
Government/contractor performance interdependencies exist, the Government must have 
enough solid data on its own performance to counter contractor challenges.  
3.3  SLA Considerations for SOA Environments 
Ideally, IT and business stakeholders must work together to define realistic service-level 
criteria for SOA, especially for web services (Wainewright, 2003).  While traditional 
infrastructure SLAs typically measure “feeds and speeds,” SOA SLAs will often need to 
measure completed events.  Blending IT and business factors will require dialogue and 
feedback, which can be used to inform the performance measurement and management 
processes.  While the notion of measuring up to specific technical performance benchmarks is 
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well-established in the IT industry, the idea of defining service-level objectives in terms of 
business factors is less familiar.  Preparing and executing an SLA in a SOA environment 
presents special challenges.  Government organizations should follow some basic steps when 
they craft and manage SLAs in an SOA environment to mitigate risks associated with 
complexity and uncertainty (Perera, 2008).   
 Define desired outcomes: SLAs can support an articulation of desired outcomes 
between business and technology sides of the organization (2008).  And, it is 
recommended that SLAs align with the overall Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  
By design, an effective CONOPS will define the operational concept relative to 
overall objectives and will support an understanding of key interdependencies.  In a 
SOA environment, people should consider, from the outset, alternatives to business 
as usual.  Certainly, people can use SOA to perform the same business tasks that 
previous software performed, but this perpetuation can ignore the opportunities that 
SOA is supposed to create for flexibility and adaptability to changing business needs.   
 Match technical requirements to business needs: Software designers must select 
performance indicators for technical services, including service availability, 
bandwidth and response times.  Forrester Research uses the analogy of a consumer 
using an automated teller machine to explain how technical SLAs should be crafted.  
“It’s not enough that you put your card and Personal Identification Number (PIN) [in 
the machine] and request to withdraw cash.  There’s an expectation of how fast that 
will happen, the level of reliability and the level of security” (Perera, 2008).   
Varied business needs require different technical thresholds.  A military targeting 
application requires the highest levels of availability, whereas a civilian data analysis tool can 
probably operate at degraded performance levels outside of normal working hours.   
Because SOA applications have many loosely coupled services, SLAs can get 
complicated.  For example, software designers need performance guarantees if they’re going to 
reuse a service.  In that case, a technical SLA between the service provider and the service 
consumer will be necessary.  Each individual service might be in compliance with its technical 
SLA, and yet the overall application could still fail to meet its performance benchmarks.  SLAs 
cannot be an afterthought; they should become part of the system engineering process that 
occurs when SOA application developers are selecting services to incorporate or reuse.  
“However, from a user standpoint, a SOA application should have one SLA” (2008). 
 Monitor performance: A technical SLA provides information as to what 
performance is expected from a SOA application, but how does one know if the 
application meets that benchmark?  DISA’s Net-Centric Enterprise Services (NCES) 
program created a SOA framework, a structured method for monitoring all service 
information going back and forth.  According to Computer Sciences Corporation 
(CSC), “The common framework captures […] service information regardless of the 
program or organizational entity” (Perera, 2008).  “Performance monitoring is an 
essential step in avoiding pass-the-buck arguments about who is responsible for 
performance failures.  Consider a scenario in which a service provider agrees to 
accept 10,000 consumer data queries in an hour.  The consumer’s service 
information shows that the queries are not exceeding that level, but the application 
isn’t responding.  Logs show that the consumer sent batches of 10,000 requests in 
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 Enforce the agreement: An agreement to provide service without a mechanism to 
penalize noncompliance is not much of an agreement.  But, this can sometimes 
occur with SOA SLAs.  “A user agency could say it has an SLA that guarantees 
performance levels, but a provider agency could argue that Congress doesn’t intend 
for the money it appropriates to the provider agency to be used to fix another 
agency’s IT problems” (2008).  Although under various laws, notably the Economy 
Act of 1933, agencies can contract for services from another agency, the law when 
applied to SOA “gets into some sticky areas that are way out of the purview of IT 
people,” said Randy Hite, director of IT architecture and systems issues at the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). “It starts getting lawyers involved.”  Partly 
because of those legal and funding issues, SOA studies show that only 5% of 
reusable services actually are reused (2008).  It’s easy to find examples of 
organizations failing to fulfill their SLA agreements.  For that reason, SLAs in the 
federal government are most effective within a single organization whose various 
parts are supported by the same source of funding.  Not going outside the 
organization for reusable services is perceived as prudent.  That constraint doesn’t 
necessarily apply to contracting with vendors for SOA services.  Government 
agencies can try to financially penalize a vendor for reusable services that fall short 
of agency expectations.  However, vendors are not eager to assume extra 
responsibility without getting paid (2008).  
4.0  A SOA SLA Governance Framework 
Government agencies should consider adopting an SLA 
governance framework to ensure that SLAs can be as effective as 
possible in managing performance and achieving overall outcomes.  
Such a framework can help rationally manage all the individual 
performance agreements and monitoring activities, especially when 
the Government is contracting for multiple and/or complex services.  
SLA governance is the ongoing process of reviewing performance 
measures and contrasting those results to the stated goals and 
targets.  Objectives of an SLA governance framework are to ensure 
that: 
 Performance standards, as communicated through SLAs, provide a clear 
understanding of how well the contractor is achieving overall service contract goals; 
 SLAs continue to describe performance deemed critical at the moment to 
achievement of overall outcomes;  
 SLAs and performance measures are prioritized according to their importance in 
achieving overall outcomes; and 
 All activities and surveillance are undertaken as effectively as possible in order to 
assess how effectively the provided services support the overall desired outcomes. 

















Figure 4-1. SLA Governance Framework Purpose, Goals, and Key Success Drivers 
An SLA governance framework should be designed so that all SLAs currently being 
applied to monitor performance: 
 Meaningfully describe progress toward achievement of specific outcomes in the 
context of overall contract objectives and in consideration of SLA interdependencies 
that may exist; and 
 Are objectively measured at the appropriate times and continually serve as the 
primary mechanism for objectively determining service provider payment and 
incentives (both positive and negative). 
The framework should assist Government leaders, contracting personnel, and Program 
Managers in consolidating, synthesizing, and rationalizing information related to service 
performance on a continuous basis—in such a way that performance status can be accurately 
determined at any point in time and readily translated into a robust characterization of how 
effectively vital outcomes are being achieved.  The SLA governance framework should clearly 
identify key service provisioning stakeholders, their performance expectations, and if/how their 
performance expectations are being satisfied.  The framework should enable the maintenance 
and improvement of service quality through a continuous cycle of agreeing, monitoring, and 
reporting upon service achievements and instigation of actions to eradicate poor service.  To be 
effective, the SLA governance framework should define roles and responsibilities for 
performance measurement and management.  The framework should also define the types of 
performance reviews that need to be conducted and the timing of these reviews.   
SLA governance does not begin when the SLA itself is documented; rather, governance 
refers to managing the entire process throughout the acquisition lifecycle.  The initial evaluation 
of current practices before the document is started, the writing of the SLA, the determination of 
key SLA participants and associated roles/responsibilities, the monitoring of the effort’s 
progress, as well as the need for any changes or updates to the agreement are all part of the 




SLA Governance Framework Purpose, Goals, and Key Success Drivers
SLAs effectively communicate how 
desired outcomes are to be 
achieved
SLAs evolve as 
circumstances/needs change
SLAs are prioritized according to 
importance for outcome 
achievement
SLAs are established, managed, and 
modified effectively
Desired service contract outcomes 
are effectively achieved
SLAs are constructed 
properly, following best 
practice guidelines





Negotiate flexibility into intial 
contracts for SLA modification 
over time
Periodically revisit Progam 
objectives and contract 
outcomes
Perioidically reassess whether 
SLAs are still meaningful
SLAs are directly mapped to 
specific outcomes
Relative value of each SLA in 
communicating outcome 
achievement assigned
SLA priorities directly influence 
overall performance assessment 
and incentivization
SLA roles and responsibilities 
are established
Appropriate, and effectively 
trained, staff support SLA 
monitoring and management
Cross-disciplinary teams and 
review committees are formed
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Government who are responsible for overseeing this process to ensure that the goals laid out in 
the SLA are realized.  The government and service providers must manage the relationship on 
an on-going basis by continuously monitoring performance, changing business needs and 
updating benchmarks.  At regularly agreed-upon intervals, the government should determine 
whether existing contracts need to be modified and new SLAs drafted.  Figure 4-2 details the 
proposed governance framework and the steps included in each of the four stages—Prepare, 






Figure 4-2. Proposed SLA Governance Framework 
Essential steps to successful SLA management include: 
 Define a service in understandable language.  This is the service. This is what 
it means. This is what is supported and what is not supported.  This is how it 
will be reported, communicated, charged. 
 Understand the costs at a granular level, identifying all the different cost 
elements involved in the delivery of a service. This will give IT the ability to 
also execute improvement programs aimed at further reducing these costs. 
 Price the service delivery accordingly. There will be projects in the future for 
which the business may not immediately see the value.  So price some of the 
services to allow for some buffer to pay for these yet-to-be-accepted services. 
 Implement differentiated charge-backs to reflect the differentiated levels of 
service you have on offer. 
 Have regular service reviews. Reviews are a communication and marketing 
mechanism for IT to show to business how it is improving and helping the 
business. Identify what else is needed by the business through this dialogue.  
A feedback loop is thus created in which both business and IT are able to 
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5.0  Conclusions 
Mechanisms are currently not consistently in place within the Federal Government for 
programs to identify key stakeholders, quantitatively articulate stakeholder needs, and 
quantifiably assess, on a timely basis, whether stakeholder needs have been satisfied.  The 
Comptroller General asks federal programs and agencies to improve performance management 
by:  
 Comprehensively reassessing what the federal government does and how it does it; 
reconsidering whether to terminate or revise outdated programs or services 
provided. 
 Reexamining the beneficiaries of federal programs; reconsidering who is eligible for, 
pays for, and/or benefits from a particular program to maximize federal investments. 
 Improving economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of federal operations; capturing 
opportunities to reduce costs through restructuring and streamlining federal activities. 
 Attacking activities at risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement; focusing on 
minimizing risks and costs. (Mihm, 2000, July 20) 
MITRE research on performance management has resulted in recommendations to: (1) 
apply ROI analysis principles as the foundation for more effective performance management of 
Government SOA, (2) create comprehensive SLAs to articulate agreements between the 
Government and external service providers, and (3) manage SLAs through a governance 
framework. 
SOA involves multiple and complex participants (e.g., SOA developers, service 
providers, service consumers) and organizations (e.g., multiple Government organizations and 
commercial industry).  It also involves potential uncertainty associated with future performance 
expectations as services are exposed through the SOA; the nature and magnitude of future 
demand for services will likely not be known with certainty at the outset.  Careful planning must 
be undertaken by Government organizations to determine outcomes for multiple stakeholders 
and determine how those outcomes are translated to performance expectations that will be 
communicated to service providers. 
If SLAs are applied to support on-going SOA performance management, then efforts 
should be undertaken to directly connect these SLAs with technical performance requirements 
and ultimate SOA expectations.  The SLAs should be carefully crafted to ensure that flexibility 
for the Government to evolve performance expectations is maximized.   
For SLAs to be effective, a disciplined governance process must be undertaken by 
sponsors to ensure that the SLAs are actually measured and monitored.  On a timely basis, the 
SLAs should be re-evaluated to determine whether they are actually measuring something of 
importance and are still relevant to outcomes.   
The problem with SLAs is that once the ink has dried, the provision, monitoring, and 
management of these agreements can become the bone of contention between the 
people who are left to execute, monitor and manage the contract.  The need to manage 
SLAs is becoming a necessity if SLAs are to achieve any semblance of success.  
Without management, SLAs are like cars that go wildly off a highway.  You need checks 
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and balances to make sure that all concerned are running in the same direction and 
hopefully meeting all the obligations set forth in the contract. (“Managing,” 2007) 
With a performance management program in place, well-written and governed SLAs 
support government programs and provide transparent accountability to their stakeholders. 
Transparent accountability can support the Government in addressing challenges associated 
with complexity and uncertainty. 
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Appendix A. Acronyms 
CSC  Computer Sciences Corporation 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
DISA  Defense Information Systems Agency 
FAR  Federal Acquisition Regulation 
FCW  Federal Computer Week 
GAO  Government Accountability Office 
IT  Information Technology 
KPI  Key Performance Indicator 
MOIE  Mission-oriented Investigation and Experimentation 
NCES  Net-centric Enterprise Services 
PBA  Performance-based Acquisition 
PIN  Personal Identification Number 
RFP  Request for Proposal 
ROI  Return on Investment 
SLA  Service-level Agreement  
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Governance is widely viewed in the SOA literature as essential to successful SOA 
deployments. That literature generally draws little distinction between in-house projects and 
those carried out by contractors. Because the relationship with contractors is negotiated and 
managed by the acquisition unit, this paper finds it essential that acquisition integrate the 
decisions of governance both into solicitation documents and the resulting contracts for 
outsourced development or operations. It identifies what should be in a model SOA contract, 
paying particular attention to specifying, monitoring, and enforcing service-level agreements and 
alternative dispute resolution. 
Introduction 
Service-oriented architecture (SOA) depends on all participants having deep and abiding 
trust that software components will work when invoked. Trust must be earned prior to seeing 
such services existing and working. Earning this trust involves clear communication of what 
rules are to be followed, hiring people who are capable of following the rules, providing 
resources to enable following the rules, monitoring that rules are followed, and taking 
appropriate action when they are not. The governance process is responsible for writing those 
rules; acquisition is responsible for integrating those rules into solicitations, monitoring 
compliance, and establishing resolution procedures when those rules are violated. This paper 
identifies some of the SOA issues that are not well-handled by traditional contracts and 
proposes writing a model contract that could be customized to meet the needs of individual SOA 
acquisitions.  
Most acquisition organizations do not develop custom contracts for each acquisition. 
Rather, acquisition organizations reuse so-called boilerplate, which is meant to handle all the 
reasonably anticipatable contingencies. Since SOA introduces new problems, that boilerplate 
should be reworked to handle those contingencies.  
This legal analysis process would be mutually beneficial for lawyers in acquisition and 
enterprise architects in governance. As a profession, lawyers have considerable skill in 
managing the risks inherent in contractual relationships between multiple parties. They identify 
things that could go wrong with engagements, develop procedures for how to handle those 
problems, and work out legal language that will stand up in court for carrying out those 
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procedures. This is a higher level of procedural scrutiny than customarily conducted by 
enterprise architects. For example, while enterprise architects might simply call for service-level 
agreements, lawyers would spend time drafting precise terms for specifying those agreements, 
how the SLAs are to be monitored, what the process is for official notification of a breach, and 
what the remediation and/penalty is for each of the anticipated contingencies that could lead to 
an SLA breach.  
Identifying possible problems and working out the remediation process ahead of time 
both prevents some problems and reduces the amount of relationship damage if a negative 
outcome occurs. This section identifies issues that should be dealt with explicitly, including: 
• Intellectual property retention: Vendors should be required at contract start to 
identify any intellectual property (IP) claims they intend to assert associated with their 
service and to grant licenses for using their IP. They also need to identify any third-
party IP requiring licensing that might impede usage of the service to be developed 
in the future. Anything else should be explicitly recognized as work-for-hire owned by 
the government.  
 
This is important for two reasons. First, many contractors are themselves using 
third-party COTS products with their own license restrictions. Decision-makers do not 
want to be in a situation where their organization is inadvertently in breach of a 
license purchased on their behalf. Second, vendors have sometimes asserted 
intellectual property rights in their own work if the contract did not make clear who 
owned the resulting work product. If a contractor were to claim a copyright or trade 
secret in contracted work (in all or part of completed work), it could lead to a dispute 
regarding reuse. This would be particularly problematical if the vendor were able to 
get a patent issued on software or process. In that case, the vendor would have a 
legal right to demand royalties from any company doing the same thing, even if the 
contract was taken away and awarded to another vendor and work product from the 
patenting vendor was discarded. 
 
• Service-level agreements (SLAs): SLAs are widely acknowledged to be of great 
importance to SOA deployment. However, the literature on SLAs often leaves out 
much guidance on how to write them into legal contracts or what to do if one of the 
SLAs has been violated. When dealing with contractors, there is a need for decision-
makers to distinguish between “hard” SLAs and “soft” SLAs. Hard SLAs are 
contractual requirements. For a hard SLA to succeed, it should be written in legally 
unambiguous language, with a monitoring scheme that provides clear evidence any 
of breaches, and provide for clear penalties in the event of breach. What are known 
as “liquidated damages”—fixed amounts of money—are preferred by most lawyers. 
SLAs should be made hard only if the performance is completely under the control of 
the relevant contractor, the SLA is clearly monitored for compliance, and the 
performance being contracted for is clearly feasible. Otherwise, it may become 
difficult to get qualified vendors to bid or to prove that an SLA has been violated.  
Unless the service was truly intended to be fail-safe, decision-makers should 
consider stating a hard SLA as a percentage goal restricted to expected usage 
hours, such as the service must be available 99% of regular office hours. Otherwise, 
bids by contractors may increase as they build in multiple levels of redundancy to 
avoid hard SLA breaches and price in 24x7 staffing. In addition, decision-makers 
should consider whether all users are to receive equal quality of service. Often, the 
organizational unit funding the development feels it has a superior claim to available 
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capacity.  There are also good reasons why different classes of users might be 
treated differently. 
 
“Soft” SLAs are stated explicitly and are still monitored but have contractual 
commitments to work through conflict with a problem diagnosis and remediation 
process rather than a fixed penalty. Binding arbitration may also be considered, 
although it is best if both customer and contractor work in a spirit of cooperation. 
Because SOA applications are often composed of multiple services from multiple 
hosts, the process of debugging is often complex. In addition, SLA breaches are 
sometimes caused by events out of control of the service provider, such as a usage 
surge not in the contract or a change in requirements requiring additional resources. 
The model contract should have a comprehensive list of both kinds of SLAs thought 
appropriate to the organization. RFP writers should use that list as a menu to pick 
what is most appropriate to the problem at hand. 
 
• Interoperability help desk: SOA eliminates the need to custom engineer point-to-
point interfaces for new connections, which require skilled labor at both ends to 
establish a connection and security accreditation. While the term plug-and-play has 
been used in connection with a web service interface, there is no way connecting to 
a complex service will ever be as easy as plugging in a USB cable. Support will 
always be needed, but never more so than at the launch of a new service, when 
there is precisely nobody in the user community with experience getting the new 
“whatever” to work, and the draft documentation has had no feedback from the 
people trying to understand it. Ideally, there would be a tiered help desk funded to 
assist. Such an operation would fund retention of this expertise, reduce the amount 
of wasted developer time, and provide valuable feedback improving the 
documentation and in understanding the problems of the people using the services.  
 
• SOA-specific contractual deliverables list: Development projects have contractual 
deliverables. These explicitly required deliverables are traditionally milestones in the 
development schedules which are tied to master schedules. In traditional information 
technology development projects, these deliverables normally include the 
requirements document, technical design, unit and system integration test, among 
others. Listed below are other contractual deliverables which are equally important in 
SOA environments.  There are at least three good reasons to expand the list. First, 
what is important should be explicit in the contract, and these are very important 
indeed. Second, inclusion establishes formal evaluation and verification points, which 
are important oversight tools for acquisition and governance. Third, inclusion of these 
deliverables as contractual milestones enables progress payments for the vendors, 
which are a real incentive for timely completion. Important deliverables of special 
importance to SOA are:   
 
o Configuration management plan: SOA depends on all parties being able to 
absolutely rely on published services. This implies the existence of very tight 
rules on changing both the interfaces themselves and on the controlled 
vocabulary those interfaces use. Indeed, it may be necessary to offer multiple 
interface versions to the same service during transition periods. While 
configuration management is hardly new to SOA, it is much more mission-
critical. It follows that the configuration management plan should be one of 
the contractual deliverables, on the general principle that if the vendor cannot 
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develop a credible plan, it will probably have problems actually managing the 
configuration.  
o Controlled vocabulary: It is crucial that the same attributes mean the same 
thing within the relevant domain if the service is to have the interoperability 
promised by SOA. Being able to exchange data is not worth much if no one  
knows what it means. The enhanced data dictionary that identifies all the 
controlled attributes and their possible values needs to be reviewed in the 
governance process. This dictionary will also be a vital reference document 
for development and testing.  
 
o Interoperability artifacts and service registration: These include XML 
schemas, web services definition language (WSDL) messages, etc. These 
are supposed to vetted and entered into the services registry. These are the 
formal definitions of the data being exchanged and the interface to the 
service.  
 
o Independent interoperability verification: Developed services are 
supposed to be usable by anybody with appropriate authorization. 
Interoperability tests are testing the documentation as well as the service 
itself, so the ideal situation is to have the testing done by an entity completely 
separate from the development team. It would be third parties implementing 
the connections in production, so this additional step would be useful and the 
report of the testing outcome of great interest.  
 
o Service user communications plan: An important part of SOA’s appeal is 
the prospect of avoiding development costs by reuse. Most new products and 
services need some kind of marketing beyond merely announcing availability 
on a website—or, in this case, a service registry. Careful consideration 
should be given to including a plan for marketing new services and 
communicating with the user base.  
 
o Service-level agreement monitoring plan: As discussed above, SLAs are 
central to SOA. Decision-makers need a plan for how to monitor the service 
levels they decided to enforce. There are commercial products which can do 
automated monitoring. There should also be a channel for service users to 
submit a documented complaint of an SLA violation directly to the acquisition 
office. Ideally, the service user communications plan would include some 
training in how to provide useful feedback and complaints to acquisition.  
• Dispute resolution mechanism: The default remedy for breach in contract law, as 
well as the Federal Acquisition Regulations, is to terminate the contract after giving 
the contractor notice and a remediation period. Firing the contractor solves very few 
IT problems, however. There are any number of reasons why a service-level 
agreement would be breached. While a vendor might actually have done something 
wrong, it is also possible that a component operated by another vendor failed to 
function properly, that demand exceeded the range specified in the contract, that the 
component met the contractual requirements but the situation changed, etc.   
In an SOA environment, acquisition, governance, and contractors need a framework in 
which problems can be noted, solutions worked out, and burdens shared in accordance with 
responsibility. SOA calls for a shift that is as much cultural as contractual, in that different 
contractors and clients brought together by a problem with a complex, composed application 
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work together to try and solve the problem first and worry about the assignment of blame and 
assessment of penalties later. The sharing of information about problems between firms that 
were direct competitors in traditional systems—but whose components have been included in 
complex applications—may be a particularly large cultural shift. While the exact form of the 
dispute resolution will be organization-specific and will vary with how governance itself is 
structured, careful consideration should be given to the use of such alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms as binding or voluntary arbitration. Ideally, the COTR or the contracting 
officer would have enough technical knowledge to understand the issues and have some 
background in dispute resolution as well. 
In conclusion, this paper finds that acquisition is the interface between acquisition and 
governance. It identifies new issues SOA brings and suggests developing a model contract that 
explicitly addresses these concerns. It also recommends a more nuanced dispute resolution 
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Chair: Mr. Mark D. Rocke was selected to the Senior Executive Service in January 2008. He leads the 
strategy development, communications, Congressional relations, and overall business transformation 
processes within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and 
Technology.  
Rocke champions the effort to create and assess the execution of strategy for the broad acquisition 
community guided by or supported by his office. This work involves establishing enterprise-level 
strategic and programmatic direction, reporting on organizational goals, and contributing to the 
determination of Army and Defense priorities. His team is responsible for promoting understanding and 
building support for over 650 Army weapons systems and acquisition programs. In support of this 
objective, Rocke designs relationship-building events to enable interaction with key stakeholders and 
groups. He and his team perform legislative analysis to support hearings on posture, readiness, and 
acquisition matters. His team also manages the full scope of Congressional activities and tracks 
progress relative to authorizations, appropriations, legislative proposals, and objectives. In addition, 
Rocke directs his office’s Business Transformation efforts intended to enhance overall organizational 
effectiveness and productivity amidst increasing fiscal constraint. In this capacity, he serves as 
Deployment Director for Continuous Process Improvement and the Lean Six Sigma methodology.  
Discussant: Mr. Keith E. Seaman is the Business Transformation Agency’s first Deputy Director, 
Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive (DBSAE). In this role, Seaman provides operational 
analysis and advice to the DBSAE in executing Milestone Decision Authority responsibilities for DoD 
Enterprise-wide business systems within the BTA portfolio of systems. He is responsible to the DBSAE 
for planning, executing and monitoring the DBSAE portfolio of programs and initiatives.  
Prior to joining BTA, Seaman served as a Command and Control (C2) Modeling and Simulation (M&S) 
Senior Advisor at the Secretary of the US Air Force’s Office of Chief Warfighting Integration and Chief 
Information Officer. In this role, Seaman served as the US Air Force’s recognized authority in the areas 
of M&S C2, and he worked to enhance mission planning, distributed mission operations and multi-
disciplinary technology integration in order to rapidly respond to priority combat capability requirements. 
His leadership both delivered a dynamic, live, virtual and constructive environment to elevate warfighter 
readiness, as well as accelerated acquisition and development of emerging warfighter capabilities. 
 =
=
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå======== - 74 - 
=
=
Seaman also served as Chief, Operations Integration Division in the Operations Directorate at the US 
Transportation Command, where he led an operational division responsible for the command’s Defense 
Transportation System portfolio management and advanced new Enterprise-wide information 
technology initiatives. He oversaw the operational process requirements definition and directed a multi-
million dollar information technology initiative that included the development of the Global 
Transportation Network Integrated Data Environment, Single Mobility System, Agile Transportation for 
the 21st Century, Operations Knowledge Wall/Dashboard and the futuristic Single Operating 
Environment for Transportation.  
Seaman retired as an officer from the US Air Force after 27 years of service. During his military career, 
his experience spanned across diverse disciplines—including intelligence, fighter operations, arms 
control, production management, planning, policy and operations.  
Seaman graduated from Cameron University with a Bachelor’s degree in Financial Business 
Management. He completed his Master’s of Middle East Studies at Southwestern Baptist and his 
Master’s in National Resource Strategy at National Defense University’s Industrial College of the Armed 
Forces. 
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The acquisition and engineering of large scale, complex information systems, particularly 
those that transcend organizational and functional boundaries, represent well-recognized 
challenges.  The processes and procedures that evolved during the second half of the 20th 
century are best suited for the development of linear, well-bounded systems.  These processes 
have proven difficult to adapt to situations in which stakeholders do not always agree, 
requirements evolve, and constraints keep changing.  Different processes and procedures are 
needed to address the acquisition and engineering of information technology systems with 
evolving requirements and rapidly changing technologies. 
This paper is based on the results of a multi-year research program that investigated 
how uncertainty-based acquisition methods can be used to improve the odds of successful IT 
acquisitions.  The paper presents new concepts for managing uncertainty in acquisition 
programs: the uncertainty landscape, uncertainty driven acquisition strategies (staged 
commitment, small bets), the Y model, and a three-step approach to implementation (i.e., 
diagnosis, strategy selection, and adaptive execution). More than 20 acquisition programs were 
studied, and pilot programs were initiated to test the frameworks and strategies suggested in the 
research. 
I. Introduction 
Traditional systems engineering and acquisition practices evolved during the second half 
of the 20th century primarily to deal with the particular challenges of developing large-scale 
weapon systems.  These systems are expected to have long service lives, often measured in 
                                                
1 MITRE Public Release: 09-1310 
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decades, and typically require development and harnessing of unique, breakthrough 
technologies.  Because of these challenges, development occurs over a multi-year period 
before these systems enter production.  Changes late in development or in production directly 
contribute to cost and schedule overruns.  Consequently, once the design is completed, there is 
strong resistance to change, and rightfully so. The ideal situation for these types of programs is 
one in which requirements remain relatively stable and critical technologies mature over the 
course of the development period (Stevens, forthcoming).  Related to this, there is growing 
Congressional emphasis on better up-front planning and governance practices that focus on 
controlling deviations from the plan (Levin & McCain, 2009).  
Information technology (IT) systems, particularly those that provide user-facing 
applications, pose different challenges.  These systems are often intended to operate in highly 
volatile environments and, thus, are subject to changing user needs and expectations. In the 
most volatile environments, the effective life of IT systems can be measured in weeks to months 
rather than years. Development and acquisition tempos have to be responsive to such urgent 
and short-lived needs. Further, these systems often leverage commercial technologies that are 
also rapidly evolving. Unlike weapons systems in which change is rightfully something to be 
controlled, for many information technology systems, change is inevitable and must be 
accommodated.  For these systems, there is a risk that requirements are locked in too early and 
may not be responsive to legitimately changing user needs and that technologies become 
outdated while the system is still in development. 
Traditional processes and procedures are best suited for the development of linear, well-
bounded systems and have proven difficult to adapt to situations in which stakeholders do not 
always agree, requirements evolve, and constraints keep changing.  Different processes and 
procedures are needed to address the acquisition and engineering of IT systems, particular 
those with evolving requirements and rapidly changing technologies.   
Current systems engineering and acquisition practices that are optimized to deal with the 
unique challenges and risks in the development of weapon systems do not provide the flexibility 
and agility needed to deal with the uncertainties inherent in many IT systems acquisitions. A 
tailored approach to IT acquisition that explicitly acknowledges the inherent uncertainties and 
provides the necessary flexibility is required.   
The challenge of developing and acquiring IT-based systems more rapidly and with 
greater agility complements and does not supplant the very real and widely recognized 
challenges of developing and acquiring weapon systems. In fact, Dr. Ashton Carter, recently 
confirmed Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in reply to 
advance questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee, pointed out these two 
challenges: 
A first major challenge is to ensure that AT&L is supporting the war effort through rapid 
acquisition of systems our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines need in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and in the war on terror …. A second major challenge is to get under 
control the many troubled acquisition programs that are supposed to be supporting our 
forces—both today and tomorrow. Too many of these programs are failing to meet their 
cost, schedule, and performance expectations, and some are failing even more 
fundamentally the test of whether they are needed for the future military challenges we 
are most likely to face. In addition to disciplining these programs, reform of the 
acquisition system is needed to ensure that we do not get ourselves in this position 
again in the future. (Carter, 2009) 
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This paper reports on research conducted by The MITRE Corporation to examine 
alternative acquisition strategies and practices for IT systems under varying conditions of 
uncertainty. Alternative strategies, tailored to an understanding of the nature and extent of 
uncertainty faced by the program, are proposed. 
The paper is organized as follows: 
 Section I introduces the need for new acquisition approaches for uncertainty. 
 Section II discusses the regulations that permit flexible acquisition approaches. 
 Section III describes the three phases of this research program. 
 Section IV highlights the key research findings, including an uncertainty landscape 
and strategies for dealing with uncertainty.  
 Section V describes a three-step approach for implementing the strategies.  
 Section VI introduces a model to describe implementation drivers, enablers, and 
barriers. Section VII summarizes the acquisition and systems engineering 
implications of this research. 
II. Regulations Support Tailoring Acquisition Practices 
Language in federal acquisition regulations specifically encourages the acquisition team 
to institute innovative practices tailored to the particular needs and circumstances of the 
program.  In particular, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 1.102: Statement of 
Guiding Principles for the Federal Acquisition System states: 
(d) The role of each member of the Acquisition Team is to exercise personal initiative 
and sound business judgment in providing the best value product or service to meet the 
customer’s needs. In exercising initiative, Government members of the Acquisition Team 
may assume if a specific strategy, practice, policy or procedure is in the best interests of 
the Government and is not addressed in the FAR, nor prohibited by law (statute or case 
law), Executive order or other regulation, that the strategy, practice, policy or procedure 
is a permissible exercise of authority. (GSA, 2005) 
Similarly, DoD Instruction 5000.02 Section 1, Defense Acquisition Management System 
(USD (AT&L), 2008) states: 
b. Consistent with this Instruction and Reference (b), the Program Manager (PM) and 
the MDA shall exercise discretion and prudent business judgment to structure a tailored, 
responsive, and innovative program.  
Despite regulations that allow flexible acquisition methods, there is little guidance on 
what these methods should be.  This research was undertaken to identify particular methods. 
III. Research Approach 
The research explores strategies and methods for managing uncertainty and offers 
opportunities to address federal IT acquisition challenges.  The objectives of the research are to 
determine: (1) how best commercial practices for dealing with uncertainty can be adapted to 
federal IT acquisition, (2) under what circumstances might they work and make a difference, 
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and (3) what needs to change to make it happen.  Research activities are organized into three 




Figure 1. Three Research Phases 
Phase I 
Phase I of the research characterized and compared commercial entrepreneurial 
(McGrath & MacMillan, 2000) and federal acquisition environments and methods to develop a 
research framework to assess the nature and level of uncertainty within an acquisition program. 
The research was based on literature reviews and analyses of federal acquisition processes 
and regulations, as well as interviews with venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, government 
program and project managers, and acquisition, contract, and budget specialists.  The concepts 
and frameworks were refined based on discussions with commercial entrepreneurs, government 
specialists, and academicians. 
Phase II 
Phase II developed and detailed alternative acquisition strategies for dealing with 
uncertainty and initiated field research.  The field research was an embedded multiple-case 
study (Yin, 2002) and included data from more than 20 programs from 12 government agencies 
responsible for the acquisition of information intensive systems. Working from an interview 
protocol, the research team collected information on the programs’ acquisition, development, 
contract, incentive, and governance strategies.  The case notes provided input for identifying 
acquisition strategies for dealing with uncertainty and for exploring the motivators, enablers, and 
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barriers to innovation in acquisition practice.  A pilot study with an active acquisition program 
was initiated in Phase II to test and validate the strategies proposed in the research. 
Phase III 
Phase III focused on synthesizing, validating, and communicating the research.  
Research findings were captured in an interactive diagnostic tool and a "How to Guide" for 
program and project managers and key members of the acquisition team.  A model for 
assessing an organization’s readiness to implement uncertainty-based strategies was then 
developed. 
IV. Research Findings 
Acquisition Uncertainty Landscape 
IT acquisitions face both internal and external uncertainty. Within a typical acquisition, 
the team faces internal uncertainties in design, implementation, and performance. Even though 
the members of the team have had similar experiences, there are still many new aspects to 
address. The team can be uncertain about how to design the system, how to optimize the 
implementation, and how well the system will meet functional and performance requirements.  
A typical acquisition also encounters even more challenging external uncertainties.  
These include changes in the: 
 Operational environment, threat or mission, 
 Business processes, governing policies and regulations, 
 User requirements and expectations, 
 Priorities, 
 Competitors (including user-initiated efforts), 
 Technologies, and 
 Stakeholder actions and influence. 
Internal and external factors translate into two critical dimensions of uncertainty: 
uncertainty about what to build and uncertainty about how to build it.  Figure 2 describes an 
acquisition uncertainty landscape based on two key dimensions of uncertainty: evolving 
requirements and emerging technologies. In the lower left hand corner of the figure, 
requirements are relatively stable, and technologies are mature.  This indicates less uncertainty 
and, therefore, more predictability in the execution and outcome of the program.  
Program/project managers know more clearly what needs to be built and the appropriate 
approach to building it.  A traditional acquisition approach often works well in this predictable 









Figure 2. Acquisition Uncertainty Landscape 
Farther away from the lower left hand corner, evolving requirements and emerging 
technologies introduce more uncertainty. The traditional approach of locking down requirements 
early and following a waterfall development effort do not work as well.  Acquisition strategies 
must expect and accommodate change and build in the flexibility for dealing with uncertainty. 
A basic premise of this research is that IT acquisition must take into account a program’s 
position on the uncertainty landscape.  Acquisition strategies should be selected depending on 
the nature and scope of the underlying uncertainties.  In addition, not all parts of a program 
demonstrate the same type and degree of uncertainty.  For example, development of the basic 
infrastructure may be more predictable and fall in the lower left hand quadrant of the landscape, 
while user facing services are often closer to the upper right hand quadrant due to changing 
user expectations and new technologies. 
As shown in Figure 3, the various components (“chunks”) of a program may belong in 
different locations on the uncertainty landscape. Therefore, not all parts of a program have the 
same need for flexibility.  It is useful to envision the components of a program as constituting a 
portfolio.  The core elements of the portfolio are those that are more predictable and can be 
managed using a classic approach, while the more uncertain components require a more 
flexible strategy.  
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Figure 3. Mapping Program Components on the Acquisition Uncertainty Landscape 
Strategies for Dealing with Uncertainty 
This research found that different strategies are appropriate for different levels and types 
of uncertainty.  A plan-driven strategy works best when requirements are primarily stable and 
technologies are mature. As illustrated in Figure 4, staged commitment and small bets 
strategies are more appropriate for components facing uncertainty about what to build and how 
to build it, respectively.  These findings are consistent with earlier research in project 
management (Loch, DeMeyer & Pich, 2006), product development (Smith, 2007) and venture 










Figure 4. Strategies Used to Manage Uncertainty 
The following paragraphs outline three strategies for different areas of the Uncertainty 
Landscape. 
    Strategy 1: Plan-driven 
When there is little uncertainty in requirements and technology, a program/project 
manager can successfully use the traditional Plan-Driven Strategy. This traditional method 
consists of defining a set of requirements, design, cost, and schedule, and then carrying out the 
associated plan.  Since there should be little need to change, progress is measured against the 
plan, and success is determined by how closely cost, schedule, and requirements goals are 
met. Project management techniques, such as Earned Value Management (EVM), have been 
developed to measure execution against the plan. This plan-driven method has been 
successfully used for years when there is little doubt about what is needed and how to satisfy it.  
Where risk is present, program/project managers use well-recognized risk management 
techniques. The idea is to “make a plan and execute to the plan.” 
     Strategy 2: Staged Commitment  
When there are rapidly evolving requirements and uncertainty about what to build, a 
program/project manager can follow an iterative, learning strategy and manage the project by 
staged commitment. In a staged commitment approach, the acquisition is structured so that 
funding and payment decisions are made based on small increments of demonstrable 
capability.  Staged commitment enables the program/project manager to scan the environment, 
assess uncertainty at each stage, and adjust the direction appropriately.  The approach 
preserves the option to re-baseline, re-direct, or terminate the effort if market conditions have 
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A staged commitment strategy is warranted when there are uncertainties in the mission, 
business environment, or user expectations about particular features or performance.  In 
addition, a staged commitment strategy is desirable when there are uncertainties about a 
provider’s ability to achieve agreed-to objectives.  Deliverables at each stage are concrete and 
can involve either early prototypes or small increments of delivered capability.  They can be 
periodically evaluated using feedback from intended users and other critical stakeholders. From 
a contracting standpoint, staged commitment can be accomplished through such mechanisms 
as shorter duration contracts/task orders, with renewal options. 
     Strategy 3: Small Bets  
When there are new or emerging technologies, program/project managers can apply a 
small bets strategy.  In a small bets strategy, parallel efforts are initiated to determine technical 
solutions and a way forward; the pharmaceutical industry makes particular use of this method 
(Eliasberg & Ding, 2002).  Simultaneous, parallel mini-projects are initiated, each one with a 
different design approach.  The projects are completed, and the design with the most successful 
outcome is adopted.  In this way, many design alternatives can be assessed by field trial and 
experimentation. 
 “Small bets” strategies are used to: 
 Explore alternative designs and approaches to implementation 
 Assess alternative technologies 
 Initiate one or more parallel activities for high-risk components on the critical path 
with the understanding that there will be a down-select decision2  
 Foster competition 
 Hedge against the risk of failure of one contractor/provider or solution 
An IT program using small bets should be one that can be structured into small, 
concurrent increments that can each be developed and acquired independently and 
subsequently integrated.  One critical method to enable a small bets approach is the creation of 
contract flexibility, which supports key decisions to modify the acquisition strategy efficiently and 
with controlled impact to cost and schedule. 
Figure 5 illustrates sample strategies and compares the more traditional approaches of 
“one big bet” and “one bet with learning” with variants of “small bets.”  The small bets strategies 
included in Figure 5 are: 
 Design fly-off: Multiple designs are initiated with a competition to select the best 
design.  The winning design is then carried through to the end of the project. 
 DARPA model: Multiple prototypes are carried forward in parallel through design, 
implementation, and field test.  Only the winner is carried into operations. 
 Two-button model: Multiple systems are presented to the user.  The marketplace 
then decides which system best fits their needs, rather than the development team.  
                                                
2 This is often initiated during design or early prototyping but can also be used downstream if the program 
encounters design or contractor/solution issues. 
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Figure 5. Variants of Small Bets 
When both requirements and technology uncertainties exist, the program/project 
manager can use a combination of staged commitment and small bets strategies. Under these 
circumstances, the program/project manager could incrementally commit to requirements, and 
within each increment, initiate alternative designs to reduce technology risk. 
V. Implementation: A Three-step Approach 
Programs that are the most likely candidates for implementation of the alternative 
practices introduced above are those that: 
 Are initiating a novel endeavor that demands a different approach, 
 Have attempted to use traditional strategies, sometimes more than once, and found 
that they proved to be unsuccessful, and  
 Anticipate considerable uncertainty and volatility either in terms of requirements 
and/or enabling technologies.   
These circumstances provide the necessary motivation to try alternative strategies.  In 
addition, the program/project manager must be willing to try these non-traditional practices, and 
the organization must be willing to support the effort.  In effect, senior management must 
provide the necessary encouragement and “top cover.”  Finally, the program must lend itself to 
being structured into small increments that can be developed and acquired independently and 
subsequently integrated to yield the desired capability. 
The implementation approach is organized into three steps (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. Three-step Approach to Implementation 
Step 1: Diagnosis 
The diagnosis step is used to determine which parts of the program are subject to 
uncertainty, as well as the nature and magnitude of the uncertainty.  The underlying premise is 
that uncertainty is not distributed evenly.  Different parts of the program face different sources 
and levels of uncertainty.  Examples of uncertainties that may be faced include: 
 Changes in the mission environment or underlying business process that result in 
changing user needs and/or expectations, 
 Uncertainties about user expectations and user acceptance of particular features 
and/or levels of performance, 
 The pace of change of the enabling technologies, 
 Uncertainties about the ability of providers to achieve agreed-to objectives within the 
time and resource constraints, 
 Items that are on the critical path for which risk-hedging strategies are warranted, 
and 
 Desire to foster competition of ideas, approaches and/or technologies. 
The diagnosis step maps each of the relevant project components onto the uncertainty 
landscape and suggests strategies that may be suitable based on the nature and degree of 
uncertainty. The research effort has developed an interactive tool to assist in conducting the 
diagnosis.  Figure 7 provides an example output of the diagnosis step for one of the case 
studies in this research.  (Note: the project name is disguised for anonymity). 
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Figure 7. Example Diagnostic Output 
 
Step 2: Select and Implement the Acquisition Strategy 
In this step, the program/project manager plans for and implements the selected 
strategies to provide a set of options that can be exercised as situations warrant.  In order to 
preserve the flexibility to respond to potential uncertainties, conditions have to be built in early in 
the planning phases of the project.  These conditions address program structure, funding, 
contracting, and contract/contractor performance.  In both the staged commitment and the small 
bets strategies, the project uses a modular system design and lends itself to modular 
development.  An overarching architecture is critical to defining the components, their 
relationships, and interactions enabling their integration. 
The enabling conditions for the staged commitment strategy include:   
 Development approach: Adopt an agile or spiral development approach to delivery 
of capability. 
 Funding: Align funding with the system architecture and project structure. Arrange 
for payments to be made based on achieving user needs in increments of capability. 
 Contracting: Structure contract vehicles to allow for incremental periods of 
performance (modular contracting), including the options for rapid termination, if and 
when needed. 
 Contract/contractor performance: Emphasize outcomes (capability delivered).  
 Incentives: Structure contractor award to delivery of capability—reflecting user 
feedback. 
The enabling conditions for the small bets strategy include: 
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 Development approach: Adopt a modular-based acquisition strategy. 
 Funding: Provide fiscal flexibility to support establishments of parallel activities as 
needed. 
 Contracting: Structure contract vehicles to allow for competitive parallel 
developments. 
 Contract/contractor performance: Define business model to foster desired 
contractor behavior.   
 Incentives: Structure contractor award to delivery of capability—reflecting user 
feedback. 
These strategies place greater emphasis on initial and recurring trade-space 
assessment that address not only cost, schedule and performance but also affordability, 
responsiveness to changing needs, capability delivered, and interoperability with other internal 
components and external systems. For such strategies to be effective, and not overly costly, 
there is a need to:  
 Limit documentation to what is necessary, 
 Find more cost efficient ways to evaluate working prototypes and early capability 
increments, 
 Implement a “light-weight” governance process for small increments and a more 
traditional governance process for major milestones, and 
 Encourage competition to get better products, sooner, at lower cost. 
Step 3. Adaptive Execution 
The program/project manager who must operate in the today’s uncertain environment 
requires a degree of flexibility to make informed decisions and to adapt to changing 
circumstances. Laying the groundwork in the acquisition strategy is critical.  So, too, is the ability 
to continuously monitor the situation to identify changes in demand, priorities, the delivery of 
products, and the “fit” between the product delivered and user expectations.  If the 
program/project manager views and manages the program as a portfolio of interconnecting 
components, he or she is prepared to rebalance the portfolio as warranted.  This includes 
redirecting, accelerating, slowing, or terminating future increments and initiating risk-hedging 
initiatives. 
VI. Drivers, Enablers, and Barriers to Adopting Uncertainty-
based Strategies 
Although the strategies proposed in this paper for addressing uncertainties in IT 
acquisition are supported and encouraged by statute and regulations, in some instances these 
strategies may be viewed as non-traditional and meet with resistance.  To assess an 
organization’s readiness to implement uncertainty-based strategies, the diagnostic tool includes 
a framework for program/project managers and acquisition professionals to assess whether 
there is “fertile ground” for implementing the proposed strategies.  Will the strategies be 
successfully adopted or challenged by long-standing practices and culture? 
Throughout the field research, the team observed several motivators, enablers, and 
barriers to trying a new acquisition approach.  The findings in the case notes and the extensive 
literature on innovation provide the basis for a model of innovation readiness.  The “Y” Model 
(named because of its shape) is illustrated in Figure 8.  
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Figure 8. "Y" Model of Innovation Readiness  
(Stevens, King, Beard & Halley, 2009) 
The three dimensions of the “Y” model portray a range of individual behavioral 
characteristics, organizational/cultural characteristics, and project circumstances.  A program is 
plotted on the model, and the resulting triangular shape suggests the degree of alignment 
between the need to implement alternative practices and the ability and willingness of the 
organization to do so. 
The project circumstances dimension of the model was developed primarily from 
information gathered from the case notes research.  The project circumstances are often the 
motivation for trying an innovative acquisition approach.  Project circumstances that may serve 
as drivers for innovation include: 
 The program is trying something novel that necessitates an innovative acquisition 
strategy. 
 The program is responding to a critical or urgent need. 
 The program is dealing with rapidly changing circumstances or threats. 
 The program has run into difficulties before (in some cases, two or three times) and 
wants to try a different approach. 
The behavioral characteristics and organizational/cultural characteristics dimensions of 
the model were developed primarily from the literature on innovation (Rogers, 2003) and 
organizational change (Kotter, 2007; Schein, 2004; Holt, Armenakis, Harris & Field, 2007). The 
individual behavior and organizational dimensions of the model form the upper arms of the Y.  
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A mapping of the programs studied in the field research on the "Y” model highlights 
some interesting patterns.  Figure 9 illustrates a project that maps to the outer points on each 
vector.  In this instance, the project was developing a novel capability—the project leader was 
comfortable with uncertainty and willing to accept risk, and the senior leadership of the 
organization was supportive and willing to provide “top cover.” This is an example of an aligned 
project. 
 
Figure 9. Examples of Aligned Project  
(Stevens, King, Beard & Halley, 2009) 
Figure 10 provides an example of a misaligned project.  In this case, the project was 
developing a capability that was fundamentally new to that agency, and the project leader was 
interested in implementing acquisition strategies that were considered to be innovative in that 









Figure 10. Example of a Misaligned Project 
Plotting the overall program and components of the program on the “Y” model can 
provide an early visual indicator of potential roadblocks to uncertainty-based strategies.  A 
misaligned mapping helps focus attention on the areas that need to be addressed up front when 
implementing innovative strategies.  The areas of concern can become part of a risk-mitigation 
plan. 
A word of caution is warranted.  While this model arose from field research observations 
and is supported by a rich body of literature (Holt et al., 2007), it is still a work in progress.  
Much of the literature focuses on the commercial and education sectors, not on acquisition 
practices in the federal government.  Follow-on research will be required to refine and validate 
the model and extend its granularity. 
VII. Conclusion 
The research effort is an ongoing study of acquisition strategies suitable for dealing with 
uncertainty, particularly as it applies to IT acquisitions in the federal government.  The primary 
products of the research are an interactive diagnostic tool as well as a How to Guide that 
provides actionable recommendations for program and project managers and acquisition 
professionals that wish to implement these strategies.   
Key to the successful implementation of these strategies is a perspective that allows the 
program/project manager to: 
 Understand that different parts of the program face different types and degrees of 
uncertainty and urgency, 
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 Be prepared to tailor acquisition strategies, picking a staged commitment strategy in 
which there are uncertain or ambiguous requirements and a small bets strategy to 
hedge against risk or foster competition, 
 Balance the need for agility and discipline, applying discipline in executing the 
current increment while being agile and adaptive in adjusting subsequent increments 
to changing needs, priorities and evolving technologies, 
 Recognize that while statute and regulations encourage flexibility and innovation, 
non-traditional acquisition approaches are often challenged by long-standing practice 
and culture, 
 Seek an active partnership with the end user and “top cover” within the organization, 
and 
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Abstract 
Effective acquisition programs, in terms of cost and capability outcomes, are increasingly 
important in today's cost-constrained environments.  Thus, it is important to have effective 
decision support for acquisition policy and process design.  This paper discusses a simulation-
based approach for decision support that facilitates analysis of the effect of system and 
acquisition enterprise characteristics on acquisition outcomes for different policy and process 
alternatives (e.g., traditional vs. evolutionary).  The particular characteristics studied are system 
modularity and production quantity, plus enterprise architecture and risk characteristics (i.e., 
mission risk).  The modeling approach and results to date are presented. 
1. Introduction 
With the continued advent of new threats on the one hand, and likely constraints on the 
ability of the government to fund new systems on the other, effective military acquisition 
programs are increasingly important.  New threats currently derive from asymmetric and 
regional sources such as terrorism, insurgencies and cyber-warfare.  These new threats call for 
new types of systems.  However, the defense acquisition enterprise operates in an increasingly 
cost-constrained environment.  In recent years, acquisition cost overruns have been highlighted 
by the GAO and have provoked concern from government funding sources.  In addition, short-
term war expenditures have used, and continue to use, funds that otherwise might have been 
used for the acquisition of new systems, and long-term government entitlement commitments 
may constrain future funding for new systems.  Finally, sustainment cost is becoming an 
increasingly significant area of concern. 
This, of course, is not a new observation since the past forty years have seen numerous 
attempts at reforming the acquisition enterprise.  One of the most important reforms is the 
concept of evolutionary acquisition, in which systems are acquired in smaller increments of 
capability and then evolved after initial deployment with capability upgrades.  The theory is that 
evolutionary acquisition enables shorter cycles for acquisition, allowing new capabilities to be 
deployed more quickly to warfighters in the field at less cost, as opposed to traditional 
acquisition approaches that rely on long development cycles (Johnson & Johnson, 2002).   
Despite evolutionary acquisition's status as official policy, though, the Department of 
Defense seems to have had limited success in its implementation (Lorell, Lorrell, & Younossi, 
2006).  Our previous work has demonstrated that evolutionary acquisition can, in fact, result in 
quicker deployment of increased capability but that more frequent cycles incur additional 
overhead that may increase overall costs (Pennock & Rouse, 2008).  By expanding on these 
results, this paper seeks to study the effect of system and enterprise features on the 
performance of acquisition policies.  In particular, the immediate focus is on the effect of system 
modularity on acquisition lifecycle performance, where performance is considered as (i) the time 
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taken to deploy new capabilities in the field, (ii) the availability of systems in the field once 
deployed, (iii) and the lifecycle cost associated with acquisition and sustainment.  The notion of 
modularity has potential synergy with evolutionary acquisition—in terms of enabling capability 
upgrades to be integrated into existing platforms—due to the presence of a modular system 
architecture.   
This paper discusses a simulation-based approach that provides decision support for the 
design of acquisition policies and processes over the acquisition lifecycle so that issues such as 
the effect of system modularity can be addressed.  The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows.  Section 2 reviews the literature on system modularity in product design and acquisition 
processes.  Section 3 describes the simulation model used in this research.  Sections 4 and 5 
discuss an initial experiment and its results, demonstrating the effect of modularity on costs and 
availability.  Then, Section 6 concludes with a description of future research intentions. 
2. Literature Review 
Modularity is typically conceptualized as a matrix of relationships between different 
system modules or components, where the relationship may mean that two modules or 
components are connected or that changes to one impact the other.  Here, we adopt the latter 
as the meaning.  For instance, a laptop computer is typically considered less modular than a 
desktop since many components of a desktop are designed to be assembled and replaced by 
the user without changes to other components (Hölttä-Otto & de Weck, 2007).  The modular 
architecture of a system often is considered to consist of a set of modules or components and 
an infrastructure, which connects components or otherwise provides a platform for the system.  
Here, we adopt the terminology that a simple system is composed of components and that a 
complex system is composed of modules, which are, in turn, composed of components.  In this 
type of complex system, a module typically has strong relationships among its constituent 
components. 
Assume that a value of 1 means that two components are strongly related, that a value 
of 0 means that they are not related, and that a value in between represents the probability that 
they are related over a set of circumstances.  Figure 1, then, illustrates the concept of 
modularity for small systems represented by matrices.  It should be noted in the figure that the 
matrix entry mij represents the degree to which a change in component i affects component j.  
Also, the matrix representation is not standardized in the literature.  For instance, other efforts 
reverse the role of the rows and columns (e.g., Baldwin & Clark, 2000).  It is assumed that 
entries along the diagonal are all 1; however, they are not relevant to the model.  In Figure 1e, 
then, component 1 is the infrastructure, and the example shows that a change to it impacts all 
components.  In Figure 1f, there are two modules, each composed of two components. 
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Figure 1. Modularity Representations 
The concept of modularity in system design has been researched fairly extensively over 
the last twenty years.  Much of this literature applies to commercial product design rather than 
military system design.  In this discussion, the terms system and product will be used 
interchangeably.  Ulrich and Tung (1991) offer one of the first definitions of modularity, focusing 
on (i) similarity between the physical and functional architectures of a product or system and (ii) 
minimization of interactions between physical components.  While function is one focus of 
modularity research, another focus is on the system lifecycle—for instance, modularity to 
facilitate component disassembly, recycling or reuse (Gershenson, Prasad & Allamneni, 1999).  
The lifecycle focus provides a framework for discussing how modularity affects cost during the 
different phases of acquisition. 
In design, there is considerable literature on how to format for modularity.  The research 
literature, for the most part, does not concentrate directly on cost, though.  Baldwin and Clark 
(2000) discuss three stages of cost with respect to designing for modularity: (i) establishing 
design rules, (ii) establishing design parameters, and (iii) testing and fixes.  Design rules provide 
constraints within which modules (or components) must operate.  As the number of modules 
increases, the cost of establishing design rules also increases, although no specific relationship 
is identified (Baldwin & Clark, 2000).  Establishing design rules is considered a one-time 
expenditure, since they are believed to remain in effect for a long time.  Design parameters 
must be established each time a module is designed.  The cost increases with product 
complexity and is applied for each redesign.  Costs for testing and fixes start high but decrease 
over time as personnel gain expertise with the particular product or system. 
Hölttä and Otto (2005) support the general relationship described for Baldwin and 
Clark’s “design parameter” costs, but add two boundary cases of significance.  First, minor 
changes often do not require a reworking of the module parameters, largely owing to the 
allowances of play existing within the system.  Second, major changes usually require a much 
more costly reworking of the module concept itself.  Although they do not use the same 
terminology as Baldwin and Clark, the implication is that these large changes could challenge 
even the initial design rules.  Between those two extremes, however, Hölttä and Otto observe a 
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roughly linear relationship between the degree of change requested and the difficulty—and, by 
inference, the cost—of enacting that change.   
In terms of production, Fixson (2007), in his review of research into modularity and 
commonality, finds that most studies of modularity have identified economies of scale as a 
significant cost benefit.  Garud and Kumaraswamy (1995) describe the effect as an economy of 
substitution.  The ability to manufacture components separately from the products they 
comprise permits these component designs to outlive individual product lines.  Thus, modularity 
extends the size of the production runs across both products and through time.  This reuse of a 
design lowers costs by reducing retooling requirements.  The relationship is not entirely linear.  
There is an optimal number of modules where increasing assembly costs balance out the 
decreasing fabrication costs (Fixson, 2007). 
The scale of the product itself may also be significant in whether these cost benefits can 
be realized.  Zhang and Gershenson (2003), investigating a collection of fourteen small-
consumer products, “found no general relationships between relative modularity and cost, or 
between change in modularity and change in cost.” 
In sales and demand for commercial products, Desai, Kekre, Radhakrishnan, and 
Srinivasan (2001) find that increasing commonality between products can hurt demand.  Shared 
components reduce the perceived value of high-value products and increase the component 
costs for low value products, thus eating into profits from both ends.  The F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter offers an interesting case of commonality across systems in a military context.  Its three 
variants are designed for three different service applications (a traditional fighter for the Air 
Force, a vertical/short take-off and landing vehicle for the Marines, and a carrier-based fighter 
for the Navy).  If successful, this approach demonstrates a way whereby commonality increases 
demand via appealing to different classes of customers. 
In sustainment, modularity can help reduce inventory cost by pooling demands, an 
extension of the economies of scale that benefit the production stage.  These early findings 
have seen much elaboration and investigation, leaving the inventory phase one of the most 
researched phases in the lifecycle of modular architecture.  Fixson (2007) offers a thorough 
account of the various exceptions and extensions of the inventory research, including the roles 
of demand distributions, correlated demands, component cost structures, inventory time 
horizon, process and supply networks, and other constraints and considerations. 
Aside from inventory, the sustainment phase of the product lifecycle is one of the least 
researched aspects of modularity.  Gershenson et al. (1999) speculate that maintenance costs 
should diminish with increased modularity, but their focus is elsewhere, and they do not back 
this speculation with data.  Newcomb, Bras, and Rosen (1998) demonstrate that it is possible to 
modularize a product with respect to lifecycle, i.e. maintenance and disposal.  Tsai, Wang, and 
Lo (2003) offer a similar demonstration.  Both papers indicate that modularity can reduce costs 
of ownership but only if applied properly.  Gershenson, Prasad & Zhang (2003) speculate that 
any modularity is good for maintenance costs; however, this hypothesis does not yet appear to 
have been tested in the research literature. 
Modularity is related to the notion of open systems, which have been adopted as an 
initiative in the DoD acquisition.  An open-systems approach seeks to enable the integration of 
current and future capabilities into a system via standards.  Ford and Dillard (2008) study the 
interaction between evolutionary acquisition and open systems and find that the use of the two 
together may improve schedule and cost performance but may also increase cost in 
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sustainment due to a trade-off between increased integration risks (due to evolving standards) 
and reduced design risks (due to use of currently stable standards). 
There are several hypotheses that are of interest when considering modularity.  These 
include, along with supporting evidence from the literature: 
1. Increasing modularity decreases the cost of implementing technology upgrades for 
deployed systems (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1995; 
Gershenson et al., 2003; Huang & Kusiak, 1998; Ulrich & Tung, 1991; Ulrich, 1995); 
2. Increasing modularity decreases the mean time to repair a system that has failed 
(Cheung & Hausman, 1995; Gershenson et al., 2003; Tsai et al., 2003); 
3. Increasing modularity increases the upfront engineering design hours required for a 
system (Ulrich, 1995); 
4. Increasing modularity increases the cost of changes to infrastructure (Ethiraj & Levinthal, 
2004; Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1995; Ulrich & Tung, 1991; 
Ulrich, 1995). 
It should be noted that Fleming and Sorenson (2001) offer mixed support for hypothesis 
1 since they find that small technology upgrades are handled easily with a modular architecture 
but that major upgrades may pose challenges since they may require changes to the modular 
architecture itself.  In addition, Garud and Kumaraswamy (1995) assert that technology upgrade 
costs decrease only at the expense of an initial infrastructure cost.  This paper primarily 
addresses the first two hypotheses. 
As the number of components in a system increases, it is a complex task to compare 
different modularity matrices and quantitatively determine differences in modularity.  Thus, there 
has been interest in establishing a modularity index to provide a standardized measurement of 
modularity.  Two such indices are given by Guo and Gershenson (2004) and Hölttä-Otto and de 
Weck (2007).  Effective modularity indices remain an area of research. 
3. Model Description 
This research uses a simulation-based decision support to determine the effectiveness 
of different acquisition policies and processes.  Simulation has traditionally been used in 
process-based domains such as manufacturing (Law & Kelton, 2000).  Increasingly, it is being 
used to study acquisition.  Ford and Dillard (2008) use a system dynamics approach, which 
models the delayed effects and feedback flows associated with the acquisition enterprise.  
Discrete-event simulation is used in our previous work (Pennock & Rouse, 2008) and by Olson 
and Sage (2003).  Discrete-event simulation tends to offer better representational support for 
organizational decision-making processes. 
3.1. Existing Model Summary 
Our existing model is implemented using ARENA 10.0, a commercially available, 
discrete-event simulation package.  It consists of three interacting components, which address 
the traditional acquisition system (Pennock & Rouse, 2008): 
 Technical Progress Model.  The technical progress model accounts for basic 
research that occurs exogenous to the defense enterprise.  This work may be 
performed in the commercial sector or via government funding.  It feeds raw, new 
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technologies into a technology development process model that reflects the 
DoD's science and technology (S&T) development enterprise.  Technologies are 
characterized by an application area, a maturity level and a capability level.  An 
example of an application area might be radar.  The maturity level reflects the 
readiness of the technology for usage and is measured using the NASA 
technological readiness level (TRL) scale, recently adopted by the DoD (DoD, 
2006, July).  Capability level, on the other hand, represents the technology's 
capability (once deployed) in relation to previous generations within the same 
application area.  Capability level for each succeeding generation is determined 
by a combination of a learning effect (from the other DoD applications) and an 
exogenous progress effect (from commercial and outside technical progress).  
Technologies are put into the technology development process model at an early 
TRL (e.g., 1). 
 Technology Development Process Model.  In this S&T enterprise, new 
technologies for the DoD systems typically undergo a staged process of 
development whereby ideas are reduced to working technologies that can be 
integrated into a system.  There is considerable technical risk in the development 
process, as ideas often do not work in practice, do not scale-up to production, or 
do not integrate into systems.  The staged process mitigates risk by not fully 
funding a technology's development, allowing it to be culled if it fails or if it is 
outpaced by competing technologies.  It should be noted that the S&T enterprise 
model consists of a single, unified organization rather than the myriad agencies 
that comprise the actual DoD S&T enterprise. 
 System Acquisition Process Model.  The system acquisition model primarily 
represents the first four phases of a defense acquisition program, as specified in 
the DoD Defense Acquisition Guidebook (2006).  These include concept 
development, technology development, system development and production & 
deployment.  Operations & support is represented by a simple delay function for 
the period of sustainment.  The system acquisition process model pulls 
technologies from the technology development process model for use in the 
system being developed.  In the existing model, the TRL at which these 
technologies are selected is an experimental variable used to assess the effect of 
traditional acquisition (which selects relatively immature technologies and 
matures them in the program for significant capability leaps in deployed systems) 
versus evolutionary acquisition (which selects relatively mature technologies for 
more frequent, but smaller capability leaps). 
The remainder of this section discusses two enhancements to the existing model—the 
introduction of a representation for system modularity and a model of the sustainment phase of 
the acquisition lifecycle. 
3.2. Modularity Matrix 
A system is assumed to have n components.  These components may or may be related 
with one another for the purposes of repair/replacement and/or technology upgrades during 
sustainment.  One of these components is designated as the system infrastructure, or the 
platform that integrates the various components.  Modular systems often require such an 
infrastructure to facilitate modularity.  Modularity is then characterized as the degree to which 
the various components interact or are connected, and it is represented as an n x n matrix.  It 
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should be noted that modularity is assumed to be a function of the system design, as 
determined in upstream stages of the acquisition process. 
Each entry mij in this modularity matrix M represents the probability that a change in 
component i necessitates a change in component j.  Component failures and component 
technology upgrade opportunities arrive and involve changes to a component.  Due to 
modularity effects, they may also involve changes to other components through the relations 
represented by M.  The modularity values for a particular system may differ for repairs and 
technology upgrades, resulting in two different matrices, Mr and Mt.  Also, a modularity matrix is 
not necessarily symmetric.  That is, changes to component i may affect component j in a 
manner different from that in which changes to j affect i.  A simple example of asymmetry is 
when replacing i requires removing j, but replacing j does not require removing i.  Components 
may be organized into modules in complex systems. 
3.3. Sustainment Model 
The sustainment model has two primary processes—repairs and technology upgrades.  
Failures and technology upgrade opportunities arrive as random events to a deployed system, 
according to a Poisson process with a particular rate.  Each failure or technology upgrade 
opportunity directly affects only one component, except that an infrastructure component, when 
present, is not affected by failures or technology upgrades and is assumed to be component 1.  
However, repairs or upgrades may cascade to other components, due to modularity 
relationships.  The following notation is used for the sustainment model. 
 fi is the failure rate associated with component i.  f1 is undefined when infrastructure 
is present (since infrastructure is component 1). 
 ri is the repair rate associated with component i.  r1 is undefined when infrastructure 
is present. 
 ti is the arrival rate of new technology upgrades for component i.  t1 is undefined 
when infrastructure is present. 
 ui is the upgrade rate for component i.  u1 is undefined when infrastructure is present. 
 pi is the cost of repairing component i.  p1 is undefined when infrastructure is present. 
 qi is the cost associated with a technology upgrade to component i.  q1 is undefined 
when infrastructure is present. 
 cij is the compatibility cost associated with making component j technologically 
compatible with component i if i is upgraded and if the interaction between i and j 
necessitates that j be made compatible to the new technology for i.  ci1 is undefined 
when infrastructure is present. 
In general, it is assumed that fi > ti, ri > ui, and pi < qi. 
The simulation logic works as follows.  When a failure to component i arrives to the 
system, it invokes a repair delay for that component, occurring at rate ri.  All components j such 
that mij > 0 are evaluated probabilistically via a Bernoulli variable, using the probability mij, to 
determine whether j must also be repaired.  Any components j requiring a repair are then 
repaired at rate rj.  This repair requirement can cascade to additional components that are 
dependent on j, and so on.  The system experiences a repair downtime equal to the maximum 
repair time of i and that of any other affected components. 
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Similarly, when a technology upgrade to component i arrives to the system, it invokes an 
upgrade delay for that component.  This delay occurs at rate ui.  All components j such that mij > 
0 are evaluated probabilistically via a Bernoulli variable to determine whether j must also be 
made compatible with the upgrade.  Any components j requiring a compatibility operation invoke 
a delay at rate uj.  Upgrade effects can cascade similarly to repair effects.  The system 
experiences an upgrade downtime equal to the sum upgrade time of i and compatibility time of 
any affected components.  This is in contrast to the downtime due to repairs. 
If a failure or technology upgrade for i arrives while the system is in downtime, then that 
failure or technology upgrade queues until the downtime is resolved.  Multiple entities in this 
queue are processed as first-come-first-served. 
Clearly, this is a relatively simple model.  It is meant to allow basic analysis of the effects 
of modularity and to provide a basis for more complex models in the future. 
4. Experiment 
In this section, we detail a simulation experiment to test the effect of different types of 
modularity matrices on sustainment.  The dependent variables are the repair costs, upgrade 
costs and system availability.  Sustainment of a single system is considered in each 
experimental run.  Three classes of modularity are considered: 
 Type 1.  All non-diagonal entries in the matrix are the same fractional probability 
value. 
 Type 2.  All non-diagonal entries in the modularity matrix are either zero or one. 
 Type 3.  The matrix consists of modules, comprised of components that have strong 
relationships, but the relationship entries between modules in different components 
is zero.   
4.1. Parameters and Assumptions 
The simulation is executed over a period representing ten years of sustainment.  The 
following parameter values are used.  These parameter values are selected as notional values 
for the experimental analysis to illustrate the effects of the modularity. 
 fi = 60 days for all i 
 ri = 1 hour for all i 
 ti = 360 days for all i 
 ui = 6 hours for all i 
 pi = 10 currency units for all i 
 qi = 100 currency units for all i 
 cij = 15 currency units for all i and j 
4.2. Experimental Setup 
Table 1 shows the variations tested among the different types of modularity matrices.  In 
matrices of types 1 and 2, n equals 10.  In matrices of type 3, the size is adjusted to n equals 16 
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to accommodate modules being the same size (e.g., systems with eight modules, each having 
two components, or with four modules, each having four components). 
Table 1. Modularity Matrix Variations Tested 
Matrix Type Variations 
Type 1 Eleven different variations are simulated.  Each variation uses a different value 
for all non-diagonal mij.  The different values used are 0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 
0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, and 1.0. 
Type 2 Seven different variations are simulated.  Each variation has a mix of values 
(0, 1) for non-diagonal mij.  Each variation uses a different probability to select 
a specific value for each mij.  These probabilities are 0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 
and 0.6, and the probability corresponds to mij equaling one, as opposed to 
zero.  It was determined that probability values above 0.6 had similar behavior; 
thus, they are not considered here. 
Type 3 Five variations are simulated.  Each variation has a different size of module.  
The variations include sixteen modules of size 1, eight modules of size 2, four 
modules of size 4, two modules of size 8, one module of size 16.  Within each 
module, all mij equal 1.  Relationships between modules have mij equal 0. 
 
Ten replications of each variation are run for statistical significance. 
5. Results and Analysis 
5.1. Repair Costs 
Figures 2-4 illustrate average repair costs as a function of the level of modularity in a 
system.  The actual average repair cost shown is the average collateral repair cost, or the cost 
of repairing other components related to a failed component that must be repaired due to a 
modularity relationship.  This shows the variable effect of modularity in terms of average repair 
cost.  The result from each replication across each variation is shown in each figure.  The units 
for cost are in currency units, as specified in the parameters for the model. 
According to expectations, as the level of relationship strength (or coupling) increases 
(i.e., as modularity decreases), the repair cost increases for each type of matrix.  The factors of 
interest include the points at which the costs start to converge to a maximum value and the 
relative spread of the costs for each level of variation within each type of modularity matrix.  In 
the type 1 matrix, the variance is less than that of the type 2 matrix, suggesting that numerous 
weak relationships provide a more predictable repair cost for a system than a set of 
relationships that are either very strong or very weak.  Intuitively, this makes sense.  It also is 
reinforced by the outcome from type 3 matrices, in which the repair cost is always the same, 
since a component failure leads to replacement of the entire module, and each module is the 
same size and cost.  Since module size has a linear relationship with module cost, the cost 
relationship with modularity is likewise linear. 
Since the failure rates are the same across all replications, the patterns for total repair 
costs of each replication (over the entire ten-year time horizon) are similar to those of average 
costs (per failure incident).  Therefore, only the average costs are shown.  However, it should be 
noted that there would be variance across variations in the type 3 matrix total costs since the 
number of failures during the time horizon is a random variable. 
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Figure 2. Repair Cost as a Function of Modularity for Type 1 Matrix 
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Figure 4. Repair Cost as a Function of Modularity for Type 3 Matrix 
5.2. Technology Upgrade Costs 
Figures 5-7 illustrate average upgrade costs as a function of the level of modularity in a 
system.  Average upgrade cost addresses the work to make components consistent to 
upgrades when they are related to the component being upgraded, i.e., the variable portion of 
cost related to modularity.  The result from each replication across each variation is shown in 
each figure.   
The behavior patterns for upgrade costs are comparable to those for repair costs: as the 
level of relationship strength increases, the upgrade cost increases for each type of matrix.  As 
with repair costs, the pattern for total upgrade cost over the ten-year time horizon is similar to 
that of the average cost, so only the average costs are shown.  The units for cost are in 
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Figure 5. Upgrade Cost as a Function of Modularity for Type 1 Matrix 
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Figure 7. Upgrade Cost as a Function of Modularity for Type 3 Matrix 
5.3. System Downtime 
Finally, Figures 8-10 illustrate average system downtime during the ten-year time 
horizon as a function of the level of modularity in a system.  Average downtime is a combined 
effect of failures and technology upgrades.  The result from each replication across each 
variation is shown in each figure.   
As the level of relationship strength increases, the average downtime increases for each 
type of matrix.  The behavior patterns are somewhat similar to those for costs.  The average 
downtime values across matrix type 3 variations are not constant, due to the random number of 
failures and technology upgrades in each replication.  The units for downtime are the fraction of 
time that the system is unavailable. 
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Figure 10. Downtime as a Function of Modularity for Type 3 Matrix 
6. Discussion and Future Research 
These results provide some insight into the effect of modularity on sustainment costs 
and system availability.  There is some potential for cost savings and improved system 
availability as modularity is increased.  Clearly, the parameter values and complexities of real 
systems need to be considered, and this will be a focus of future research efforts.  Such efforts 
need to account for the notion of integration risk over the lifecycle, as detailed in Ford & Dillard 
(2008). 
One major goal of this research is to characterize the effect of modularity over the 
acquisition lifecycle.  Thus, current work is focusing on integration of the existing model of 
acquisition with the new sustainment and modularity models.  This involves modeling modularity 
and its engineering costs in the acquisition model as well as modeling the flow of technology 
upgrades to the sustainment model from the S&T model.  The emphasis on cost modeling will 
be on parametric models for cost estimation (e.g., Valerdi & Liu, in press).  Such models must 
address not only the initial design of modularity but also adjustments during development such 
as evolution of design parameters (Baldwin & Clark, 2000).  The hypothesis is that modularity 
tends to increase design and development costs while decreasing production and sustainment 
costs.  The question is to determine what levels of modularity, in combination with other system 
characteristics, achieve the best results, not only in terms of cost but also in terms of time to 
deployment and post-deployment availability.  One such system characteristic is production 
level, which has the potential to leverage economies of scale in making modularity more cost 
effective. 
To answer the question about the effectiveness of modularity levels, it is important to be 
able to characterizer modularity by a standard metric such as a modularity index.  This also will 




==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå======== - 109 - 
=
=
Another goal is to study the effect of enterprise characteristics and their interactions with 
system characteristics.  In particular, we are interested in studying the effects of alignment in the 
S&T system and the concept of mission risk.  The current model assumes a unitary S&T 
organization rather than the multi-organization S&T enterprise.  In terms of cost, schedule and 
risk, what is the trade-off between the redundancy of a multi-organization S&T enterprise versus 
the efficiency of a unitary organization?  Mission risk is increasingly important, given the 
evolution of threats that need to be addressed.  Does modularity aid in adapting systems in the 
field to new mission requirements?  Finally, we plan to extend previous results by exploring 
which conditions from the above areas of study make evolutionary acquisition more favorable 
than traditional approaches. 
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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the probabilistic cost model currently in use by 
NAVSEA 05C to predict cost uncertainty in naval vessel construction and to develop a better 
method of predicting the ultimate cost risk.  The data used to develop the improved approach is 
collected from analysis of the CG(X) class ship by NAVSEA 05C.  The NAVSEA 05C cost risk 
factors are reviewed and analyzed to determine if different factors are better cost predictors.  
The impact of data elicitation, the Money Allocated Is Money Spent (MAIMS) principle, and 
correlation effects are incorporated into the research and analysis of this paper.  Data quality is 
directly affected by data elicitation methods and influences the choice of probability distribution 
used to give the best predictor of cost risk.  MAIMS and correlation effects are shown to make a 
significant impact to the overall cost model.  Program managers and analysts can readily 
implement the enhanced models using commercial Excel® add-ins, such as Crystal Ball® or 
@Risk and integrate them into their current cost risk analysis and management practices to 
better mitigate risk and control project cost. 
Executive Summary 
In order to generate the funds to implement the 30-year plan of future ships and 
capabilities, the Navy must explore different options for cost savings.  Fundamental to the 
success of complex projects, such as naval vessel construction, is the ability to control, 
manage, and communicate the status of the risk reduction effort throughout the development 
and production cycles (Kujawski & Angelis, 2007).  It is recognized that the Navy and the 
shipbuilding industry need to change their technical and business shipbuilding strategies in 
order to achieve the goal of a future fleet that balances both capability and affordability.  Cost 
risk assessment and analysis is one tool that can be utilized to help recapitalize costs used in 
the ship acquisition and building process. 
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This paper analyzes the probabilistic cost model currently in use by Naval Sea Systems 
Command Cost Engineering and Industrial Analysis Division (NAVSEA 05C) to predict cost 
uncertainty in naval vessel construction and to develop a method that better predicts the 
ultimate cost risk.  The NAVSEA 05C’s cost analysis model for the proposed new cruiser, 
CG(X), encompasses all aspects of cost for the entire fleet, including inflation and profit.  The 
data used in the NAVSEA model were acquired from subject matter expert (SME) inquiry using 
three-point estimates of high, most-likely, and low values.  The Navy is placing great emphasis 
on producing the best product for each dollar spent.  In order to ensure the continued 
acquisition of CG(X), it is important that realistic cost risk analysis be performed so that program 
managers can make informed decisions. 
The cost model elements investigated in this paper include data elicitation methods, 
probability distribution function (PDF) choice, correlation effects, and Money Allocated is Money 
Spent (MAIMS) principle effects.  The most significant impact is seen with MAIMS and data 
elicitation effects.  PDF choice and correlation effects have lesser impact upon the cost model. 
Methods of data elicitation are explored and the use of a direct fractile assessment 
(DFA) is recommended for future use (Kujawski, Alvaro & Edwards, 2004), although the 
research in this paper does not involve data acquisition.  To simulate the use of a DFA 
methodology, three-parameter Weibull distributions are employed to account for uncertainty 
associated with SME estimation of data.  A Weibull (10%, 50%, 90%) distribution is used to 
simulate a more optimistic view of the uncertainty of data, while a Weibull (20%, 50%, 80%) 
distribution models a more pessimistic view. 
The methodology in choosing different probability distribution functions and their 
applicability to the model is evaluated.  Specifically, triangular, lognormal, and two variations of 
the three-parameter Weibull distribution are considered.  Once enhanced models are 
established, program managers can implement them into their current cost risk analysis practice 
to mitigate risk and control project cost. 
Two types of correlation effects are considered and modeled in this paper.  The first is 
the correlation between the components of the radar suite, and the second is the correlation 
between all the components of the electronics suite.  The radar suite is one of the systems that 
make up the electronics suite.  The results suggest that the correlation effects are important for 
probability values midway between the mean and the extremes, but there is little difference for 
correlation coefficients beyond 0.5.  Further investigations are recommended to quantify 
correlation effects. 
MAIMS modified probability distributions are used to show the significance of budget 
allocation levels (Kujawski, Alvaro & Edwards, 2004).  These distributions reflect an empirically 
observed effect, namely, that once a budget is allocated, the project cost will most likely be at 
least equal to the amount allocated.  As the MAIMS modification value increases, the overall 
distribution cost rises with increasing probability. 
Credibility and realism are two key cost risk assessment criteria.  The use of improved 
methods, such as those investigated in this paper, are especially significant for today’s Navy 
during a time of budget hardship.  If the Navy’s plans for a 313-ship fleet are to become a 
reality, the incorporation of cost risk analysis into acquisition and shipbuilding management is 
imperative.  Reliable cost assessments can help deliver projects on time, at a lower cost, with a 
higher probability of success.  Effective training of personnel involved in cost assessment and 
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continued efforts to improve existing cost models will help improve the Navy’s current cost  
estimating process. 
I. Introduction 
Admiral Gary Roughead stated in the Chief of Naval Operation’s (CNO) Guidance for 
2007-2008 that: 
We manage risk.  We will identify, analyze, mitigate and then accept risk, 
appreciating that we must always consider the risks in aggregate across the 
entire force.  Zero risk is not achievable nor affordable.  We must manage risk 
and move forward to accomplish the mission while safeguarding our people and 
infrastructure. (Roughhead, 2007) 
Vice Admiral K. M. McCoy took this a step further in 2008, in a statement made on 
assuming the position of Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command: 
Our Common mission is to develop, deliver and maintain ships and systems on 
time and on cost for the Navy.  To build an affordable future fleet, we will focus 
on reducing acquisition costs, including applying more risk-based decisions to 
specifications and requirements. (McCoy, 2008) 
The United States Navy is living and functioning in an era of ever-expanding technology, 
more stringent requirements, and a growing need for more ships and resources, all while 
working with a limited budget.  These factors all lead to inherent cost growth in the projects that 
are developed to provide the fleet with the capabilities it needs.  In order for the United States 
Navy to acquire and provide a full,  
state-of-the-art, 313-ship Navy by 2020, as stated in the fiscal year (FY) 2007 plan (Department 
of the Navy, 2006) it is imperative that methods allowing full capitalization of each dollar spent 
by the Navy are developed and implemented. 
In February 2006, the United States Navy presented its FY2007 plan, which outlines the 
objective of increasing the current 285-ship fleet to 313 ships by 2020 (Department of the Navy, 
2006).  By 2008, the Navy increased the estimate of its annual cost for the 30-year plan by 
about 44% in real terms, but it is still approximately 7% less than independent cost estimates 
conducted by the Congressional Budget Office (O’Rourke, 2008).  This increase in estimated 
cost poses a problem for the overall funding of the shipbuilding strategy proposed by the 
Secretary of the Navy.  The credibility of the Navy’s estimates and the ability to fund its 
shipbuilding plans have been questioned by Congress and industry (Cavas, 2008). 
In order to adequately generate the funds to implement the 30-year plan of future ships 
and capabilities, the Navy must explore different options for cost savings.  Fundamental to the 
success of complex projects, such as naval vessel construction, is the ability to control, 
manage, and communicate the status of the risk reduction effort throughout the development 
and production cycles (Kujawski & Angelis, 2007).  It is recognized that the Navy and 
shipbuilding industry need to change their technical and business shipbuilding strategies in 
order to achieve the goal of a future fleet that balances both capability and affordability.  Cost 
risk assessment and analysis is one tool that can be utilized to help recapitalize costs used in 
the ship acquisition and building process. 
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Risk analysis is an important component of the cost analysis of new vessels because 
actual costs will always have a probability of differing from the estimate.  Several reasons 
account for the difference between the estimate and actual cost, which can include lack of 
knowledge about the future, errors associated with assumptions and cost-estimating equations, 
historical data inconsistencies, and factors considered in making the estimate.  The overall 
purpose of risk analysis is to quantify the potential for error (GAO, 2007).  In the case of a cost 
estimate, it is the probability that the actual cost will exceed the cost estimate or the budget.  
This cost estimate allows for the assessment of risk of a given program. 
Cost overruns and growth are an enduring problem that is not new to the Navy.  A 1939 
inquiry from Secretary of the Navy Ray Spear asks the question, “Why do naval vessels cost so 
much?” Answers to this inquiry include increased progress in marine engineering and naval 
construction, increased horsepower in shipbuilding, improved quality of building materials, 
inflation, and the practice of paying full price for the best you can buy naturally increases costs.  
Spear (1939) states that, “care must be taken in approving estimates to make sure that they are 
reasonable and held to in the cost of production.  When contracts are negotiated, the question 
of costs should be investigated and a detailed knowledge of approximate costs obtained.”  Just 
as cost estimation was recognized by the Secretary of the Navy in 1939, it is recognized by 
today’s Navy leadership as an integral part of the ship acquisition process. 
Risk analysis and management can be used to help program managers more effectively 
make acquisition decisions and allocate their resources by allowing for a better understanding of 
program risks.  Risk management is a continuous process in the acquisition and development of 
naval vessels. 
The Naval Sea Systems Command, Cost Engineering and Industrial Analysis (NAVSEA 
05C) introduced Cost Risk Analysis (CRA) into the Navy’s PR09 Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) to help assess vessel costs in terms of quantifiable 
risk.  Cost Risk Assessment is defined as the process of quantifying the uncertainties 
associated with major acquisition programs.  It therefore allows for informed decisions with an 
estimated level of confidence (McCarthy, 2008). 
One of the key objectives of CRA is to enable better risk management, which will 
simultaneously reduce program costs and increase the probability of success.  Cost estimating 
is recognized by NAVSEA 05C as an essential element of effective program management, 
required for realistic program planning and decision-making.  Risk analysis is important because 
the previous methodology of using point estimates is “precisely wrong” (Deegan, 2007).  Risk 
cannot be assessed with a point estimate, as it represents a single value that serves as a best 
guess for the parameter to be defined.  Decision-makers may not be able to completely 
understand the influence of different variables on cost with the use of a point estimate.  
Conversely, the use of risk analysis allows the decision-maker to utilize his or her acquisition 
experience, while quantifying the qualitative aspects of acquisition scenarios. 
Point estimates are not an accurate method for predicting costs in shipbuilding because 
they do not properly account for problems that may be encountered in the acquisition process, 
as described above.  They may be either overly optimistic or overly pessimistic.  Optimistic point 
estimates ignore the potential risk and uncertainty in a project, which is necessary for 
management to make informed decisions.  Immature technology, uncertain product design, 
schedule problems, and unforeseen events all have risk associated with their end product.  Risk 
 =
=
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå======== - 117 - 
=
=
analysis is necessary in order to incorporate the effect of risk into the overall cost.  Pessimistic 
point estimates assume worst scenarios and unlikely high costs.  Quantitative risk analysis 
allows the cost estimator to assign a realistic range of costs around a point estimate, which 
provides decision-makers with a level of confidence in achieving a credible cost. 
The NAVSEA Cost-estimating Process is comprised of three parts, which are further 
divided into 12 tasks.  The three parts consist of Develop Approach, Perform Estimate, and Brief 
Results.  Figure 1 shows the breakdown of the 12 tasks within the three parts.  This paper 
focuses on the Develop Approach and Perform Estimate parts of the cost-estimating process. 
 
Figure 1. NAVSEA 12-Step Cost-estimating Process  
(NAVSEA, 2005) 
Data collection is a task within the Develop Approach part of cost estimation and can be 
regarded as the most important part of risk analysis.  Bad data will produce bad results, 
regardless of the subsequent analysis.  Data elicitation is often done ad hoc; however, several 
reliable methods and sources are available for data collection.  Data quality is critical to the 
success of the analysis and plays a significant part in the results generated for cost estimation.  
This paper will discuss improved methods for data collection in order to obtain more reliable and 
standardized data from subject matter experts (SMEs). 
Risk analysts use probability distributions rather than point estimates to represent the 
possible outcomes of an event.  There is a significant difference between a point estimate and a 
distribution, in that the distribution provides the full range of values with their associated 
probabilities, while the point estimate presents a single value.  This allows program 
management to make budget decisions, based on desired confidence levels.  Quality may differ, 
based on the method of collection.  Two methods commonly used for data collection include 
database queries and interviews of SMEs or stakeholders (Deegan & Fields, 2007).  This paper 
analyzes the current NAVSEA 05C Cruiser (CG(X)) probabilistic cost model including data 
elicitation. 
The direct fractile assessment (DFA) method provides one of the most reliable and least 
bias-prone procedures for eliciting uncertain quantities from SMEs (Kujawski, Alvaro & 
Edwards, 2004).  Data elicitation from SMEs is innately uncertain; three findings from 
psychological experiments conducted by Alpert and Raiffia (1982) are: 
 A systematic bias toward overconfidence is common. 
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 Extreme value judgment is poor. 
 Maximum and minimum values are vague terms.  What do these terms really mean? 
Based on the findings of Alpert and Raiffia (1982), Kujawski et al. (2004) propose the 
following guidelines for data elicitation: 
 Ask SMEs to provide 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles values for cost elements.  
Avoid extreme values, abstract measures such as the mean or standard deviation, or 
specific distribution functions.  Allow for discussion and education of the SME in 
terms of bias when giving data figures. 
 Calibrate each set of percentiles to reflect individual and project specific 
considerations, both pessimistic and optimistic.  For estimates that might be overly 
optimistic, a cost analyst might choose to shift a 90th percentile value to perhaps 
80th or 75th percentiles. 
Tasks involved in the Performing Estimate depicted in Figure 1 are running the model 
and generating a point estimate or probability distribution, conducting a cost risk analysis, and 
conducting a preliminary estimate review. 
Traditionally, triangular distributions have been used in cost estimation models because 
of the simplicity in entering the required data.  The triangular distribution requires minimum or 
low, most-likely, and high or maximum values.  Other commonly used distributions include 
normal, lognormal, and uniform.  Table 1 lists eight of the most common probability distributions 
used for cost estimation and uncertainty analysis.  This paper investigates different methods for 
data elicitation and selecting appropriate distributions.  The effects of using different 
distributions on cost risk are evaluated and identified.
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Table 1. Common Probability Distributions Used in Cost-estimating Uncertainty Analysis  
(GAO, 2007) 
 
The Money Allocated is Money Spent (MAIMS) principle is based on Parkinson’s Law, 
where “Work expands to fill the time allotted” and “padding schedule estimates directly 
contribute to cost overruns” (Augustine, 1997).  In other words, it suggests that there will be no 
cost underruns, and that the project will come in at or above the cost to which it is funded.  
Implementing the MAIMS principle in Monte Carlo simulations modifies the basic probability 
distribution functions (PDF) by setting any value less than the money allocation point equal to 
that money allocation value.  There will be no costs associated with a value less than this 
money allocation point.  Utilizing the MAIMS principle, the PDFs are modified to include a spike 
or delta function at an arbitrary point, which is assumed to be the “money allocation point,” 
corresponding to the dollar amount allocated to the program manager for the project and/or 
project cost elements. 
Correlation effects between elements are analyzed.  Correlation accounts for 
interrelationships between cost elements.  Data elements can either be negatively, neutrally, or 
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positively correlated and can either exist among cost elements within a subsystem or between 
elements in different subsystems.  For example, take into consideration the elements of a ship.  
Positive correlation arises when increases in weight, size, and number of weapons systems 
onboard result in an increase in acquisition and shipbuilding costs.  An increase in the 
complexity of a weapon system further forces an increase in cost of other systems such as 
power, cooling, control.  Analysis would be greatly simplified if analysts could assume that all 
elements are independent or that all elements are dependent.  Since neither statement is true, 
correct correlation between elements is necessary to provide the most accurate representation 
of cost. 
Many software programs are available for cost risk analysis.  This paper uses Crystal 
Ball® as an add-in to Microsoft Excel®, because of its ease of use and because it is the current 
program used by NAVSEA 05C.  Crystal Ball® generates the Monte Carlo simulations that 
become the backbone of the cost risk analysis.  A Monte Carlo simulation calculates multiple 
scenarios of a model by repetitively sampling values from the input variable distributions for 
each uncertain variable and then calculates the result.  The resulting cost distributions from 
Crystal Ball® provide the decision-maker with powerful cost risk information. 
A program built on a solid foundation of accurate cost estimating that effectively 
considers risks, combined with strong systems engineering and program management, gives 
the program a greater chance of success. 
B. Purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the probabilistic cost analysis approach that 
NAVSEA’s Cost Engineering and Industrial Analysis division (SEA 05C) currently uses to 
predict new naval vessel construction costs and to develop a method that better predicts the 
ultimate cost risk.  This paper uses data collected from analysis of the CG(X) class ship cost 
model.  The model used to determine cost is reviewed and analyzed to determine what factors 
should be considered to produce more realistic cost estimates. 
II. Revised Cost Risk Analysis 
A. Introduction 
The NAVSEA 05C’s cost analysis model of CG(X) encompasses all aspects of cost for 
the entire fleet including inflation and profit in a 63 worksheet Excel® workbook.  The data used 
in the NAVSEA model were acquired from SME inquiry using three-point estimates of high, 
most-likely, and low values.  In order to ensure the continued acquisition of CG(X), it is 
important that realistic cost risk analysis be performed so that program managers can make 
informed decisions. 
This chapter presents an approach to improve on the model that NAVSEA 05C has 
provided for CG(X).  The focus is strictly on the methodology used in the cost analysis of the 
electronics suite of CG(X) cost model  and cost uncertainties associated with engineering and 
manufacturing of the lead vessel.  Nine systems make up the electronics suite: 
 Radar suite, which consists of the following subsystems: X-band, S-band, Cooling, 
and Power 
 ExComm—External Communications 
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 TSCE—Total Ship Computing Environment 
 IUSW—Integrated Undersea Warfare 
 EW-IW—Electronic Warfare-Information Warfare 
 EO-IR—Electro Optical-Infrared 
 IFF—Identification, Friend or Foe 
 MS EI&T (SS Only)—Mission Systems Engineering, Integration, and Testing (Ship 
Systems Only) 
 MS EI&T (CS Only)—Mission Systems Engineering, Integration, and Testing 
(Combat Systems Only) 
The electronics suite cost is determined with the following two equations that treat each 
of the cost elements as a random variable (RV).  The costs in bold represent composite of the 
costs in regular font, which Crystal Ball® refers to as forecasts and assumptions: 
COST(Electronics Suite) = COST(Radar Suite) + COST(ExComm) + COST(TSCE) + 
COST(IUSW) + COST(EW-IW) + COST(EO-IR) + COST(IFF) + COST(MS EI&T (SS 
Only)) + COST(MS EI&T (CS Only)), 
Cost(Radar Suite) = Cost(X-band) + Cost(S-band) + Cost(Cooling) + Cost(Power). 
 
The steps of analysis for the CG(X) model are as follows: 
1. Analyze the cost factors used by NAVSEA 05C to develop the electronics suite cost. 
2. Analyze the PDFs used for the electronics cost elements. 
3. Identify what data elicitation methods were employed. 
4. Determine if correlation factors were used in the cost analysis. 
5. Develop cost factors to be modeled for cost realism. 
6. Decide which PDFs to use for greater fidelity. 
7. Develop an improved cost risk model that includes realistic correlation factors; 
credible PDFs, including MAIMS influences; and SME biases. 
B. Review Development of Cost Factors 
1. Data Elicitation Methods 
The data elicitation methods used by NAVSEA 05C cost analysts are not well 
documented.  It is clear that the engineering and expert judgment of SMEs is heavily relied on 
for the assessment of uncertain cost elements associated with new designs.  This is an area 
where the use of improved methods can dramatically improve the quality of data that is used in 
the computation of the cost risk model.  Subjective assessments to obtain data have been 
identified as a critical source of uncertainty in probabilistic risk analyses (Keeney & von 
Winterfeld, 1991).  Kujawski et al. (2004) discuss the use of the DFA method for data elicitation 
and how this ties in with distribution choice, to provide the most realistic cost assessment. 
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DFA has been found to provide one of the most consistent and least bias-prone methods 
for eliciting uncertain quantities (Alpert & Raiffa, 1982).  In their research, people were asked to 
consider uncertain quantities by providing values in terms of percentiles or fractiles.  The 
findings indicated: 
 There is a systematic bias toward overconfidence in estimates.  The subjective 
probability distributions were too narrow.  Usually, 33% instead of 50% of the actual 
values fell within the 0.25 to 0.75 fractiles. 
 Extreme value judgment is even worse: 20%, rather than 2%, of the actual values fell 
outside the 0.01 and 0.99 fractiles. 
 What is the meaning of minimum and maximum values?  Defining these terms, so 
that they are universal, is difficult. 
Kujawski et al. (2004) further suggest using experts to provide the 10th, 50th, and 90th 
percentile values, as these may be easier to assess than extreme values of maximum and 
minimum.  They recommend avoiding asking for extreme values, abstract values such as the 
mean or standard deviation, or other specific distribution functions.  If the analyst does not fully 
understand the background of the questions being asked, or if he or she does not fully 
understand the behavior of the system and associated data, obtaining discrete values will be 
near impossible. 
Education also plays an important role in the quality of the data provided by the SMEs 
for analysis.  The understanding of bias and its role in affecting data elicitation is important.  In a 
presentation to the Navy Cost Analysis Symposium, Fields and Popp (2007) stress the 
importance of several lessons learned on risk.  One of the most interesting of these lessons 
learned is the importance of training.  They indicate that although NAVSEA and its technical 
community have a broad cross section of educational backgrounds and experience, not 
everyone has experience in simulation and statistics.  The SME for a particular electronics suite 
component is probably not an expert in probability and statistics, and because of this, tends to 
give biased answers to the cost analysis.  The distributions formed from the biased data have 
been found to be particularly narrow and centered on a given point estimate, while the extreme 
values are very rarely taken into account, for reasons described above. 
Education of the SMEs while conducting data elicitation is important, so that the experts 
have a better understanding of what data is required and how it is going to be utilized.  This 
training needs to be continually refreshed due to the high turnover rate of personnel, whether 
they be military or civilian, and also because of improving methods for cost analysis.  An 
adequate training plan for both the cost analysts and the SMEs providing data will ultimately 
result in better data acquisition for cost analysis. 
In this paper, the use of DFA is simulated though the use of Weibull probability 
distributions because no new data elicitation was conducted.  The differences between the 
distributions using identical values for 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles versus the 20th, 50th, 
and 80th percentiles illustrates data elicitation that is optimistic versus pessimistic.  The 
resulting cost associated with each of the two distributions shows how dramatic the effects of 
slightly different parameters can have on the estimated cost. 
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2. Choice and Development of Probability Distribution Functions 
Kujawski et al. (2004) emphasize the importance of realistically modeling cost 
uncertainties through the appropriate choice of probability distribution by meeting the following 
criteria: 
 Capable of fitting three arbitrary percentiles. 
 A finite lower range. 
 An infinite upper range with reasonable behavior. 
 Physically meaningful and easy to estimate parameters. 
Three types of PDFs are developed and modeled for this paper, with the goal of finding 
a realistic and flexible probability distribution.  Uncertainty for each cost element in the cost 
model is represented using the same type of PDF with different parameters (based on NAVSEA 
data).  First, a triangular PDF that uses low, most-likely, and high values for its parameters is 
developed.  A lognormal PDF that uses the mean and standard deviation from the triangular 
PDF as its parameters is the second distribution.  The third PDF is a three-parameter Weibull 
distribution based on the low, most-likely, and high values of the triangular PDF provided by 
NAVSEA 05C.  The low and high values are calculated by multiplying the low and high 
percentages obtained with the most-likely value.  Two Weibull distributions are created.  One of 
the Weibull distributions uses the data as input for the 10th, 50th, and 90th, percentiles, while 
the other is more pessimistic and uses these values for the 20th, 50th, and 80th percentiles.  
For consistency, the triangular distribution is used to determine the 50th percentile.  The low, 
50th percentile, and high values are substituted for the 20th, 50th, and 80th percentiles and for 
the 10th, 50th, and 90th, for each three-parameter Weibull distribution, respectively.   
a. Triangular Probability Distribution Function 
The parameters used to develop the triangular PDF are the low, most-likely, and high 
values from the Mission Systems Risk Assessment worksheet of the CG(X) model.  The 
determination of the high and low percentages for cost values in the Mission Systems Risk 
Assessment worksheet were figures given to NAVSEA 05C cost analysts by SMEs from the 
NSWC Dahlgren.  These percentages are based on historical database values and inquiry of 
the SME for an opinion about what the low and high values would be, based on the most-likely 
values obtained from the historical databases.  In this case, data elicitation plays a big part in 
the reliability of the data used in the model, which is to be described in more depth in Section 
IV.B.1. 
The triangular distribution is not a good predictor of high and low costs because it uses 
the low and high values as extreme values for the end points.  There is no allowance for costs 
above or below the input values.  It has been argued that a triangular distribution can lead to 
either underestimates or overestimates.  Graves (2001) states that underestimates are likely 
due to the finite upper limit of the distribution.  Moran (1999) believes that overestimates happen 
because of the distribution’s inability to portray the expert’s confidence level of achieving the 
most-likely value and/or knowledge of the shape of the distribution.  The triangular distribution is 
assigned a very low score for criteria (i) and (iii) (Kujawski et al., 2004) and is not the chosen 
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b. Lognormal Probability Distribution Function 
The lognormal PDF is created with the mean and standard deviation parameters taken 
from the triangular distribution.  Characteristics of a lognormal distribution include being 
positively skewed with a limitless upper bound and known lower bound.  This distribution is 
assigned an acceptable score for criteria (iii), but a low score for (i), due to the always positively 
skewed nature of the distribution.  The lognormal distribution results in a cost profile that closely 
follows with the triangular distribution and is one of the narrowest profiles modeled.  A lognormal 
PDF has been associated with providing unreasonably high probabilities at high values, due to 
the relatively slow falloff to the right.  For this reason, it gets an acceptable score for the criteria 
(iii) but scores low on the criteria (i) because of its always positively skewed characteristic 
(Kujawski et al., 2004). 
c. Weibull Probability Distribution Function (10%, 50%, 90%) 
The three-parameter Weibull distribution is characterized by being flexible and able to 
assume a wide variety of shapes, while also being open-ended.  Because of its flexible profile 
and ability to mimic other distributions, it scores high on all criteria.  This paper models one of 
the three-parameter Weibull distributions with the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile values for cost.  
The parameters of 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles are chosen to simulate a cost environment 
that allows for some cost flexibility on the upper and lower limits rather than making them 
extreme as in the triangular distribution.  Although this 10% change on either side of the 
distribution seems large, it actually represents a fairly optimistic assessment of cost.  This model 
is best for a situation in which the data obtained for the model is very reliable. 
d. Weibull Probability Distribution Function (20%, 50%, 80%) 
The three-parameter Weibull distribution using the 20th, 50th, and 80th percentiles for 
distribution parameters is intended to correct or account for the overly optimistic biases 
discussed in Section 2 above.  Systems that are new and untested have a certain amount of 
uncertainty inherent in their acquisition, and most cost assessments made on their components 
are based on past history if components are being reproduced, or a best estimate for new 
systems and their components.  SMEs are naturally optimistic about their systems and have 
been shown to give cost estimates that are overconfident, resulting in probability distributions 
that do not accurately reflect the possible range of costs (Kujawski et al., 2004). 
Much of the data for the CG(X) electronics suite is the result of SME inquiry, which 
explains why the Weibull distribution using 20%, 50%, and 80% parameters is chosen to model 
costs for the electronics suite components in this paper. 
e. Cost Comparisons with the Different Probability Distributions 
Figure 2 is the Excel® overlay created with Crystal Ball® that shows of a 10,000-run 
Monte Carlo simulation for the triangular, lognormal, Weibull (10%, 50%, 90%) and Weibull 
(20%, 50%, 80%) distributions, representing the electronics suite cost of the CG(X).  Figure 10 
is the cumulative probability distribution derived from the PDF shown in Figure 9.  The triangular 
and lognormal distributions are very similar in both the probability distribution and cumulative 
frequency functions, which is expected.  Since the lognormal distribution uses the mean and 
standard deviation from the triangular distribution as its parameters, the end result should be 
very similar.  Both the triangular and lognormal functions show a distinct peak and sharp falloff 
at both the lower and upper bounds.  This behavior does not realistically model the electronics 
suite cost because of the sharp peak with sharp falloff. 
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Figure 2. CG(X) Crystal Ball® Analysis, 10,000 Runs Showing the Effects of Distribution 
Choices on the Cost Probability Distributions 
 
Figure 3. CG(X) Crystal Ball® Analysis, 10,000 Runs Showing the Effects of Distribution 
Choices on the Cost Cumulative Distribution Functions 
The Weibull (10%, 50%, 90%) distribution shows a broader cost range for the given 
probability brackets.  The tapering lower and upper bounds in comparison to the triangular and 
lognormal distribution represent a more likely cost outcome.  The Weibull (20%, 50%, 80%) 
shows an even larger cost range, which makes sense because this distribution is supposed to 
model a more pessimistic view of cost.  Both of these distributions are associated with higher 
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costs as the probability of the cost increases.  It is important to note the difference between the 
optimistic and pessimistic Weibull distributions in Figure 3.  For each, the cost increases with an 
increase in probability, but it is clear that the model’s results indicate that the cost risk is 
significantly higher using the pessimistic Weibull distribution. 
3. Correlation Effects 
Correlation effects are potentially important in modeling appropriate cost relationships 
between different elements of systems and are not conducted enough in current cost analysis 
models (Book, 2001).  Trends with correlation tend to lean toward perfect correlation because of 
simplicity.  Perfect correlation helps to widen the range of outputs in the distribution functions, 
but this may not be an accurate or reliable representation.  Reasonable correlation coefficients 
may provide more realistic and credible estimates of project costs, rather than assuming perfect 
or zero correlation.  Assessing correlation coefficients is a difficult problem.  A need exists for 
the investigation and development of a realistic and practical model to account for 
interrelationships between cost elements. 
Two types of correlations are modeled in this paper: 
 Correlations among cost elements within the radar suite.  The radar suite includes 
elements of X-band, S-band, Cooling, and Power.  Dependencies among these 
components are mainly from subsystem characteristics such as complexity. 
 Correlations among cost elements in the entire electronics suite.  Dependencies 
among these cost elements occur from the programmatic and organizational 
considerations common to all cost elements that are a part of the same project 
(Kujawski et al., 2004). 
There are two types of correlations: Pearson and Spearman.  Pearson correlation 
coefficient determines the degree of linearity between two random variables, while Spearman 
rank order correlation coefficients measure monotonicity.  Correlation among cost elements in 
the electronics suite is modeled with the use of the Correlation Matrix function in Crystal Ball®.  
Crystal Ball® uses rank correlations to correlate assumptions.  This means that the values are 
not changed, but they are rearranged to produce the desired correlation.  Rank correlation 
eliminates the need to explicitly model the dependence between the cost elements.  Garvey 
(2000) advocates the use of Pearson’s correlation.  However, given the limited information, rank 
correlations offer the advantage of accounting for correlations independent of explicit distribution 
and dependency models.  The use of Monte Carlo simulations generates the full PDF rather 
than simply expected value and variance. 
This paper uses three sets of two correlation coefficients to model the correlation 
between the radar suite elements and the rest of the electronics suite components.  The first set 
models the distributions with correlation coefficients of 0.5 for the radar suite elements and 0.5 
for the entire electronics suite elements.  The second set of correlation coefficients is 0.5 and 
0.2.  The third set uses correlation coefficients of 0.8 and 0.5.   
Figure 4 is an overlay of the different probability distributions for the electronics suite 
cost, produced by using the following three different combinations of correlation coefficients for 
the radar suite and electronics suite: 
 Correlation coefficients of 0.5 among the radar suite components and 0.2 between 
the different electronic suite components. 
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 Correlation coefficients of 0.5 among the radar suite components and 0.5 between 
the different electronic suite components. 
 Correlation coefficients of 0.8 among the radar suite components and 0.5 between 
the different electronic suite components. 
As discussed above, positive correlations give rise to broader distributions, which reflect 
higher uncertainty.  The no correlation PDF in Figure 4 is the same as the no correlation shown 
in Figure 9.  They do not appear to be the same due to the difference in scale because they are 
from separate Monte Carlo simulations.  Although the Monte Carlo simulations will give similar 
results for each run, they will not be identical.  
 
Figure 4. CG(X) Crystal Ball® Analysis, 10,000 Runs, Overlay of Electronics Suite Cost 
Based on Different Correlation Effects in Cumulative Probability Form 
4. MAIMS Principle Effects 
The MAIMS principle is modeled in this paper by using the three-parameter Weibull 
(20%, 50%, 80%) distribution function and predetermined percentile points for the MAIMS set 
points.  By implementing MAIMS into the distribution function, any value less than the money 
allocation point is equal to the money allocation value.  The percentage parameters used for 
MAIMS are the 50th percentile or median, the mean, and the 80th percentile funding levels.  A 
spike, or delta function, is observed in the MAIMS modified distributions at the money allocation 
points.  These money allocation points correspond to the budget allocated to the WBS cost 
elements by the project manager. 
The MAIMS modified functions are modeled by using the following equation: 
If Distribution Value < X, then X, else Distribution Value. 
By using this equation, the value of the MAIMS modified distribution will never be less 
than the value X. 
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1. Effects of Distribution Choice on Cost Forecast 
The first distributions modeled were the single electronics suite elements with different 
distributions.  For the purpose of this paper, the element ExComm is chosen for this 
explanation.  Figure 5 shows the cumulative frequency distribution of the different modeled 
distributions for the ExComm element.  The triangular and lognormal distributions show similar 
characteristics, which is expected since the lognormal distribution uses parameters taken from 
the triangular distribution (mean and standard deviations).  Both Weibull distributions show 
expected characteristics.  The Weibull (20%, 50%, 80%) definitely indicates a more pessimistic 
cost forecast because as the cumulative probability increases, the cost increases more 
significantly than for the Weibull (10%, 50%, 90%) distribution.  This overlay indicates that the 
choice of distribution used in modeling plays a significant part in results obtained for cost.  The 
three-parameter Weibull distributions represent a more realistic cost outcome for high-risk 
components.  Weibull distributions allow for modeling of highly complex distributions using DFA, 
while triangular distributions have a more restrictive shape, making it difficult to fit three arbitrary 
percentiles for the low, most-likely, and high values (Kujawski et al., 2004). 
 
Figure 5. CG(X) Crystal Ball® Analysis, 10,000 Runs, Overlay of Electronics Suite Element 
ExComm Cumulative Frequency Distributions for Different Probability Distributions 
The probability distribution functions shown in the overlay in Figure 6 illustrate expected 
behaviors for the ExComm PDFs.  Both the triangular and lognormal distributions are narrow 
because the triangular distribution upper and lower bounds do not allow for infinite upper cost 
ranges.  The sum of the Weibull (20%, 50%, 80%) distributions shows a more pessimistic 
behavior in comparison to the sum of the Weibull (10%, 50%, 90%) distributions. 
 =
=




Figure 6. CG(X) Crystal Ball® Analysis, 10,000 Runs, Overlay of Electronics Suite Element 
ExComm with Different PDFs 
Once all the individual electronics suite elements are modeled, they are summed up 
probabilistically in the main worksheet in Excel® to obtain the entire electronics suite cost.  The 
simulation selects a random value from each of the element distributions then adds them to 
create one data point for the total cost.  This is repeated 10,000 times to create the total cost 
distribution.  When all the distribution functions (assumption cells in the model) of the electronics 
suite elements are probabilistically summed, the resulting cost is illustrated in the overlay shown 
in Figure 7.  All four distributions have the appearance of a normal distribution consistent with 
the Central Limit Theorem (Garvey, 2000). 
The lognormal and triangular distribution functions give rise to relatively narrow total cost 
distributions, consistent with the finite ranges of the contributing triangular distributions and the 
modeling of the lognormal distributions using the corresponding mean and standard deviation 
values.  The Weibull (10%, 50%, 90%)-based cost distribution shows more narrow behavior for 
cost range than the Weibull (20%, 50%, 80%)-based distribution.  The Weibull (20%, 50%, 
80%)-based distribution allows for more uncertainty in data elicitation from SMEs.  Weibull 
distributions not only show higher probabilities of cost overruns but also higher probabilities of 
cost underruns.  These underruns reflect the assumption of 10% and 20% as the low value 
parameter for the distribution, rather than using it as the minimum value.  Figure 8 shows the 
same data as Figure 7, except that it is in the cumulative probability form. 
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Figure 7. CG(X) Crystal Ball® Analysis, 10,000 Runs, Overlay of Electronics Suite Cost 
Based on Different Distribution Selections 
 
Figure 8. CG(X) Crystal Ball® Analysis, 10,000 Runs, Overlay of Electronics Suite Cost 
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2. Effects of Correlation on Cost 
As discussed in Section II.B.1, two types of correlations are modeled in this paper: (1) 
Correlations among cost elements within the radar suite, and (2) correlations among cost 
elements in the entire electronics suite.  This paper uses the following three correlation 
coefficient factors to show the correlation between the radar suite elements and the rest of the 
electronics suite components: 
 Radar suite correlation coefficient = 0.5, electronics suite correlation coefficient = 0.5 
 Radar suite correlation coefficient = 0.5, electronics suite correlation coefficient = 0.2 
 Radar suite correlation coefficient = 0.8, electronics suite correlation coefficient = 0.5. 
The choice of the values listed above simulates an environment that is not a perfectly 
correlated or no-correlated situation.  The (0.5, 0.5) correlation assumes there is an equal 
correlation relationship between the subcomponents of the radar suite and the elements of the 
electronics suite.  The (0.5, 0.2) correlation illustrates the effects of having a stronger correlation 
between the elements of the electronics suite than between elements of the entire electronics 
suite.  The (0.8, 0.5) correlation shows the impact of a stronger correlation between components 
of one system than between different systems.  These correlation coefficients represent a 
limited set of parameters for investigation in this paper.  Further research in the determination of 
appropriate correlation coefficients and their effect is needed to provide a more complete 
analysis. 
The impact of correlation effects is seen in Figures 9 and 10.  These overlays show the 
different distributions that are a result of a 10,000-run Monte Carlo simulation for the correlated 
distributions in cumulative distribution form (Figure 9) and PDF form (Figure 10).  The blue PDF 
is the reference Weibull (20%, 50%, 80%) distribution with no correlation effects.  This 
distribution has the most narrow cost range when compared with the correlated distributions.  
The cost ranges of the Weibull distribution increases as the correlation factors increase.  Also, 
in the cumulative probability distribution shown in Figure 9, all the distributions intersect at the 
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Figure 9. CG(X) Crystal Ball® Analysis, 10,000 Runs, Overlay of Electronics Suite Cost 
Showing the Impact of Different Correlation Effects 
 
Figure 10. CG(X) Crystal Ball® Analysis, 10,000 Runs, Overlay of Electronics Suite Cost 
Based on Different Correlation Effects in Cumulative Probability Form 
As expected, the (0.5, 0.2) correlation being the smallest has the least effect on the total 
cost distribution.  It is interesting to note that the distribution resulting from the (0.5, 0.5) 
correlation does not differ much from the (0.8, 0.5) distribution, but both of these correlations 
have a more significant effect than the (0.5, 0.2) correlation.  This indicates that a change in the 
correlation factor for the radar suite from 0.5 to 0.8 is not as significant as a change in the 
correlation factor from 0.2 to 0.5 for the different components of the entire electronics suite.  
These results suggest that the correlation effects are important for probability values midpoint 
between the mean and the extremes, but there is little difference for values beyond 0.5.  The 
results in Figure 10 are consistent with theoretical predictions of positive correlation effects in 
that the total cost becomes broader than for uncorrelated total cost (Kujawski et al., 2004).  
Further investigations are recommended to quantify correlation effects. 
3. MAIMS Effects on Cost 
The MAIMS modified cumulative probability and density density distributions for the 
electronics suite cost are shown in Figures 11 and 12.  Characteristics of the MAIMS modified 
PDF is that they will never have a value less than the chosen value of modification.  So, for the 
MAIMS 50th percentile modified distribution in Figure 11, the distribution has no value less than 
the 50th percentile baseline cost level.  In Figure 12, the spikes or delta functions normally 








Figure 11. CG(X) Crystal Ball® Analysis, 10,000 Runs, Overlay of Electronics Suite Cost 
Showing the  MAIMS Effects in Cumulative Probability Form 
 
Figure 12. CG(X) Crystal Ball® Analysis, 10,000 Runs, Overlay of Electronics Suite Cost 
Showing the MAIMS Effects in PDF Form 
It is important to note the significant rise in cost curve that occurs as the MAIMS 
modification value increases.  The mean value of the distribtion increases as the funding level 
increases, and this is very clear in Figure 11.  The curve representing the MAIMS 80% 
distribution shows how the budget is always high when comparing it to the MAIMS 50% or 
MAIMS mean distribution.  This effect is because once money has been allocated to a WBS 
element, it is almost never seen in cost savings as underruns because cost account managers 
never return money to the project.  Any remaining money from one WBS is subsequently spent 
on a different existing WBS that has cost overruns. 
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These simulations can be considered with other cost factors in making program 
management decisions regarding budgets.  Funding projects at a level too low to cover costs 
will lead to cost overruns, while funding at a level that is too high leads to money not being 
recouped as savings later.  Allocating reasonable budgets is the goal. 
E. Chapter Summary 
The research for this paper is based on the NAVSEA 05C CG(X) model provided by Mr. 
Chris Deegan and his CG(X) analysts.  The CG(X) model encompasses all factors considered 
for cost of the entire program, including labor rates, material cost, overhead cost, planning cost, 
and other factors.  Because of the complexity of the model and the numerous factors to 
consider, one portion of the model was chosen for analysis.  The Electronic Suite and its nine 
elements are specifically targeted as the focus for analysis. 
The steps used in the analysis of the CG(X) model include: 
1. Analyze the cost factors used by NAVSEA 05C to develop the electronics cost. 
2. Analyze the PDFs used for the electronics cost elements. 
3. Identify what data elicitation methods were employed. 
4. Determine if correlation factors were used in the cost analysis. 
5. Develop cost factors to be modeled in a new model. 
6. Decide which PDFs to use in the new model. 
7. Develop a new cost model using correlation factors, chosen PDFs, and MAIMS 
influenced distributions. 
Identified cost factors include NAVSEA 05C’s probability distribution choice—a method 
used for developing the low, most-likely, and high cost values for the electronics suite elements, 
data elicitation methods, and correlation effects.  This paper explores the methodology in 
choosing different probability distribution functions and their applicability to the model.  
Specifically, triangular, lognormal, and two variations of the three-parameter Weibull distribution 
are considered. 
Methods of data elicitation are explored and the use of a DFA method is recommended 
for future use, although the research in this paper did not involve data acquisition.  To simulate 
the use of a DFA methodology, Weibull distributions are employed to account for uncertainty 
associated with SME estimation of data.  A Weibull (10%, 50%, 90%) distribution is used to 
simulate a more optimistic view of the uncertainty of data, while a Weibull (20%, 50%, 80%) 
distribution models a more pessimistic, but probably more realistic, view of the uncertainty 
associated with data from the SMEs. 
Two types of correlation effects are considered and modeled in this paper.  The first is 
the correlation between subcomponents of the radar suite, and the other is the correlation 
between the elements of the electronics suite.  The radar suite is one of the elements that 
makes up the electronics suite.  Analysis shows that a more significant effect is experienced 
with higher correlation between the elements of the electronics suite than between the 
subcomponents of the radar suite. 
MAIMS modified probability distributions are modeled to show the significance of budget 
allocation level.  These distributions are truncated at the baseline budget with a delta function at 
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the baseline.  This is based on the principle that once a budget is allocated, money is almost 
never seen in the form of cost under runs as the project progresses.  As the MAIMS 




This paper begins by exploring the definitions of risk and how it applies to the guidance 
set forth by current Navy leadership.  Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, 
states that, “We manage risk” (Roughead, 2007).  The need to develop effective acquisition and 
shipbuilding methods to successfully deliver an “affordable future fleet” (McCoy, 2008) is 
imperative if the Navy is to meet the goal of a 313-ship Navy by 2020.  Cost risk analysis is one 
tool of many that can be used to help attain this goal. 
This paper then proceeds to examine the probabilistic cost analysis approach that 
NAVSEA 05C currently uses to predict new naval vessel construction costs and to develop a 
method that better predicts the ultimate cost risk.  Cost factors analyzed in this paper include 
the effect of data elicitation, distribution choice, the impact of the MAIMS principle, and the 
effect of correlation factors.  Data elicitation and MAIMS have significant impact.  Correlation 
effects vanish at the minimum, mean, and maximum values.  PDF selection has a small impact 
as long as the distributions fit the three specified percentiles. 
The model provided by NAVSEA 05C encompasses all aspects of the ship’s cost and 
only the nine elements of the electronics suite were chosen for analysis in this paper.  Using 
data obtained from SMEs for low-, most-likely, and high-cost values, experiments were 
conducted for the noted cost factors in the Excel® Monte Carlo simulation add-in Crystal Ball®. 
Triangular, lognormal, Weibull (10%, 50%, 90%) and Weibull (20%, 50%, 80%) 
distributions are modeled and simulated to show the impact that each distribution can have on 
budget considerations for program managers.  Both the triangular and lognormal distributions 
show narrow cost ranges when compared to the Weibull distribution cost range.  The Weibull 
(10%, 50%, 90%) represents a more optimistic distribution than the more pessimistic Weibull 
(20%, 50%, 80%) distribution.  The Weibull (20%, 50%, 80%) distribution accounts for the 
optimism bias commonly associated with SMEs.  Data elicitation effects are modeled through 
the use of the Weibull distributions.  
Correlation among cost elements in the electronics suite is modeled with the use of the 
Correlation Matrix function in Crystal Ball®.  This paper uses three sets of two correlation 
coefficients to model the correlation between the radar suite elements and the rest of the 
electronics suite components.  The results suggest that the correlation effects are important for 
probability values midpoint between the mean and the extremes, but there is little difference for 
values beyond 0.5.  Further investigations are recommended to quantify correlation effects. 
MAIMS principle modified distributions are modeled with the 50th percentile cost value, 
mean, and 80th percentile cost value to show the impact of funding at these different levels.  
The MAIMS principle is based on the observation that for a given budget, any money allocated 
is considered money spent.  Very rarely are cost underruns experienced on a project once the 
budget has been allocated.  The MAIMS modified distributions in this paper show the impact of 
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either under-funding a budget or over-funding.  Under-funding leads to cost overruns and over-
funding leads to an overall higher cost, since money allocated is unlikely to be recouped. 
B. Recommendations and Areas for Further Research 
The analysis conducted in this model is only a starting point for improvements in the 
area of cost analysis for naval vessels.  Although the methodology used in this paper provides a 
framework for obtaining more accurate predictions of cost than those in use with current 
probabilistic cost analysis, more work is required to develop a more complete and tested model.  
Recommendations for future research in the area of probabilistic cost analysis for shipbuilding 
include: 
 Use of the DFA method to obtain data for cost assessment.  Recommend eliciting 
data from SMEs at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles, at a minimum, for relatively 
optimistic view of the data quality, and at the 20th, 50th, and 80th percentiles if a 
more pessimistic view of the quality of data is present.  Take into consideration the 
overconfidence of estimates provided by experts in their field and use this knowledge 
when calibrating data for analysis. 
 Select flexible and realistic probability distribution functions for cost analysis.  Create 
probability distribution functions from historical data and adjust for expected 
differences in new programs. 
 Incorporate the use of correlation among cost elements of a system.  Aim to use a 
range of correlation coefficients that is realistic.  A reasonable range for correlation 
coefficients is between 0.3-0.6, with some room for variation.  Overly optimistic 
correlation coefficients that assume independence and overly pessimistic correlation 
coefficients that assume perfect correlation rarely exist in real data. 
 Use the “Money Allocated is Money Spent” (MAIMS) principle to model budget 
management behavior.  The MAIMS function will not allow the system cost to be a 
lesser amount than the budgeted cost baseline. 
 Investigate further capabilities available with advanced modeling software such as 
Crystal Ball® or @Risk. 
 Incorporate systems engineering methodologies and thinking into the development of 
probabilistic cost analysis.  Kujawski et al. (2004) state that this is the single greatest 
challenge to the development and use of improved cost models. 
Continuing with the development of improved cost models is an important step in helping 
the Navy to ensure the successful acquisition of the 313-ship Navy it desires.  Improved cost 
models can give project managers the ability to develop more realistic and successful plans for 
their projects, while enabling them to make better budget decisions.  The cost analysis 
methodology presented in this paper can serve as a starting point for further advanced research 
in this area that can be used by different programs across the Navy. 
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Abstract 
This project continues ongoing efforts by the authors to understand transactions costs 
within DoD acquisition.  Past studies by the authors have been constrained by the data 
available.  As part of continuing effort to acquire more data and take advantage of first-hand 
knowledge of the issue, we now analyze results from a survey of US Air Force Program 
Managers (PMs) undertaken in 2008 by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS).   
The number of oversight reviews has steadily increased, with increasingly higher-level 
involvement.  Accordingly, the resources and management attention devoted to these reviews 
has also increased.  Within that context, the NAS Study is intended to assess a large number of 
prescribed reviews (programmatic and technical) with respect to value added and various costs 
incurred.  The fundamental question addressed to the study team is as follows: “Can changes in 
the number, content, or sequence of program reviews help the Program Manager more 
successfully execute the program?”  Public release of the report is expected in April.  (Until that 
time, we are constrained to withhold our results.) 
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The theoretical foundations of our supporting inquiry come from the Agency Theory and 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)—well-established fields of study.  In particular, we are 
concerned with the complications and costs of dealing with partners both outside the DoD (TCE) 
and within (Principal-Agent Problem).   
Our analysis of the survey results also distinguishes between technical and 
programmatic reviews.  Technical reviews are conducted by the appropriate Program Office to 
monitor technical progress of the system contractors (prime and sub-).  Program reviews 
provide management oversight of the Program Manager by higher-level authorities (service or 
DoD). 
Our purpose is to analyze the survey data made available in the NAS study.  We will 
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Management Level 
11:15 a.m. – 
12:45 p.m. 
Chair: Captain Brian Gannon, US Navy, Program Manager, Naval Open 
Architecture, PEO Integrated Warfare Systems 
Discussant: James Wolfe, Head, Strategic and Weapon Control Systems 
Dept, Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren 
Facilitating Decision-making, Re-use and Collaboration: A Knowledge 
Management Approach to Acquisition Program Self-awareness 
John Robey and Chris Odell, Naval Postgraduate School 
Effective Programmatic Software Safety Strategy for US Navy Gun System 
Acquisition Programs 
MAJ Joey Rivera, US Army, US Pacific Command, J63, Luqi, and 
Valdis Berzins, Naval Postgraduate School 
 
 
Discussant: Mr. James A. Wolfe, Head, Strategic and Weapon Control, Systems Department (K), is a 
native of Miami, FL.  Wolfe’s Government career began in 1978 after enlisting in the United States Air 
Force (USAF).  After serving more than four years of active duty and five years as an Air Reserve 
Technician, he graduated from Florida International University in December 1987 receiving a Bachelor 
of Science Degree in Computer Science.  Shortly thereafter, he was commissioned in the USAF 
Reserve as an Aircraft Maintenance Officer assigned to the 482 Tactical Fighter Wing at Homestead 
AFB.  Wolfe’s next assignment was with DISA as a Communications and Computer Systems 
Programmer Analysis Officer, where he developed software applications supporting the Worldwide 
Military Command and Control and Communications System (WWMCCS).  He later wrote software to 
support the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) integration laboratory.  Wolfe was then 
transferred to the DISA Joint Services Support Center in the Pentagon, where he was assigned as 
Command and Control Operations Officer in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) providing 
direct support to the Deputy Director of Operations during day-to-day, real-world crises. He also 
participated in exercise operations with National Command Authority, CINCS, and CJCS.   
Wolfe’s career at Dahlgren started in 1988 as a system software programmer. Soon after, he was 
selected as group leader of the SLBM Software Generation System (SGS). To further develop his 
career, he accepted a position as group leader of the Quality Assurance for SLBM Fire Control Support 
Software and then as the Group Leader of the Advanced Fire Control System Group. He was then 
selected as Branch Head of the SLBM Engineering and Facilities Branch, where he managed and 
directed the branch operations which provided computer systems, Fire Control Engineering, and Facility 
Engineering support for 400 users.  Wolfe was then assigned as Branch Head of the Weapons 
Software Engineering Branch. He was responsible for the development of several key components of 
the Tactical Tomahawk Weapon Control System (TTWCS), the Advanced Tomahawk Weapon Control 
System and a number of key simulators used for development and testing.  Wolfe was then selected as 
Division Head of the Strike Weapon Systems Division. His responsibilities include managing and 
directing scientific, engineering, technical, and administrative support personnel tasked with performing 
all areas of development—including system engineering, software development, and system integration 
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and system test for all strike weapons systems and strike weapon control systems.  Wolfe is presently 
the Department Head for the Strategic and Weapon Control Systems Department (K). 
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Facilitating Decision-making, Re-use and Collaboration: 
A Knowledge Management Approach to Acquisition 
Program Self-awareness 
Presenter: John Robey, Commander, US Navy, Student, Graduate School of Operational and 
Information Sciences.  Robey earned a BS in 1988 and an MBA in 1995 from the University of South 
Carolina. He is a graduate of the US Naval War College of Command and Staff. Robey is a P-3 Naval 
Flight Officer, having served in a wide range of operational and staff assignments in 21 years of active 
service, to include his most recent tour as Commanding Officer of VPU-2.  Upon graduation from the 
Joint C4I Program at the Naval Postgraduate School in June 2009, CDR Robey will report to the Navy 
PEO-C4I Office, San Diego, CA.     
John L. Robey, Commander, US Navy 
Graduate School of Operations and Information Sciences 
555 Dyer Road 
Monterey, CA 93943 
Email: jlrobey@nps.edu 
Phone: 775-224-3156 
Co-Presenter: Chris Odell, Lieutenant Commander, US Navy, Student, Graduate School of 
Operations and Information Sciences. Odell earned a BA in 1999 from the University of South 
Carolina and is a graduate of US Naval War College of Command and Staff.  Odell is a Naval 
Intelligence Officer and a former Surface Warfare Officer. Prior to attending NPS, he was on the J2 
staff at US Strategic Command. Upon graduation from the Information Systems Technology Program 
at the Naval Postgraduate School in September 2009, Odell will report to USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-
65) as the Assistant Intelligence Officer.  
Christopher W. Odell, Lieutenant Commander, US Navy  
Graduate School of Operations and Information Sciences 
555 Dyer Rd.  





Decades of reform have been largely ineffective at improving the efficiency of the DoD 
Acquisition System, due in part to the complex processes and stovepipe activities that result in 
duplication of effort, lack of re-use and limited collaboration on related development efforts.  
This research applies Knowledge Management (KM) concepts and methodologies to the DoD 
acquisition enterprise to increase “Program Self-awareness” (Gallup & MacKinnon, 2008, p. 2).  
This research supports the implementation of reform initiatives such as Capability Portfolio 
Management and Open Systems Architecture, which share the common objectives of reducing 
duplication of effort, promoting collaboration and re-use of components.  The DoD Maritime 
Domain Awareness (MDA) Program will be used as a test case to develop prototype data 
schemas and apply text and data mining tools to identify duplication and/or gaps in the features 
of select MDA technologies.  This paper will also provide the foundation for future development 
of the Program Self-awareness concept and KM tools to support decision-making and improve 
the effectiveness of the DoD Acquisition System.   
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The Department of Defense (DoD) fiscal year 2009 budget for Research, Development, 
Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement exceeds $180 billion (Gates, 2009, p. 37).  
Given such huge budget outlays and the increasing pressures of shrinking discretionary 
budgets and fragile economy, the DoD Acquisition System is the subject of intense scrutiny from 
government oversight activities, industry, and the general public.  This scrutiny has been 
amplified by highly publicized acquisition program failures, continued cost and schedule 
overruns and lengthy development cycles. 
DoD acquisition has endured an environment of seemingly perpetual reform to arrest 
this chronically poor performance, resulting in complex acquisition process models, increased 
executive oversight, and incremental policy changes. The effectiveness of acquisition reforms 
has yet to be evidenced in the overall performance of the DoD Acquisition System.  
Independent and government-chartered studies and reports have repeatedly highlighted the 
need for improved systems engineering and business processes to incorporate best practices 
from the commercial sector.   
The DoD has embraced several recommendations from these critical reports and moved 
to adopt several commercial best practices and process initiatives.  Two such policy initiatives 
relevant to this research are the adoption of Capability Portfolio Management (CPM) and Open 
Architecture (OA) approaches, discussed at length in later sections of this paper.  CPM and OA 
are relatively early in their implementation and address different levels of the acquisition 
process, but reflect the overarching DoD goals of improving decision-making regarding 
systems-of-systems (SoS) acquisitions to avoid duplication, identify gaps, and decrease costs 
and development times.    
The tools and processes used by acquisition decision-makers to support implementation 
of CPM and OA are not well defined.  A fundamental requirement of both CPM and OA 
approaches is that acquisition managers develop an awareness of related efforts and activities 
across an enterprise and/or community of interest (COI) to identify duplication of effort, 
capability gaps, re-use and collaboration opportunities.  It is the premise of this paper that 
development of improved “Program Self-awareness” is fundamental to the success of the CPM 
and OA reform initiatives.  This paper applies commercial and government best practices to 
develop Program Self-awareness through Knowledge Management (KM) methods and tools.   
The DoD Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Program will be used as a test case for 
application of KM decision support tools to provide normalized “views” of program elements and 
attributes, termed “features”, to support informed program decision-making.  The premise of this 
research is that application of KM tools will improve Program Self-awareness and support the 
informed decision-making required to realize the full potential of the CPM and OA initiatives.   
B. Problem Statement and Research Question 
DoD acquisition is an extremely complex system comprised of numerous stakeholders 
and organizations that navigate an array of procurement processes in an uncertain environment 
to deliver useful military capability to the warfighter at the best possible value to the government.  
Acquisition reforms have been largely ineffective at improving the efficiency of the system, due 
in part to stovepipe activities that often result in duplication of effort, lack of re-use and 
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collaboration on related development efforts.  This research applies KM concepts, 
methodologies, and tools to DoD acquisition programs to increase its self-awareness.  It is the 
goal of this research to demonstrate the Program Self-awareness concept through application of 
prototype decisions support tools to the DoD MDA Program to answer the following research 
question.   
 How can KM methodologies and decision support tools be used to improve 
Program Self-awareness and decision-making to reduce duplication and enable 
collaboration and re-use in complex DoD acquisition programs?  
C. Methodology 
This paper provides an overview of ongoing thesis research which will explore the 
problem of duplication, lack of re-use and collaboration in DoD Acquisition and follow the 
intuition that increased “Program Self-awareness,” enabled by KM decision support tools, will 
improve acquisition process efficiencies in these areas.  The research will be grounded in 
Systems Theory and Congruence Model to develop an understanding of the DoD Acquisition 
System and identify root causes of the stated problem.  This research will apply KM tools to the 
DoD MDA Program as a test case and evaluate the potential for improved Program Self-
awareness based on feedback from the office of the DoD Executive Agent (EA) for MDA.  This 
work will provide the foundation for future research on the Program Self-awareness concept and 
development of KM tools with the goal of improving decision-making and enabling re-use and 
collaboration in DoD acquisition programs  
D. Scope 
The impact of implementation of the concepts and tools suggested in this research on 
other organizational components within the DoD Acquisition System (structure, processes, 
people) are not addressed in depth in this research.  It is recognized that further research will be 
required to study organizational congruence and cultural issues to realize the full benefits of the 
Program Self-awareness concept.  
II. Systems Theory and Organizations  
This research explores the potential for change in the DoD Acquisition System through 
application of KM tools to improve Program Self-awareness.  The Congruence Model, depicted 
in Figure 1, is grounded in Systems Theory and provides a framework to understand the 









Figure 1. The Congruence Model  
(Mercer Delta, 1998, p. 14) 
 
This research focuses on the potential benefit of technology, namely KM tools, to 
improve “fit” among acquisition system components to achieve improved output efficiency and 
facilitate implementation of policy objectives such as CPM and OA.  The Congruence Model is 
useful in this context as it highlights the interdependency among system components, which 
must be considered when introducing such tools into a complex system (Mercer Delta, 1998, 
pp. 1-15).  This research suggests that application of KM tools may form a sort of “glue” to 
improve the fit among components, and that subsequent change(s) to other system 
components, namely organizations and processes (work), will likely be necessary due to 
implementation of these technologies  
This research seeks to demonstrate the potential increase in MDA Program Self-
awareness, which could facilitate improved decision-making, increased collaboration, object re-
use, and reduced development timelines.  Figure 2 applies the Congruence Model to the DoD 
Acquisition System and highlights the opportunity area for application of KM tools and 








Figure 2. The Congruence Model Applied to the DoD Acquisition System  
(Mercer Delta, 1998, p. 14) 
III. Program Self-awareness 
This research defines Program Self-awareness as the collective and integrated 
understanding of program attributes (system technology features, R&D activities, etc.) and 
surrounding environment by program decision-makers (program managers, system engineers, 
sponsors).  Program Self-awareness allows decision-makers to recognize relationships among 
program attributes and seize collaboration and re-use opportunities to support cost effective 
acquisitions.   
Achieving Program Self-awareness in complex acquisition programs such as the DoD 
MDA program is a lofty goal considering the myriad of stakeholders, processes, people, 
activities, and organizational structures involved.  This research will highlight the potential of KM 
tools to provide an incremental improvement in Program Self-awareness.  The figure below 
represents what Program Self-awareness embodies in the MDA Community of Interest, 
supported by collaboration and use of KM tools to enable improved decision-making (Gallup & 








Figure 3. MDA Program Self-awareness  
(Gallup & MacKinnon, 2008) 
IV. Knowledge Management 
The information age continues to shape the organizational environment and produce 
varying effects on all system components of the Congruence Model.   The power of personal 
computing, global networking, and collaborative technologies are now fundamental to many 
organizational processes—enabling increased speed, availability, and volume of data to support 
decision-making.  These technology changes have challenged organizational norms and forced 
organizations to perform varying degrees of self-analysis to assess the impact of these changes 
to the fit among organizational components (Mercer Delta, 1998, p. 15).   
The challenges posed to organizations in the information age are many, to include the 
task of turning massive amounts of data into pertinent knowledge and leveraging the potential of 
the network enabled “informal organizations” to improve decision-making.  The study of the 
dynamics and potential of technology, process, and structure to improve organizational 
knowledge and decision-making has fueled academic study and technology research and 
development under the umbrella term of Knowledge Management (KM).  The formal definitions 
of KM vary widely among theorists and practitioners in the field, but generally address the 
common goal of improving the ways organizations transform data into knowledge to support 
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decision-making.  This research will focus on how KM methodologies and tools which can be 
applied to organizations to improve process, structure, and decision-making.    
The application of KM principles to DoD acquisition was the subject of research by 
military fellows at the Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) in January 2000, titled 
“Program Management 2000: Know the Way. How Knowledge Management Can Improve DoD 
Acquisition” (Cho, Hans & Landay, 2000).  The DSMC fellows draw the following conclusions 
relevant to this research:  
 the commercial sector is successfully adopting KM strategies to achieve competitive 
advantage; 
 Implementation of KM technologies in an organization must consider impacts on its 
people, processes, and structure to be successful; 
 KM initiatives require culture change and must have the full support of the leadership 
to be successful; 
 Mangers who effectively use their company’s knowledge were able to overcome 
knowledge-based barriers and institutional stovepipes to improve collaboration and 
customer relationships; 
 KM is a source of organizational and economic value; 
 Communities of Practice or Interest (COP/COI) are forums of networked people with 
similar interests and issues which come together to address problems, provide 
solutions, share ideas, and build communication links.  COI development provides 
the foundation for KM implementation;    
 KM implementation should be an incremental process built upon small successes. 
(Cho et al., 2000) 
Cho et al. make a compelling case for adoption of a KM concepts, tools and strategy in 
the DoD Acquisition System.  This research will apply specific KM tools to a specific acquisition 
problem in hopes it will lead to the “small success” the DSMC researchers suggest is vital to 
foster widespread KM adoption in DoD acquisition.   
A. KM Tools 
KM tools and methodologies support the transformation of data into information and 
knowledge.  The KM tools relevant to this research include data and text mining, data 
warehousing, data analysis and visualization. 
1. Data and Text Mining  
DoD acquisition programs generate massive amounts of documentation during all 
phases of development process, to include text documents, spreadsheets, and structured 
relational databases, etc.  The amount of data and text contained in these documents is 
staggering and holds great potential for application of data and text mining techniques to derive 
and discover useful information that can be used to generate knowledge and improve decision-
making from a sea of seemingly unrelated data.   
Data mining is a “class of information analysis based on databases that looks for hidden 
patterns in a collection of data which can be used to predict future behavior.  True data mining 
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software does not just change the presentation, but actually discovers previously unknown 
relationships among the data” (Turban, Shardra, Aronson & King, 2008, p. 13).   
Text mining is “the application of data mining to non-structured or less structured text 
files, which entails the generation of meaningful numeric indices from the unstructured text and 
then processing those indices using various data mining algorithms” (Turban et al., 2008, p. 
224).  
This research will apply certain data and text mining techniques to the DoD MDA 
Program to demonstrate the potential for increased Program Self-awareness of the portfolio of 
MDA system features to support improved programmatic decision-making. 
2. Data Warehouses and Data Marts 
Data mining techniques require a set of data be defined from which the various data 
mining algorithms can be applied and subsequent analysis be performed.  This set of data is 
termed a data warehouse or data mart.  A data warehouse is a “physical repository where 
relational data are specifically organized to provide enterprise-wide, cleansed data in a 
standardized format.” (Turban et al., 2008, p. 223).   A data mart can be considered a subset of 
a data warehouse which can be used to support a functional area, department, or community of 
interest.  These terms will be used interchangeably for the purposes of this research (Turban et 
al., 2008, p. 222). 
The development of data warehouses into the structured form required to support data 
mining is not a trivial process.  The data warehouse will need to be developed to support the 
functional area being supported and have the following fundamental characteristics: subject-
oriented, integrated, time-variant, and nonvolatile.  The data warehouse may also be developed 
to include the following capabilities: web-based, relational/multi-dimensional, client/server, and 
include metadata (data about data.  (Turban et al., 2008, pp. 39-40). 
Text mining, on the other hand, is focused on developing new meanings and 
relationships from unstructured data in the form of documents (memos, e-mails, instructions, 
policies, etc.) to support decision-making.  The set of documents required to support text mining 
can vary in type and structure, providing much more flexibility in formulation compared to data 
warehouse development.  The additional benefit of text mining is the amount of information 
available in a form ready for processing, which includes upwards of 80% of the data a typical 
organization collects.  Text mining algorithms are also complex and typically involve the 
following steps. 
1. Eliminate commonly used words (the, and, other); 
2. Replace words with their stems or roots (e.g., eliminate plurals, and various 
conjugations and declarations); 
3. Consider synonyms or phrases (e.g., student and pupil may be grouped together);       
4. Calculate the weight of the remaining terms (e.g., based on frequency of occurrence 
in a document or set of documents). (Turban et al., 2008, pp. 159-160) 
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3. Analytics and Visualization 
The development of data described above supports its transformation to information and 
knowledge through the process of analytics and visualization.  Analytics can be defined as a 
“category of applications and techniques for gathering, storing, analyzing, and providing access 
to data to help enterprise users make better business and strategic decisions” (Turban et al., 
2008, p. 86).  This research will apply several analytical applications, to include data mining, text 
mining and visualization techniques to discover new information and knowledge.  These KM 
tools have the potential to highlight relationships among program “features” to support decision-
making regarding duplication of effort, gaps, re-use and collaboration opportunities in the DoD 
MDA program.  For the purposes of this research, a "feature" is a marketable behavior or 
property of a system, ideally documented in a design, such as the “power window” feature on 
modern automobiles. 
B. Collaboration 
This research has repeatedly identified the importance of collaboration to support KM 
implementation. The DSMC study heavily emphasized the linkage between KM success and the 
organization’s culture of information sharing and collaboration.  The DSMC researchers also 
concluded that a typical DoD acquisition program performs very little collaboration across 
different programs other than informal networks of functional area experts formed at the same 
physical location.  When development teams were asked how often they go outside their 
program organization to seek knowledge to problems they faced, the most frequent response 
was “rarely if ever.”  The researches found it wasn’t that the teams didn’t recognize the potential 
power of collaboration, they just “don’t know who else is working on similar issues or don’t see 
any connection between their project and another one in a different area” (Cho et al., 2000, pp. 
1-4).    
The size of the DoD Acquisition enterprise, lack of enterprise collaboration and KM tools 
and stovepipe organizational structures do not support a culture of information sharing.  The 
continued explosion and proliferation of networking technologies has penetrated the DoD 
acquisition environment and spawned several collaboration and knowledge-sharing initiatives 
germane to this research, which may represent the early stages of a move towards greater 
collaboration in DoD acquisition: 
In recognition of the imperative and potential power of collaboration to support the 
complex DoD Acquisition System, KM and acquisition experts at NPS (Thomas, Hocevar & 
Jansen, 2006) studied collaboration in the most complex DoD and Interagency acquisitions to 
develop a “collaborative capacity” assessment tool.  Figure 3 depicts the “Collaborative 
Capacity” model developed by Thomas et al (2006) to guide their research.  The notion that 
collective self-awareness is integral to the success of solving a common problem can be derived 
from this model.  It can also be inferred from the model that collaboration is the “glue” used to 
bond “stovepipe” organizations together to solve a common problem such as an inter-agency 
acquisition.   
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Figure 4. Collaborative Capacity Model  
(Thomas et al., 2006, p. 7) 
V. DoD Acquisition Initiatives  
Two DoD acquisition policy initiatives relevant to this research are the adoption of 
Capability Portfolio Management (CPM) and Open Architecture (OA) approaches.  Both CPM 
and OA are relatively early in their implementation and address different levels of the acquisition 
process, but share the common goal of improving DoD decision-making regarding systems-of-
systems (SoS) acquisitions to avoid duplication, reduce costs, and decrease development 
times.    
A. Open Architecture (OA) 
The emphasis on open systems architecture (OA) has increased over the past decade 
with OA now recognized as an integral part of DoD systems engineering and acquisition 
processes.  OA is not a new concept, however, and draws from engineering design principles 
that have shaped mature industries for many decades.  The modern automobile is one such 
example of OA design principles, as it supports integration of thousands of its components 
through what can be viewed as a system-of-systems design.  This OA design allows most 
components to be built by numerous manufactures to a standard interface specification, which 
allows tires built by numerous manufactures to fit onto the wheels of a wide range of vehicles.  
The OA approach is very attractive in the context of DoD acquisition as it offers potential for 
decreased development timelines and reduced costs largely through re-use of components in 
system-of-systems acquisitions.  OA designs also support quick upgrades and modifications, 
removing the requirement to redesign other components or entire system as would be 
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necessary due to change propagation in closed or non-modular system designs.  The 
application of OA to the design of software-intensive systems has been the focus of early OA 
initiatives, to include the Navy PEO-IWS Software Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) 
Repository, which serves as a searchable library of ship combat systems software and related 
assets available for re-use by eligible contractors.(Johnson & Blais, 2008, p. 1).    
The increased emphasis on OA has resulted in several initiatives to establish common 
technical and architectural standards to promote increased re-use and interoperability for OA 
systems, to include the SHARE repository described above.  These efforts are critical to the 
success of DoD OA implementation and require continued development of common 
vocabularies and collaboration tools to facilitate discovery of related efforts and potential re-use 
opportunities.   
A fundamental requirement of OA is that acquisition managers develop an awareness of 
related efforts and activities across an enterprise and/or COI to support decision-making 
regarding re-use and collaboration opportunities.  It is the premise of this paper that 
development of Program Self-awareness is fundamental to the success of OA policy initiatives.   
B. Capability Portfolio Management (CPM) 
In 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense released a memorandum to introduce the 
Capability Portfolio Management (CPM) approach to DoD Acquisition.  The intent of exploring 
the CPM approach was: 
to manage groups of like capabilities across the (DoD) enterprise to improve 
interoperability, minimize capability redundancies and gaps, and maximize capabilities 
effectiveness.  Joint capability portfolios will allow the Department to shift to an output-
focused model that enables progress to be measured from strategy to outcomes.  
Delivering needed capabilities to the joint warfighter more rapidly and efficiently is the 
ultimate criterion for the success of this effort. (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2006, p. 1) 
The initial implementation of CPM included establishment of four capability area test 
cases (Joint Command and Control, Joint Net Centric Operations, Battlespace Awareness, Joint 
Logistics) to evaluate the CPM approach with the long-term goal of achieving broader 
implementation in the 2009-2013 timeframe.  CPM goals, objectives, and guidance emphasized 
the importance of system-of-systems engineering approaches and “data transparency”: 
test case managers–in conjunction with existing data management stewards and the 
Institutional Reform and Governance effort–should work together to establish an 
approach (business rules, data structure changes, knowledge management tools) that 
will strengthen the linkage of authoritative information to capabilities without 
compromising information flexibility. (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2006, Attachment A, 
p. 4)  
CPM implementation was further directed across the DoD acquisition enterprise in 2008 
and linked to all nine Tier 1 Joint Capability Areas (JCA).  The new policy detailed CPM 
integration and alignment with existing DoD acquisition structures and processes to achieve 
widespread implementation. (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2008, p. 1)   The definition of CPM 
was also refined to “the process of integrating, synchronizing, and coordinating Department of 
Defense capabilities needs with current and planned DOTMLPF investments within a capability 
 =
=
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå======== - 154 - 
=
=
portfolio to better inform decision-making and optimize defense resources” (Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, 2008, Glossary, p. 8).  
The CPM approach is relevant to this research in that it is grounded in improved 
acquisition decision-making to reduce duplication of effort and identify capability gaps in the 
DoD portfolio of systems.  The emphasis on development supporting data structures, KM tools, 
and implied expectation of expanded collaboration provide a clear linkage between DoD policy 
and this area of research.  KM tools directly support CPM decision-making at multiple levels of 
acquisition as will be demonstrated with the DoD MDA Program to identify relationships among 
a portfolio of system features.   
VI. MDA Program 
The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) from October 2005 
defines the Maritime Domain as “all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or 
bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, 
infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances.”  Additionally, it defines MDA 
as “the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could 
impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States.” The stakeholders in 
this enterprise make up the Global Maritime Community of Interest (GMCOI), which includes 
“federal, state, and local departments and agencies with responsibilities in the maritime domain. 
Because certain risks and interests are common to government, business, and citizen alike, 
community membership also includes public, private and commercial stakeholders, as well as 
foreign governments and international stakeholders”  (DHS, 2005, p. 1).  
The problem set that faces the Navy, a key member of the GMCOI, is that:  
commanders lack access to, and the ability to process and disseminate, the broad 
spectrum of information and intelligence that enables cooperative analysis necessary to 
understand maritime activity in their area of responsibility, and requisite to early threat 
identification and effective response against these threats; and when appropriate, to 
enable partners to respond (Chief of Naval Operations, 2009).   
Navy MDA is key to addressing this problem set because it will “enable the warfighter to 
sustain decision superiority to successfully execute its missions.  MDA is fundamental to 
decision making superiority at all levels of command” (Chief of Naval Operations, 2009). The 
Navy plans to improve the following capabilities to achieve MDA; “focused data collection; 
technological enhancements; greater cooperative information sharing; supporting enduring and 
emerging maritime security partnerships; and the professional development of navy personnel 
within the maritime operations centers at naval components and numbered fleets” (Chief of 
Naval Operations, 2009). 
VII. MDA Program Self-awareness Test Case 
The MDA Program is indicative of complex system-of-systems acquisition efforts being 
undertaken by the DoD.  The MDA program includes additional complexity caused by the 
extensive international and interagency involvement, which exhibit the complexities shown in 
the Collaborative Capacity Model shown in Figure 3.   
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This research will develop and examine a representative data mart of structured and 
unstructured program and policy documents from members of the GMCOI.  This task is 
especially challenging in that there is not one consolidated repository for MDA-related 
programmatic documentation.  This data will be collected from various members in the GMCOI 
closely involved in MDA systems development and acquisition.  Data and text mining tools 
will be applied to the MDA Data Mart using the methodology depicted in Figure 5 (Turban et al., 
2008, p. 156).  
 
 
Figure 5. Data-mining Process Recommended by CRISP-DM  
(Turban et al., 2008, p. 156) 
To date, this research has gathered program documentation related to three prototype 
MDA systems, to include Predictive Analysis for Naval Deployment Activities (PANDA), a 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) project, Track Assessment and 
ANomoly Detection–Maritime (TAANDEM) software subsystem, and Comprehensive Maritime 
Awareness System being developed through the Navy Research Lab (NRL).  These documents 
have been placed into the MDA data mart for use in our modeling and analysis.  
The next step in our research will be to further our data understanding and prepare the 
data for application of the various mining algorithms.  This phase of the research is underway as 
this paper is being prepared.  NPS KM research expertise and cutting-edge data and text 
mining applications will be leveraged during this phase of the research. After the initial data 
cleansing and preparation, the mining tools will be applied to the data mart for subsequent 
evaluation and analysis using visualization products to identify common features, capability 
gaps, and relationships between MDA system features.  We expect several iterations of this 
process to extract useful data from the models.   
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Using preliminary data and the Quantum Intelligence (QI) data and text tools developed 
by Dr. Ying Zhao, the visualization products depicted in Figures 6 and 7 were developed to 
demonstrate representative products of this research to highlight relationships among system 
feature data.    
 









Figure 7. Sample MDA System Cluster Visualization  
(Zhao, 2009) 
The final step in the data mining process is deployment. As this is only a demonstration 
of KM tool utility for Program Self-awareness, we do not plan to deploy the algorithms 
developed during this process.  This work will for the foundation for a larger effort by the DoD 
EA for MDA that will hopefully be applied to a much larger data mart developed from the entire 
GMCOI. 
VIII. Predicted Findings 
The MDA Program is representative of complex DoD Acquisition Programs.  KM 
concepts and tools demonstrate utility for improving Program Self-awareness to help identify 
portfolio gaps and duplication which can lead to improved resource allocation decision-making, 
collaboration among acquisition activities, and re-use of SoS components.  Figure 8 provides an 









Figure 8. Program Self-awareness KM Process 
As mentioned above, a central repository for MDA programmatic documentation does 
not currently exist.  This research will recommend development of a GMCOI MDA web portal for 
use as a data warehouse to support future KM implementation and to promote collaboration and 
re-use.  We hope this work will provide foundation for future work to refine Program Self-
awareness concept and KM implementation in DoD Acquisition.  
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Abstract1 
The System Software Safety Technical Review Panel (SSSTRP) is tasked with 
reviewing the software safety processes and practices of US Navy software-intensive Gun 
                                                
1 This work was supported in part by ARO under project number P-45614-CI and in part by NAVSEA 
under project number 09WX11455. 
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System acquisition programs from the early stages of the acquisition process.  As these 
systems grow in complexity and as Open Architecture (OA) is implemented, the acquisition and 
demonstration of safe software is becoming a more challenging task— often resulting in 
unexpected safety risks, schedule delays, and cost overruns.  This research presents an 
approach to mitigate common risks in this domain from the Program Management level. This 
approach focuses on analyzing historical weapon system SSSTRP data to identify trends that 
could lead to a strategy to increase software safety as well as reduce unexpected findings at the 
SSSTRP.  This research effort is still in the early stages, but data are being collected, and 
progress is being made.  The goal of this paper is to increase awareness of both the problem 
and the research effort that is attempting to mitigate the common effects felt by Program 
Managers. 
Background 
The United States Navy (USN) formed the Weapon Systems Explosive Safety Review 
Board (WSESRB) in 1968 as a result of the tragic fire onboard USS FORRESTAL (CV 59).  The 
subsequent investigation recommended an independent review process be established. The 
report highlighted the need to ensure explosives safety requirements are met for all munitions 
introduced to the Fleet.  WSESRB members participate in numerous weapons system safety-
related meetings, technical reviews, and working groups. 
The WSESRB's responsibility is to review the overall safety aspects of each weapon 
system, explosive system, and related system to ensure that weapon system safety 
requirements are satisfied.  Having assessed the degree of compliance with existing criteria, the 
WSESRB provides an assessment of the adequacy of the safety program and makes 
recommendations on the advancement of the item to the next stage in the acquisition cycle to 
the program manager, program sponsor, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and the Milestone 
Decision Authority (MDA).   
At the discretion of the WSESRB Chairperson, special WSESRB Technical Review 
Panels (TRPs) may be established to review specific safety aspects requiring special expertise 
(e.g., ordnance-related software safety) of weapon systems.  These TRPs are scheduled and 
led by an appointed TRP Chairperson and have at least two other designated members.  Naval 
Systems Commanders, when requested by the WSESRB Chairperson, may identify a member 
to serve on TRPs.  These members are familiar with the responsibilities of their Systems 
Commands and respective program requirements and have expertise in the applicable area of 
the TRP.  Other members and technical advisors, chosen for their expertise, are appointed at 
the discretion of the TRP Chairperson.  Software System Safety Technical Review Panel 
(SSSTRP) is one of these special WSERB TRPs. 
Recommendations made by TRPs will be presented to the Program Office and the 
WSESRB at the conclusion of the TRP meeting; however, they do not become official until 
reviewed and endorsed by the WSESRB.  The WSESRB may accept, modify, or reject the 
recommendations of the TRP.  The results of the WSESRB action on the TRP 
recommendations will be provided to the Program Office.   
Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Dahlgren Division acts as a principal activity for 
system safety support to the WSESRB, as well as chairing the SSSTRP and other TRPs as 
assigned.  These assignments include: (1) developing and recommending, with WSESRB 
approval, TRP review criteria and related data, (2) coordinating meetings of the SSSTRP with 
members and program offices, (3) assisting the program office in tailoring TRP review criteria 
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for each type of program and current program phase, (4) identifying qualified technical advisors 
to participate in the TRP, and with the WSESRB chairperson’s concurrence, arranging for their 
participation, (5) scheduling meetings of the TRP at the request of the WSESRB chairperson, 
and (6) providing a summary report of the findings and recommendations of the SSSTRP TRP 
to the WSESRB. 
The SSSTRP's primary focus is to investigate whether the vendor's software engineering 
processes properly identify and address the risks associated with the implementation of their 
product.  The following list represents the SSSTRP's areas of focus within the software 
development process: 
• Software Development Process Essentials 
o Software Development Plan 
o Configuration Control Management 
o Requirements Management 
o Safety Involvement 
 Change Boards 
 Trouble Reports 
 Build Reviews 
 Test & Integration Plans 
Vendors are required to submit Technical Data Packages (TDPs) that contain 
documentation that details the vendor's quality control procedures associated with the following 
engineering processes: 
• Software Engineering 
o Software Development Plan 
o Software Architecture Design 
o Software Interfaces 
o Software Detailed Design 
o Software Testing & Integration Plans 
o Software Verification & Validation Plans 
o Software Build Schedule 
o Build Milestones 
o Build Functionality 
• Specialty Engineering 
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o Configuration Management 
o Requirements Management 
The actual components of the TDP are made up of the project documentation submitted 
by the vendor.  The vendor submits the following documents as the TDP: 
• System Program 
o System Description 
o Program Organization 
o Program Schedule 
o Concept of Operations 
• Software Program 
o Software Development Plan 
o Software Build Plan 
o Software Configuration Management 
o Software Requirements Management 
o Software Change Board Control 
• System Safety Program 
o System Safety Program Plan 
 Integrated Safety Schedule 
 Safety Organization 
• Roles & Responsibilities 
• IPT (Cross Product Team) Interactions 
 Software Safety Analyses Descriptions 
 Hazard Tracking System 
 System Safety Working Group (SSWG) 
• Current Safety Status 
o Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) 
The vendor's responsibility during the SSSTRP presentation is to identify the risks 
associated with its products relative to all stages of the software lifecycle.  The vendor is also 
required to present the associated mitigation strategy for each risk.  Software risks can be found 
via the following analysis techniques: 
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• Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) 
• Software Requirements Analysis (SRA) 
• Preliminary Design Analysis (PDA) 
• Detailed Design Analysis (DDA) 
• COTS Analysis 
• Code Analysis (CA) 
• Software Test Results Analysis (STRA) 
Problem Statement 
Current and active US Navy gun system acquisition programs are more complex than 
their predecessors.  The systems being acquired are much more software-intensive and present 
a much greater challenge with respect to understanding and mitigating the risks associated with 
Navy gun safety.  Navy gun systems are much more software-intensive than previous 
generations due to the increasingly complex requirements for centralized command and control 
(C2).  In order to adapt to new technologies, the Navy has engaged the Open Architecture (OA) 
concept.  Although the OA approach is much more flexible, there are inherent risks associated 
with it.  The Navy acquisition community, specifically the SSSSTRP process, needs to adapt to 
this new OA environment and standardize the SSSTRP processes. 
Significant effort is required to put together a TDP for SSSTRP review.  The SSSTRP 
panel finds issues in the vast majority of systems that come before it. Such findings need to be 
addressed prior to WSESRB concurrence on the overall program.  Typically, every system 
going in front of the WSESRB and SSSTRP is handled on a strictly individual basis by its 
respective vendor and Program Managers (PMs).  PMs ideally want their programs to be well 
prepared for the SSSTRP so there are no unexpected surprises resulting in safety hazards, 
schedule delays and/or cost overruns. However, Navy gun system PMs do not have a good 
handle on what the trends are in the findings from system to system, and there is always a 
desire to reduce the programmatic risk involved in passing the reviews. 
If commonalities or trends in SSSTRP findings were identified, they could be analyzed— 
leading to a better programmatic strategy to generate safe systems.  This would also result in a 
minimal number of hurdles during the SSSTRP review, and the end result would be beneficial to 
all parties involved.   
Research Approach 
Our proposed strategy for identifying trends in SSSTRP findings on weapon-system-
related acquisition programs is to initially meet with PMs, US Navy safety community members, 
and system developers to discuss experiences and lessons learned. We can also gather data 
from informal meetings and discussions and analyze it to find more quantitative sources of 
information. 
In addition to collecting data from various participants from the acquisition community, 
we will also request and analyze TDPs, SSSTRP reports, and WSESRB data related to recent 
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navy gun system acquisition programs. We expect this information to yield quantitative data that 
can assist us as we identify trends across different acquisition programs.  Due to the nature of 
the OA initiative, we should be able to derive trends specific to OA software-intensive systems 
from the data, as well.   
The third step in this research approach is to analyze the SSSTRP process itself with the 
goal of quantitatively determining the consistency of the process.  This information is a vital 
data-collection objective because specifics in the consistency of the SSSTRP process from 
system to system should correlate with similar results for similar cases being presented to the 
panel. 
Our fourth step in this research approach is to connect the identified lessons learned and 
trends in SSSTRP data reports with data on the SSSTRP process itself.  This step is essentially 
the point at which we can begin to derive conclusions and recommendations.  Relationships in 
the data will primarily focus on how to most effectively reduce programmatic risk in guiding a 
weapon system acquisition program through the SSSTRP process smoothly. In this 
assessment, we will pay particular attention to system characteristics that will be consistent 
throughout future programs, such as OA software.   
The end result of this research will be to create a deliverable that can be used by PMs to 
more effectively manage their OA-based acquisition system programs.  A side deliverable will 
be an analysis of the SSSTRP process and recommendations on how personnel involved in the 
safety community can improve it. 
Current Research Status 
Data collection has been a time-consuming task, but progress is ongoing.  From October 
to December 2008, we conducted both project-scope refinement and meetings with safety and 
acquisition community members.  We established relationships with the Naval Gunnery Project 
Office, NSWC Port Hueneme Division (PHD) Detachment Louisville, NSWC Dahlgren and 
Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity (NOSSA).  We also discussed specifics of the 
process with a majority of players in the community and compiled information on the process 
itself.  Any stakeholders we have missed are encouraged to contact us. 
Along with SSSTRP and WSESRB process data, we received recent gun-system-related 
SSSTRP reports through a request from the Naval Gunnery Project Office to NSWC Dahlgren. 
For research purposes, we also have had access to reports deemed releasable by the Navy 
from the past six years.  TDPs were not made available for more detailed analysis due to the 
sensitivity of the majority of the programs.  The above-mentioned data were received in 
February 2009, and our primary focus has been to determine what information is most useful for 
analysis.  Collaboration has taken place with NOSSA personnel to determine how to break 
down and classify findings from the SSSTRP reports.  The analysis is ongoing, but research is 
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2003, Chao was a managing director and senior aerospace/defense analyst at Credit Suisse First 
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Prior to joining CSFB, Pierre was the senior aerospace/defense analyst at Morgan Stanley Dean Witter 
from 1995-1999. He served as the senior aerospace/defense industry analyst at Smith Barney during 
1994 and as a director at JSA International, a Boston/Paris-based management-consulting firm that 
focused on the aerospace/defense industry (1986-1988, 1990-1993). Chao was also a co-founder of 
JSA Research, an equity research boutique specializing in the aerospace/defense industry. Before 
signing on with JSA, he worked in the New York and London offices of Prudential-Bache Capital 
Funding as a mergers and acquisitions banker focusing on aerospace/defense (1988-1990).  
Chao garnered numerous awards while working on Wall Street. Institutional Investors ranked Pierre's 
team the number-one global aerospace/defense group every year eligible from 2000-02, and he was on 
the Institutional Investor All-America Research Team every year eligible from 1996-2002. He was 
ranked the number-one aerospace/defense analyst by corporations in the 1998-2000 Reuters Polls, the 
number-one aerospace/defense analyst in the 1995-99 Greenwich Associates polls, and appeared on 
the Wall Street Journal All-Star list in four of seven eligible years.  
In 2000, Chao was appointed to the Presidential Commission on Offsets in International Trade. He was 
a member of the 2005 Defense Science Board Summer Study (Assessment of Transformation), 2006 
DSB Summer Study (Strategic Technology Vectors), and the 2006/2007 DSB Task Force on the Health 
of the Defense Industry.  He is also a guest lecturer at the National Defense University and the Defense 
Acquisition University. Chao has been sought out as an expert analyst of the defense and aerospace 
industry by the Senate Armed Services Committee, the House Science Committee, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, DoD Defense Science Board, Army Science Board, NASA, DGA (France), NATO 
and the Aerospace Industries Association Board of Governors.  
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Chao earned dual Bachelor of Science degrees in Political Science and Management Science from 
MIT. 
Discussant: John Birkler, senior management systems analyst at RAND, has been at RAND for 
almost 30 years, where he has led projects relating to weapon system acquisition across all the military 
services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense, and the 
U.S. Coast Guard. In recent years, Birkler has specialized in directing complex projects on acquisition 
of air and naval systems.  These projects—often mandated by the Congress or by senior U.S. or U.K. 
acquisition officials—involved budgets over $1 million and short timelines considering the level of effort.  
All these projects have been completed on time and within budget.  Recent study topics have included 
developing acquisition strategies for U.S. and UK submarines, aircraft carriers, and surface 
combatants, competitive strategies for the Joint Strike Fighter, and the U.S. Coast Guard’s Deepwater 
modernization plan.  Over the past decade, Birkler has held a wide range of RAND management and 
research positions. He is now responsible for RAND’s maritime research.  A graduate of UCLA’s 
Executive Management Program, Birkler earned an M.S. in nuclear physics from the University of 
South Carolina and, after three command tours, retired from the U.S. Naval Reserve as a Captain. 
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Globalizing World 
Presenter: Dr. Nayantara Hensel has taught finance and economics at the Graduate School of 
Business and Public Policy at the US Naval Postgraduate School since 2004 and is a Research 
Associate for the Center for Defense Management Research.  She received her BA (magna cum 
laude) from Harvard University where she was a member of Phi Beta Kappa. She received her MA 
and PhD from the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University in Business 
Economics (Applied Economics). She recently served as the Pentagon Scholar in Residence, 
attached to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Prior to joining the faculty at the US 
Naval Postgraduate School, Hensel served as a Senior Manager at Ernst & Young, LLP, and as the 
chief economist for one of its units, was a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the National Bureau of 
Economic Research, taught at Harvard University and the Stern School of Business at NYU, and was 
an economist at NERA (part of Marsh & McLennan). Hensel’s recent research has examined the 
impact of consolidation in the defense industrial base, policy concerns in the recent tanker 
competition between Boeing and Northrop Grumman/EADS, the factors impacting personal discount 
rates for US Marine Corps personnel, the efficiency of IPO auctions, and economies of scale and 
density in the European and Japanese banking sectors. She has published over 19 articles and book 
chapters. Her most recent publications have been in Business Economics, the International Journal of 
Managerial Finance, the Review of Financial Economics, the European Financial Management 
Journal, the Journal of Financial Transformation, and Harvard Business School Working Knowledge.  
She is the Chair of the Financial Roundtable for the National Association of Business Economists 
(NABE) and is one of 34 elected members to NBEIC, which is a group composed of the top corporate 
economists in the US. Hensel has given seminars at a number of institutions and has appeared on 
CNBC, Bloomberg Radio, and CNNMoney.  
Abstract 
The purpose of this analysis is to discuss the importance of linkages between US and 
European defense manufacturers with the emergence of the common global threat of terrorism, 
the greater price sensitivity of governments concerning weapons systems costs, and the 
shrinkage of defense budgets. The article discusses the reasons behind the formation of 
alliances between US and European defense contractors, examines several case studies of 
alliances, assesses some of the patterns in alliance formation, and analyzes the potential for 
trans-Atlantic alliances between defense contractors in the future. 
I. Introduction 
The landscape of the global defense industry in the post-Cold War period has changed 
in a number of ways. First, the emergence of the terrorist threat has transcended the boundaries 
of nation-states and has led to the emergence of allied forces requiring interoperability of 
equipment and synergistic compatibility in computer systems. Cooperation in research, 
development, and technology transfer between defense contractors from various countries is 
important to produce the best product at the lowest cost. Second, the defense spending gap 
between Europe and the US continues such that the US remains a lucrative market for both 
European and US defense contractors. Third, the US defense industry experienced significant 
consolidation during the 1990s, which, in turn, contributed to greater consolidation among 
European defense contractors to remain competitive globally. This has limited the number of 
possible partners for additional mergers or alliances on both sides of the Atlantic. Fourth, as 
weapons systems become increasingly complex, it can be cost-effective to spread the research 
and development costs across different defense companies. Fifth, the trend toward globalization 
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across industries and greater collaboration between companies in different countries has 
accelerated over the past twenty years.  
Against this backdrop, there have been a number of studies across industries on 
mergers, as well as on alliances. Mergers have the benefit of leading to the formation of more 
permanent relationships between the merging companies. With the absorption of one company 
into another, there are greater opportunities for cost-cutting in eliminating duplicative workforces 
and in reorganizing the corporate hierarchy to better internalize and reduce the transactions 
costs that would have been present in an arm’s-length relationship. The benefits of this 
absorption can also lead to substantive integration costs and cultural/communication difficulties, 
which can postpone or altogether eliminate the benefits of the merger. Mergers can have 
permanent or long-lasting effects on the market power of various companies, the ability of new 
firms to enter the industry, and market concentration levels. As a consequence, the regulatory 
scrutiny from the antitrust authorities is important in concluding the deal.  
When mergers occur between companies from different countries, the magnitude of the 
opportunities for benefits relative to the costs changes. Absorption costs for an international 
merger can increase relative to a domestic merger, especially if there are cultural or 
communication incompatibilities between the merging parties. The issue of which country loses 
jobs to the other country is often magnified by the popular press and government officials. 
Although the impact on market power and market concentration may be less with an 
international merger than a domestic merger because the definition of the relevant market is 
geographically larger, the regulatory review process can become more complicated since 
regulatory authorities from multiple countries are involved.      
Alliances can often be a good alternative to mergers. The parties involved in the alliance 
can obtain some of the benefits of a merger—joint investments in R&D expenses and 
production equipment, knowledge transfer and technology transfer, and access to new markets. 
Alliances can be easier to disassemble than mergers because less integration of operations is 
required. As a result, integration costs are lower, and the potential for cultural or communication 
clashes is less. Nevertheless, as discussed by Doz and Hamel (1998), in alliances in which 
generation of economies of scale is a motivation, the costs of exiting the alliance can be high 
due to the sunk costs of investment in equipment. Since alliances may lack the depth of 
integration found in mergers, there could be less of an incentive for parties to invest in 
relationship-specific assets and to produce the types of benefits and efficiencies that would be 
possible in a merger. Finally, although alliances may raise fewer regulatory concerns, the 
degree of technology transfer, etc., is still subject to review. Government officials can also 
protest ensuing job loss if combined production facilities from the alliance result in a loss of jobs 
in one country.  
Alliances have become increasingly prevalent in a variety of industries; indeed, a 
number of studies on alliances have been cross-sectional, rather than focused on a specific 
industry, such as Yoshino and Rangan (1995) and Liedtka (1998). The importance of global 
competition as an impetus for alliance formation is discussed in Yoshino and Rangan (1995). 
Strategic alliances can even be a defensive strategy in that, as Gomez-Casseres (1994) 
discussed, as more alliances are formed, there are fewer possible partners available for firms 
that wish to form new alliances, and “strategic gridlock” can develop.  
Alliances are helpful in the defense industry for several reasons. First, the R&D costs for 
development of a product can be high, which is why it is more cost-effective not to duplicate 
efforts. Second, the primary buyers are governments who are increasingly cash-constrained. 
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Collaboration between companies can be more cost-effective and successful than the 
competition between many different companies to chase a few contracts. Third, firms benefit 
from each other’s skills without paying the integration costs and financial costs of a merger, 
which can lead to a higher return on investment from the collaboration because the costs of the 
investment are lower. This study analyzes the reasons behind the formation of alliances 
between US and European defense contractors, examines several case studies of alliances, 
assesses some of the patterns in alliance formation, and discusses the potential for trans-
Atlantic alliances in the future. 
II. Motivations for Trans-Atlantic Ties 
One of the primary reasons for further developing trans-Atlantic ties between US and 
European defense contractors was the need for more synergistic and interoperable equipment 
among NATO members. In 1999, Alfred G. Volkman, US Acting Deputy Under Secretary for 
Defense, noted: 
The end of the Cold War, the break-up of the Soviet empire, the emerging power of 
rogue nations, and equally destabilizing geopolitical events are transforming our vision of 
the 21st century security needs and our NATO military strategy […]. In order to develop 
and field interoperable equipment, it is necessary that stronger transatlantic ties are 
forged […]. Governments would agree on common [military] requirements, then invite 
defense firms to form transatlantic competitive teams of their own choosing. (Sparaco, 
1999)  
Nevertheless, concerns over limitations on technology transfer on national security 
grounds between countries was one of the greatest stumbling blocks in strengthening trans-
Atlantic ties. Indeed, in 1999,General Jean-Yves Helmer, Director of the DGA French 
armaments agency, noted, “the US and Europe do not share identical [defense] concepts and 
[operational] requirements. Nevertheless, there is ample room for synergy, on the condition 
that know-how and technology can circulate freely” (Sparaco, 1999, emphasis added). Barriers 
on export licensing and the transfer of technology limited the development of trans-Atlantic 
alliances in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but the “Declaration of Principles” signed by the US 
and the UK in February 2000 was an early step to greater joint research and development, and 
coordination of technology transfer, military requirements, etc. (Sparaco, 2000). Some argued, 
however, that with the exception of the UK and Canada, the US had a lack of trust for most 
other countries, especially in terms of technology-transfer issues (Barrie & Taverna, 2002).  
European defense firms were also attracted to the US market because its defense 
market was much larger than the defense market in Europe. For example, in 2002, the US 
budget was three times that of EU countries. As a result, the investments of European 
companies in the US were 10 times greater than the value of US acquisitions in the European 
defense sector. In some sub-sectors of the defense market, the gap in spending and trade 
between the US and Europe was less. For example, Raytheon argued that in the areas on 
which the Thales Raytheon Systems focused—battlefield surveillance and command and 
control (C2) systems—there was less of a differential in spending (Barrie & Taverna, 2002). 
Consequently, the interest of the Europeans in the US defense market was driven both by 
disparities in spending, as well as by the perception that US R&D might drive the next 
generation of weapons systems—such that an alliance would give European countries access 
to the technologies without having to fund their development themselves (2002).  
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III. Historical Concerns over International Merger Activity 
Involving the US Defense Sector 
Mergers or acquisitions involving the US defense market have historically been 
problematic. Although there may have been benefits from the acquisition, Congressional 
representatives are often concerned about job loss, as well as the national security issues 
inherent in technology transfer. As discussed in Hensel (2008), the acquisition is often formally 
disallowed, or the foreign entrant withdraws its bid in anticipation that the acquisition will be 
blocked if it proceeds further.   
Hensel (2008) discusses, as an example, the concerns over the acquisition of Fairchild 
Semiconductors by Fujitsu, a Japanese firm, in the US semiconductor industry in the 1980s. 
Fujitsu announced that it planned to purchase 80% of Fairchild Semiconductors, which was the 
second largest seller of chips to the US military. The US semiconductor industry was important 
for early warning, air-defense, and air-to-surface attack systems, naval surface warfare, tanks, 
and conventional artillery. Between 1978 and 1987, Japan had increased its share of the 
semiconductor industry from 28% to 50%, while the share of the US in semiconductors had 
fallen from 55% to 44%. For particular types of chips, such as DRAM chips, the share of US 
companies fell from 90% in 1975 to 5% by 1986. A Congressional outcry ensued following 
Fujitsu’s proposal. Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio argued that jobs would be lost, while 
B. Jay Cooper, the press secretary for the Department of Commerce, argued that the deal 
would place “vital national interests at stake.” Several proposals were suggested, including a 
proposal that the merged firm would not be allowed to have military contracts and a proposal 
that Fairchild would not provide Fujitsu with military technology. The outcome of the protests 
was that, in March, 1987, Fujitsu withdrew its offer, and National Semiconductor bought 
Fairchild and became the sixth largest chipmaker in the world (Dallmeyer, 1987). 
Hensel (2008) discusses a more recent example of a failed attempt at entering the US 
market that occurred in 2005 in the US oil sector. As in the semiconductor case, the foreign 
acquirer withdrew its offer due to a substantive Congressional outcry. China National Overseas 
Oil Corporation  (CNOOC), a Chinese state-owned company, tendered a bid to purchase 
Unocal Corp for $18.5 billion. Chevron, the other bidder, was offering only $17.1 billion, but it 
mobilized Congressional representatives to express their concerns about a Chinese firm playing 
a significant role in the US oil sector. In the wake of this outcry, CNOOC withdrew its bid even 
before the CFIUS review, and Chevron acquired Unocal (Shearer, 2006). 
Hensel (2008) notes that concerns over national security can lead to some form of 
separation or divestiture of operating units linked to the defense sector so that the rest of the 
acquisition can proceed. One recent example, discussed in her article, is the merger of Alcatel 
(a French firm) and Lucent Technologies. Since Bell Labs, a division of Lucent, had undertaken 
a number of projects for the US government, Bell Labs would be insulated from the new firm 
and would become a separate US subsidiary with an independent board. A second example, 
discussed in her article, was the concern over the acquisition of Peninsula & Orient Steam 
Navigation, Co. (P&O), a British firm, by the state-owned Dubai Ports Worldwide (DPW). This 
acquisition provoked a Congressional outcry because it would have resulted in a foreign 
company managing 6 US ports. DPW agreed to sell the ports to a US company in the wake of 
strong Congressional opposition (Lynch, 2006; “Buy America,” 2006; Shearer, 2006).  
Hensel (2008), however, describes how the US is not the only country which uses 
protectionism to block mergers. For example, Dominique de Villepin, who served as the French 
Premier, designated 11 sectors of the French economy as sensitive for national security, and 
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blocked the merger of PepsiCo (US) and Danone (French) under “economic patriotism.” He 
further encouraged the merger of Gaz de France (a French gas supplier with significant state 
involvement) with Suez (a French power and water supplier) at the expense of a bid by the 
Italian company Enel. Similarly, Italy has blocked foreign takeovers of many of its banks 
(Pearlstein, 2006; Platt, 2006; Beattie, 2008). As globalization exposes vulnerabilities, countries 
will likely continue to promote domestic champions by preventing foreign acquisitions through 
protectionist concerns linked to national security. 
IV. Patterns in Alliances between US Defense Contractors and 
Foreign Defense Contractors 
Alliances between US defense firms and foreign firms are also exposed to some of the 
same concerns as mergers—such as concerns over the potential of US jobs going overseas 
and national security concerns over technology transfer. Nevertheless, although alliances 
undergo some scrutiny, it can be easier for the parties involved in the alliance to limit the degree 
of their involvement with each other, at least initially, than would be the case in a merger. As the 
alliance deepens and trust is built—both between the two parties concerned and between the 
two governments involved in the alliance—the degree of involvement can increase.    
Butler, Kenny, and Anchor (2000) discuss strategic alliances within the European 
defense industry, as well as many of the changes to the defense sector. They describe how 
certain defense sub-sectors have more alliances than others and note that the electronics 
sector, the land vehicles sector, and the naval vessel sector have more alliances than the small 
arms and ordnance sector. Although they do not discuss why this might be the case, one 
possibility is that the sectors with more alliances are more R&D-intensive, and it is more cost-
effective for the partners to share the costs than to bear the costs alone. They also discuss how 
cultural compatibility has not been necessary for the success of defense alliances, although 
70% of UK contractors are in an alliance with a US firm. They find that many of the alliances are 
actually agreements for sub-contracting (in which the US firm is the lead contractor), or licensing 
agreements (in which the US firm is the licenser).  
The author collected data on the number, type and details of joint ventures and alliances 
between 2002 and 2005 involving US defense contractors with both other US defense 
contractors, as well as foreign defense contractors. Her analysis of the data found that 
Lockheed Martin and Boeing had the greatest number of alliances with foreign defense 
contractors. Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, and Raytheon had between 1/4 and 1/3 of 
the number of alliances with foreign contractors as Lockheed Martin and between 1/2 and 1/3 of 
the number of alliances with foreign contractors as Boeing. The fact that Boeing and Lockheed 
Martin had more alliances with foreign defense contractors during this period than other large 
US defense contractors may be a function of: (a) the opportunities for shared R&D in the 
weapons systems sub-sectors in which these alliances focused, as well as (b) the success of 
previous alliances made by these companies, which made them more likely to be willing to enter 
into additional alliances, thus creating a positive, self-reinforcing cycle.  
In further examining the data, the author divided the foreign defense contractors involved 
in alliances with a US defense contractor by region—Europe, the UK/Australia/Canada, Asia, 
and the Middle East. Lockheed Martin contracted half of its alliances and joint ventures involving 
foreign contractors with UK, Australian and Canadian contractors and the other half with Asian 
contractors. Northrop Grumman contracted 2/3 of its foreign alliances with UK, Australian, and 
Canadian contractors, and 1/3 with Middle Eastern contractors. General Dynamics contracted 
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1/2 of its foreign alliances with European contractors and half with UK, Australian, or Canadian 
contractors. Raytheon had 100% of its foreign alliances with European contractors. Boeing had 
1/3 of its foreign alliances with European contractors and 2/3 with Asian contractors. Lockheed 
Martin and Northrop Grumman did not form an alliance with a European contractor at all during 
this period, while Raytheon and Boeing, which did form alliances with European contractors, did 
not form any alliances with UK, Australian, or Canadian contractors over this period. The 
dominance of UK, Australian, Canadian, or European firms as foreign partners in these 
alliances suggests the importance of: (a) common language; (b) geographic proximity; (c) a 
prior history of successful alliances with firms in that country, leading to a positive, self-
reinforcing cycle; and (d) the importance of these partner countries as allies in the Global War 
on Terror and the need for interoperability of equipment, especially in joint operations.   
V. The Role of Alliances in Creating Additional Alliances among 
Competitors: A Case Study of the CFM Alliance and International 
Aero Engines 
Alliances are often formed in order to combine different knowledge pools to create a new 
and superior product. As the market share for this product increases, the competitors in this 
product space may also form alliances to share knowledge and to develop an even better 
product than their allied competitors. The result of this defensive alliance formation can be an 
improved market sector—with several innovative and competing products for the end-user—
developed by multiple competing alliances. The development of the CFM International alliance 
and the International Aero Engine alliance is an example of this.   
CFM International is a joint venture between Snecma, formerly a French state-owned 
enterprise, and General Electric (GE).  The alliance, which is one of the most successful and 
long-lasting alliances in the trans-Atlantic market, was formed in 1974 because GE and Snecma 
intended to leverage their skills developed in the engine market in the defense sector by 
entering the civilian market for engines, which was heavily dominated by Pratt & Whitney at the 
time. One of the initial hurdles was to convince the US government to allow GE to share its 
military technology with Snecma. As of 2007, the engines made by CFM (especially the CFM 56 
engine) could be found in over 50% of the fleet of single-aisle planes with 100 seats or more 
and are often found in Airbus 320s and Boeing 737s. The way in which the alliance was 
structured was that each of the two partners would be involved with the design, production, and 
research of their respective modules/components within the engine. GE and Snecma’s 
relationship has not been based on equity holdings. The two firms split the proceeds from the 
engines in half, based on notional costs, although neither company knows the true costs of its 
partners (“Business: Odd Couple,” 2007). 
During the early 1980s, Pratt & Whitney’s market share began to fall in this product 
space. In 1983, it created an alliance—International Aero Engines (IAE)—with MTU (part of 
Daimler-Benz), Fiat, Rolls-Royce, and Japanese Aero Engines to develop an engine which 
would compete with CFM’s engines (“Business: Odd Couple,” 2007). This product alliance, like 
CFM International, was based around the design of an engine—in this case, the V2500 engine. 
By 1995, CFM International and International Aero Engines controlled 26.6% of the aero 
engine sector. One benefit of the alliances within the civil engine arena has been that, although 
Rolls Royce, Pratt and Whitney, and GE were already involved in the civil engine market, the 
other members of the alliances, such as Snecma, through its development of the CFM56 engine 
with the CFM International alliance, and Daimler-Benz, through its development of the V2500 
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engine as part of the International Aero Engines alliance, were able to enhance and establish 
their positions in this market. The creation of the CFM International alliance allowed Snecma, 
which had manufactured jets for the French military, to use this expertise to enter the civilian 
aero engine market and to build up a significant presence through its development of the 
CFM56 engine. Consequently, by galvanizing Pratt & Whitney and other manufacturers to form 
International Aero Engines, alliance formation facilitated the development of several new 
engines, as well as a vibrant, competitive marketplace for the end-user (Smith, 1997).  
VI. Trans-Atlantic Partnerships as a Means of Promoting National 
Defense Strategy: A Case Study of Trans-Atlantic Cooperation in 
Missile Defense 
In 2002, Boeing entered into separate agreements at the Farnborough Air Show with 
BAE, EADS, and Alenia Spazio to cooperate on ballistic missile defense. The alliance planned 
to be an informational exchange in which Boeing would discuss with its European partners its 
approach to missile defense, and they would discuss the technologies they could incorporate 
into the missiles (Asker, Barrie & Taverna, 2002). Part of the purpose of the agreements was to 
galvanize the interest of European governments in larger ballistic missile defense programs, 
which they thought could be destabilizing, rather than just theater-wide missile defense. It could 
help the US convince the Europeans that larger missile defense programs could also cover 
NATO’s European members and to show the Europeans that there would be jobs involved in it 
(“Business: Hands Across the Sea,” 2002). 
The various European partners in the alliance were chosen due to the contributions that 
their expertise would provide to the project. Alenia Spazio, part of Finnmeccanica, would add its 
expertise in supercomputers/data fusion, synthetic aperture radar satellites, and wideband 
secure telecommunications to the joint missile defense architecture discussions. EADS would 
add expertise in the space area from its affiliate, Astrium, as well as its knowledge of early 
warning satellite systems, which could locate the sites where the ballistic missiles were 
launched, the zone of potential impact, and the trajectory of the missile in the boos phase 
(Asker, Barrie & Taverna, 2002).  
Part of the reason why there was an impetus for trans-Atlantic alliances in the missile 
area is that there have been several previous alliances in the missile product area.  
For example, Boeing and EADS had collaborated on a study for NATO on tactical 
missile defenses (Asker, Barrie & Taverna, 2002), and Boeing had worked in marketing the 
Meteor missile, made by EADS and BAE. Most of the previous arrangements between Boeing 
and EADS had involved subcontracting or marketing, while this alliance involved sharing the 
product development responsibilities (“Business: Hands Across the Sea,” 2002).  
Consequently, this alliance was partially motivated by the need to convince the 
Europeans of the US perspective toward larger missile defense programs. It involved sharing of 
knowledge between the members and a fusion of their different capabilities to produce 
innovative products. Alliances, particularly between Boeing and EADS, had previously existed in 
the missile defense arena, and the positive momentum from these previous alliances had 
helped in building trust and, thus, helped to promote the development of subsequent alliances.  
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VII. Alliances Focused on Specific Product Areas: A Case Study 
on the Alliance between Raytheon and Thales 
Many of the successful trans-Atlantic alliances between defense contractors have been 
focused on a specific product area. CFM International and International Aero Engines, 
discussed in Section V, are examples of successful alliances which concentrated on developing 
systems in a specific product area. Another example of this type of alliance is the alliance 
between Thales (formerly Thomson-CSF, a French company) and Raytheon. This alliance, 
Thales Raytheon Systems, was completed in early 2001. This alliance was created so the two 
contractors could collaborate on ground-based battlefield radar programs and air defense 
command/control (C2) programs (Taverna, 2001). By the end of 2001, Thales and Raytheon 
had collaborated on 17 projects (“US-Euro Strategic Alliances,” 2001). 
The alliance was a horizontal combination in which firewalls were built to protect against 
leakage of sensitive information. Thales Raytheon Systems was divided into two subsidiaries; 
Raytheon would have a 51% share in the US subsidiary, and Thales would have a 51% share in 
the European subsidiary. The revenues of Thales Raytheon Systems were split between France 
and the US (Taverna, 2001). 
As was the case in the alliance formed between Boeing and EADS in the missile 
defense area, Thales Raytheon Systems was formed partially because the two companies 
involved had successfully collaborated on other fronts—thus building trust between the two 
parties and increasing their tendency to invest in relationship-specific assets, despite the more 
arm’s-length nature of an alliance relative to a merger. Thales and Raytheon collaborated on the 
Air Command Systems International (ACSI), which was a venture established in 1997 to work 
on the Florako air defense radar project in Switzerland, and NATO’s Airborne Command and 
Control System (LOC1). ACSI continued to be a separate entity, but was attached to Thales 
Raytheon Systems (Taverna, 2001). 
VIII: The Role of Alliances in Sharing R&D Costs: A Case Study of 
Boeing’s “Super-Jumbo” Jet Alliance 
Mergers and alliances are often valuable in enabling the participating firms to generate 
economies of scale in both R&D costs and in production costs by sharing these costs or by 
spreading them over a greater number of units of output to lower per-unit costs.  As weapons 
systems have become more complex, R&D has continued to be an important and costly phase 
of the product development cycle.  
One example of an alliance which was formed to share R&D costs was an alliance—led 
by Boeing, and including the Airbus companies of Aerospatiale SA (France), British Aerospace, 
and Daimler-Benz—to develop a “super-jumbo” jet. The R&D costs to develop this jet, which 
would have carried between 600 and 800 passengers, were $15 billion. This was too much for 
one contractor to sustain and was more affordable when spread over an alliance of contractors 
(Cole, 1995). 
The project first began development in January 1992, but collapsed in 1995 due to 
uncertainty in demand. Only Singapore Airlines and British Airways were willing to place orders. 
This underscores the importance of the need to share R&D costs, and hence the risk of product 
development, in an environment of uncertain demand. A second reason for the collapse of the 
project was the concern that it would consume so much capital that it would limit the 
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development of the next generation of supersonic planes (Cole, 1995). Consequently, although 
alliances are important in sharing R&D costs, the placement of the product being developed has 
to be evaluated in the context of the costs of the estimated future trajectory in product 
development.  
IX. The Role of Alliances in Developing Interoperable Equipment 
between Allied Forces: A Case Study of the Joint Strike Fighter 
The development of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is an example one of the most 
extensive alliances in the defense sector, involving 9 different contractors from various 
countries, led by Lockheed Martin. The JSF not only allows the various contractors to contribute 
their expertise to provide a better product, but also provides a strong basis for understanding 
the challenges facing global defense alliances in the future, ranging from cost-allocation issues, 
to technology transfer security issues, to global supply chain integration issues.    
One of the main benefits of the creation of the JSF is that the new product—created by 
the sharing of technology between the various allied nations—will allow greater synchronization 
of subsequent operations of the coalition of allied countries and the development of more similar 
capabilities. The intention has been for the F-35 to replace 13 different types of aircraft across 
11 different countries (“Lockheed Martin,” 2008). Nine nations are participating in the JSF 
program, according to their levels of financial involvement. While the US is the primary 
customer, the UK is a Level I partner since it contributes 10% of the development costs, 
followed by Level II partners—the Netherlands and Italy, and then followed by Level III 
partners—Canada, Turkey, Australia, Norway, and Denmark (“F-35 Lighting II,” 2009).  
The international structure of the relationships between the US contractors and the 
foreign contractors on the JSF has drawn criticism. By mid-2003, one of the concerns was 
linked to the fact that the foreign contractors on the JSF did not have to share the growing 
development costs, which had already increased $3 billion since the start of the system 
development phase. The US defense representatives argued that they could ask for assistance 
from their foreign allies in handling cost overruns. A second concern, voiced by the chairman of 
the House Government Reform Panel, Representative Shays, was that too many US jobs on 
the JSF were going overseas—as of that point, 18% of the contracts on the JSF had gone 
overseas, valued at $2.2 billion. A third concern came from the partners on the other side of the 
Atlantic: the Chairman of Alenia Aeronautica noted his disappointment in the return on 
investment in the JSF. On the US side, there were concerns that program decisions might have 
to be made to increase the return on investment to partner countries, but which could also lead 
to delays or higher costs (Wall, 2003). Finally, a fifth concern arose surrounding technology-
transfer issues. The UK threatened to exit the JSF program unless the US shared information 
on the stealth technologies, etc., related to the plane (“Politics and Economics,” 2006). Britain 
had invested $2 billion in the plane as of the spring of 2006, when the discussions began about 
their concerns over the US not sharing this technology (“Strains in the Alliance,” 2006). This 
disagreement was subsequently resolved.  
Multinational military operations require a degree of synergy between the technology of 
the various allied powers; compatibility in computer systems and communications systems is 
important. Trans-Atlantic alliances can promote this, not only in the case of the JSF, but for 
subsequent products. The intention of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to purchase more 
JSFs, as announced in April 2009, emphasizes the commitment of the US to systems that are 
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compatible with its allies and that are developed through global alliances, as well as to the high 
quality of the collaboratively produced plane.   
Section X: The Role of Alliances in Entering New Markets: A Case 
Study of the Northrop-Grumman/EADS Alliance on the KC-45a 
Tanker 
One of the most recent chapters in the evolution of trans-Atlantic defense relations has 
been the alliance between Northrop-Grumman and EADS to supply the USAF with a new fleet 
of aerial refueling tankers. This contract may the largest defense contract in history with the 
exception of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. This is a landmark case not only in terms of the size 
of the defense contract, but also in terms of the relationship of the US with the broader 
European defense market, and the impact of the US reaction to the tanker competition on global 
perceptions concerning the openness of the US defense market.  
As discussed in Hensel (2008), the tanker competition is very important to the USAF 
because the average age of the existing KC-135 tankers is 47 years; the planes were first put 
into service in 1957. The 2008 competition was initially over a $1.5 billion contract, covering 4 
test aircraft. The intent was then to buy 175 more planes, for a total value of $35 billion. While 
the $35 billion amount would stretch over 10-15 years, an additional $60 billion in revenue could 
come from maintenance and parts such that the overall contract would be worth $100 billion 
(“Analysts,” 2009; “Northrop group,” 2008; Wolf and Shalal-Esa, 2008; Hinton, 2008).  
Hensel (2008) discusses how, in this competition, Boeing displayed the behavior of a 
traditional incumbent. It had been the provider of refueling tankers to the USAF for almost 50 
years and had what was often referred to as a “ monopoly.” When the Air Force announced that 
the Northrop Grumman/EADS team had won the contract on February 29, 2008, Boeing 
indicated shortly afterward that it was dissatisfied with the decision and lodged a series of 
protests with the GAO about the way in which the competition was conducted. The GAO 
recommended that the competition be reopened and upheld 8 of Boeing’s 100 protests, 
although it stated that it found no evidence of “intentional wrongdoing” by USAF procurement 
officials (Randolph, 2008).  
The USAF announced on July 9 that it would reopen the competition and would focus it 
on the 8 areas of protest sustained by the GAO. Unlike the previous competition, which was 
overseen by the USAF, this competition would be overseen by John Young, the chief of 
weapons procurement and the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics at the Pentagon. The Air Force stated explicitly that in the new competition, it would 
provide extra credit for a larger plane with additional fuel offload capacity (Shalal-Esa, 2008, 
July 9). Boeing, faced with the opportunity to propose the larger 777 in light of this “extra credit” 
suggested in the draft RFP, claimed that it would pull out of the competition if it were not 
provided with more time to develop a modified 777. The USAF decided to cancel the 
competition in the fall of 2008 and to re-open it again in the summer of 2009. The last chapter in 
this story remains to be written.  
The alliance of Northrop-Grumman and EADS to build aerial refueling tankers differed 
from previous trans-Atlantic alliances due to the substantive investment that EADS planned to 
make in the US defense industrial base—both in terms of creating jobs and in terms of building 
production facilities. This was because it wanted to obtain a stronger base within the US to enter 
the US market, as well as to protect itself from currency fluctuations, which had hurt it in 2008. It 
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pays suppliers in euros, but sells airliners in dollars, so moving production to dollar-zone 
countries was particularly helpful when the euro was strong relative to the dollar. About 60% of 
the Northrop/EADS tanker would be made in the United States. Some of the parts would be 
manufactured in Germany, France, Spain, and Great Britain, but assembly of the tanker would 
have occurred in Mobile, AL, where EADS planned to build the third largest manufacturing 
facility in the world and where it had also planned to assemble a commercial freighter version of 
the A330 (Wolf & Shalal-Esa, 2008).   
Unfortunately, as extensively discussed in Hensel (2008), the Congressional 
representatives from the states which would have benefitted if Boeing had received the contract 
protested strongly that US jobs would be lost under the Northrop/EADS proposal. Despite the 
fact that the Northrop/EADS tanker would create 48,000 jobs in the US, Kansas Representative 
Tiahrt continued to argue that “‘I cannot believe we would create French jobs in place of Kansas 
jobs’” (as cited in Drawbaugh, 2008, February 29). On the other hand, Senator McCain noted, 
‘“I’ve never believed that defense programs should be—that the major reason for them should 
be to create jobs. I’ve always felt that the best thing to do is to create the best weapon system 
we can at cost to taxpayers’” (as cited in Drawbaugh, 2008, March 3). These thoughts were 
echoed in the comments of Pentagon acquisition chief John Young, who noted, ‘“I don’t think 
anybody wants to run the department as a jobs program,”’ further arguing that lawmakers 
usually focused on asking him to reduce the costs of weapons systems (as cited in Shalal-Esa, 
2008, March 4).  
As analyzed in Hensel (2008), the initial award of the contract to the team of 
Northrop/EADS reinforced the perception of many that, as Defense Secretary Robert Gates had 
stated, “‘defense manufacturing is a global business’” (“Northrop Grumman Fires Back,” 2008), 
particularly as the US had allied with many other countries in combating the War on Terror. 
Many perceived this initial award as the harvest of improved relations with France, and that it 
would be much harder for European manufacturers to claim that US markets were closed to 
them. French President Nicholas Sarkozy stated on March 3, 2008, ‘“If Germany and France 
had not shown from the beginning that we were friends and allies of the United States, would it 
have been possible to have such a commercial victory?”’ (as cited in Hepher, 2008).  
Nevertheless, after the GAO handed down its ruling, several European officials expressed 
concerns that this signaled that US markets were not open to European products, despite the 
investment of the European alliance partner in the US defense industrial base. Others 
expressed concerns of retaliation on the part of European manufacturers if Northrop/EADS 
finally loses the contract when the competition is re-opened.  
Section XI: Conclusion 
The purpose of this analysis is to discuss the importance of linkages between US and 
European defense manufacturers with the emergence of the common global threat of terrorism, 
the greater price sensitivity of governments concerning weapons systems costs, and the 
shrinkage of defense budgets. Due to national security concerns and integration costs, alliances 
can often be easier to develop than mergers and can ultimately provide a prelude to an ultimate 
merger between the parties if the alliance is successful. Alliances can provide many of the 
benefits of mergers, such as sharing R&D costs or allowing access into new markets, without 
many of the costs of mergers: difficulty in exiting, substantive integration costs, etc.  
The case studies in this analysis highlighted the role of trans-Atlantic alliances in 
achieving various outcomes—spurring alliances between competitors to ultimately create a 
market with several new products (CFM International and International Aero Engines), 
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promoting national defense strategies (Boeing’s alliance with EADS and other manufacturers in 
the missile arena), sharing R&D costs (the failed alliance between Boeing and other 
manufacturers to build a “super-jumbo” jet), developing interoperable equipment between allied 
nations (the JSF), and entering new markets (the alliance between Northrop Grumman/EADS to 
supply new aerial refueling tankers).  
The last two cases—the JSF and the tanker competition—will have a significant impact 
on subsequent trans-Atlantic defense alliances. The JSF, because it unites manufacturers from 
9 countries, will break new ground and set new precedents in how issues involving global 
supply chain problems, cost absorption, and technology transfer will be resolved in later trans-
Atlantic alliances. The tanker competition—due to the magnitude of the contract, the size of 
EADS’ proposed investment in the US, and the international publicity that the competition 
achieved from the dialogues of various Congressional representatives and government 
leaders—will affect perceptions about the openness of US markets to foreign manufacturers.  
As countries are increasingly faced with budgetary strains from combating the current 
financial crisis, the fiscal strains imposed by an ageing population, and other areas such as 
education, infrastructure, etc., defense budgets will likely be under more pressure. Moreover, 
there will be a greater emphasis on obtaining innovative weapons systems products at low costs 
and in a timely manner. As supply chain issues are smoothed out, there will be a significant 
opportunity for global alliances in the defense sector to play a valuable role in helping 
governments meet the challenges of the new millennium.  
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This is a summary of the report cited above for inclusion in the Proceedings of the Sixth 
Annual Acquisition Research Symposium hosted by NPS (May 2009).  The report itself greatly 
exceeds the length guidelines for the Proceedings.  The topics raised here are discussed in 
greater detail within the body of that report. 
Summary 
International defense industrial affairs are becoming increasing global and increasingly 
complex.  This report is a continuation of the authors’ efforts to provide insights and analytical 
frameworks useful for understanding ongoing developments in the global defense market.1 
In this stage of that overall project, we focus primarily on defense industrial firms and 
their relationships with their sovereign customers—considering the organization of Boeing 787 
development and production, the KC-45 aerial tanker competition, and European defense firms’ 
direct investment in the US defense market. 
Our Cases 
In the 787 case (Section II), we observe that even experienced companies like Boeing 
can run afoul of the complexities of coordinating a multinational, multiform venture.  We suspect 
this problem is not unique to Boeing, and will, if not satisfactorily addressed, limit the scope and 
success of multinational projects in the defense sector as well. 
The KC-45 (Section III), at least to date, seems to illustrate a new weakness of defense 
establishments relative to their suppliers.  The failure to successfully award a KC-45 contract to 
the EADS-Northrop Grumman team (after protest to the GAO) raises some troubling questions.  
Is it possible to award a protest-proof contract for a major defense system?  Doesn’t the buyer 
side of the US defense market more resemble a quarrelsome committee than the classic model 
of the sovereign monopsonist?  With increasingly large, winner-take-all competitions, what’s the 
potential for procurement gridlock—the apparent state of the KC-45?  Will the concentration of 
buyer power (through smaller numbers) and the resultant increase in agility give suppliers 
exploitable advantages over their customers? 
Our discussion of foreign direct investment in US defense industries focuses on three 
European firms: BAE, EADS and Finmeccanica (Section IV).  Our research was informed in 
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significant part through confidential interviews with high-level, Washington-based officials 
intimately familiar with the issues at hand.  The central theme of this discussion is the interplay 
between the motivations for these firms to enter the US defense market, the US regulatory 
environment (which constrains such entries), and the corporate strategies intended to work with 
(and around) those legal barriers.   
Our discussion of these three firms suggests three interesting conclusions.  First, entry 
into the US defense market is indeed motivated primarily by the relatively high level of the US 
defense budget, relative to those in Europe (consistent with prevailing conventional wisdom).  
Second, “Buy American” and restrictions on direct investment have proven to be penetrable—to 
a significant degree.  Finally, a two-way street of defense industrial trade between the US and 
Europe appears to be emerging as fully fledged reality—after decades of heated debate and 
limited progress. 
Conclusions 
Our conclusions follow.  Many are not striking (or new to us), but taken together, we feel 
they are significant and useful. 
Complexity and cost have changed and are fundamentally changing the nature of 
economies of scale.  Production runs that usefully exploit economies of scale and learning 
curves are increasingly beyond the reach of single nation-states.  Accordingly, new weapon 
systems (such as the Joint Strike Fighter) have increasingly become international ventures—
albeit with senior partners.  On the supply side, defense firms have undertaken more projects 
featuring outsourcing arrangements and strategic partnerships.  In addition, the number of first-
tier defense suppliers has significantly declined. 
Inter-firm relationships are much more a product of situation and project type than by the 
firm boundaries of more traditional thought.  Even very large firms (such as Boeing and 
Lockheed-Martin) can compete in some areas and collaborate in others.  This has contributed to 
the increased complexity of both the market structure and the management of major projects. 
Finally, the combination of reduced numbers of suppliers and the complexity of 
globalized defense markets has significantly increased the market power of defense industrial 
suppliers relative to their (sovereign) customers.  Among other things, it appears that the 
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Chair: Fred Thompson, PhD, is Grace & Elmer Goudy Professor of Public Management and Policy at the 
Atkinson Graduate School of Management and Director of the Willamette University Center for Governance 
and Public Policy Research. He is the only member of the Willamette University’s faculty to have received 
all three of its top awards—for teaching, for research, and for service. He recently coauthored two books, 
Digital State at the Leading Edge (University of Toronto Press, 2007), and From Bureaucracy to 
Hyperarchy: Netcentric and Quick Learning Organizations (Information Age Publishing, 2007), and co-
edited a third, Public Ethics and Governance (Elsevier JAI, 2006). His recent articles include “Responsibility 
Budgeting in the Air Force Materiel Command” (2006), “Netcentric Organization” (2006), and “Betting on the 
Future with a Cloudy Crystal Ball” (2007) in Public Administration Review; and “A Better Budget Rule” 
(2009) and a review of The Oxford Handbook of Public Management (2007) in Journal of Policy Analysis 
and Management. He also served on the United Nations Development Program’s Blue Ribbon Commission 
on the Republic of Macedonia and helped write its report Achieving Dynamic Economic Growth. Last fall, he 
was a visiting professor in the Interdisciplinary Institute of Management at the London School of Economics, 
teaching organizational economics and mechanism design. 
Thompson is a recipient of the NASPAA/ASPA Outstanding Research Award, ABFM’s Wildavsky Award for 
lifetime scholarly achievement, and various best-article awards, including PAR’s Mosher Award for best 
article by an academic. He currently sits on ten editorial boards and over his career has served on 18. He is 
the founding editor of the International Public Management Journal and currently edits the comparative 
statistics section of the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis. 
Thompson received his doctorate in Economics & Politics from Claremont Graduate University. 
Discussant: David M. Van Slyke, PhD, is an instructor for the Acquisition Solution Training Institute™, 
responsible for training personnel to optimize their potential and helping organizations to achieve their 
acquisition goals and mission-critical objectives. Van Slyke brings nine years of experience teaching 
public administration and public affairs to university students. He specializes in public and nonprofit 
management, privatization and contracting, contract management, policy implementation, strategic 
planning and performance management, as well as faith-based organizations and philanthropy.  
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transformation.  Previously, Lucyshyn served as a program manager and the principal technical 
advisor to the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) on the 
identification, selection, research, development, and prototype production of advanced technology 
projects.   
Prior to joining DARPA, Mr. Lucyshyn completed a 25-year career in the US Air Force.  Lucyshyn 
received his Bachelor Degree in Engineering Science from the City University of New York, and he 
earned his Master’s Degree in Nuclear Engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology.  He 
has authored numerous reports, book chapters, and journal articles.   
Michael Arendt is a Faculty Research Assistant at CPPPE and provides support for various research 
projects related to defense acquisition policy.  Past reports he co-authored include “Achieving the 
Desired Structure of the Defense Industry in the 21st Century.” His current research focus is on bid 
protests in defense acquisitions. 
He is a current PhD student at the University of Maryland, School of Public Policy, with a research 
concentration in Management, Finance and Leadership.  Arendt holds an MS in Defense and 
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and a BA in Political Science and Sociology from The Ohio State University.   
Abstract 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) provides an objective, independent, and 
impartial forum for the resolution of disputes concerning the awards of federal contracts.  Over 
the years, their decisions in bid-protest cases have resulted in a uniform body of law applicable 
to the procurement process that is relied upon by the Congress, the courts, contracting 
agencies, and the public.  Filing a bid protest is easy, inexpensive, and does not require the 
services of an attorney (although protesters may be represented by counsel).  In general, the 
process is quicker than using court litigation.   
Recently, there has been a perceived increase in the number of contract awards that are 
protested and a perception that firms may be protesting government contract awards as a 
strategy to negotiate their way into contracts or to derail an award process already in place.  Are 
these perceptions accurate? Are firms protesting more frequently?  If firms are protesting more 
frequently, then why?  If not, perhaps there are simply more contracting actions that are 
resulting in a comparable increase in protests.   
An examination of this phenomenon is important, as bid protests could have significant 
detrimental effects on the cost and schedule of defense programs.  Our study will examine and 
evaluate bid-protest data from 2001 through 2008, use specific case studies to shed light on the 
current state of bid protests across the military services, and provide recommendations for 
moving forward.  The study will be broken up into two parts. 
Part One will offer an overview of the bid-protest process through the GAO.  We will map 
the policies and procedures from start to finish for filing a protest with the GAO.  Next, we will 
present an analysis for the open-source bid-protest data we have collected, our interpretation of 
the data, and its implications.   
Part Two will examine specific bid-protest cases in greater detail.  Each case will include 
background information, an overview of the contract, the items being protested, the result of the 
protest and the lessons learned in the process.  These cases will include the Logistics Civil 
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) IV case, Information Technology Enterprise Solutions 2 
Services (ITES-2S) case, and the HRSolutions case. 
Finally, we will provide specific recommendations for government acquisition planning 
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Chair: Captain Albert J. Grecco is a native of Poughkeepsie, NY.  He is a 1982 graduate of the 
United States Naval Academy, where he received a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering and 
was commissioned.  
Grecco's initial sea assignment was aboard USS KING (DDG 41), where he served as Gunnery Officer 
and TERRIER Missile Officer and completed a 1984 deployment to the Persian Gulf.  He subsequently 
entered the Weapon Systems Engineering program at the Naval Postgraduate School, was 
redesignated as an Engineering Duty Officer, and graduated in 1988 with a Master’s of Science in 
Engineering Science.  
Grecco has served in acquisition billets at headquarters and in field assignments.  He served as a 
Project Officer for the FFG-7 Shipbuilding Program Manager (PMS 314) and the MK 92 Program 
Manager (SEA 62Z3) at the Naval Ship Weapon Systems Engineering Station, where he led the 
introduction and development testing of MK 92 Mod 6 Fire Control System on USS INGRAHAM (FFG 
61).  Subsequent headquarters assignments included tours as Technical Director for the NAVSEA 
Surveillance Systems Subgroup (SEA 62X) and as a Ship Self-Defense System Engineer in the 
Program Executive Office, Theater Air Defense.  
Grecco returned to sea to serve as Combat Systems Officer aboard USS TICONDEROGA (CG 47), 
where he completed a 1995 deployment to Sixth Fleet and conducted EASTPAC counter narcotic 
operations.  He has subsequently served ashore as the first Combat Systems Officer for the DD 21 
Program, as the AEGIS Shipbuilding Combat Systems, Test and Trials Officer (PMS 400D5), the 
AEGIS Combat Systems Engineer (PMS 400B3), and as the DD(X) Warfare Systems Engineer in the 
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Program Executive Office, Integrated Warfare Systems, and most recently as the Technical 
Director/Major Program Manager for the AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense Program.  Grecco's current 
assignment is Major Program Manager, Integrated Combat Systems (IWS 1.0), Program Executive 
Office, Integrated Warfare Systems.  
Grecco's personal decorations include the Legion of Merit, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, 
Meritorious Service Medal with one gold star, Navy Commendation Medal with three gold starts, Navy 
Achievement Medal, and NATO medal.  Grecco is married to the former Lacy Williams of Norfolk, VA, 
and has two daughters, Mary Lacy (1990) and Arleigh (1995).  
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In the Department of Defense (DoD), the typical outcome of a software acquisition 
program has been massive cost escalation, slipping planned delivery dates and making major 
cuts in the planned software functionality to guarantee program success. To counter this 
dilemma, the DoD put forth a new weapons acquisition policy in 2003 based on an evolutionary 
acquisition approach to foster increased efficiency while building flexibility in the acquisition 
process. However, the evolutionary acquisition approach often relies on the spiral development 
process, which assumes end-state requirements are known at the inception of the development 
process, a misrepresentation of reality in the acquisition of DoD software-intensive weapons 
systems. This article presents a framework to address requirements uncertainty as it relates to 
software acquisition. The framework is based on Real Options theory and aims at mitigating 
risks associated with requirement volatility based on the technology objectives—constraints as 
put forth by the customer at the acquisition decision-making level.  
1. Introduction 
The software acquisition lifecycle, which encapsulates the activities related to its 
procurement, development, implementation and subsequent maintenance, continues to present 
challenges to software executives and program managers due to increasingly complex 
organizational requirements and the ever-increasing role that software plays in US Department 
of Defense (DoD) weapons systems. Various factors and considerations, most of which are 
complex in nature, compound the software acquisition process: factors that present themselves 
in the form of “uncertainties,” and which have the potential of introducing risks if the 
uncertainties are not adequately addressed and or resolved. In this paper, we address the issue 
of requirements uncertainty and propose a methodology for addressing this issue.  Our 
approach addresses these issues by taking a proactive/preemptive approach to risk 
management by planning and paying up front for the risks associated with requirements. This is 
not to say that risk management strategies are not being adopted today; rather, there is a failure 
of management to take a strategic approach towards risk management. Currently, the status 
quo is to employ reactive risk management strategies that often result in the reduction of much-
needed functionality from the scope of the software investment effort. We therefore propose a 
more proactive decision-making framework that involves identifying the risks, pricing risk upfront 
during the planning stages of the acquisition before a decision to commit resources is made.  
2. The Requirements Dilemma 
In software development, requirements instability has a profound impact on a program’s 
schedule and drives up costs due to increases in Research, Development, Test & Evaluation 
(RDT&E) costs associated with the requirements changes. The lack of adequately defined 
requirements is one of the leading problems in the software development effort. Without 
adequate definition and validation of requirements and design, software engineers could be 
coding to an incorrect solution, resulting in missing functionality and errors. This dilemma is 
highlighted in a 2007 interview of the Army’s Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Ammunition, 
                                                
1 This work was supported in part by the NPS Acquisition Research Program—OUSD_08 (Project #:F08-
023, JON: RGB58). The views and conclusions in this talk are those of the authors and should not be 
interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, 
of the US Government. 
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in which “the ability to acquire and maintain, safe, reliable supportable and modifiable software 
systems which met user requirements in an environment of rapid technological advances” was 
identified as their biggest challenge in software acquisitions (Starrett, 2007). Furthermore, the 
US Government Accountability Office (GAO), responsible for reviewing weapon systems 
investments, found consistent problems of cost increases, schedule delays, and performance 
shortfalls exacerbated by factors such as pressure on program managers to promise more than 
they could deliver. These concerns infer a resounding theme that continues to resonate within 
the software acquisition community: Meeting customer requirements within cost and schedule 
constraints. 
Balancing the satisfaction of a customer’s ever-changing requirements within the realms 
of meeting both current and future uncertain operational needs against the costs and schedule 
constraints poses a cumbersome challenge to the software executive, thereby making software-
investments a very risky venture. They are risky in the sense that software engineering and 
investment decisions are plagued by uncertainties that more often than not lead to varying 
degrees of risk ranging from operational shortfalls to cost and schedule overruns.  
Ever-changing requirements continue to impact software acquisition efforts, and more 
often than not, force managers to choose between requirements, i.e., which requirements to 
accept and which requirements to reject with the full understanding that ignoring changes in 
requirements results in the delivered product failing to meet the customers needs while 
accepting changes in requirements has the potential of impacting costs and schedule.  
Furthermore, changes in requirements while a software acquisition effort is under way 
poses the risk of introducing unwanted, unanticipated or unknown impact on existing 
requirements, not to mention associated costs and scheduled delays depending on the phase of 
the investment or software development process experiencing significant requirements 
changes. While the standard practice has been to “freeze” requirements prior to the 
commencement of any development activities, frequently, this does not work and is not 
representational of the DoD doctrine to support the flexible development and rapid delivery of 
products to meet the warfighters needs in an ever-changing environment in response to 
operational needs.  
The inefficiencies of current management techniques as shown in Table 1 highlight the 
needs of new management approaches that proactively plan for and factor uncertainty into their 
acquisition strategy. This is because the acquisition of software, its development and the 
operational use of the software are dominated by human action, human judgment, decision-
making and, inevitably, human error. The outcome is, therefore, often uncertain and 
unpredictable and leads to unavoidable uncertainties that introduce and drive risk (Starrett, 
2007). 
Table 1. Program Management Failures of Top Three Major Weapons Systems2 
                                                
2 Numbers were complied from various GAO reports and were current as of 2007. 
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We must, however, emphasize that uncertainty should not be confused with risk as there 
is an important distinction between the two. Risk is something one bears and is the outcome of 
uncertainty, as uncertainty is either resolved through the passage of action or left unattended 
due to inaction (Mun, 2006). The risks associated with the acquisition of the software need to be 
identified and analyzed very early in the decision-making process, and an approach to mitigate 
the high-priority risks must be incorporated into a software acquisition plan. 
Therefore, in order to accurately estimate requirements volatility and its impact on the 
future value of a software-intensive-system under consideration for acquisition, the risk of 
requirements changes must be quantified, and it must also be specifically predicted and 
quantified based on the phase in the software development process in which the changes are 
more likely to occur. Hence, the need arises for an approach that would explicitly acknowledge 
the probability of occurrence based on previous objective estimates also in addition to the 
possibility of occurrence based on subject expert opinions (Delphi Method) that acknowledges 
either the degree of belief or ignorance in the objective probability estimates. (See Section 4 for 
details.) 
3. The Real Options Approach 
The Real Options approach is based on the concepts of financial options theory, and it 
builds on several tried-and-proven approaches of management. The study conducted by 
Olagbemiro (2008), showed how the Real Options approach could be used as a proactive risk 
management tool within a strategic decision-making level (executive level) pre-acquisition 
context—further complementing the spiral development approach at the “tactical level.” It was 
also demonstrated using the US Army Future Combat Systems program as an example of how 
the traditional Real Options methodology, when enhanced and properly formulated around a 
proposed or existing software-investment, could provide a framework for guiding software 
acquisition decision-making by highlighting the strategic importance of managerial flexibility. 
This flexibility offers management the ability to balance the satisfaction of a customer’s 
requirements within the realms of the associated cost and schedule constraints by developing 
the appropriate options during the acquisition decision-making phase and executing the options 
when optimal. However, the Real Options approach calls for the existence or satisfaction of 
certain pre-conditions before it can be applied. These pre-conditions, which correlate directly to 
the various activities associated with software related capital investments, are outlined in Mun 





















aircraft $206.3 billion 
2,459 
aircraft 26.7 14.2 
Future 
Combat 
Systems $92 billion 18 System $163.7 billion 
14 
systems 54.4 77.7 
F-22A Raptor $81.1 billion 648 aircraft $65.4 billion 
181 
aircraft 188.7 72.1 
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1. The existence of a basic financial model used to evaluate the costs and benefits of 
the underlying software asset (e.g., Net Present Value (NPV) as the Real Options 
approach builds on the existing tried-and-tested approaches of current financial 
modeling techniques.  
 
2. The existence of uncertainties during the software-related capital investment 
decision-making process, otherwise the Real Options analysis becomes useless as 
everything is assumed to be certain and known. 
 
3. The uncertainties surrounding the software-related capital investment decision-
making process must introduce risks that directly impact the decision-making 
process. Real Options could then be used to hedge the downside risk and take 
advantage of the upside uncertainties. 
 
4. Management must have the flexibility or option to make mid-course corrections when 
actively managing the project. 
 
5. Management must be smart enough to execute the Real Options when it becomes 
optimal to do so. 
 
3.1 Real Options Valuation  
Real options valuation originated from research performed to price financial option 
contracts in the field of financial derivatives. The underlying premise of its suitability and 
applicability to software engineering is based on the recognition that strategic flexibility in 
software acquisitions decisions can be valued as a portfolio of options or choices in real 
“assets,” akin to options on financial securities that have real economic value under uncertainty 
(Dixit & Pindyck, 1995). In contrast to financial options, real options valuation centers on real or 
non-financial assets and is valuable because it enables the option holder (i.e., software program 
manager) to take advantage of potential upside benefits while controlling and hedging risks. 
When extended to a real “asset,” such as software, real options could be used as a decision-
making tool in a dynamic and uncertain environment. An option gives its holder the rights but 
without the obligations, to acquire or dispose of a risky asset at a set price within a specified 
time period (Erdogmus, 1999). If the market conditions are favorable before the option expires, 
the holder exercises this right, thus making a profit—otherwise, the holder lets the option expire. 
A necessary and key tenet of the real options approach is a requirement for the 
presence of uncertainties, a constraint that is widely characteristic of software acquisitions 
decision-making. Software acquisitions encapsulate the activities related to software 
procurement, development, implementation, and subsequent maintenance. The uncertainties 
that surround these activities are compounded by increasingly complex requirements demanded 
by the warfighter and present themselves in various forms: changing or incomplete 
requirements, insufficient knowledge of the problem domain, decisions related to the future 
growth, technology maturation, and evolution of the software.  
To tackle the issue, we developed a formal and distinct uncertainty elicitation task as 
part of the software investment decision-making process (Figure 1) to obtain information on the 
relevant uncertainties from a strategic point of view. While this task would not include members 
of a typical requirements team, they would work in tandem with the requirements team to 
identify and document uncertainties as they are revealed from an independent point of view. 
Implementing an explicit uncertainty elicitation task would facilitate the identification of 
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uncertainties very early in the acquisition process, so that the necessary steps could be taken to 
either refine the requirements to address the uncertainties or identify strategic options to 
mitigate the risks posed by the uncertainties.  
 
Figure 1. Uncertainty Elicitation Model 
 
In the uncertainty elicitation step in the model, uncertainties are captured from two 
perspectives (the managerial and technical perspective) using what we call the “2 T” approach 
as illustrated in Figure 2. Managerial uncertainties of people, time, functionality, budget, and 
resources contribute to both estimation and schedule uncertainties that are considered to be 
pragmatic uncertainties. Technical uncertainties of incomplete requirements, ambitious, 
ambiguous, changing or unstable requirements contribute to software specification 
uncertainties. Such uncertainties lead to software design and implementation, software 
validation and software evolution uncertainties all of which can be categorized as exhibiting both 
Heisenberg-type and Gödel-like uncertainties. 
If uncertainty cannot be resolved, strategic real options could be developed to address 
the risks posed by the uncertainty, providing management the flexibility to address the risks 








Figure 2. Expanded View of Uncertainty Elicitation Model 
 
3.2 The Real Options Framework 
To develop the appropriate options to hedge against the risks due to the uncertainties 
surrounding a software acquisition effort, we develop a generalized Real Options Framework 
(Figure 3) in line with the five preconditions outlined in Mun (2006). This proposed framework 
consists of the following four phases, each of which explicitly addresses and establishes 
compliance with the preconditions.  
1. Study Phase 
2. Data Collection and Preparation Phase 
3. Analysis Phase 








Figure 3. Real Options Framework 
 
4. Addressing Uncertainty 
Uncertainties permeate virtually every phase of the software acquisition process—
ranging from procurement decision-making, requirements specification, software development 
and implementation, to the eventual evolution of the software. These uncertainties could be 
broadly categorized into the categories shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Taxonomy of Uncertainty 
 
Epistemic uncertainties are reducible, and they deal with our lack of knowledge, lack of 
information and our own and others’ subjectivity concerning an issue. Aleatoric uncertainties, on 
the other hand, are irreducible and they deal with the randomness (or predictability) of an event 
due to variability of input or model parameters when the characterization of the variability is 
available (Wojtkiewicz, Eldred, Field, Urbina, & Red-Horse, 2001). In other words, an aleatoric 
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uncertainty is an inherent variation associated with the physical system or the environment. 
Both epistemic and aleotoric uncertainties are interwoven and form the general framework of 
uncertainties that plague software acquisition efforts from a requirements uncertainty 
perspective.  
Since requirements uncertainty implies risk, consequently, uncertainty must be duly 
quantified as a risk factor to gauge the magnitude of its impact on the underlying asset. The 
process of translating or equating software engineering uncertainties into a quantifiable property 
begins with quantifying the identified requirements uncertainties, computing the impact of 
uncertainties and ultimately developing a risk analysis framework in which the associated risks 
are identified, predicted and modeled using simulation and the results analyzed and costs 
factored into the software acquisition as appropriate. 
4.1 Estimating Requirements Volatility 
While volatility is just one of the parameters needed for Real Options analysis, it is the 
most difficult of all the parameters to estimate. Given the impact that requirements instability has 
on costs, we attempt to determine the rate of requirement change or the volatility of 
requirements. We will then use volatility to quantify the risk of requirements changes in the 
proposed software acquisition effort. 
In order to estimate the volatility of the returns associated with our current software 
investment effort, we attempt to gather evidence to help derive our estimates.  Historically, 
gathering of evidence using previously completed software-related capital investments as a 
proxy is a difficult task for the following reasons: 
1. The current software investment effort under consideration might be the first of its 
kind with no known comparables. 
2. Information is rarely or actively collected and managed in a disciplined fashion. 
3. Even when information is collected, accessibility by third parties is usually difficult 
due to the proprietary nature of the information.  
Thus, more often than not, the software executive is faced with identifying alternate 
sources of information to either assert or dispute their initial volatility estimates. In our study, we 
propose to use either historical data (i.e., objective approach) or expert opinions obtained using 
the Delphi method (i.e., subjective approach). We choose to use both methods because we 
believe intuition and judgment (subjective approach) should supplement quantitative analysis 
(objective approach). More often than not, past success and failures serve as key indicators of 
the future. Historical data can be used to predict and explore “what-if” scenarios on future 
projects based on the use of forecasting and analytical analysis. 
The Delphi Method is a technique first introduced by the RAND Corporation in the 
1940’s as a methodology for the elicitation of the opinion of an expert or groups of experts to 
guide decision-making by the making predictions about future events. It places emphasis on an 
iterative, systematic, disciplined and interactive process of individual interviews (usually 
conducted using questionnaires) and the outcome is based on the Hegelian Principle of 
achieving consensus through a three-step process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis (Stuter, 
1996). In the thesis and antithesis steps, the team of experts present their opinion or views on 
the given subject, establishing views and opposing views, and consensus is ultimately reached 
during the synthesis phase as opposing views are brought together to form the new thesis. 
 =
=
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå======== - 197 - 
=
=
Widely used as an estimating tool, the Delphi Method has been used to estimate values for 
factors (e.g., cost estimation) that appear in software estimation models such (Boehm, Abts, & 
Chulani, 2000) and risk estimation. Furthermore, it is one of the approved techniques published 
in February 2001 by the US Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center for preparing or 
reviewing economic analyses in support of the decision-making process. 
In the event that there is no historical data available, the customer should resort to 
obtaining the required information using the Delphi Method. In the case that we do have 
historical data but are unable to find projects meeting any or all of the criteria above, we 
proceed to “fit” the data to as close as possible to mimic our current software investment effort 
by employing interpolation techniques to understand and forecast our project based on the 
trends depicted in the historical data.  
To determine the rate of volatility, we employ the Caper Jones’ approach, which is a 
transposition from the financial industry (Kulk & Verhoef, 2008). Jones asserts that existing 
methods of average percentage of change of the overall requirements volume lacks information 
because it does not give any information on the time in which the change occurred—a key 
factor in determining software engineering since requirements changes become more 
expensive to implement the farther we are into the software development process.  
Jones therefore uses the compound monthly requirements volatility rate to express the 
time aspect. Calculating monthly requirements volatility rates, as defined by Jones, is a 
transposition from the financial world. The time value or future value of money is well-known in 
the field of accounting as compound interest or CAGR, short for compound annual growth rate. 
By transposing from compound growth rate in finance, we assume that requirements are 







SizeAtEndr        (1) 






SLOCAtEndr        (2) 
where t is the time period in years during which the estimates were observed. 
However, SLOC is not a suitable proxy for measuring requirements volatility because it 
is often dependent on the type of programming language being used and does not take COTS 
into consideration. In light of this finding, we proposed an alternative proxy: Function Points, 
which is a better metric for the size of the software requirements irrespective of how the 
software will be developed.  
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4.2 Refining Volatility Estimates 
Volatility refinement based on the Dempster-Shafer Theory on Evidence was a key 
aspect of the framework proposed in Olagbemiro (2008). Since volatility is a key input 
parameter needed for Real Options analysis, we attempt to overcome the complexity of volatility 
estimation by proposing the use of Dempster-Shafer Theory on Evidence, a technique first 
proposed for application in the domain of sensor fusion. It is a mathematical theory of evidence 
based on belief functions and plausible reasoning, which is used to combine separate pieces of 
information (evidence) to calculate the probability of an event. We posit that it could be used to 
address both aleotoric and epistemic uncertainties inherent in software-related capital 
investments by “fusing” and reducing uncertainties to the maximum extent as they become 
revealed, thereby facilitating a more accurate estimate of the risks propagated by uncertainty 
and allowing us to develop the appropriate option in response based on a more accurate 
volatility measure. 
We choose to use DST because while Bayesian inference requires all unknowns to be 
represented by probability distributions, which awkwardly implies the probability of an event for 
which we are completely ignorant, DST takes over by introducing belief functions to distinguish 
ignorance and randomness by assigning probability mass to subsets of parameter space, so 
that randomness is represented by the probability distribution and uncertainty is represented by 
large subsets (Gelman, 2006). In other words, while Bayesian theory requires probabilities for 
each uncertainty of interest, the theory of belief functions provides a non-Bayesian way of using 
mathematical probability to quantify subjective judgments (Shafer, 1996). It measures degrees 
of belief (or confidence) for one uncertainty on the probabilities for a related uncertainty. 
The premise behind DST is it can be interpreted as a generalization of probability theory 
where probabilities are assigned to sets as opposed to mutually exclusive singletons. In the 
case that there is sufficient evidence to permit the assignment of probabilities to single events, 
the Dempster-Shafer model collapses to the traditional probabilistic formulation in which 
evidence is associated with only one possible event (Sentz & Ferson, 2002). DST relies on 
three basic functions: the basic probability assignment function, a primitive of evidence theory 
that does not refer to probability in the classical sense, and two non-additive continuous 
measures called Belief and Plausibility that are used to combine separate pieces of information 
(evidence) to calculate the probability of an event, while simultaneously defining the upper and 
lower bounds, respectively, of an interval that contains the precise probability of a set of interest. 
Since evidence can be associated with multiple possible events (i.e., sets of events) the 
evidence in DST can be meaningful at a higher level of abstraction—a key benefit needed at the 
strategic decision-making level that eliminates resorting to assumptions about the events within 
the evidential set. Furthermore, the DST model can be used to cope with varying levels of 
precision regarding information with no further assumptions needed to represent the 
information, as demonstrated during a study in addressing uncertainties in systems (Sentz & 
Ferson, 2002).  We posit that the demonstrated approach also allows for the direct 
representation of uncertainties associated with software-related capital investments since we 
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DST is a theory about two things: 1) Degrees of belief and 2) Weights of evidence.  A 
key benefit of DST is the ability to represent ignorance in the face of uncertainty, especially 
when there is no information so far. In probability theory, uniform distributions are used to 
represent ignorance; however, the problem with this approach is that we represent the space of 
possibilities affected by the probabilities we get. The theory of belief functions is based on two 
ideas:  
1.  The idea of obtaining degrees of belief for one question from subjective probabilities 
of a related question, and 
2. Dumpster’s rule for combining such degrees of belief when they are based on 
independent items of evidence. Degrees of belief obtained in this way differ from 
probabilities in that they may fail to add to 100%.   
Both ideas are consistent with the Real Options pre-conditions as the degrees of 
belief are established on a frame of discernment meant to address uncertainty.  DST 
assumes a Universe of Discourse Θ, otherwise known as the Frame of Discernment, 
which is a set of mutually exclusive alternatives. Thus a frame of discernment A of a set of 
mutually exclusive alternatives or possibilities can be represented as  
Θ = {A1………..An}          (4) 
where A1 through An represents the set of possibilities or mutually exclusive alternatives.  
A key stipulation of DST is that it should only be used to combine belief functions that 
represent independent items of evidence. The independence required is simply probabilistic 
independence applied to the questions for which we have probabilities, rather than directly to 
the question of interest. In other words, it means that the sources of information (or at least their 
current properties as sources of information) are selected independently from well-defined 
populations. 
Combining information or evidence from multiple sources (historical data and Delphi 
method) in the form of belief assignments aggregates the information with respect to its 








when A ≠  Ø       (5) 
where  K = ∑
=∩ ØCB
)C(2)B(1 mm  
This rule is computed by summing the products of the belief probability assignments 
(bpa’s) of all sets where the intersection is null, and represents basic probability mass 
associated with conflict. In addition, m12(A) is calculated from the aggregation of two bpa’s m1 
and m2.  
Assuming we have two pieces of evidence, based on historical data and expert 
judgment (Delphi Method), we combine the pieces of evidence using the Dempster’s 
combination rules by computing the orthogonal sum of both. First, we determine the pairs of 
sets whose intersection is A for a given set A such that A1 I A2 = A. We then add the products 
of the basic probability assignments m1(A1) and m2(A2), giving us  
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The orthogonal sum of m1 and m2 defined by m = m1 ⊕ m2 could then be given as m(Ø) 
= 0 and is demonstrated in the matrix below (Table 2), in which we compute the orthogonal sum 
of three hypothetical risk factors (Risk1, Risk2 and Risk) affecting a software investment 
program based on two independent expert assessments. 
 
 
Table 2. Orthogonal Sum of Basic Probability Assignments 
 
Based on the sample matrix (Table 2), we can obtain the resulting three evidence 
functions. 
m1 ⊕ m2({Risk1})  
=  m1({Risk1})*m2({Risk1)} + m1({Risk1,Risk2})*m2({Risk1}) 
 + m1({Risk1,Risk2,Risk3})*m2({Risk1}) + m1({Risk1})*m2({Risk1, Risk2}) + 
m1({Risk1})*m2({Risk1, Risk2, Risk3}) 
m1 ⊕ m2({Risk1,Risk2})  
=  m1({Risk1,Risk2})*m2({Risk1,Risk2})  
+ m1({Risk1, Risk2})*m2({Risk1, Risk2, Risk3})  
+ m1({Risk1, Risk2, Risk 3})*m2({Risk1, Risk2}) 
m1 ⊕ m2({Risk1,Risk2,Risk3})  
=  m1({Risk1,Risk2,Risk3})*m2({Risk1,Risk2,Risk3}) 
Using on the information derived from the matrix, we can establish joint beliefs. Any 
variations between inferred probability assignments based on the mass of evidence under this 
joint belief and our initial volatility estimates based on our modified Caper Jones’ equation (Eqn. 
3) would reflect inconsistencies. These variations are captured and used to refine the initial 
probability estimates to reflect the new “findings” that are then modeled using a Monte Carlo 
simulation to derive new estimates for the requirements volatility and an overall volatility for the 
software acquisition effort.  
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5. Applying the Real Options Valuation Framework 
In an attempt to validate our proposed approach, we applied the framework to the 
software component FCSN (Future Combat Systems Network) of US Army Future Combat 
System (FCS). The decision to select this case study as a validation mechanism was based on 
the recent nature of the project, the high-risks associated with software development due to the 
advanced technologies involved, the challenge of networking the FCS subsystems so that FCS-
equipped units can function as intended, and the associated outcome had a Real Options 
approach been applied.  This section summarizes our study. Readers can refer to Olagbemiro 
(2008) for the details of the study. 
5.1 Development of a Business Case 
We used a traditional discounted cash flow model to obtain a net present value (NPV) in 
terms of five high-level determinants (Erdogmus & Vandergraaf, 1999): 







−∑ - I 
where I is the (initial) development cost of the FCSN 
t is the (initial) development time or time to deploy the FCSN. 
C is the asset value of the FCSN over time t 
M is the operation cost of the FCSN over time t 
r is the rate at which all future cash flows are to be discounted (the discount rate). 
 
A NPV of $6.4 trillion3 was computed for the FCSN using estimated values based on key 
assumptions in Olagbemiro (2008). 
5.2 Identification of Uncertainties and Risk Quantification 
Using publicly available information (GAO, 2008), we determined that requirements 
uncertainty fostered by technology maturation issues plagued the FCSN program and resulted 
in the following uncertainties: 
1. Requirements uncertainties 
2. Integration uncertainties 
3. Performance uncertainties 
4. Estimation uncertainties (size and cost of the software) 
5. Scheduling uncertainties. 
In response, we developed Real Options to mitigate the risk due to requirements 
change. Due to the lack of publicly available historical data for the FCSN program, data from the 
Joint Strike Fighter program was fitted and utilized as a source of historical information for 
comparative purposes. The risk of requirements changes in the FCSN program was estimated 
                                                
3 NPV of $6.4 trillion is computed based on (1) Value of the FCSN program, (future value less operating 
costs, i.e., sum of (C – M), = $10 trillion), (2) Initial development cost I = $163.7 billion, (3) r = 3%, and (4) 
Time t to develop the FCSN = 13 years. 
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to be 12% (as oppose to 0.28% for the JSF program, which is 1/5 the size of the FCSN 
program) using Equation 1.4  
We used requirements volatility to quantify the risk effect as variations in the returns 
associated with the investment.  We ran Monte Carlo simulation of the risk model using the Risk 
Simulator software, taking into account interdependencies between the risk variables to emulate 
all potential combinations and permutations of outcomes. The analysis indicated that 
requirements volatility introduced an overall volatility of 0.0866% in the FCSN program. The 
volatility of 0.0866% resulted in a reduction in the NPV of the FCSN program from $6.4 trillion to 
$6.1 trillion. This reduction in NPV is a result of the potential increased costs in light of the risks 
facing the FCSN program, which ultimately reduces the value of the investment effort from a 
financial point of view. 
To improve the accuracy of the volatility estimates, we chose to refine the volatility using 
the DST. This is accomplished by establishing “belief functions” that reflect the “degrees of 
belief” between our NPV estimates in light of the risks posed by requirements uncertainty and 
the FCSN cost estimates provided by two independent sources: the Cost Analysis Improvement 
Group (CAIG) and the Institute of Defense Analysis (IDA). The independent belief functions 
based on the CAIG and IDA, which inferred basic probability assignments associated with each 
of the FCSN risk factors (i.e., requirements, integration, estimation risk, etc) were combined 
using an orthogonal matrix to determine the most probable beliefs for the set of risk factors. 
Where the combined functions reflected “belief” in our estimates, the latter were considered 
valid and were left untouched.  When the combined belief functions reflected conflict with our 
estimates, our estimates were revised accordingly. We ran the Monte Carlo simulation of the 
model with the revised risk estimates again. Based on the risk of requirements uncertainty 
presented in the FCSN, a resulting “refined” volatility of 0.0947% was obtained. The derived 
volatility, which reflects an increase from the initial volatility estimate of 0.0866%, results in a 
further reduction of NPV of the FCSN program from $6.1 trillion to $5.7 trillion. Details of the 
computation can be found in Olagbemiro (2008). 
5.3 Options Development 
The FCS software effort has been decomposed into six components: Combat 
Identification, Battle Command and Mission Execution, Network Management System, Small 
Unmanned Ground Vehicle, Training Common Component, and Systems-of-Systems Common 
Operating Environment. We consider a hypothetical scenario in which we assume that of the six 
component systems, the Systems-of-Systems Common Operating Environment is not facing 
uncertainty while the other five software components are facing uncertainty. We proceeded and 
developed two options to address this scenario: (1) Compound Option and (2) Deferment 
Option. 
 
                                                
4 The requirements volatility of 12% was computed based on start and ending SLOC for the FCSN 
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Figure 5. FCS Strategy Tree Depicting Strategy A and B for Given Scenario 
 
(1) Strategy A—The Compound Option 
 
In the event that at least one of the software components is not facing requirements 
uncertainty, with all the others facing requirements uncertainty, an option could be developed to 
scale down the resources/staff allocated to the software components facing requirements 
uncertainty. The staff could then be switched to work on the software component that is not 
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facing requirements uncertainty, while the uncertainties in the other components are addressed 
using our uncertainty elicitation model.5 We, therefore, frame the real options in this case as an 
Option to Contract and Scale Down from an uncertain system, Option to Switch resources to 
another system, Optios to Expand and Scale Up staff assigned to the development of a system 
not facing uncertainty (shown as Strategy A in Figure 5).  Essentially, this is a compound 
option—an option whose “exercise” is contingent on the execution of the preceding option. 
(2) Strategy B—The Deferment Option 
  
In the event that five out of the six software components are facing requirements 
uncertainty, then an option could be developed to stop and defer all development to include the 
development of the software component that is not facing requirements uncertainty for a 
specified period until uncertainty is resolved (shown as Strategy B in Figure 5). This is an Option 
to Wait and Defer. 
5.4. Options Valuation 
We utilize the Real Options Super Lattice Solver (SLS) 3.0 software developed by Real 
Options Valuation, Inc., for the task.  
(1) Strategy A 
The Real Options SLS software was populated based on the following underlying values:  
(1) Development/Implementation cost of FCSN is $163.7 billion, 
(2) Value of underlying asset is $6.4 trillion, 
(3) The risk-free rate is 3.0%, 
(4) Volatility of the project is 0.0947, 
(5) Duration of software development is 13 years, and 
(6) Lattice steps was set to 300. 
The value of the underlying asset was computed as $6.4 trillion, and the option analysis 
of the value of the option under Strategy A returned a value of $6.27 trillion. 
(2) Strategy B 
In Strategy B, which calls for a “defer and wait approach,” an assumption is made that 
the duration for deferment option would be three years. We set up our model using the same 
assumptions used in strategy A, but we set the duration of the Deferment Option to three years. 
The value of the underlying asset was computed as $6.4 trillion, and the option analysis 
returned a value of $6.25 trillion. 
                                                
5 Note: The assumption with this approach is that the software component development effort, which the 
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5.5. Investment Valuation 
Given the option value of $6.27 trillion under Strategy A, the intrinsic value of the 
compound option is determined to be $6.4 trillion—$6.27 trillion = $130 billion. Under Strategy 
B, the intrinsic value of the deferment option is determined to be $6.4 trillion—$6.25 trillion = 
$150 billion. This implies that under both Strategies A and B, the software executive should be 
willing to pay no more than (and hopefully less than) the option premium of $130 billion and 
$150 billion, respectively, in addition to the initial investment cost of $163.7 billion to increase 
the chances of receiving the initially projected NPV of $6.4 trillion for the FCSN as opposed to 
the current $5.7 trillion in light of the risks caused by the uncertainties in five of the six software 
components. This premium would also include the administrative costs associated with 
exercising an option from an integrated logistics support point of view (i.e., costs associated with 
contractual agreements, software development retooling costs, and costs associated with 
infrastructure setup of the infrastructure). 
In analyzing both strategies, Strategy A is more attractive than Strategy B. Instead of 
waiting another three years at an additional potential cost of $150 billion (after which uncertainty 
would hopefully have been resolved) and then proceeding to spend $163.7 billion at once to 
develop all six software components, the staged-phase approach in Strategy A calls for 
spending up to $130 billion for the option up front plus some of the $163.7 billion for the 
Systems-of-Systems Common Operating Environment component, and then investing more 
over time as the requirements are firmed up for the other five components. Therefore, under 
these conditions, Strategy A—which employs the compound sequential options—is the optimal 
approach. 
6. Conclusion 
Uncertainties associated with software-related capital investments lead to unnecessary 
and sometimes preventable risks. As the DoD often sets optimistic requirements for weapons 
programs that require new and unproven technologies, the application of the real options 
valuation methodology would be beneficial to enable the DoD to incorporate the appropriate 
strategic options into the acquisition contracts. The options would serve as a contract 
between the software executive and the contractor––in the case of a government 
acquisition––to buy or sell a specific capability known as the options on the underlying 
project. The proposed real options valuation approach is able to overcome the limitations of 
traditional valuation techniques by utilizing the best features of traditional approaches and 
extending their capabilities under the auspices of managerial flexibility. The explicit uncertainty 
elicitation task, the development of options to hedge against the risk, and the timely execution of 
the options as they appear will allow decision-makers to better balance customer requirements 
as dictated by operational needs within financial viability and schedule constraints and manage 
risks proactively. 
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Abstract 
Providing system interoperability and evolving technologies in major DoD systems are 
two important acquisition challenges in preparing the military to meet current and future 
demands. The Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (ARCI) program successfully addressed many of 
the associated challenges. That program was studied as the basis for modeling the planned 
Rapid Capability Insertion Process (RCIP) approach for continuous, reduced-cost upgrading of 
assets. ARCI used atypical methods in the face of atypical program requirements and 
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conditions. A previously developed acquisition program model was adapted to reflect ARCI and 
used for model validation. This model was then changed to reflect the basic conditions expected 
to be faced by RCIP programs. The model demonstrated the potential of RCIP to significantly 
improve program performance. However, implementation risks are identified that may degrade 
potential performance, including increased oversight, the use of more new development, and 
the resulting integration scope and risk. When incorporated into the model, these risks were 
shown to significantly decrease RCIP performance. Means for successfully managing the RCIP 
design based on the ACRI program and RCIP operations are suggested for use in addressing 
the identified implementation risks  
Introduction 
Providing system interoperability and evolving technologies in major DoD systems are 
two important acquisition challenges in preparing the military to meet current and future 
demands. The use of legacy and other weapons platforms, joint Service solutions, the 
information and communication needs of Network Centric Systems (NCS), and coordination 
with allies in joint operations require the development of weapons systems that can operate 
across system, platform, and systems-of-systems boundaries. Traditional DoD acquisition 
approaches do not fully provide the interoperability and development speed needed to meet 
these demands. The continued, and in some cases accelerating, evolution of technologies 
continuously creates new challenges that are difficult to forecast and require fast acquisition 
response. Threat matrices also evolve, changing the capabilities required to meet them. Short 
capability improvement cycle-times are needed to respond to these moving targets for 
acquisition efforts. The development of an Integrated Weapons System (IWS) for surface ships 
is an example of a major acquisition effort to provide system (and platform) interoperability and 
exploit technology evolution to meet changing threats. The current work focuses on acquisition 
approaches to meet these challenges.  
Naval Open Architecture (OA) (DAU, 2009) is a breakthrough acquisition approach that 
develops and facilitates the use of acquisition processes, which integrate interoperable systems 
that evolve with technologies, threats, and program environments (e.g., funding). OA does this 
through five principles: 1) modular design and design disclosure, 2) reusable application 
software, 3) interoperable joint warfighting applications and secure information exchange, 4) 
lifecycle affordability, and 5) encouraging competition and collaboration through the 
development of alternative solutions and sources. Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) (DAU, 2009) is 
a somewhat recently developed acquisition approach that uses the repeated integration of only 
mature-enough technologies into products to speed capability improvement for warfighters. OA 
and EA can act synergistically to meet their objectives. However, effective implementation is 
critical for success. Particularly in large, complex systems that span platforms, the successful 
implementation of OA and EA is not obvious or easy.  
Despite their potential, OA and EA have not yet been fully developed or implemented in 
DoD acquisition. Previous research (Ford & Dillard, 2008; Dillard & Ford, 2007) suggests that 
the DoD can successfully integrate open systems and Evolutionary Acquisition. This supports 
the Navy’s current development of the Rapid Capability Insertion Process (RCIP) to implement 
Open Architecture and Evolutionary Acquisition (described later). The Navy’s Acoustic Rapid 
COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) Insertion program (ARCI) experience (described later) 
demonstrates that these approaches can be integrated and applied successfully. An improved 
understanding of how OA and EA have been used successfully and can be used in RCIP is 
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needed to better apply them across systems and platforms and, thereby, improve acquisition 
programs.  
The Research Approach  
Evolutionary Acquisition and open systems approaches combine to create a complex set 
of development processes that evolve over time. An improved understanding of these 
processes and their management is available through formal modeling of the most important 
components and relationships that drive system performance and risk. Due to the number and 
complexity of the components and their relationships, the formal model structure and rigor of 
calculations can simulate and forecast performance and risk better than informal, tacit 
predictions by humans. Therefore, we applied a computational experimentation approach to 
investigating Evolutionary Acquisition and open systems projects, integrating theory and 
practice in a computational tool that allows controlled experimentation through simulation.   
Previous research and modeling of Open Architecture and Evolutionary Acquisition is 
being used as the foundation of the current work. That model was first revised and improved to 
reflect the ARCI program to develop a basis for understanding success factors in OA and EA 
implementation. This required the development of a deep understanding of the relevant aspects 
of the ARCI acquisition program (summarized next). The ACRI model was then revised to 
reflect the Rapid Capability Insertion Process. Model analysis was used to better understand the 
requirements for success in RCIP.  
The System Dynamics Modeling Methodology 
The system dynamics methodology was applied to model the ARCI program. System 
dynamics is one of several established and successful approaches to systems analysis and 
design (Flood & Jackson, 1991; Lane & Jackson, 1995; Jackson, 2003). The methodology has 
been extensively used for this purpose, including to study several aspects of development 
projects. System dynamics shares many fundamental systems concepts with other systems 
approaches, including emergence, control, and layered structures. Therefore, system dynamics 
can address issues such as risk in large complex systems such as the DoD acquisition projects 
(Lane, Größler & Milling, 2004). The methodology’s ability to model many diverse system 
components (e.g., work, people, money, information), processes (e.g., design, technology 
development, quality assurance, rework), and managerial decision-making and actions (e.g., 
forecasting, resource allocation) makes it useful for investigating acquisition programs. Forrester 
(1961) develops the methodology's philosophy, and Sterman (2000) specifies the modeling 
process with examples and describes numerous applications.  
The system dynamics methodology applies a control theory perspective to the design 
and management of complex human systems. The perspective focuses on how the internal 
structure of a system impacts managerial behavior and performance over time. The system 
dynamics approach is unique in its integrated use of stocks and flows, causal feedback, and 
time delays to model structures and policies. Stocks represent accumulations or backlogs of 
work, people, information, or other portions of the system that change over time. Flows 
represent the movement of those commodities into, between, and out of stocks. For example, 
Figure 1 shows a simple stock and flow diagram of one possible arrangement of the backlogs 
and movements of work within a single activity (e.g., Advanced Development) of an acquisition 
program. Stocks are represented by boxes. Flows are represented by arrows between the 
boxes with the valve symbols. Arrowheads indicate the direction of movement of the work.  
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Figure 1. A Stock and Flow Diagram of Work Backlogs and Development Activities 
Feedback is modeled conceptually in system dynamics with causal loop diagrams. 
Figure 2 shows a portion of a causal loop diagram for a single activity of an acquisition program. 
In causal loop diagrams, arrows indicate the direction of causal influence. The variable at the tail 
of an arrowhead influences the variable at the head of the arrow. A plus sign at an arrowhead 
indicates that the impacted variable and driving variable move in the same direction (i.e., an 
increase in the driving variable increases the impacted variable, and a decrease in the driving 
variable decreases the impacted variable). A negative sign at an arrowhead indicates that the 
impacted variable and driving variable move in opposite directions (i.e., an increase in the 
driving variable decreases the impacted variable, and a decrease in the driving variable 
increases the impacted variable). The two types of feedback loops are also illustrated in Figure 
2. A balancing loop (“B” in Figure 2) tends to control or limit the movement of the variables in the 
loop. In contrast, a reinforcing loop (“R” in Figure 2) tends to move systems farther and farther 
from their initial conditions at faster and faster speeds. The behavior pattern generated by a 
specific feedback loop (e.g., exponential growth or movement toward a target) can be identified 
by sequentially tracing these impacts on variables through the series of causal links that 
describe the loop. See Sterman (2000) for a detailed description of the building and use of 
causal loop diagrams.  
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Feedback Loop Legend 
B – Rework backlog increases rework rate, controlling the size of the backlog 
R – Poor quality rework increases the work fraction requiring rework and rework backlog, further 
increasing the amount of work requiring rework 
 
Figure 2. A Causal Loop Diagram of a Portion of an Advanced Development Phase  
Stock and flow diagrams and causal loop diagrams can be integrated into system 
structure diagrams that simultaneously describe the feedback and accumulation/flow nature of 
the system being modeled. Figure 3 shows a system structure diagram of a model of an 
acquisition program phase. The diagram integrates the stock and flow diagram in Figure 1, the 
causal loop diagram in Figure 2, and some of the other important portions of the system. The 






























































Feedback Loop Legend (partial) 
B1 – An increase in the Initial Design Backlog increases the initial design rate, thereby 
controlling the backlog 
B2 – An increase in the Quality Assurance (QA) Backlog increases the QA rate and 
discovery of rework, thereby controlling the backlog 
B1 – An increase in the Quality Assurance (QA) Backlog increases the QA rate and 
design approval rate, thereby controlling the backlog 
B4 – An increase in the Rework Backlog increases the rework rate, thereby controlling 
the backlog 
B5 – An increase in the accumulation of approved designs increases the size of the 
design release, thereby controlling the Approved Design accumulation 
B6 – An increase in the Quality Assurance (QA) Backlog increases the QA rate, 
discovery of rework, fraction discovered, and approval rate, thereby controlling the 
backlog 
R1 – An increase in the Quality Assurance (QA) Backlog increases the QA rate, 
discovery of rework, Rework Backlog, and rework rate, thereby increasing the QA 
Backlog further  
R2 – An increase in the rework rate increases the fraction requiring rework, fraction 
discovered, discovery rate, and Rework Backlog, thereby increasing the rework rate 
further.  
 
Figure 3. A System Structure Diagram of a Portion of Advanced Development 
The full power of system dynamics can be realized only through formal simulation of the 
system’s evolution. Formal simulation models developed from conceptual models are sets of 
nonlinear differential equations simulated with difference equations. Because no closed-form 
solutions are known, system behaviors over time are simulated. The simulator uses initial or 
current conditions, calibration values of constant parameters, and the difference equations to 
calculate conditions in the nest time period. Although the methodology initially assumes that 
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small changes over time can be used to describe systems (e.g., the continuous adjustment of 
resources toward demands for those resources); however, discrete changes (e.g., the release 
of a complete design) at specific dates (e.g., a scheduled upgrade date) can also be modeled.  
When applied to development projects, system dynamics focuses on how performance 
evolves in response to interactions among development strategy (e.g., Evolutionary Acquisition 
versus traditional acquisition), managerial decision-making (e.g., the allocation of resources), 
and development processes (e.g., concurrence). System dynamics is considered appropriate for 
modeling acquisition programs because of its ability to explicitly model critical aspects of 
development projects (Ford & Sterman, 1998; Cooper, 1993a, September; 1993b, September; 
1993c; Cooper & Mullen, 1993; Cooper, 1994). System dynamics has been successfully applied 
to a variety of project management issues, including prediction/discovery of failures in project 
fast-track implementation (Ford & Sterman, 2003b, September), poor schedule performance 
(Abdel-Hamid, 1988; Taylor & Ford, 2006; 2008), the impacts of changes (Rodriguez & 
Williams, 1998; Cooper, 1980), the planning of fast-track construction projects (Pena-Mora & Li, 
2001; Pena-Mora & Park, 2001), construction innovation (Park, Napa & Dulaimi, 2004), change 
management (Lee, Pena-Mora & Park, 2005; 2006; Park & Pena-Mora, 2003), resource 
allocation (Lee et al., 2007), and concealing rework requirements  on project performance (Ford 
& Sterman, 2003a, September). See Lyneis and Ford (2007) for a review and analysis of the 
application of system dynamics to projects.  
The ARCI Program  
Information on the ARCI program was collected as the basis for modeling the OA and 
EA aspects of its acquisition process. In particular, differences between ARCI and traditional 
acquisition with an evolutionary approach were investigated. Data was collected primarily 
through a review of Navy documents (Johnson, 2007; Chief of Naval Operations, 2009), 
contractor program documents (Lockheed Martin, 2003; 2009), defense analyst documents 
(Global Security, n.d.), previous research concerning the program (e.g., Beaudreau, 2006; 
Johnson, 2004), and an extended interview with Bill Johnson, who developed and managed the 
ARCI program (Johnson, 2009). The data collection focused on the acquisition (development) 
aspects of ARCI. A summary of the results of that data collection follow.  
Although it occurred within the established DoD acquisition processes of its time, the 
ARCI program was atypical in several important ways. The description here focuses on the 
program’s atypical nature, as it relates to the current work. See Beaudreau (2006) and Johnson 
(2004) for additional program descriptions. Three atypical aspects of the ARCI program in 
particular generated the need for and prompted the use of a new and different acquisition 
approach: 1) the urgent operational need, 2) tight constraints on funding, and 3) an environment 
of acquisition reform.  
An Urgent Operational Need  
In September of 1995, the Submarine Sonar Technology Panel reported a serious 
reduction in acoustic superiority. The reduced superiority resulted in reductions in the “stand off” 
distance between US submarines and other vessels (particularly other submarines), the 
distance at which US submarines recognize other vessels. The standoff distance is determined 
by the noise radiated from vessels and the capabilities of the recognizing ship through its sonar 
systems. Although the radiated noise of other vessels had progressively reduced (Figures 4 and 
5), US sonar capabilities had not progressed in-step. Improved sonar systems could recapture 
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the lost acoustic superiority. Importantly, the acoustic superiority loss had already occurred by 
1995, and the need to regain it was considered urgent by the operating submarine fleet. ARCI 
needed to develop solutions fast. Figures 4 and 5 are examples of data used to support these 
findings and recommendations.  













































































Figure 5. Diesel Rated Noise Trend 
(Johnson, 2007) 
 
Based on these findings, the Submarine Sonar Technology Panel recommended a 
radical transformation of the approach to designing and fielding sonar systems. 
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Tight Constraints on Funding  
By 1995, the Cold War was over and funding for the DoD acquisition had reduced 






















































































































































Figure 7. Combat Control Development Funding 
(Johnson, 2007) 
Å ARCI need reported 
Å ARCI need reported 
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Traditional acquisition approaches, such as the development of unique systems for one 
or more sonar systems, were not available due to the large funding requirements of these 
approaches.  ARCI had to develop solutions relatively inexpensively, at much less cost than 
required by the traditional DoD acquisition approaches.  
An Environment of Acquisition Reform   
Although not a characteristic of the ARCI program itself, the DoD acquisition processes 
were evolving faster than usual during the period in which ARCI began. This had potentially 
significant impacts on the program in terms of allowing it more than the usual amount of 
freedom to pursue and develop innovative acquisition perspectives, methods, and tools. These 
potential impacts are investigated later in the current work.  
The ARCI Program Results   
The ARCI program succeeded in significantly improving US submarine sonar systems 






























































































































Mean Operator Detection 
Success Rate
Mean # of False Alarms 
Per Run
Mean Initial Detection & 
Classification Time
(When Detection Occurred)




9 Min Earlier 27 Min EarlierBaseline
10 Min Longer 25 Min LongerBaseline
Improved by a Factor of ~ 4
False Alarms Reduced by 40%
Improved by 27 Minutes
Improved by 25 Minutes*
* Measured holding time limited by the length of recorded tape.  
Figure 9. Towed Array Processing Performance-improvement Trend 
(Johnson, 2007) 
ARCI performed quickly. Phase I improvements were installed on Agusta in December 
of 1997, and performance improvements delivered 18 months after the MDA decision. By the 
eighth anniversary of the ARCI MDA decision in June of 2004, ARCI had installed on over 50 
submarines with at least four generations of hardware and software upgrades. These durations 
are much shorter than those in most comparable acquisition programs.  
In addition to improving sonar system performance, ARCI generated large cost savings 
(Johnson, 2007) by reducing budget allocations across SCN, OPN, O&MN, RDT&E, and MilCon 
by over 50% ($7.6 billion to $3.6 billion) when the 1983-1993 budget allocations are compared 
to the 1996-2006 allocations. These savings reflect a reduction in Development and Production 
by a factor of six and a reduction in Operating and Support costs by a factor of eight. ARCI also 
realized over $25 million in cost avoidance for logistics support, including:   
 Over $1 million in technical manuals, 
 Over $2 million in direct vendor delivery, 
 Over $19 million in interactive, multimedia instruction, and 
 $3 million in outfitting spares reduction. 
In summary, ARCI was an extremely successful acquisition program. A fundamental 
question for learning how to improve other acquisition programs is “Why was ARCI so 
successful?” Several factors, internal to the program and from its environment, help explain this 
success. Beaudreau (2006) focused on the role of the Modular Open Systems Approach 
(MOSA), now incorporated into the Navy’s Open Architecture approach, changing culture, and 
systems engineering (including spiral development, now termed Evolutionary Acquisition). The 
current work focuses on the dynamic nature of the ARCI program and what that nature suggests 
about the successful implementation of acquisition programs.   
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Open Architecture and Evolutionary Acquisition in the ARCI 
Program  
ARCI was created in the early 1990s in an unusual acquisition environment that was 
dominated by an urgent need for significant improvement in active fleet capabilities, very 
constrained funding, and ongoing acquisition reforms. More specifically, submarine sonar 
hardware and software needed large improvements in performance. Complete solutions were 
not available and ready for operational testing when ARCI began. The need to develop solutions 
and make improvements quickly required an evolutionary approach. In addition, existing 
capabilities used legacy systems, which made repeated and fast changes difficult and 
expensive. Moving away from the legacy systems to an Open Architecture system potentially 
provided the flexibility needed for frequent upgrades as technologies developed. Program 
managers initially planned to replace legacy hardware with COTS (a central tenant of OA) to 
take advantage of the increased computing capability of hardware developed since the original 
system development and to facilitate future upgrades. Reduced hardware size provided space 
for the redesign of cabinets, etc. so that COTS products would meet military reliability 
requirements not met by those products “out of the box.” ARCI managers originally planned to 
write middleware to link the new hardware and legacy software. However, analysis revealed that 
rewriting the operating software in a modern software platform (C++) was less expensive than 
developing middleware and also provided opportunities for an Open Architecture for software 
upgrades. Therefore, the Open Architecture approach was expanded to include software. Four 
acquisition iterations were initially designed (a central tenant of EA), each to address a different 
portion of the sonar system: 1) the towed array, 2) the hull array,30 3) the spherical array, and 4) 
the high frequency arrays. Each iteration used the standard DoD acquisition phases at the time 
of the program that identified and specified requirements, acquired technologies, designed and 
developed products, and integrated those solutions into ships.  
As described so far, ARCI was a straightforward (albeit challenging) integration of Open 
Architecture and Evolutionary Acquisition. However, the ARCI program included some important 
features that distinguish it from known descriptions of the implementation of open systems and 
Evolutionary Acquisition. First, consider the dynamic nature of the need (evolving threats) and 
solutions (technology evolution). As hardware and software technologies improved and threats 
evolved, additional ARCI iterations would be needed. Improvements would be needed on an 
almost continuous basis to adequately improve fleet performance. Therefore, ARCI needed to 
be able to generate many repeatable capability upgrade iterations. This required ARCI to 
develop a process that integrated continuous processes with phased development, Open 
Architecture, and Evolutionary Acquisition. This was done partially by setting frequent upgrade 
release dates and not letting those dates slip. The first iteration was released 18 months after 
the identification of initial requirements, with subsequent upgrades every 12 months. This is 
much more frequent than the common DoD practice. The frequent integration of improvements 
was possible only by utilizing many previously developed technologies and solutions from a 
variety of sources (e.g., ONR, small businesses, academics). “Leverage, leverage, leverage” 
was a mantra in ARCI that referred to the program’s emphasis on the use of existing 
technologies and solutions.  
                                                
30 Some towed array upgrades were included in some of the second (hull array) iterations to respond to 
the fleet’s overwhelming support based on the results of initial towed array improvement results and the 
fleet’s urgent need for improvement.  
 =
=
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå======== - 219 - 
=
=
ARCI completed frequent upgrades through a second important difference between 
ARCI and other OA and EA programs that is related to the relationship of requirements, 
technologies, products, and implementation to specific acquisition iterations. Traditional DoD 
acquisition (including traditional EA) strongly link specific requirements to specific development 
blocks at the start of the block. Tests for specific blocks can be failed if the requirements linked 
to that block are not met and development is slowed to be sure that promised requirements are 
included.31  Strongly linking requirements to blocks before solutions have been developed 
requires a flexible schedule—in case of development problems—lots of money to speed 
development, or both. ARCI had little flexibility of time or money, so it made requirements 
flexible to meet iteration deadlines (i.e., the commitments to upgrade at specific intervals) and 
control costs. This was done with a combination of a deviation from the traditional acquisition 
process and the use of a different conceptualization and utilization of several acquisition 
processes. ARCI delayed the selection of technologies and products to be included in each 
iteration until as late as possible (typically, about six months before delivery) and only included 
(at the program manager’s discretion) those improvements for which developed technologies 
and solutions were available and in-hand. Requirements for which solutions were not yet 
available were delayed until solutions had been developed. ARCI is distinguished from many 
other DoD programs by its ability to locate the authority to include or delay meeting 
requirements with the program managers. According to the program manager, this was 
accepted by the fleet largely because the frequent iterations provided an opportunity for delays 
in meeting requirements to be relatively short, and solutions were being developed relatively 
rapidly.  
ARCI managers also adopted a fundamentally different mental model of the acquisition 
process than was described in the DoD policy at the time of the program (e.g., 5000.1) and 
extended concepts that are described in current policy (USD (AT&L), 2003b, May 12, sections 1 
and 2, pp. 12-13). Current policy describes sequential acquisition phases (Materiel Solution 
Analysis, Technology Development, and Engineering and Manufacturing Development) that are 
repeated after requirements are developed, with continuous technology development and 
maturation (USD (AT&L), 2003b, May 12, Figure 2). In contrast, ARCI used continuous 
requirements development, technology development, and advanced development. Only the six-
month implementation phases (analogous to Manufacturing Development) were viewed as 
specific to individual upgrades. This, and the Open Architecture approach to solutions, required 
ARCI to aggressively pursue and actively manage and coordinate continuous and parallel 
requirements revision, technology identification and development, and product development. 
This approach (three continuous processes and one iteration-based phase) is fundamentally 
different than traditional acquisition (all iteration-based phases) or current policy (one 
continuous process and several iteration-based phases). This approach also required a different 
set of government and contractor skills and relationships.  
ARCI changed important relationships among program participants. The prime 
contractor was forced to take a role of primarily providing coordination but not generating 
solutions. This was to prevent solution bias in choosing technologies and products for inclusion 
in upgrades. Solutions were developed by multiple and diverse organizations (e.g., academia, 
ONR, small businesses) and chosen based on transparent assessments by an objective team 
                                                
31 This may be part of why traditional EA is difficult to plan. Program managers must successfully predict 
which requirements will be filled through future technology development, product design, and 
implementation when they commit to meet specific requirements for specific development blocks, often 
long before that technology and product development has occurred or can be reliably forecasted.   
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of experts. This successfully prevented purposeful or accidental sole-source acquisition by 
providing suppliers that were not awarded contracts with realistic opportunities to fairly compete 
and potentially win future ARCI work. These changes required several atypical program 
management skills.  
Modeling the ARCI Program  
The simulation model used here is based on a previously developed formal (i.e., 
computer simulation) system dynamics model of a DoD acquisition project using Evolutionary 
Acquisition and some aspects of open systems. The model is purposefully simple relative to 
actual practice to expose the relevant relationships, with a focus on the open systems and 
Evolutionary Acquisition aspects. Therefore, although many development processes and 
features of program participants interact to determine program performance, only those features 
that describe the critical evolutionary, Open Architecture, and ARCI-specific nature of the 
program are included. For example, the model assumes that resource productivities are fixed, 
that work backlogs are available for development, and that work packages are completed in 
accordance with schedule requirements (i.e., work packages on the critical path are completed 
first) but does not identify specific critical-path work packages. The literature cited above 
investigates the impacts of these and other factors influencing program performance. The model 
generates complex and realistic behavior patterns despite its relative simplicity when compared 
to the actual DoD acquisition programs. A brief description of the conceptual model that was 
used as the basis for the formal model provides a foundation for describing the current model of 
ARCI. See Ford and Dillard (2008) for a detailed description of the previous model.   
A Conceptual Model of an Evolutionary Acquisition Program 
The model structure reflects the structure of development work moving through the 
separate development blocks of an acquisition project. In the model, four types of work flow 
through each block of an acquisition project: requirements, technologies, product component 
designs, and manufactured products. Each type of work flows through a development phase 
that completes a critical aspect of the project: 1) develop requirements, 2) develop technologies, 
3) design product components (advanced development), and 4) manufacture products. The 
exception is requirements, which also measures progress through the final phase, 5) conduct 
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Figure 10. Information Flows in a Single-block Acquisition Project 
(Ford & Dillard, 2008) 
In Figure 10, arrows between phases indicate primary information flows. The start of all 
phases (except the development of requirements) is constrained by the completion of previous 
(“upstream”) phases. These constraints are relaxed in the ARCI model to reflect continuous 
development phases. In the previous model, the completion of some requirements allows for the 
start of technology development, reflecting the concurrent nature of this portion of acquisition. 
Both requirements development and technology development must be completed for advanced 
development to begin. The completion of advanced development allows manufacturing to begin. 
When some products have been manufactured, they are shipped to users for readiness testing. 
Figure 10 also identifies the five major reviews within a single acquisition block (A, B, Design 
Readiness Review, C, and Full-rate Production) at their approximate times during a project.   
Each of the five phases in a development block (shown in Figure 10) are modeled with 
the workflows through the phase as a value chain of alternating backlogs and development 
activities with two types of rework cycle (within phases and between phases). The value chain is 
described with the boxes and pipes and with valves along the bottom of Figure 11. The value 
chain passes from the Initial Completion Backlog, through the Initial Completion Rate, into the 
Quality Assurance Backlog, through the Approval Rate, into the stock of Work Approved, and 
through the Release Rate to the accumulation of Work Finished and Released. Rework cycles 
are inherent in development projects and have been modeled and used extensively to explain 
and improve project management (Lyneis, Cooper, & Els, 2001; Ford & Sterman, 1998; Cooper 
& Mullen, 1993; Cooper, 1980; 1993a, February; 1993b, February; 1993c; 1994; Taylor & Ford, 
2006; 2008). The scope of work is measured with the number of equal-sized work packages 








Figure 11. Work Backlogs and Flows through a Development Phase 
For most phases in most blocks, all work starts in the backlog32 of work needing to be 
initially completed (“Initial Completion Backlog” box at the bottom of Figure 11). The ARCI 
project includes an exception, which will be described later. As work is first completed, it enters 
the stock of work needing quality assurance (QA). Quality assurance could take many forms, 
including reviews of designs by senior engineers, prototype building and testing, and the 
inspection of work. Work needing quality assurance accumulates in a Quality Assurance 
Backlog (the box in the middle of Figure 11).  If work passes QA (either because it is correct or 
the need for changes is not detected), it is approved and adds to the stock of Work Approved. 
When sufficient work has been approved, a package is released, adding to the stock of Work 
Finished and Released to other phases or users. The release package size is a management 
decision, often based on the characteristics of the phase. For example, in semiconductor 
development, the vast majority of the design code must be completed prior to release for a 
prototype build since almost all of the code is needed to design the masks. In other 
development settings, managers have broad discretion in setting release package sizes.  
In rework cycles, between-phases work that is found to require changes moves into a 
stock of tasks that require changes that must be resolved through coordination with the phase 
responsible for the problem (“Coordination Backlog”). Classic examples include designers 
working with users to refine ambiguous or infeasible requirements or manufacturing engineers 
meeting with product designers to explain why parts can’t be built as specified in the drawings. 
After coordination resolves the disputed issues, these tasks move to the stock of work known to 
need rework (“Known Rework Backlog”) and are subsequently reworked and returned to quality 
assurance for re-inspection, testing, etc.  
Since quality assurance is imperfect, some tasks requiring rework can be missed and 
erroneously approved and released. These rework requirements may be discovered later by 
another work phase. We assume that all defects are discovered in final product testing by users. 
When the phase that discovers the problem reports it, the generating phase is notified, and the 
affected tasks are moved from the stock of work considered finished to the coordination backlog 
                                                
32 Because the flows of development activities reflect the completion of the activity, the backlogs, as used 
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and then eventually reworked. For example, a test phase may discover a short circuit across 
two layers in a prototype chip. If the error is traced to the design, test engineers must notify the 
designers and work with them to specify the location and characteristics of the short circuit. The 
designers must then rework, re-check and re-release the design, followed by changes in layout, 
tape-out, masking, and prototype fabrication.  
The previous model of Open Architecture and Evolutionary Acquisition simulated the 
movement of work through an acquisition program. That model linked all five phases to specific 
iterations, which were completed at different intervals (Figure 10). Figure 12 depicts an 
acquisition project with multiple iterations or blocks. The first block is the same as Figure 10 
above. Subsequent blocks have the same basic information flow, but can also be delayed by 
the completion of phases in previous blocks or constrained by the lack of progress in their own 
block.  
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Milestones, Iter #2 A2 B2 DRR2 C2 FRP2
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Figure 12. Information Flows in a Three-block Acquisition Project 
(Ford & Dillard, 2008) 
Modeling Open Systems in an Evolutionary Acquisition Program 
The previous simulation model reflected some important aspects of open systems by 
changing model parameters to reflect impacts of open systems suggested by the literature. As 
an example, Table 1 describes some of the open systems impacts derived from Meyers and 
Oberndorf (2001) that were incorporated into the model.   
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Table 1. Impacts of Open Systems on Evolutionary Acquisition Due to Changes 
Suggested by Meyers and Oberndorf (2001) 
(Ford & Dillard, 2008) 
Change Required by  
Open Systems Impact on Evolutionary Acquisition Processes 
1) Build standards & COTS for 
program use 
Increases Requirements scope in Block 1 
Increases Technology Development scope in Block 1 
2) Build high-level model with open 
systems 
Increases Technology Development scope in Block 1 
3) Document use of OS Increases Technology Development scope in all blocks 
4) Coordinate standards Increases scope of all phases in all blocks 
5) Implement OS Decreases Advanced Development scope in all blocks 
Fewer Advanced Development design problems in all blocks 
6) Integrate components More Advanced Development integration problems in all blocks 
More Manufacturing integration problems in all blocks 
 
Model Changes to Reflect the ARCI Program 
The structure of the simulation model of a traditional acquisition program that adopts 
Open Architecture and Evolutionary Acquisition approaches was changed to better reflect the 
ARCI program. The primary changes are:  
 Rename “Advanced Development” as “Design” to reflect the broader acquisition 
approach to this phase in ARCI that often adopted existing solutions instead of 
developing new solutions such as is often done in many traditional programs.   
 Rename the “Manufacturing” phase to the “Integration” phase to reflect the nature of 
this activity in ARCI.  
 Model the Requirements, Technology, and Design phases as a single, continuous 
development activity that occurs throughout the program.  
 Begin the program with a set of initially developed requirements to be addressed but 
no inflow of new requirements. This reflects the conditions at the beginning of the 
program and the nature of the needs that the program was addressing (i.e., largely 
understood and described).  
 Model the Integration activity as separate phases (as in the previous model), but 
start those phases at specific times (6 months before release), and end them at 
specific Integration release dates.   
 Fix Integration release dates at 1.5 years after the program start (MDA) for the first 
release and then annually thereafter (i.e., at weeks 78, 130, 182, and 234).  
 Disaggregate supplier-resource types into three types, reflecting those addressing 
technology acquisition, design, and implementation. The resources include several 
types of suppliers: contractors, ONR, government labs, and academic agencies. 
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Resources-for-requirements was not separately modeled because the requirements 
were largely already developed at the start of the program, and resources for 
checking and revising requirements was not considered by the program manager to 
constrain program progress.  
 Disaggregate government program-management resources into three types, 
reflecting the same three types of resources as supplier modeling: technology, 
design, and integration work.  
Little specific data was available for model parameter estimates. Therefore, the ARCI 
model was calibrated using data collected through the interview with the program manager and 



























1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250
Time (weeks)
Work Approved[Requirements,Iter1] : ARCI work packages1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Work Approved[Technology,Iter1] : ARCI work packages2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Work Approved[Design,Iter1] : ARCI work packages3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Integration work approved : ARCI work packages4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  
Figure 13. Approved Work in the Simulated ARCI Program  
The vertical axis in Figure 13 is work packages, as described above. Figure 13 reflects 
the critical behavior patterns that describe the ARCI program. Work for each upgrade 
progresses first through the checking and revision (as required) of requirements (blue line #1 in 
Figure 13), subsequent acquisition of technologies to fulfill those requirements (red line #2 in 
Figure 13), and design of upgrade solutions using those technologies (green line #3 in Figure 
13). As in the ARCI program, these continue throughout all upgrades (weeks 0–250 in Figure 
13). But the accumulation of mature-enough requirements, technologies, and designs for each 
upgrade are collected at weeks 52, 104, and 156 (6 months before each release) to initiate the 
Integration phase for the upgrade. The four Integration phases (grey line #4 in Figure 13) each 
last six months and end at the release of each upgrade package to the fleet for operational 
testing and use. Consistent with ACRI, the revision of requirements, acquisition of technologies, 
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and design of solutions does not stop during integration but continues, as show in Figure 13 by 
the overlapping of the progress rate lines during the Integration phases.   
The ARCI model was tested for its usefulness for investigating implementation issues. 
Standard model tests as described by Sterman (2000) were used, including testing both the 
model structure and behavior. The model is based on previously developed system dynamics 
models of product development in several industries that have been developed and tested over 
several decades, as described and referenced above. Model structure was tested for similarity 
to the structure of the actual system through one-to-one linking of model components and 
specific parts of the system structure and units-consistency checks. Models were tested for their 
ability to generate “the right behavior patterns for the right reasons” (i.e., for the same reasons 
as in the actual system) using extreme-conditions testing and the comparison of simulated 
behavior patterns with an understanding of the behavior of the actual and similar systems. In 
extreme-conditions testing, one or more model parameter values are set to represent extreme 
conditions, which the modeler can use to predict correct model behavior. For example, the 
extreme condition of no resources should generate a program with no progress. The ARCI 
model generated reasonable behavior over a wide range of parameter values. The model 
behavior is similar to the described project behaviors, also supporting the model’s ability to 
reflect the relevant portions of the ARCI program. Based on these tests, the model was 
considered useful for investigating RCIP implementation issues.   
Modeling RCIP  
The Rapid Capability Insertion Process (RCIP) seeks to develop a process that can 
capture the types of performance improvements realized by ARCI in more and larger acquisition 
programs. The upgrading of AEGIS and its preparation for net-centric warfare is a potential 
application of RCIP. RCIP is based on the ARCI program and includes its core concepts and 
changes from most traditional acquisition projects, including those that adopt the Open 
Architecture and Evolutionary Acquisition approaches. However, based on an interview with one 
of the RCIP developers (2009), there will be differences between ARCI and RCIP, primarily: 
 RCIP will be applied to larger acquisition efforts (e.g., AEGIS);  
 After an initial start-up phase, RCIP will receive and develop a continuous stream of 
new requirements instead of having a fixed set of established requirements in place, 
as ACRI had; 
 RCIP is initially planned to release upgrades to the fleet every two years, thereby 
adopting a cycle that is twice as long as that used in ARCI; and 
 RCIP is planned to use 12-month integration periods, twice as long as those in ARCI. 
These differences were integrated into the simulation model to provide an estimate of 
the potential of the RCIP approach. This represents a simple (and simplistic, as will be 
explained) scaling of the ACRI approach to RCIP. Figure 14 shows RCIP’s potential 
performance. Steady-state output exceeds the ARCI’s average output, although ARCI’s 








































0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
Time (weeks)
Work Approved[Requirements,Iter1] : RCIP Opportunity work packages1 1 1 1 1 1
Work Approved[Technology,Iter1] : RCIP Opportunity work packages2 2 2 2 2 2
Work Approved[Design,Iter1] : RCIP Opportunity work packages3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Integration work approved : RCIP Opportunity work packages4 4 4 4 4 4 4  
Figure 14. Simulated RCIP Program Behavior 
Figure 14 includes the fundamental, desired behavior of RCIP, a basically continuous 
process of requirements development upgrades (after an initial start-up phase). While useful as 
a benchmark for the current work, important risks must be addressed to better reflect the RCIP 
approach.  
The RCIP Implementation Risks 
A simple scaling-up of the ARCI program into an RCIP program will not capture the 
potential performance (especially considering that the model above is simplistic) because it 
ignores important implementation risks that can degrade RCIP performance when compared to 
its potential. In addition to the changes from ARCI to RCIP listed above, several implementation 
challenges pose risks that may affect RCIP, including: 1), an increased pool of suppliers due to 
increased scale, 2) a reduced number of off-the-shelf technologies and designs available for 
use, resulting in a need for more new development, and 3) increased systems that solutions 
must be integrated across. Table 2 contrasts the three acquisition programs to highlight their 
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Table 2. Contrasts among Traditional Phased, ARCI, and RCIP Acquisition Programs 
Acquisition Feature Phased 
Program with 















with continuous inflow 
of requirements  
Innovation sources Primarily through 
Prime Contractor  
Primarily Off-the-shelf 
solutions 
Mix of new development 





across phases & 
development blocks 
Primarily separate 
systems (towed, hull, 
spherical, high 
frequency) 






Prime contractor “Prime” coordinator & 
multiple solution 
suppliers 
Larger solution supplier 
pool 
Primary Locus of 
Performance Flexibility 
Cost, Schedule Scope Scope with possible 
flexibility in cost 
 
The Primary Locus of Program Flexibility (the last row in Table 2) describes a generic 
model of program management that can partially explain the ARCI success and facilitate the 
design and management of RCIP programs. The model describes how program management 
handles, in practice, the ubiquitous circumstances of having inadequate resources (broadly 
defined) to meet all performance targets (e.g., cost <= budget, completion date <= deadline, 
capabilities >= warfighter needs). In these circumstances, program management is forced to 
select one or more performance dimensions that will not meet targets and project by how much 
they will underperform. The dimension or dimensions that are chosen is the Primary Locus of 
Program Performance Flexibility. A common saying among commercial contractors (although 
perhaps not said to their clients) that captures the essence of this model is “Fast, cheap, good. 
Pick two.” Table 2 identifies the Primary Locus of Performance Flexibility as a significant 
difference between traditional programs with Open Architecture and Evolutionary Acquisition 
and programs adopting the ARCI/RCIP approach. In the former, performance flexibility is 
primarily located in the cost and schedule dimensions. In contrast, in the ARCI program, it was 
in the scope included in the current upgrade. In the RCIP approach, it is expected to remain in 
the scope dimension, with the possibility that cost may also provide some flexibility.  
The RCIP’s expected implementation risks were integrated into the simulation model. 
Specifically:  
 Increased scope is expected to attract increased oversight and, therefore, reduce 
productivity due to the use of resources (primarily labor) in the preparations for 
reviews, etc. (20% reduction estimated).  
 Existing inventories of requirements, off-the-shelf technologies, and off-the-shelf 
designs were reduced by 50% to reflect the need for more new development. This 
will require their initial development in addition to the testing and revisions included in 
the ARCI model.  
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  Increased new development will also require more integration effort than off-the-
shelf solutions, which have already been partially developed for integration upon 
adoption. Therefore, the amount of integration work was increased by 25%.  
  Increased new development will also make integration more difficult than off-the-
shelf solutions, which have been partially tested for integration upon adoption. 
Therefore, the amount of iteration required in the integration phases was increased 
by 25%.  
Figure 15 shows the simulated RCIP program with implementation risks. The program 






























1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
Time (weeks)
Work Approved[Requirements,Iter1] : RCIP Challenges work packages1 1 1 1 1 1
Work Approved[Technology,Iter1] : RCIP Challenges work packages2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Work Approved[Design,Iter1] : RCIP Challenges work packages3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Integration work approved : RCIP Challenges work packages4 4 4 4 4 4 4  
Figure 15. Simulated RCIP with Implementation Challenges 
Implications of Implementation Risks for RCIP Success 
The work completed and released to the fleet when RCIP implementation risks are 
considered (Figure 15) is significantly less than the potential (Figure 14). Figure 16 illustrates 
this difference (about 14% in the simulated program) by accumulating the Integration phase 
work released across four upgrades, without (blue line #1) and with (red line #2) implementation 
risks included. RCIP implementation risks must be addressed to capture the full potential of the 




















0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
Time (Week)
Project Integration Work Released : RCIP Opportunity work packages1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Project Integration Work Released : RCIP Challenges work packages2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  
Figure 16. Cumulative RCIP Performance without and with  
Implementation Issues 
Another RCIP implementation risk is program management burnout. The ACRI program 
manager specifically identified the potential of burnout in his program management team due to 
the repeated, intense Integration phases. To investigate the possibility and severity of this risk to 
RCIP implementation, the total required (but not necessarily provided) government program-
management workforce size was simulated for the ARCI program, RCIP without implementation 
risks, and RCIP with implementation risks (Figure 17). Figure 17 clearly shows the spikes in 
demand for program management during the Integration phases for all three simulations. Notice 
that the peaks are significantly higher for both RCIP simulations than for the ACRI simulation. 
This suggests that the burnout risk will be larger for RCIP than it was for ACRI. Successfully 
implementing a sustainable RCIP program will require a method to address potential burnout of 
the government program-management workforce.  












0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21
1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (weeks)
Required total Govt PM workforce : ARCI person1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Required total Govt PM workforce : RCIP Opportunity person2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Required total Govt PM workforce : RCIP Challenges person3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3  
Figure 17. Simulated Total Required Government Program-management  
Workforce: ARCI, RCIP without and with Implementation Risks 
Managing RCIP Implementation Risks 
The RCIP’s implementation risks can be managed through the careful design of its 
processes, organizations, and their interactions. Specific recommendations based on the ARCI 




==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå======== - 232 - 
=
=




















continuous inflow of 
requirements  
Standardize continuous processes 





Mix of new 
development & off-
the-shelf. More new 
development 
1) Adapt continuous 
processes into a mixture of off-
the-shelf & new development 
solutions 
















configuration management for 











Formalize open, transparent, 
objective, & repetitive competition 




Scope Scope with 
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cost 
1) Improve user-acquisition 
coordination to facilitate scope 
flexibility 
2) Operationalize ARCI 
management of solution 
acquisition to make RCIP 
responsive to warfighter priorities 
 
Conclusions 
The Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (ARCI) program was studied as the basis for 
modeling the planned Rapid Capability Insertion Process (RCIP) approach for continuous, 
reduced-cost upgrading of warfighting assets. ARCI used atypical methods in the face of 
atypical program requirements and conditions. ACRI was very successful in improving 
performance quickly for reduced costs. A previously developed acquisition program model was 
adapted to reflect ARCI and used for model validation. This model was then changed to reflect 
the basic conditions expected in RCIP programs. The model demonstrated the potential of RCIP 
to improve program performance. However, implementation risks were identified that may 
degrade potential performance, including increased oversight, the use of more new 
development, and the resulting integration scope and risk. When incorporated into the model, 
these risks were shown to significantly decrease RCIP performance. The means for 
successfully managing the RCIP design based on the ACRI program and RCIP operations are 
suggested for use in addressing the identified implementation risks  
Based on the work described above, we conclude that RCIP has great potential to 
improve acquisition. But the failure to identify and successfully address implementation risks, in 
particular, can significantly constrain RCIP program performance. Special attention must be 
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paid in the design of the RCIP approach to the differences between the ACRI program and the 
features, characteristics, and environmental conditions that RCIP programs will face. The five 
principles, concepts and tools and methods embodied in the Navy’s Open Architecture 
approach to acquisition are likely to be particularly useful in developing RCIP and addressing its 
implementation risks. Many Open Architecture concepts were used successfully in the ACRI 
program, including modular design, design disclosure, interoperability, lifecycle affordability, and 
lots of vigorous (and vigorously managed) competition to generate a wide range of possible 
solutions from many sources. Applying Open Architecture required strong, assertive, 
government program management but provided the basis for extraordinary success. Similar 
extraordinary success is possible in RCIP programs but will also require a process based on 
Open Architecture and vigorous and assertive management by the government. By doing so, 
RCIP can become an example of effective and efficient acquisition for widespread adoption to 
many acquisition efforts.   
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Abstract 
The policy specified by DoDI 5000.02 (DoD, 2008, December 8) prescribes an 
evolutionary acquisition strategy.   Products with long lifecycles such as torpedoes, evolutionary 
updates via incremental development, modular design updates, technology refreshes, 
technology insertions, and Advanced Processor Builds are all in play at the same time.  Various 
functional elements of the weapon system are often redesigned during the lifecycle to meet 
evolving requirements.  Component obsolescence and failures must also be anticipated and 
addressed in upgrade planning.  Within each weapon system’s evolutionary acquisition, cycle-
changing requirements may expose weaknesses that have to be rectified across the inventory.  
New acquisition paradigms such as modular design have to be introduced into the supply chain 
while maintaining inventory levels of previously designed weapons at a high level of readiness.  
Thus, a diverse set of requirements must be satisfied with a finite set of resources. The 
acquisition policy does not provide guidance on how to address cross-coordination and 
optimization of project resources.  This paper explores decision models for balancing conflicting 
demands and discusses the application of how these models address cross-coordination and 
optimization of project resources in the torpedo acquisition process while keeping the weapon’s 
efficiency and inventory effectiveness at or above minimum specified levels.   
Introduction 
The policy specified by DoDI 5000.02 (DoD, 2008, December 8) prescribes an 
evolutionary acquisition strategy.  The Defense Acquisition Management System, as depicted in 
Figure 1, provides a framework in which to accomplish evolutionary updates in the Torpedo 
Enterprise. Evolutionary acquisition processes are deployed in the maintenance and upgrade of 
complex systems in an incremental manner to maximize the overall system efficiency and 
effectiveness.  Technology-intensive products such as weapon systems are often redesigned 
during the lifecycle to meet changing requirements.  Component obsolescence and failures 
must be anticipated and addressed in upgrade planning.  Acquisition paradigms such as 
modular open systems approach (MOSA) are introduced while continuously maintaining 
unmodified inventory levels of previously designed weapons at a high level of readiness. 
 
Figure 1. Overview of Defense Acquisition Management System 
z The Materiel Development Decision 
precedes entry into any phase of the 
acquisition management system
z Entrance criteria met before entering phase
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Prior to discussing how planning is conducted in the torpedo acquisition process, we 
define key terms used in the Torpedo Enterprise. These include evolutionary update, 
incremental development, modular design, technology refresh, technology insertion, Torpedo 
Modular Update, Advanced Processor Build, backwards compatible, lifecycle sustainment plan, 
weapon efficiency, and inventory effectiveness. 
Evolutionary update: Planned or opportunistic updates to system hardware and software 
that address requirements relating to new customers, new technologies or innovations. 
Evolutionary updates can be fully implemented in a single step or implemented via an 
incremental development approach. 
Incremental development: A development process in which hardware and/or software 
capability is delivered in increments, recognizing up front the need for future improvements. 
Each increment is a militarily useful and supportable operational capability. Each design 
increment goes through the entire design cycle of prototyping, testing, and release.  
Modular design: A design in which hardware and software components are designed to 
be independently sustainable. The goal is for each module to stand on its own and interface to 
the required components via a standard set of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). 
Technology refresh: Planned obsolescence upgrades on existing product baselines. A 
technology refresh involves repairs/fixes/upgrades for existing components in an incremental 
manner.    
Technology insertion (TI): Planned hardware capability upgrades either on existing or 
new product baselines. A technology insertion involves the introduction of new components that 
are functionally equal to or superior to existing components. 
Torpedo Modular Update (TMU): An integrated/collaborative development, production 
and in-service approach to improve the overall effectiveness of torpedo inventories while 
addressing obsolescence issues and reducing Total Ownership Cost (TOC). 
Advanced Processor Build (APB): Incremental software-capability improvement on either 
existing or new product baselines. 
Backwards compatible: Hardware, technology refresh evolutions and software upgrades 
must be compatible with previous product baselines.  
Lifecycle sustainment plan: The ability to maintain the product from the time that the user 
receives it to the time the product is disposed of. 
Weapon efficiency: Weapon or torpedo efficiency is equivalent to torpedo effectiveness 
(Teff).   (This is not the weapon system’s effectiveness but only that of the torpedo itself.) 
Torpedo effectiveness (Teff) can be defined as the probability that all elements of the torpedo will 
work correctly after it is successfully launched and deployed in a manner that affords the 
torpedo an opportunity to detect a target that is acoustically and dynamically within the design 
capabilities of the torpedo.  For a 100% reliable torpedo, all the subsystems of the torpedo (i.e., 
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Inventory effectiveness: Inventory effectiveness is a gauge of how successful our 
inventory of torpedoes will be in eliminating a defined set of specific threat targets given precise 
operational scenarios.   The threat target would be a class of submarines with a defined, 
acoustic signature/dynamic operational capability, operating with or without countermeasures.  
The operational scenario would be defined as the ocean environment in which the threat targets 
would be operating (i.e., shallow water, high sea states, specific world locations, and under ice).  
Given that the defined threat and the operating scenario are known, the number of torpedoes 
needed to eliminate the set of target threats can be calculated via simulation exercises.  These 
exercises will give an indication of how effective our torpedo inventory is in eliminating the given 
threat under various environments.  Such exercises establish torpedo inventory requirements.  
As torpedoes become more effective (Teff), their ability to counter the enemy threat in all given 
conditions becomes greater, and the inventory levels required can be reduced with confidence. 
For weapons or products with long lifecycles such as torpedoes, evolutionary updates 
via incremental development, modular design updates, technology refreshes, technology 
insertions, and Advanced Processor Builds are all in play at the same time.  A wide-ranging and 
extensive set of requirements must be satisfied with a finite set of resources. The goal of 
keeping the weapon’s efficiency and inventory effectiveness at or above minimum specified 
levels while optimizing program resources makes program planning very challenging.  In this 
paper, we explore decision models for balancing these conflicting demands. 
Historical Background 
 
Figure 2. Torpedo Evolution 
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Since the Fleet introduction of the Torpedo MARK (Mk) 48 Modification (MOD) 4 in 
December 1980, the basic Torpedo Mk 48 has undergone several modifications.  The torpedo 
evolution is shown in Figure 2. The most recent upgrade to the Fleet Torpedo Mk 48 occurred in 
December of 2006 with introduction of the Torpedo Mk 48 Mod 7 version.   
In the ‘70s, the surprise emergence of a very fast and very deep-diving Soviet SSN 
(Alpha type) presented the US Navy a challenge.  The new threat speed exceeded the Doppler 
detection/tracking capabilities of the mostly analog-based Torpedo MK 48 Mod 3 electronics, 
and the postulated threat depth capability was beyond the Mod 3’s original design capability.  In 
response, the MK 48 Mod 4 Ordnance Alteration (ORDALT) was initiated in late 1979 to 
address these shortcomings, and the first MK 48 Mod 4 was provided to the Fleet in December 
1980.  The Torpedo Mk 48 Mod 4 was gradually replaced by the upgraded versions of the 
Torpedo Mk 48, and in March 2008, the last Torpedo Mk 48 Mod 4 was withdrawn from the last 
US Navy submarine.    
In parallel, the MK 48 Mod 5 Advanced Capability  (ADCAP) heavyweight torpedo was 
designed in the early 1980s as a modular weapon based on a state-of-the-art, multi-beam, low-
noise acoustic sensor array with very low self-noise.  To counter the emergence of Soviet high-
speed and deep-diving SSNs, the Mod 5 employed a modified MK 48 Mod 4 propulsion system 
that fully exploited the design margin in the engine and allowed operation at higher horsepower.   
The Mk 48 Mod 5 was introduced to the Fleet in August 1988.  
With the end of the Cold War came the reduction in the Soviet’s nuclear submarine fleet 
and the emerging growth of modern diesel-electric submarines; as a result, the US Navy began 
to give more serious attention to the development and proliferation of modern, very quiet, diesel-
electric and air-independent propulsion submarines and advanced torpedo countermeasures in 
Rest-of-World (ROW) countries. In contrast to the Cold War, when Soviet submarines operated 
primarily in open-ocean blue water, these ROW diesel-electric submarines operated primarily in 
shallow, coastal, littoral waters where the environment presented a different, and more 
significant, set of challenges for acoustic torpedoes.  
By the late 1990s, the concern that the next ASW operations might occur in the 
challenging brown water of the littorals against small, very quiet diesel-electric submarines 
prompted a review of the capabilities of US Navy torpedoes in shallow waters around the world. 
Testing confirmed that operation in the littoral presented problems to both the US submarine 
trying to detect and classify a threat and to the torpedo in effectively prosecuting an attack on 
that threat.   
To fulfill this need, the Mk 48 ADCAP Torpedo Propulsion Upgrade (TPU) and the MODs 
Programs were initiated.  This resulted in a program for the design of the Mk 48 Mod 6 torpedo.  
The MK 48 Mod 6 entered the Fleet in August 1997 at the Naval Submarine Base, New London, 
when USS Alexandria (SSN 757) loaded the first warshot MK 48 Mod 6 torpedoes. 
In 2001, a partial redesign of the guidance hardware of the torpedo was undertaken to 
resolve critical parts obsolescence issues.  In addition, the change incorporated component 
commonality with existing torpedoes for the guidance hardware.   These changes, along with all 
future torpedo changes, were defined and developed as part of a newly implemented Advanced 
Processor Build (APB) process for the MK 48 and MK 54 torpedo programs.  The APB process 
relied on rapid improvement in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) advancements and was 
instituted to more rapidly field improved performance by finding the best-of-the-best sonar-signal 
processing algorithms from industry, academia, and Navy researchers and applying them to 
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both lightweight and heavyweight torpedoes.  Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division, 
Newport took on the APB leadership role to evaluate and integrate improved software and 
hardware capabilities into the torpedo inventory.     
Although the Mk 48 Mod 6 upgrade addressed littoral operations, the fundamental 
challenge presented by these operations for active acoustic systems is the high levels of 
reverberation that often effectively mask low-target strength targets.  One approach that 
mitigates this reverberation masking is using a broadband acoustic system that can take 
advantage of various waveforms and frequency diversity to discriminate target returns from the 
background reverberation.  
In 1996, a concept-definition torpedo program was started in parallel with the Mk 48 Mod 
6 upgrade.  This torpedo configuration was referred to as the Torpedo Mk 48 Common 
Broadband Acoustic SONAR System (CBASS) and officially designated the Torpedo Mk 48 
Mod 7.  The CBASS program evolved as a result of concerns identified in reports that 
highlighted future vulnerabilities of US Navy torpedoes and noted that evolving threats will 
eventually reduce the effectiveness of the current torpedoes, Mk 48 Mod 5 and Mk 48 Mod 6.  
By employing a broadband sonar system and advanced broadband signal processing 
algorithms to enhance the detection and prosecution of threats, the Mk 48 Mod 7 program 
implemented the necessary hardware modifications and advanced software algorithms required 
to sustain undersea superiority well into the future.     
The Mk 48 Mod 7 program was a two-phased evolutionary APB acquisition program.  
Phase I provided the enabling hardware required to support Phase II software enhancements.   
Phase I built upon current capabilities and introduced several guidance and control (G&C) 
performance enhancements, including new beam sets, narrow-band frequency agility, 
frequency selection, and enhanced target rejection tests.   Phase I attained Initial Operating 
Capability (IOC) in FY06 with the preparation of four warshot Mk 48 Mod 7 torpedoes by a 
certified Fleet Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA).  Phase II will incrementally improve, via 
the structured Torpedo Modular Upgrade (TMU) process, the sonar characteristics of the Mk 48 
Mod 7 from a frequency-agile system to a fully coherent broadband system through three 
planned software APBs.     
In April 2003, the United States of America and the Commonwealth of Australia signed 
an Armaments Cooperative Program (ACP) agreement for Mk 48 Mod 7 engineering and 
manufacturing development, production, and in-service support.  Introduction of the Torpedo Mk 
48 Mod 7 had a profound effect upon the Torpedo Enterprise both from a performance 
perspective and from an inventory management perspective.  The overarching plan will convert 
the entire Mk 48 ADCAP inventory to the Mk 48 Mod 7 configuration through a cost-effective 
and controlled conversion program via an engineering change to the Mk 48 Mod 5, Mk 48 Mod 
6, and the Mk 48 Mod 6 Advanced Common Torpedo (ACOT).  The Mk 48 Mod 7 Full 
Operational Capability (FOC) is scheduled for FY11. 
The Torpedo Acquisition Process 
As noted in the historical background, torpedo evolution is a continuous process, which 
can be driven not only by a series of detailed, long-range plans but also by exigencies that 
emerge as the long-range plans are being implemented.  Torpedo evolution is typically 
incremental and evolutionary versus revolutionary in scope. 
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In response to shortfalls in undersea weapon capability, identified in the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), approved Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), CNO-
N87 together with PEO (SUB) and PMS 404 have initiated analysis to identify the best technical 
approach to deliver the capability identified in the ICD. A Capabilities Development Document 
(CDD) is currently being worked on to describe the approach for a material solution needed to 
deliver the capability required to meet the operational performance criteria specified in the ICD.  
With approval of the CDD, the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) will be able to initiate a 
development program.  
Through an examination of undersea weapon technology available in the current 
technology base, a phased technology integration approach through incremental development 
and technology insertion has been defined.  Technology from the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency and the Office of Naval Research will be assessed in terms of potential to 
improve weapon capability through technological advances in areas such as guidance and 
control processing, fiber connectivity, sonar signal and classification processing, sensing 
systems, processor systems, and hybrid propulsion systems. 
Technologies are grouped in bundles and aligned to each incremental phase based on 
compatibility with current and planned technology insertion baselines, technology maturity, and 
relevance to fielding the required capability as defined by the CDD.  Technologies identified for 
transition into system development and demonstration baselines are acquired using the Small 
Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program, competitive contracts with industry, University 
Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs), federally funded research and development centers such 
as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory, and through annual task 
negotiation with the Naval Undersea Warfare Center.  Material solutions to the capability needs 
defined in the ICD and further developed in the CDD follow the Torpedo Modular 
Upgrade/Advanced Processor Build (TMU/APB) process for transition in torpedo acquisition and 
delivery to the Fleet.     
At the completion of each incremental development phase, a Capability Production 
Document (CPD) will be developed to describe the actual performance of the undersea weapon 
system going into production.   The approved CPD becomes the basis for the MDA decision to 
begin production of hardware technology insertions and/or operational software.    
The current torpedo evolutionary acquisition process presents a number of challenges 
and benefits to torpedo program managers during each phase of the acquisition lifecycle.  
Although various torpedo programs may require increased or decreased emphasis on specific 
acquisition-lifecycle elements, Figure 3 and the narrative below provide a description of the 
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Figure 3. Acquisition Planning in the Torpedo Enterprise 
User needs are the prime driver of the evolutionary acquisition process.  From an 
operational perspective, user needs take the form of increased US Navy inventory requirements 
or the sale of torpedoes to other countries.  The user demand signal triggers a logistics 
assessment at the lowest modular level of procurement.  In the case of torpedoes, this is at the 
Functional Item Replacement, or FIR, level.  This FIR-by-FIR logistics assessment provides 
insights into the availability of the required material and provides answers to such questions as:  
1) Is there a surplus in current inventories to address the new user need?  If there is a 
surplus, user needs can be satisfied by issuing the material to the Fleet for 
installation via the associated torpedo IMAs. 
2) Are the needed items currently in production?   
3) Are there any real or potential obsolescence issues which must be addressed via 
technology refresh?  
4) Are there any near- or long-term program objectives or TIs planned that might impact 
the FIRs being considered for procurement?  Torpedo near- and long-term program 
objectives are assessed via a continuous six-year Capability Development Document 
(CDD) generation process.  The CDD forms the basis for formulation of a 
comprehensive Torpedo Technology Roadmap and subsequent focal point for a 
TMU/TI/APB program which addresses the full scope of future torpedo development 
and support initiatives.  Feedback from the CDD/TMU/TI/APB and obsolescence 
assessments will contribute to the decision to either reconstitute production of the 
items or to perhaps merge the new user needs with a larger CDD/TMU/TI/APB effort 
and blend in the added quantities with ongoing redesign initiatives for the needed 
FIRs. 
Once it is determined that the user needs can only be met by producing additional 
hardware, the information gathered relative to applicable obsolescence concerns and the 
CDD/TMU/TI status are used to determine if changes are needed to the affected FIR 
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requirements.  This assessment includes a review of reliability and availability factors to ensure 
that they are at acceptable levels before proceeding.  
If no changes are needed to the FIR requirements, applicable and existing FIR 
documentation (i.e., specifications and standards) is reviewed and updated, if necessary, so 
that it can be utilized in a build-to-drawing or build-to-specification contract.  The contract is 
awarded at the FIR level. An in-factory acceptance process and applicable performance-based 
lifecycle product support considerations are typically included in the contract. 
If changes are needed to the FIR requirements, the applicable specifications are 
updated along with any necessary reliability/availability enhancements.  The Defense 
Acquisition Management Framework is used as a guide to develop a set of specific acquisition-
lifecycle elements that must be completed as the new FIR design proceeds through the various 
gates of the acquisition process.  This process will vary with the scope of the FIR redesign being 
undertaken and will include at a minimum an analysis of alternatives, prototyping, Proof of 
Development (POD) and Proof of Manufacturing (POM) units, laboratory and in-water test and 
evaluation as well as modeling and simulation, if necessary.  Once the upgraded design has 
been demonstrated as acceptable, a production contract will be competitively placed and 
hardware will be delivered to the Fleet IMA, following successful factory acceptance testing. 
Torpedo software acquisition activities via the Torpedo APB program solicit inputs from 
the Science and Technology (S&T) community, including small businesses, as well as 
leveraging advancements from other undersea programs.  It evaluates and selects the most 
promising solutions using common development and evaluation tools prior to implementation. 
Types of APB improvements include Signal Processing Algorithm Enhancements and Weapon 
Control Improvements. The Torpedo APB process for software enhancements is based on the 
existing and proven Submarine Acoustic APB four-step process: 
1) Evaluation,  
2) Assessment,  
3) Implementation, and  
4) System Assessment.   
TMU/APB is embodied in three primary thrusts. First, obsolescence upgrades address 
production obsolescence and reduce total-ownership cost.  Upgrades are planned every two 
years to leverage the APB cycle. Second, Advanced Processor Builds focus on software 
product to improve performance through increased effectiveness.  Hardware compatibility is 
maintained within a technology insertion baseline. Third, hardware technology insertions are 
major hardware upgrades to enable further increase in torpedo effectiveness.  Hardware 
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and “Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development” 
(RDT&E) 






Maintain the Inventory 
Mod 6 
baseline     
• Sustainment 
   "severe" obsolescence 
   kit upgrade candidate 
• Reliability 
Mod 6 
ACOT     
• Sustainment 
• Reliability 




• TMU Program 
• CBASS FOC (APB 
Spiral 4) 
• Develop New s/w 
algorithms  
   (APB Spiral 5) 





   (APB Spiral 5) 
• Sustainment 
• Reliability 
• Maintenance s/w 
build 
Mod 8 
• TMU Program 
• CDD requirements 
• Develop new h/w 
solutions 
(APB Spiral 6)     
 
Table 1 applies to torpedo lifecycle phases and various configurations of the active 
torpedo inventory, as described in the previous section. The information in this table shows the 
current activities that are occurring in each phase. 
From the perspective of the “Technology Development” and “Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development” phases, the focus is on introduction of new capability.  Introduction 
of new capability is tied to user requirements and transitioning technology developed by the 
Office of Naval Research (ONR).  The CDD is currently being updated, and Tech Insertion 1 
(new array ~ MK48 Mod 8) is being defined.  The Enterprise is examining new CDD 
requirements and determining whether the existing capability of the MK48 Mod 7 CBASS can 
address any requirements gaps and whether the schedule for a new array is compatible.  If so, 
then funding associated with the new array (Tech Insertion 1) could be re-programmed.  From 
the software perspective, specific focus at this time is on delivery of an APB Spiral 4 software 
product, which provides the Full Operating Capability (FOC) for CBASS Mod 7.  APB Spiral 5 
software is currently being defined per the CDD.  
From the perspective of the “Production and Deployment” phase, the government buys 
to a performance specification (government-controlled baseline).  Also, the government awards 
annual production contracts and is prohibited from buying any material in advance of need (i.e., 
the torpedo program does not have multi-year procurement authority).  Obsolescence issues 
with the current, contractor-controlled hardware design are discovered at contract-award on an 
annual basis.  The extent of the obsolescence issues can result in reducing the quantity of kits 
procured.  Furthermore, changing the design can result in unplanned software builds, which can 
also affect the quantity of kits procured.  Reduction in kit quantity affects in-service supportability 
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planning, particularly for the oldest torpedo configuration being supported since this 
configuration is the candidate pool for upgrade hardware coming off the production line.  In 
addition, the Torpedo Enterprise is in the market-research phase of separating 
hardware/software interdependence via investment in Open-architecture solutions. Future 
upgrades in this area may necessitate changing the design and can result in further unplanned 
software builds. 
As seen in Figure 4, from the perspective of the “Operations and Sustainment” phase, 
there is a fixed budget year-to-year, and the Torpedo Enterprise has three configurations in the 
Fleet that they are required to maintain: MK48 Mod 6 baseline, MK48 Mod 6 ACOT, and MK48 
Mod 7 CBASS.   
 
Figure 4. Planned Torpedo Configurations per Fiscal Year 
 
The MK48 Mod 6 baseline configuration is faced with the most severe obsolescence 
impact and, therefore, the worst-case sustainment problem.  These torpedoes are the candidate 
upgrade torpedoes (i.e., they will receive the resulting new production torpedo kits).  The 
upgrade process creates spare parts for sustainment of the balance of the MK48 Mod 6 
baseline inventory.  Unexpected delays in receipt of production hardware for any reason mean 
that sustainment of this torpedo configuration is extended and is more costly than initially 
planned.  Typically, software upgrade builds are not associated with the MK48 Mod 6 baseline 
configuration.    
The MK48 Mod 6 ACOT configuration must be sustained since it comprises a large 
percentage of the inventory and will be in the inventory for many years. There may be high-
priority software problems, which require unplanned maintenance builds that are not part of the 
APB process.     
The MK48 Mod 7 CBASS configuration is just entering the “Sustainment” phase as 
CBASS units make their way from production to in-service.  The supportability strategy is still 
evolving. Currently, all MK48 Mod 6 ACOT and MK48 Mod 7 CBASS torpedoes are produced 
by the same prime contractor.  The Torpedo Enterprise FY09/10 procurement is competitive.  
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This could result in a different hardware baseline (the contractor controls the drawing baseline 
and the government controls the specification baseline).  It remains to be seen what types of 
unplanned sustainment problems we will encounter with MK48 Mod 7 CBASS over its lifecycle. 
Unplanned software builds for the MK48 Mod 6 ACOT or MK48 Mod 7 CBASS 
configurations divert resources from ongoing sustainment and reliability efforts, which are 
planned within the fixed budget.  
Planning in the Torpedo Enterprise 
In any given year, the program office has finite Research Development Test & 
Evaluation (RDT&E), Weapon Procurement, Navy (WPN), and Operations and Maintenance, 
Navy (OMN) budgets.  The decisions to be made on how to expend these budgets are 
challenging.  On a yearly basis, there is a torpedo production contract for some number of 
torpedo kits from the contractor.  This raises several questions that must be answered.  Is it 
possible to purchase the materials for the current design?  If not, how extensive is this 
obsolescence problem?  Is this just a matter of form, fit or functional replacement, or should 
effort be expended on the design of a new piece of hardware?  Since the torpedo does not fully 
conform to a modular open system approach (MOSA), the implications of designing a new piece 
of hardware to meet a production contract are numerous and potentially expensive since a new 
software build will need to be synchronized with the hardware design.  This will require careful 
planning as to where to introduce it into the program as well as resources to enable it to come to 
fruition.  Another budget consideration is in the area of RDT&E, with respect to evolutionary 
acquisition of hardware and software.  The Enterprise plans for technology insertions, and 
Advanced Processor Builds are in the forefront of the development community. 
Unlike many other programs, the Torpedo Enterprise is not currently procuring new all-
up-round torpedoes. At this time, FIRs are being procured to support upgrade of inventory 
quantities. The torpedo inventory is exercised in the Fleet, and torpedoes may become 
candidates for the upgrade pipeline based on budgets and “op-tempo” requirements.  The 
torpedo has a number of FIRs and several specialized cable interconnects. Most mechanical 
and some other subassemblies are available in sufficient quantity and are maintained during 
routine turnaround periods.  The persistent question is whether there are enough 
subassemblies on-hand to continue to keep up with current inventory requirements.  If 
production is to be re-initiated, how will this be done?  A decision to begin production of one or 
more FIRs is also an opportunity to consider upgrading other FIRs that may currently meet the 
needs but have not taken advantage of technological advances that could significantly increase 
capabilities.  
Other complications may be introduced if the strategic guidance points to the sale of the 
torpedo to a foreign ally, or if there is a requirement to increase US inventory.  A new torpedo 
variant may be produced with FIRS either off-the-shelf (existing designs), new (new production 
of an existing design) or newly designed.  In addition to this complex combination of 
requirements is the desire to shift business models and move from a sole-source contract with a 
major industry partner to a competitive, cost-plus contract with potentially multiple industry 
partners for single FIRs. 
Based on the challenges presented, it was decided that the Torpedo Enterprise would 
benefit from a decision model capable of balancing these conflicting demands while keeping the 
weapon’s efficiency and inventory effectiveness at or above minimum, specified levels. Typical 
scenarios and questions that face the decision-maker are listed below: 
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1. Given an incremental development strategy and a minimum system-effectiveness 
level, what budget do we need? Is it cost effective to maintain the current torpedo 
configurations? 
2. Given that we know we have to plan for obsolescence and maintain inventory, which 
component, in which year, and in what quantity should we replace? 
The system maintenance and upgrades are performed in cycles—each cycle focuses on 
technology insertions and refreshes for a set of components only.  As is the case in real-world 
situations, there are budget and time constraints that limit the number of components that can 
be selected for upgrade as part of any cycle.  The goal of the decision-maker is to identify the 
components for upgrade during each cycle, with the cycles being distributed over the lifetime of 
the system to ensure that some metric related to system performance is satisfied or maximized. 
3. In the phase of “Operations and Sustainment,” if an unplanned software build is 
required, what do we forgo in the area of reliability improvements and sustainment? 
If a downward trend in component reliability becomes apparent, what do we forgo in 
the area of software maintenance improvements and sustainment? Is unit quantity 
on the production contract impacted? 
4. How should we allocate budgets between design upgrades and sustainment to 
maintain inventory at a minimum effectiveness level? If we progress to a modular 
design in the near-term, what budget becomes available for sustainment? 
5. If we have fixed resource levels (other than budgets), what work can we accomplish 
given a minimum effectiveness requirement level? 
Resource Optimization Modeling 
A basic mathematical model for planning in the evolutionary acquisition process, as well 
as optimizing the budget required to maintain minimum system efficiency, is developed below.  
A single product efficiency maximizing model is first constructed.  Given that the product is 
assumed to consist of N components, let the efficiency of component i in period t be denoted by 
fit.  The overall efficiency of the product is, for now, assumed to be a linear product of the 
efficiencies of all the constituent efficiencies.  Thus, the efficiency in period t is: 
∏= N
i
itt fS  (1) 
Various definitions of efficiency and effectiveness can be used to obtain a measure like 
Equation 1.  For example, one definition of efficiency is the competence in performance 
(Blanchard, 2003).  With this definition, the efficiency of each component can be referenced 
against the current capability of an opposing technology threat.  Thus, a typical torpedo 
component such as an IMU, which is capable of maintaining a specified precision that met the 
needs at design-time, may be considered to have a lower efficiency when placed in operation 
against a newly developed, opposing technology threat that requires greater precision to 
neutralize.  Another definition of efficiency is the accomplishment of or the ability to accomplish 
a job with a minimum expenditure of time and effort—if the existing range and endurance of the 
weapon is not capable of meeting current threats under all conditions, this can be captured by a 
degraded performance/efficiency metric.  A related concept that can be applied instead is that of 
effectiveness.  Effectiveness is usually defined as the adequacy in accomplishing a purpose 
(Fabrycky & Blanchard, 1991). 
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If Bt is the budget available for upgrading the product in period t, a mathematical 
formulation for determining the optimal upgrade strategy for maximizing the minimum efficiency 
required can be constructed.  For this, let the value of binary variable Xit determine whether or 
not a component is upgraded in period t. The formulation follows: 
 
Maximize Minimize System Effectiveness = Z      
              (2) 
 
 subject to: 
 











=1  (6) 
 
0}1,0{ ≥∈ tit SX  (7) 
 
In this model, the objective function represents the minimim efficiency attained by the 
product over the planning horizon.  This minimum obtains its value from Equation 3, where SEt 
is the efficiency of the product in period t.  Inequalities (Equation 4) compute the efficiency of the 
torpedo in each period as the product of efficiencies of the constituent components.  Equation 5 
sets the efficiency of a component by either degrading the efficiency of the same component in 
the previous period by a discount factor (assumed constant here) or, if the component has been 
renewed, the efficiency is set to 1.    In Equation 6, the cost expended in each period is 
maintained within the budget for the period—in this case, this is assumed to be the same 
throughout.  Finally, the binary variables and system-efficiency variables are appropriately 
designated in Equation 7.   
As formulated above, this model is non-linear; however, it can be log-linearized.  Using a 
log-linearized version, a hypothetical scenario is illustrated using parameters from Table 2.  
Table 2. Parameters for a Log-linearized Version Model 
 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Replacement Cost 
(x1000) $100 $50 $120 $50 $75 $120 
Degradation 
Factor/yr 0.95 0.98 0.92 0.99 0.875 0.92 
 
Table 2 shows the replacement cost of a component and the degradation factors that 
are applied to the component on an annual basis.  Thus, if component 5 is not replaced for 
three years, its effective degradation factor is (0.875)3 = 0.67, and if all components other than 
component 5 are renewed annually, the system efficiency in period 3 would be 0.67 as well.  
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Using this data, the optimal solutions for a 10-year horizon, obtained using the formulations 
given in Equations 2-7 and a continuous replacement budget of $250,000 per year, are shown 
in Table 3. 
Table 3. Optimal Solutions for a 10-year Horizon  




1 2 3 4 5 6 
Expenditure System Effectiveness 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 515 1.00 
2   1   1 240 0.81 
3 1 1   1  225 0.83 
4   1   1 240 0.79 
5 1 1   1  225 0.81 
6   1   1 240 0.77 
7 1   1 1  225 0.81 
8  1   1 1 245 0.80 
9   1 1 1  245 0.81 
10  1   1 1 245 0.78 
 
The minimum system efficiency attained over the planning horizon is 0.77 in year 6. The 
model above is a highly simplified version of what occurs in reality.  Practical matters that 
require inclusion in any “real” solution should include a more realistic deterioration factor.  The 
formula used here is an exponential representation that assumes a constant deterioration rate, 
regardless of the state of the system.  In practice, the deterioration functions are substantially 
more complicated.  For mechanical components, the deterioration changes with the age of the 
part in a non-linear manner.  Some electronics components fail at a higher-than-normal rate 
during an initial “burn-in” period but subsequently stabilize and are then subject to “random” 
failures.   
Returning to the operational questions posed in the previous section, the model 
presented above can be restructured to provide answers as detailed below. 
1. Given an incremental development strategy and a minimum system-effectiveness 
level, what budget do we need? Is it cost effective to maintain the current torpedo 
configurations? 
 
This question is immediately addressed by altering the basic model configuration of 
Equations 2-7 in the following manner.  The objective is reconfigured as a cost function, say, 
 =
=











and the system effectiveness for each period is constrained to meet a minimum 
requirement, η.  This gives the efficiency constraints as: 
 
tSt ∀≤η  (8) 
 
The budget for each period is then included as a decision variable, and constraints (6) 
are dropped from the formulation. 
 
Using the data from Table 3, if a minimum system effectiveness of 0.75 is required for 
any given year, the upgrade strategy and minimum budgets necessary for meeting this 
requirement, computed using the modified model, are calculated as shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Upgrade Strategy and Minimum Budget Requirements 
 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Budget $ 
(X1000) 515 75 295 240 220 295 220 175 195 195 
Component 
Upgrades All 5 1,3,5 3,6 2,4,6 1,5,6 2,3,4 1,5 5,6 3,5 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the budget requirements for the entire planning horizon (10 years) as a 




Figure 5. Budget Requirements as a Function of System Effectiveness 
 
 
2. Given that we know we have to plan for obsolescence and maintain inventory, which 
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Given the long lifecycle of torpedoes and the emphasis on the use of COTS 
components, the issue of obsolescence can occur frequently.  Based on the analysis by Porter 
(1998), obsolescence can be addressed in several ways, as shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Obsolescence in COTS Components 
OBSOLESCENCE SOLUTION APPLIES TO (COMPONENTS) COST 
By selecting interchangeable replacement component All  Minimal 
Selecting alternate sources for components (which 
can require recertification) All Low/Medium
Use of alternate "upscalable" components found to 
be suitable based on screening to meet or exceed 
performance requirements 
Electronic Low 
Part emulation, using newer-technology components 
that are packaged in the same form factor as the 




Use of a 3rd-party source to hold the manufacturing 
plans for the component at a future point in time 
Electronic, 
Mechanical Medium 
Use of newer fabrication techniques  for replacement 
of either a component or a component group Electronic Medium 
Last-time buy of components All Medium 
Line Unit Redesign (LRU) All High 
 
In most cases, there is some advance notification of obsolescence.  As shown in Table 
6, the cost of mitigating obsolescence can vary, and, as it becomes clear that lower-cost 
solutions are not available, valuable budget- and effort-resources must be diverted from other 
activities in a timely manner for this purpose.  The problem of planning resource expenditures to 
meet obsolescence has been previously considered in Brown, Lu, and Wolfson (1994),  
Rajagopalan (1992), Rajagopalan, Singh, and Morton (1998, January), and Singh and 
Sandborn (2006, April-June).  In Brown et al. (1994), the obsolescence of a single item is 
evaluated under the assumption that obsolescence can occur unpredictably in future periods.  
Rajagopalan et al (1998) considers a planning model that determines how much capacity in 
current technology must be procured, assuming that deterioration and breakthroughs are 
uncertain—but distributionally known—for future periods.   
This model can accommodate future obsolescence by adjusting the component 
efficiency appropriately.  In particular, the parameters f(i) can be replaced by f(i,t), and a change 
can be forced in period t by setting f(i,t) to 1 for the appropriate period.  
3. In the phase of “Operations and Sustainment,” if an unplanned software build 
becomes required, what do we sacrifice in the area of reliability improvements and 
sustainment? If a downward trend in component reliability becomes apparent, what 
do we sacrifice in the area of software maintenance improvements and sustainment? 
Is unit quantity on the production contract impacted? 
 
A downward trend in component reliability may be tolerable in the short–term, if the 
overall system efficiency is not reduced below acceptable levels.  Again, this can be 
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accommodated with the model above by adding constraints on efficiency, ηt ,as shown in 
Equation 9. 
 
tSt ∀≥ η  
 (9) 
 
The objective function in this case can directly address the budget instead of targeting 
the minimum system efficiency.    
 
As an example, if the drop in the efficiency rate of component 1 is assumed to be as 
shown in Figure 6, then the replacements recommended by solving the model and the budget 









Table 6. Upgrade Strategy and Budget Requirements Related  
to a Drop in the Efficiency of Component 1 
 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Budget $ 
(X1000) 515 75 340 125 245 220 275 295 220 225 
Component 
Upgrades All 5 1,3,6 4,5 2,3,5 1,6 1,2,4,5 1,5,6 1,3 1,2,6
System 
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4. How should we allocate budgets between design upgrades and sustainment to 
maintain inventory at a minimum effectiveness level? 
 
Addressing budgets between design upgrades and sustainment to maintain inventory 
requires expansion of the model to include either/or choices for upgrades.  This can be 
accommodated by adding binary choice variables and bringing these into the budget 
calculations appropriately.  As an example, if there are several choices for upgrades (A1, A2, A3, 
etc.) and the corresponding budgets for these are (B1, B2, B3,etc.), then the choice can be 
enforced by imposing 
 
1...321 ≤++ AAA  (10) 
 
and the exact budget restriction is obtained by  
 
....332211 availablebudgetTotalABABAB ≤++  (11) 
 
5. If we have fixed resource levels (other than budgets), what work can we accomplish 
given a minimum effectiveness level? 
 
The answer to this can be derived from the model by including additional constraints, 






















where Bm is the limit of resource type m available. 
 
Multiple-product Evolutionary Design 
Figure 7 illustrates a time-compressed representation of typical ongoing activities in 
progress in the Torpedo Enterprise.  Three major acquisition projects, in different stages of 
realization, are shown simultaneously.  In reality, the number of projects in play at the same 








Figure 7. Multiple Cycles of the Torpedo Enterprise 
As mentioned in the historical overview, as a result of emergent threats and technology 
upgrades, several designs of the torpedo are in service in the Fleet at any given point in time.  
In addition, because overall torpedo inventories are fixed, the upgrade process involves 
coordination of Fleet exercises, depot workloads, transportation times between locations, 
spares’ availability and several resource considerations.  Based on the depiction in Figure 7, the 
planning task involves determining not only the levels of effectiveness obtained by upgrading 
existing inventory, but also the scheduling of different design and maintenance activities over an 
extended-time horizon.   Models 2-7 can be extended to include these considerations, but the 
resultant model is a large, mixed-integer programming formulation. Although this model has 
been solved for test cases using commercial mathematical-programming software, the solution 
times are considerable, and work on improving the solution efficiency is ongoing. 
Conclusion 
Planning in the Torpedo Enterprise is difficult because of various unique constraints.  
One of these is that the Torpedo Enterprise has not been procuring new torpedoes for the past 
two decades.  New upgrades are introduced into the Fleet by taking existing inventory offline 
and updating specific hardware and software components.  As discussed in the historical 
background section, changes in threats and new technology opportunities have resulted in 
multiple torpedo configurations concurrently in the Fleet. This compounds the planning problem. 
When budget decisions have to be made, torpedo effectiveness, inventory effectiveness, 
software capability upgrades, and technology insertions and refreshes must all be taken into 
consideration.  To assist the decision-makers, a mathematical model has been developed that 
enables satisfaction of system-effectiveness requirements while meeting budgetary and 
programmatic constraints.  This model is a linear, mixed-integer model, and it can be solved for 
problem sizes matching those corresponding to the decisions typically encountered in the 
torpedo domain within reasonable computation time.  This model can be extended to answer 
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typical programmatic questions such as the budget required to meet prescribed levels of system 
effectiveness, planned obsolescence upgrades, and tradeoff decisions between software 
upgrades, reliability improvements, or sustainment planning.  The use of this model for multiple-
project planning with several resource types is also presented.  Program management, using 
the DODI 5000.02-prescribed framework (DoD, 2008, December 8), may reduce some 
uncertainties in resource utilization, but it does not eliminate them.  The uncertainty remnants 
include reliability failures, resource reduction, component obsolescence, technology upgrades, 
and threat changes.  The task of managing multiple projects and optimizing project resources 
remains a complicated endeavor. 
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Panel 20 - Acquisition Program and Policy Analysis 
 
Thursday, 
May 14, 2009 
Panel 20 - Acquisition Program and Policy Analysis 
3:30 p.m. – 
5:00 p.m. 
Chair: Dr. Douglas A. Brook, Director, Center for Defense Management 
Research, Naval Postgraduate School; former Acting Under Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller) 
Examining the Institutional Factors Affecting Cost Growth in Defense 
Acquisition: Additional Insights May Yield More Effective Policy 
Interventions 
Phil Candreva, Naval Postgraduate School 
An Assessment of DOD's Acquisition Outcomes, Initiatives for Change, 
and Future Challenges 
Michael Sullivan, Government Accountability Office 
When Instructions Provide Too Much Flexibility, Establish Rules 
J. David Patterson, University of Tennessee 
 
 
Chair: Douglas A. Brook, PhD, teaches and researches large-scale issues of budgeting and 
management in the Navy and DoD. He is interested in the management agendas of Navy and DoD 
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The US Defense Department suffers from persistent, but not certain, cost growth within 
major acquisition programs. Over the past few decades, scores of empirical studies have 
examined the causes and consequences of cost growth and have shed light on characteristics 
of programs that fail to meet cost-performance goals. They have looked at factors such as the 
size of the program, its phase in the development cycle, the type of weapon being purchased 
and organizational structure. Other studies have taken a more qualitative view and have 
considered the interplay of actions within a program office and between a program office and its 
environment. Both types of studies have provided countless recommendations to fix defense 
acquisition. Yet, problems persist.   
The question motivating the present study is: given the materiality of the problem 
(hundreds of billions of dollars), the number of times it has been studied, the attention of the 
highest levels of government, and numerous attempts to reform acquisition, why does the 
problem persist? What have the studies and policy prescriptions missed? 
Two recent and important deviations from the norm of past studies focused less on the 
acquisition program and more on the decisions made by officials about the program. This paper 
was motivated by those studies and was further informed by various literatures, including 
behavioral finance, group decision-making psychology, and organizational failure. First, cost 
growth is a matter of financial behavior—allocations are made; funds are applied to particular 
objects of expense based upon estimates; new information becomes available and reallocations 
occur; additional funds are requested on a regularly recurring annual cycle. There are well-
known biases in financial behavior derived in other contexts that may exist in defense 
acquisition.  Second, some of those decisions are made by individuals, but many are group 
decisions.  Fully informed, rational decisions may not be possible in the defense acquisition 
context because of political considerations, information limitations, limitations on information-
processing capabilities, mental models and heuristics, the experience of participants, and other 
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factors. Third, there is a growing literature on the causes of organizational failure, and by most 
definitions, persistent cost growth is an example of such failure. Many of those studies cite 
sociological and cultural factors as causes. It is apparent that a sociological approach, rather 
than an economic or systems engineering approach, has the promise to provide fresh insights 
into an old problem. 
This paper makes the case for the application of a framework taken from the worlds of 
political science and sociology to gain a better understanding of the problem of cost growth. The 
Institutional Analysis and Diagnosis (IAD) framework has been used to study the dynamics of 
complex decision-making processes involving collective resources. Those situations are similar 
to the resource-allocation processes in the DoD. The framework is focused on “action arenas” 
composed of actors who decide from among diverse actions based upon the role they play, their 
individual preferences, the information they possess, and the expected payoffs from potential 
outcomes.  These action arenas are not situated in a sterile context. They are affected by the 
attributes of the environment, attributes of the communities within which the actors identify, 
rules, and institutional norms. Within the action area, patterns of interaction result in outcomes 
that can be evaluated based on some criteria. 
While the DoD has codified processes that dictate how the PPBE process chooses 
programs and funds them and how acquisition programs operate, those rules are augmented 
and contravened by institutional norms. Changes to rules face cultural obstacles. A GAO Report 
(GAO-09-295R, 2009, February 27) commented on recently proposed reforms, “Our 
discussions with acquisition experts indicate that these changes may not achieve the desired 
improvement in acquisition outcomes unless they are accompanied by changes in the overall 
acquisition environment, its culture, and the incentives provided for success.” The effect of 
culture on acquisition program performance is acknowledged, but it is not well understood. 
Given a better understanding, decision-makers can design more effective policy interventions. 
Toward that end, this paper illustrates the application of the IAD framework to defense 
acquisition. The data set is a collection of studies of defense acquisition cost growth from 
government organizations, academics, and think tanks. Using a software tool, the content of 
those reports is analyzed according to the IAD framework. 
The report then proposes a stream of research using the IAD framework—in conjunction 
with theories of behavior finance, group decision-making, and organizational failure—to improve 
our understanding of the dynamics and factors that result in cost growth. This framework has 
been successfully employed in other contexts to perform both qualitative field research and 
laboratory experimentation. Thus, the report proposes a mutually supportive set of studies that 
combine the realism of field studies with the ability to rigorously test hypotheses through models 
in computational and laboratory experiments.  
By studying institutional variables that have not previously been considered, we may 
gain fresh insights on the problem. Those insights will provide an understanding of how and why 
various policy prescriptions may or may not result in better outcomes. By considering and 
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Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected 
Weapon Programs 
Presenter: Michael J. Sullivan 
Why GAO Did This Study1 
This is the GAO’s seventh annual assessment of selected Department of Defense (DoD) 
weapon programs. The report examines how well the DoD is planning and executing its weapon 
acquisition programs, an area that has been on the GAO’s high-risk list since 1990.  
This year’s report is in response to the mandate in the joint explanatory statement to the 
Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009. The 
report includes (1) an analysis of the overall performance of the DoD’s 2008 portfolio of 96 
major defense acquisition programs and a comparison to the portfolio performance at two other 
points in time—5 years ago and 1 year ago; (2) an analysis of current cost and schedule 
outcomes and knowledge attained by key junctures in the acquisition process for a subset of 47 
weapon programs—primarily in development—from the 2008 portfolio; (3) data on other factors 
that could impact program stability; and (4) an update on changes in the DoD’s acquisition 
policies. To conduct our assessment, the GAO analyzed cost, schedule, and quantity data from 
the DoD’s Selected Acquisition Reports for the programs in the DoD’s 2003, 2007, and 2008 
portfolios. The GAO also collected data from program offices on technology, design, and 
manufacturing knowledge, as well as on other factors that might affect program stability. GAO 
analyzed this data and compiled one- or two-page assessments of 67 weapon programs.  
What GAO Found 
Since 2003, the DoD’s portfolio of major defense acquisition programs has grown from 
77 to 96 programs, and its investment in those programs has grown from $1.2 trillion to $1.6 
trillion (fiscal year 2009 dollars). The cumulative cost growth for the DoD’s programs is higher 
than it was 5 years ago, but at $296 billion, it is less than last year when adjusted for inflation. 
For 2008 programs, research and development costs are now 42% higher than originally 
estimated, and the average delay in delivering initial capabilities has increased to 22 months. 
The DoD’s performance in some of these areas is driven by older programs, as newer 
programs, on average, have not shown the same degree of cost and schedule growth.  
                                                
1 Previously published as GAO-09-326SP, March 2009. 
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Figure 1. Analysis of DoD Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolios  
(Fiscal Year 2009 Dollars) 
 
(GAO analysis of DoD data) 
a
Last year, the GAO reported total acquisition cost growth for the fiscal year 2007 portfolio was $295 
billion in fiscal year 2008 dollars. This figure is now expressed in fiscal year 2009 dollars.  
For 47 programs the GAO assessed in-depth, the amount of knowledge that programs 
attained by key decision points has increased in recent years; but most programs still proceed 
with far less technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge than best practices suggest and 
face a higher risk of cost increases and schedule delays. Early system engineering, stable 
requirements, and disciplined software management were also important, as programs that 
exhibited these characteristics experienced less cost growth and shorter schedule delays on 
average. Program execution could be hindered by workforce challenges. A majority of the 
programs the GAO assessed were unable to fill all authorized program office positions, resulting 
in increased workloads, a reliance on support contractors, and less personnel to conduct 
oversight.  
In December 2008, the DoD revised its policy for major defense acquisition programs to 
place more emphasis on acquiring knowledge about requirements, technology, and design 
before programs start and on maintaining discipline once they begin. The policy recommends 
holding early systems engineering reviews; includes a requirement for early prototyping; and 
establishes review boards to monitor requirements changes—all positive steps. Some programs 
we assessed have begun implementing these changes. 
 
 
Portfolio status  
Fiscal year 2003 
portfolio 
Fiscal year 2007 
portfolio 
Fiscal year 2008 
portfolio 
Number of programs  77 95 96 
Total planned 
commitments  $1.2 trillion $1.6 trillion $1.6 trillion 
Commitments 
outstanding  $724 billion $875 billion $786 billion 
Change to total 
research and 
development costs 
from first estimate  37 percent 40 percent 42 percent 
Change in total 
acquisition cost from 
first estimate 19 percent 26 percent 25 percent 
Estimated total 
acquisition cost 
growth  $183 billion $301 billion
a
 $296 billion 
Share of programs 
with 25 percent or 
more increase in 
program acquisition 
unit cost  41 percent 44 percent 42 percent 
Average delay in 
delivering initial 
capabilities   18 months 21 months 22 months 
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More than three years have passed since the Defense Acquisition Performance 
Assessment (DAPA) project was completed and the results briefed to the study’s sponsor, the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense.  In that time, the Department of Defense has issued its fourteenth 
major change to the Department’s Acquisition System management guidance. Combined with a 
shortfall of experienced and skilled acquisition business professionals, the result is a pervasive 
and troubling level of uncertainty and unpredictability regarding defense acquisition programs.   
The resulting Acquisition System including Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution 
(PPBE), Requirements and the little “a” Acquisition process lacks structure and discipline.  What 
follows is persistent failures to meet cost, schedule and performance objectives.  This paper 
presents a case for a mandatory set of Acquisition System rules to address this problem.  
Though by no means exhaustive, the recommended rules fit categories in the acquisition 
process, the requirements process and the PPBE process -- referred to here simply as the 
“Budget Rules.”  The premise of this paper is that the right mandatory set of rules applied to 
Major Defense Acquisition Programs would result in weapon systems and equipment critical to 
warfighter success being fielded more rapidly on cost, on schedule and performing as expected. 
Introduction 
More than three years have passed since the Defense Acquisition Performance 
Assessment (DAPA) project chaired by Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, USAF (Ret.) was 
completed in November 2006 and the results briefed to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the 
study’s sponsor.  Since that time, there have been several more attempts to describe the root 
cause of the flaws in the Department’s Acquisition System.  Most studies cover the same 
ground plowed by the DAPA project and previous studies, dating back to the 1985 Packard 
Commission Report.  Despite these numerous evaluations of the Defense Acquisition System, 
none have advanced the discourse beyond what has been clear from the beginning.  There is a 
fundamental lack of a budget process and requirements discipline that leads inexorably to 
programs that are over cost, behind schedule and not performing.  Additionally, there is one 
factor that is common to serious analyses of the Department of Defense (DoD) Acquisition 
System.   
The general discussion of reforming the Acquisition System with its many subsystems, 
procedures, and methodologies reveals that there is a basic failure to drive predictability 
regarding what the DoD can expect as a product (fielded weapon system) emerging from its 
acquisition process.  In fact there is seldom any effort to make “predictable outcome” a program 
management priority.  All program managers try to stay within budget or cost limits, meet 
schedule guidelines, and produce a weapon system or piece of equipment that performs to the 
level of stated requirements.  But, is there any real certainty that the program manager’s efforts, 
no matter how diligent, or adherence to the acquisition process will produce the desired result?  
The case presented here would answer, no.  The DAPA study raised the issue of the 
government’s inability to predict cost, schedule, and performance as a self-induced symptom of 
“instability” (Kadish, 2006, January).  It is that instability in acquisition programs that defeats 
efforts to meet cost, schedule, and performance objectives.  
The Problem Explained 
Recent analyses of the troubles experienced in the DoD acquisition of weapons systems 
identify instability as a significant factor in program cost growth.  A 2008 RAND Corporation 
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study on cost growth of fixed-wing military aircraft identified the “practice of rotating officers 
through jobs every three to four years” as creating an unstable program management workforce 
(Arena, Younossi, Brancato, Blickstein & Grammich, 2008).  This results in a management 
situation where experience gained in solving management problems is not effectively used over 
the term of the program and not available to those entering new to the program.  The Aerospace 
Industries Association, in its November 2008 Special Report, U.S. Defense Acquisition: An 
Agenda for Positive Reform, raised instability as an area where the Defense Department should 
focus management attention.  
Two elements combine to create instability in the acquisition of weapon systems.  First, 
there seems to be no lasting agreement on what should be the DoD Acquisition System policy 
directions.  Since Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard issued the first DoD Directive 5000.1 in 
1971, the regulations documents have been revised significantly about every three years: 14 
times in 38 years.  As Charles Cochrane (2009, January 1) so masterfully revealed in his 
presentation Acquisition Management System from 1971 to 2008, the DoD 5000 series 
documents have provided direction varying from 8 pages to 840 pages of recommendations, 
suggestions, regulations, policy, procedures and definitions.  No single Acquisition System 
approach has survived for more than five years, while the length of time for Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs to reach full operational capability is generally three times this Acquisition 
System regulation change cycle.  For the purposes of this paper, reference to the most recent 
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02 (2008, December 8) shown in Figure 1,1 will be 
used. 
Figure 1. Defense Acquisition Management System 
(used to identify where rules described later in the paper will apply) 
Second, while the acquisition playing field is persistently changing, the workforce 
challenged with making the system successful has been reduced in numbers and experience.  
In the past, even though there were frequent modifications to the 5000 series Department 
guidance, there was also a cadre of experienced acquisition executives in the career ranks that 
could adjust with a modicum of disruption. The United States Senate and House Armed 
                                                
1 Adapted for use in this paper from the graphic presented on page 12 of the DoDI 5000.02. 
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Services Committees, in their respective committee reports supporting the FY 2008 National 
Defense Authorization Act, were very concerned that the numbers, years of experience and skill 
levels of the professional acquisition workforce had reached unacceptably low levels (US 
Congress, 2008).  Particularly troublesome was the major reduction in the acquisition workforce 
within the Department of Defense during the 1990s, the workforce on whom the Department 
counted to make sense of the constantly changing 5000 series Department guidance. 
However well-intentioned and necessary the Department’s changes to the 5000 series 
guidelines were thought to be, the consequence was instability in acquisition programs—an 
unfortunate result of a purposeful action by department management.  Instability drives 
uncertainty, creating an Acquisition System environment where the program outcome is 
unpredictable.  When the program outcome is unpredictable, program risk is increased.  There 
is a corresponding drive to reduce risk by increasing the cost as a premium or hedge against 
uncertainty.  When the workforce does not have the experience to deal with program risk, 
because every program event is being seen for the first time, there is very little chance of 
maintaining cost, schedule and performance.  The underpinning experience necessary to work 
through a “tried-and-true” process does not exist.   
These circumstances hold true for the Acquisition System as a whole, not just for the 
acquisition process—or little “a” (SECDEF, 2007, July) as it is generally understood within the 
acquisition community.  The distinction between little “a” and big “A” is best summarized with the 
diagram in Figure 2.  Program instability is reflective of a systemic problem inherent in the big 
“A” versus simply fixing a process problem in the little “a.”  The mythology that attends the Venn 
diagram with the intersecting circles is that there is integration among the elements of the 
Acquisition System.  The implication is that each of the elements contributes to and gains from 
being associated with the others.  The intended result is a successful program defined by being 
on cost and on schedule and performing as expected.  The reality is more accurately 
represented by Figure 3,2 in which the three elements exist independently of one another by 
virtue of the fact that changing regulations and vague Acquisition System direction combined 










                                                
2  Both Figures 2 and 3 are adaptations of figures used in the DAPA Report, p. 4. 
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Figure 2. The Acquisition System 
(This includes the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting and Execution process and the 
Requirements process in addition to the 
little “a” Acquisition process.) 
Figure 3. The Acquisition System 
(In reality, the System is not cohesive, but 
more often three independent processes 
creating program instability resulting in 
cost increases schedule slips and 
uncertain performance.) 
 
What results from the combination of changing acquisition regulations and a workforce 
that does not have a high enough number of acquisition professionals or the experience of 
seeing and working through a variety of program issues, is an inability to anticipate and prevent 
situations that put programs in jeopardy of failing the cost, schedule and performance 
standards.  The DAPA study found that unstable programs did have a workforce component 
that contributed to the instability, and though there was also recognition during the subject-
matter expert briefings that changing regulations and guidance might be troublesome in 
establishing stable programs, the combination of these two factors was not made prominent in 
the final report.  Numerous studies have recommended solutions to the shortcomings of the 
Acquisition System, but for the most part, these fixes focus on the little “a” acquisition process, 
not on the larger systemic issues.   
A focus on the acquisition process (“a”) fails to address the larger contextual issue of the 
system-driven program instability.  Mandating a rule set is necessary to establish discipline and 
structure.  “Following the rules” helps to create an acquisition program where uncertainty and 
the resulting program instability are reduced.  The need for acquisition program discipline was 
emphasized by Dr. Ashton Carter, newly confirmed Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics.  Quoted in DefenseNews.com from his written testimony presented 
at his confirmation hearing, Dr. Carter made clear his position: “Development, procurement and 
sustainment of major weapon systems require experience with the Department of Defense and 
the defense industry, systems engineering at every stage and iron discipline” (Bennett, 2009, 
March 26). 
The following are a set of rules for defense acquisition programs that resulted from the 
DAPA panel discussions, interviews, and subject-matter expert surveys conducted during the 
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DAPA project.  This paper diverges from the DAPA project in that what the 2006 study 
presented as “recommendations” for consideration by the Department of Defense are offered 
here as “rules” to be followed.  Additionally, the DAPA recommendations focused on six 
categories affecting the Acquisition System: organization, industry, workforce, requirements, 
budget and acquisition.  However, only the last three categories are addressed in this paper as 
particularly appropriate for establishing rules to abide by for the acquisition of defense weapon 
systems.  The list of rules is by no means exhaustive, but, rather, the list is intended to establish 
a foundation upon which additional rules may be considered, developed and applied.  Rules that 
all the participants in the Acquisition System play by and are accountable to adds a level of 
transparency and predictability that can provide for stable programs. 
Requirements Rules 
For the purposes of this paper, two basic types of requirements are considered: 
customer requirements and derived requirements.  Customer requirements are very 
straightforward and defined at the macro-level by approved Key Performance Parameters 
(KPPs)3 and non-Key Performance Parameters.4 Derived requirements, on the other hand, are 
requirements that the customer has not specified directly as a requirement but that emerge or 
derive from the design decisions that are made (Brooksby, 2003).5   
                                                
3 “Those attributes or characteristics of a system that are considered critical or essential to the 
development of an effective military capability and those attributes that make a significant contribution to 
the characteristics of the future joint force as defined in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. KPPs 
must be testable to enable feedback from test and evaluation efforts to the requirements process. KPPs 
are validated by the Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC) for JROC Interest documents, and by 
the DOD component for Joint Integration, Joint Information, or Independent documents. Capability 
development and capability production document KPPs are included verbatim in the acquisition program 
baseline” (CJCS, 2007, May 1).  Occasionally, (some would say all too often) KPPs cannot be achieved 
with the level of technology existing now or in the foreseeable future.  Approval of this category of KPP 
suffers from collective bad judgment, and no rule set will be a remedy.  Consequently, this article does 
not address the development of this type of requirement. 
4 Non-Key Performance Parameters are requirements that are desired by the customer but not deemed 
critical or essential. Often, these requirements represent the trade-space in programs when budget 
constraints or program execution problems demand a de-scoping of the program. 
5 Though this reference defines requirements as they apply to software development, the relevance to 
weapons system program development generally is very compelling and appropriate and, therefore, is 
used here. 
Derived requirements are not capabilities that the customer specifically has identified.  
Particularly troublesome is a subset of derived requirements that fall into the category of 
engineering changes—those changes that improve on “good enough” and that have a combined 
effect of driving up costs and missing schedule milestones.  In the absence of rules that prevent 
pursuing this type of engineering change as a derived requirement, the guiding thought process 
follows this logic: “because we can, we should; because we should, we must; and because we 
must, we will no matter how much it costs or how long it takes.”  According to a recent Under 
Secretary of Defense, Comptroller study, prepared by Monitor Company Group, L.P. and based 
on Selected Acquisition report data, engineering changes account for approximately 33% of the 
nearly $265 billion in program cost growth from 2000 to 2007 (Monitor, 2007).  No doubt, some 
of the engineering changes were to correct design problems.  However, the engineering 
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changes that simply improve on an otherwise sufficient, specification-compliant design while 
driving up costs and impacting schedule need to be reduced or eliminated. 
As a result, what follows are recommended rules with appropriate rationale that should 
apply when considering the addition of both new customer requirements and derived 
requirements. 
Requirements Rule One: Weapon system requirements will be fixed prior to Engineering 
and Manufacturing Development (EMD) or achieving Milestone B phase (see Figure 1 on page 
4). 
The prohibition of additional system requirements beyond the KPPs and the specific 
capabilities that contribute directly to them after approval for the EMD phase at Milestone B 
helps to ensure that Initial Operating Capability (IOC) will be met.  Fielding weapon systems on 
schedule simply must be a program priority.  By allowing requirements to be adopted beyond 
those identified prior to EMD,  ensures that IOC will be slipped and the weapon system will not 
be fielded on schedule. 
Requirements Rule Two: From the start of EMD (Milestone B, program initiation) to IOC, 
only safety-of-flight or other safety-related engineering changes will be allowed.  The only 
exceptions are those design changes that can be proven to produce a three-to-one savings to 
investment while not missing schedule. 
This rule addresses the insidious nature of an ever-growing number of engineering 
changes that routinely skulk their way into systems development.  Additionally, the rule provides 
a potential for incentives that produce beneficial engineering changes and cost savings.  
Though some will attempt to insert engineering changes using “safety” as justification, specious 
arguments for such justification at least will have increased scrutiny, prompted by the deviation 
from rule two. 
Requirements Rule Three: Any and all additional system requirements that are deemed 
essential following the start of EMD will be developed as unique block-up grades that will be 
introduced as blocks or variations after Full Operational Capability (FOC) has been certified 
(see Figure 1 on page 4). 
There is a persistent need for a disciplined and structured way of incorporating 
meritorious capabilities enhancements to a weapon system while not disrupting the established 
design, cost, schedule, or performance.  By following this rule, there is the added benefit of 
having some level of operational experience that can inform the development and insertion of 
weapon system improvements. 
Requirements Rule Four: Holding to an established Initial Operational Capability as a 
time-certain for fielding the weapon system will be a Key Performance Parameter. 
Weapon systems development and fielding plans must have some consideration of time-
to-need as integral to the requirement for the capability.  This rule makes the time-to–need, or 
fielding, an essential consideration in program development and planning.  If there is no fully 
understood and accepted time by which a weapon system must be fielded, the importance of 








According to the DAPA report (Kadish, 2006, January), budget instability is a major 
contributor to acquisition program instability and the failure of acquisition programs to meet cost 
expectations.  Lack of funding discipline on the parts of Congress, the military, and the Defense 
Department produces acquisition programs that are targeted as bill payers for other funding 
priorities or that are under-funded because of poor cost estimating. 
In his written confirmation statement submitted to the Senate Armed Forces Committee 
and reported in DefenseNews.Com, Dr. Ashton Carter emphasized the importance of having 
“stable funding” (Bennett, 2006, March 26). He considered stable funding a key factor in 
choosing whether a weapon system contract is a fixed-price type contract or cost-plus (2006, 
March 26). 
The DAPA report offers the following solution: the establishment of a funding account for 
the duration of the acquisition program from the program initiation at the beginning of EMD to 
IOC, referred to as a “Stable Program Funding Account” (see Figure 1 on page 4). In this article, 
the term “Capital Funding” is used to describe a stable funding account during the period from 
Milestone B, EMD to IOC that is tied to specific programs and funded by the individual Services 
with a fixed budgeted amount.  Capital funding will apply initially only to MDAPs, though other 
acquisition programs could be considered.  The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the 
Services will guarantee that programs identified for capital funding will not be used to pay other 
bills. 
Budget Rule One: All Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) will be evaluated as 
candidates for capital funding. 
Though not all acquisition programs are suitable for a capital funding approach, MDAPs 
should at least be considered since these programs—because of their size—offer the most 
potential for reduced cost growth based on a guaranteed stable funding profile. 
Budget Rule Two: Capital funding programs will: 
a. Have a fixed-funding profile from Milestone B (EMD) to Initial Operating Capability.  
Capital funding programs will not be used as bill payers during that timeframe. 
The timeframe for capital funding allows for follow-on increases in the unit quantity for 
the acquisition program after IOC while helping to ensure that fielding the program is on time.  
Put another way, this rule helps to ensure that funding is not the reason for not fielding a 
program on time. 
b. Provide bi-annual reports to Congress on cost-schedule and performance progress. 
Congress’s responsibility and right for oversight of Defense spending must be 
addressed.  By engaging with congressional staffs and principals to keep them informed of how 
effectively the Defense Department is spending taxpayer dollars for acquisition programs, the 
needs of Congress will be addressed.  Frequent, statutorily mandated program reviews will 
provide Congress the opportunity to assess not only the program’s progress but also the 
effectiveness of capital funding.  The program should be reviewed with Congress twice 
annually.  This provides congressional staff and principals an early understanding of developing 
trends.  Failure to have a successful review (over cost, behind schedule or failing to perform) is 
addressed later in this paper. 
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c. Have a Technology Readiness Level of at least 6 at Milestone B (EMD). 
Programs that move into EMD that do not have a Technology Readiness Level of 6 or 
better are destined to experience cost escalation, schedule slips, and unpredictable 
performance.  Capital funding is predicated on the fact that costs can be controlled and 
schedule can be maintained.  For capital funding to be effective, all aspects of an acquisition 
program must have as much stability as possible.   
d. Be “time-certain” programs. 
Capital funding success depends on strict adherence to a fully-agreed-to timeframe (by 
the government and the contractor) from Milestone B approval for EMD to IOC.  This provides 
predictability regarding what to expect in the program in general. It also drives the government 
and industry program managers to be realistic in what they promise for the program and in how 
they propose to meet the program milestones to stay within the timeframe for system fielding.   
e. Be cancelled if the program fails to meet established cost, schedule, and performance. 
If a program fails to meet any one of the cost, schedule, and performance objectives 
established at program initiation after three consecutive congressional reviews, the program will 
be cancelled; not re-baselined or re-planned—cancelled.  When government and industry 
program managers as well as the military departments and Defense Department program 
executives fully understand the consequences of program failure, the likely result will be greater 
management attention. 
Acquisition Rules 
Analysis of acquisition programs over time shows that programs generally grow about 
50% in cost (Younossi et al.,  2006).  Larger Defense programs clearly are more prominent 
when analyzing program cost growth because the amounts of money are very large compared 
to programs managed by other Federal agencies.  Though it may seem obvious, programs that 
have longer timeframes for EMD also experience greater cost growth (Younossi et al., 2006).  
Furthermore, missing from most, if not all, acquisition strategies is analysis that asks: “What 
does time, as an independent variable, do to the trade space defined by the minimum and 
optimum performance and cost?” 
To address the importance of time as a consideration in developing acquisition 
strategies, the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense asked The Monitor Group 
(2003) to look at the value of establishing time as a boundary condition or driver in determining 
the desired timeframe between Milestone B and IOC. Time should be considered an 
independent variable, as should cost, especially when it is critical to field a capability in time to 
have a positive impact on a threat. 
Time is not the only factor that works against well-run acquisition programs.  We have 
developed an acquisition-workforce culture that has adopted “flexibility” as a means to acquiring 
more capable weapon systems, other equipment, and services.  The consequence of this 
culture is that there is a deliberate attempt on the part of the acquisition community to establish 
the broadest interpretation of what constitutes best value, desired technology, and solicitation 
outcome.  Unfortunately, “flexibility” often comes at the expense of discipline and structure as a 
means to achieve cost, schedule, and performance objectives. 
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Successful competitive solicitations, however, depend on discipline and structure in the 
way that the acquisition competition is managed.  Competition management begins with 
development of and adherence to an acquisition management/master plan or strategy.  That 
plan or strategy should inform the Request for Proposal and is the roadmap for the subsequent 
competition and program management. 
Acquisition Rule One: No MDAP will be considered for Milestone B certification without a 
comprehensive Single Acquisition Management Plan/Strategy to include at a minimum total 
system procurement quantity, explanation and rationale for the contracting methodology 
selected (i.e., prime contractor choosing subcontractors, leader-follower prime contractors, etc.), 
sustainment plan and how the Prime Contractor or Lead Systems Integrator will select and 
manage subcontractors. 
Most, if not all, programs that experience significant problems with cost, schedule, and 
performance have inadequate or flawed acquisition strategies or management plans.  Often, the 
focus of the acquisition strategy is on what the weapon system should do, the plans of the 
Military Services to field the system, and the phasing of the number of units over time that are 
required.  This approach, while important, does not comprise an acquisition strategy or 
management plan.  The acquisition strategy should explain how the competition will be run; 
what management, technical, and cost elements are most important; and whether it will be a 
winner-take-all (and why that is the preferred choice), split-buy, leader/follower strategy, or 
some combination of each.  These considerations in an acquisition strategy are important and 
will drive necessary program decisions in the follow-on program management. 
Management and acquisition strategies should consider what must be fielded and when 
and how block upgrades will be completed, managed, and integrated after full operating 
capability is achieved.  The acquisition strategy must describe how the winning contractor will 
manage subcontractor content.  An annex to the acquisition strategy must be how the weapon 
system competition will be financed, and consideration must be given to any subsystem’s 
commercial value in terms of design buy-back and production rights.  In the past, the 
Department has either retained all of the design rights or retained none of the rights.  Retaining 
substantial design rights while keeping open the opportunity for the contractor to benefit from 
any commercial markets that might emerge makes competing for the Department’s business 
more appealing.   
Acquisition Rule Two: All MDAPs will be evaluated as “time-certain” programs, where 
the timeframe between Milestone B and IOC (see Figure 1 on page 4) will be established with a 
thorough analysis, using Time as an Independent Variable (TAIV). Additionally, the criteria that 
describe what must be accomplished in the EMD phase of the program cannot significantly 
change.  
When TAIV is applied to the development of an acquisition program, the importance of 
time in developing and defining the technology, as well as its design and production factors, are 
given prominence in the analysis of cost, schedule, and achieving the desired performance.  
Time-certain in this instance is not synonymous with schedule.  Schedule is the sequential 
distribution of program events that, on completion, have a timeframe associated with them.  We 
measure schedule with milestones accomplished.  TAIV, on the other hand, is the analytic 
construct that identifies which out of a given list of performance capabilities are of marginal 
value when considering the amount of time necessary for a capability to be developed, 
incorporated  into the weapon system, and fielded.  The time-certain period is established with 
the results of the TAIV analysis.  Schedule is, then, the sequence of events or program 
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milestones that fit within the time-certain period. Though a recent Government Accountability 
report (GAO, 2009) points out that the DAPA report (Kadish, 2006, January, p.49) 
recommended that schedule be a Key Performance Parameter, this rule departs from DAPA in 
that the time between Milestone B and IOC be a time-certain period and that specific length of 
time be a Key Performance Parameter.  Urgency for fielding a particular desired capability, then, 
has a context that can be used to describe what needs to be fielded or deployed and when. 
Acquisition Rule Three: Aircraft programs will take no longer than five years from 
Milestone B (EMD) to Initial Operational Capability, again using TAIV as an analytic tool to 
validate the optimum timeframe. 
Successful aircraft programs have been fielded in five years or less.  The fielding of both 
the F-15 and F-16 were achieved in approximately five years, with the F-15E  (Woods, 2008) 
fielded in approximately five-and-one-half years.  Had management and budget attention been 
constant and sufficient, the C-17 cargo aircraft could have achieved IOC in five years. But after 
several false starts, it took almost 10 years.  The complexity of the aircraft’s technology 
demands is clearly important, but other factors seem to play roles as well.  The EA-18G is 
planned for five years and nine months from Milestone B to IOC while the F/A-18E/F was 
planned for nine years and four months. It is true, however, that the EA-18G is basically an F/A-
18F airframe integrated with an Improved Capability III, Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) 
avionics suite (employed on the EA-6B) and should take less time to field.  The accelerated 
development schedule (over its F/A-18E/F predecessor) probably can be attributed to the 
coupling of that proven, in-production airframe with an existing AEA technology.  
The B-2 took 18 years from Milestone B to IOC for a variety of reasons, only some of 
which had to do with available technology.  Budget and congressional interest played big roles 
in the length of time that it took for the B-2 to reach IOC.  At 14 years and four months, the F-22 
has taken the longest of any of the fighters to reach IOC.  If the rules are followed that require 
capital funding and not being certified for EMD without achieving a TRL of 6, it is not a stretch 
for a well-managed program with stable funding that follows all of the rules described in this 
paper to reach IOC in five years.  However, when the program becomes a bill payer for other 
Service needs or derived requirements are inserted before or during the EMD phase, five years 
will, of course, be a difficult achievement.  The criteria that describe what must be accomplished 
in the EMD phase of the program cannot significantly change. 
Acquisition Rule Four: Ship-building programs will take no longer than seven years from 
Milestone B (EMD) to Initial Operational Capability, again using TAIV as an analytic tool to 
validate the optimum timeframe. 
Currently, the average time from Milestone B to IOC for US Navy ships entering the fleet 
is eight years, nine-and-one-half months (Costello, 2008).  Size and complexity, however, do 
not seem to be what determines the length of time to get combat ships into the fleet.  The range 
is from CVN21 (Gerald R. Ford Class modern aircraft carrier) taking 12-and-one-half years to 
strategic sealift ships taking five years, nine months.  But, again, complexity or size does not 
seem to be the driving factor since a Supply Class Fast Combat Support Ship (AOE6) took over 
eight-and-one-half years to go from Milestone B to IOC while the aircraft carrier CVN74, USS 
John C. Stennis, took a little over eight years, four months to achieve IOC.  An LPD 17 San 
Antonio Class amphibious docking ship took 11 years and one month to reach IOC while the 
Arleigh Burke Class (DDG 51) destroyer took nine years, three months to go from Milestone B 
to IOC.  Arguably, to establish seven years as the time-certain for naval shipbuilding programs 
from program initiation at Milestone B to IOC will be a challenge—but a challenge that can be 
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met if the time-certain constraint is one that both the contractor and the Department understand 
and capture in their Integrated Master Plan and Integrated Master Schedule.  Also, the criteria 
that describe what must be accomplished in the EMD phase of the program cannot significantly 
change. 
Acquisition Rule Five: Requests for Proposals (RFP) will include a competition element 
that asks how the competitors plan to select, manage, and evaluate their subcontractors.  
Subcontractor management will be an element of the Contractor Performance Assessment 
report and considered in determining award and incentive fees. 
With regard to the issue of subcontractor management raised in Rule Four, how the 
winning prime contractor intends to select and manage its subcontractors and suppliers will be a 
prominent competition element in the Request for Proposal (RFP).  The purpose of this rule is to 
discourage potential prime contractors from arbitrarily, and as the default position, choosing 
sister divisions as subcontractors.  If a competitor must explain the rationale for selecting 
subcontractors’ contributions and their cost and design advantages compared to sister divisions 
or other alternatives, sister divisions may not be as appealing of a choice as a program 
subcontractor.  Knowing that the plan for selecting and managing subcontractors will be 
weighted in the management section of the RFP will provide more incentive to the potential 
prime contractor to give very careful consideration to subcontractor selection.  Profit-on-profit 
should become more of a competitive liability. 
Acquisition Rule Six: No MDAP will be considered for Milestone B certification without a 
Test and Evaluation Master Plan that has been agreed to and approved. 
All too often, the test and evaluation process results in new requirements that exceed 
contract specifications.  Ensuring that a fully agreed-to and approved Test and Evaluation 
Master Plan that clearly bounds the limits of what can be tested, including metrics for success 
that all understand, is essential.  This will go a long way to precluding testing the driving 
engineering changes and requirements that exceed the contract defined design. 
Acquisition Rule Seven: Where the competitors offerings are comparable and the 
competition will allow, competitors for EMD will submit cost-model data and Most Probable Cost 
will be determined prior to final Request for Proposal release and shared with competitors.  
Most Probable Cost will be contract cost.  Competitions will be based on technical and 
management risk. 
A long-held view in the defense industry is that any program vice president who loses a 
cost competition by not having the lowest cost is fired.  What exactly drives the industry to hold 
this point of view?  If you don’t count their years of experience, a winning contractor believes 
that there is a better than 80% probability that the contract specifications that were bid will be 
changing as the ink is drying on the contract.  The winning contractor can then charge full price 
on the updated program specifications, within the cost and pricing guidelines, and make up for 
any risk accepted in the original winning proposal.   
This approach to an acquisition program is most often prevalent when the contract is a 
cost-plus arrangement, though fixed-price contracts experience the same type of expanding-
contract cost growth with the emergence of derived requirements and engineering changes.  
The problem that occurs with fixed-price contracts that have engineering changes or derived 
requirements is that unless the contract is amended, the cost of the changes often turns up as 
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claims against the government.  Cost-plus contracts, on the other hand, only have the added 
costs show up as the “plus” in cost-plus.   
The excuse often heard when costs rise is that the Department and the defense 
contractors do not have good cost estimates.  This assertion does not generally prove to be 
true.  When competing contractors reveal the output of their cost models and compare them 
with the Department’s estimates, there is often very little difference.  As a general rule, then, all 
the participants in acquisition competitions have a very good estimate of what the costs will be.  
Why then are competitions based on cost when everyone knows what the most likely cost will 
be?  Cost should be taken off the table and the competition should be about which competitor 
has the better solution for management and technical risk, with subcontractor selection and 
management being prominent in that evaluation. Most Probable Cost, or the cost that the 
competitors and government models agree is the cost, should become the contract cost. 
Acquisition Rule Eight: Competitions will be based on the motto: “the design you bid is 
the design you build.”   
A number of activities take place while the ink is drying on the contract.  Not the least of 
these is that the government program manager and executive are saying to the winning 
contractor, “We know what we said we wanted, and what you proposed, but we have a few 
changes to the requirements we’d like you to adopt.”  To which the winning contractor readily 
replies, “Not a problem; just a few design changes, another year on the program, and an 
increase in cost.”  If both the winning contractor and the government program manager fully 
understand and believe that the design that was bid is the design that will be built, then their 
behavior will change to  follow the rule. 
Conclusion 
The Department of Defense is now in a budget environment where it is directly 
competing with a formidable domestic agenda that will not be denied.  In his January 2009 
article A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming The Pentagon For A New Age, published in 
Foreign Affairs, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated,  
In recent years, these platforms have grown ever more baroque, have become ever 
more costly, are taking longer to build, and are being fielded in ever-dwindling quantities.  
Given that resources are not unlimited, the dynamic of exchanging numbers for 
capability is perhaps reaching a point of diminishing returns.  A given ship or aircraft, no 
matter how capable or well equipped, can be in only one place at one time. (Gates, 
2009)   
If Secretary Gates’ message is going to be taken to heart by those charged with 
acquiring the “platforms” and those responsible for producing them, then far greater attention 
must be given to using the defense budget wisely, efficiently and effectively.  Programs simply 
must be managed to cost, schedule and performance.  A mandated set of rules that drive 
discipline into the Acquisition System is one answer. 
This paper describes a few such rules that are worthy of implementing.  They are by no 
means inclusive of all the rules that should be considered and established.  Additionally, it 
should be clearly understood that for behaviors to change, all of the rules must be followed 
since no single rule or group of rules stands alone.  For example, without a time-certain 
program, the discipline for capital funding will not be present and planning for funding over a 
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well-defined time period will not be possible.  The rules are interrelated, and these rules are 
necessary in order to re-establish an acquisition culture that is disciplined with a clear 
understanding of how to bring predictability and stability to the Department of Defense 
Acquisition System.   
The institution of rules that are clearly communicated and consistent must be enforced to 
reinvigorate and support the acquisition workforce’s enthusiasm for meeting cost, schedule, and 
performance as well as establishing discipline and structure in the Acquisition System.  The 
Department of Defense establishes and follows checklists for any number of activities from 
flying airplanes to mailing packages.  Rules are just another form of a checklist.  With 91 major 
Defense Acquisition Programs with a combined value of over $1.6 trillion currently being 
managed, the result will be getting better weapon systems into the hands of the warfighter in 
time to make a difference on the battlefield. 
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Chair: Mr. Jeffrey P. Parsons is the Executive Director of the US Army Contracting Command, a new 
major subordinate command of the US Army Materiel Command (AMC).  The Army Contracting 
Command provides global contracting support to the operational Army across the full spectrum of 
military operations and in garrison. Parsons commands over 5,500 military and civilian personnel 
worldwide, who award and manage over 270,000 contractual actions valued at more than $80 billion 
per fiscal year. He exercises command and procurement authority over two subordinate commands, the 
Installation Contracting Command and the Expeditionary Contracting Command, and also leads the 
AMC Acquisition Centers which support AMC’s other major subordinate commands and Lifecycle 
Management Commands. Parsons was appointed to the Senior Executive Service on December 15, 
2003. 
Prior to assuming his current position, Parsons served as the Director of Contracting, Office of 
Command Contracting, Headquarters, AMC, Fort Belvoir, VA.  Responsibilities from the Office of 
Command Contracting transitioned into the Army Contracting Command. Parsons continues to serve as 
the Principal Advisor to the Commanding General of AMC and his staff on all contracting matters and 
as the AMC Career Program Manager for the Contracting and Acquisition Career Program, with 
responsibility for the recruitment, training, education, and professional development of the civilian and 
military contracting professionals who are part of the acquisition workforce.   
Prior to his appointment to the Senior Executive Service, Parsons was the Director of Contracting, 
Headquarters, US Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, where he retired 
from active duty as an Air Force Colonel after 26 years of service.  He was responsible for developing 
and implementing contracting policies and processes to annually acquire $34 billion in research and 
development, production, test, and logistics support for Air Force weapon systems.  He was directly 
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Missile Wing at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, WY.  He held a variety of positions as a contracting officer 
with a wide range of experience touching on all aspects of systems, logistics, and operational 
contracting.  He was the Director of Contracting for a multi-billion dollar classified satellite program 
operated by the National Reconnaissance Office and served twice as a plant commander in the 
Defense Contract Management Agency.  Parsons also held several key staff positions at Headquarters, 
US Air Force, the Air Force Secretariat, and with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in which he 
was responsible for the development, implementation, and management of integrated, coordinated, and 
uniform policies and programs to govern DoD procurement worldwide. 
Parsons received his Bachelor’s degree in Psychology from St. Joseph’s University, Philadelphia, PA, 
and holds two Master’s degrees—one in Administration with a concentration in Procurement and 
Contracting from George Washington University, Washington, DC, and the other in National Resource 
Strategy from the National Defense University.  He is a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed 
Forces and the Defense Systems Management College Executive Program Management Course. 
Parsons holds the Acquisition Professional Development Program’s highest certifications in contracting 
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and credits towards a PhD in Mathematics from Temple University, Philadelphia, PA. She has taught 
in the Cox School of Business, School of Engineering and the Department of Mathematics at 
Southern Methodist University. She has over twenty years of experience in teaching operations 
management, operations research, and mathematics courses at the undergraduate and graduate 
levels in the resident and remote programs. 
Apte has successfully completed various research projects involving applications of mathematical 
models and optimization techniques. Her research interests are in the areas of developing 
mathematical models and algorithms for complex, real-world operational problems—especially in the 
area of humanitarian logistics and critical infrastructure networks using techniques of combinatorial 
optimization, network programming, and mixed-integer programming based on heuristic search 
methods.  It is also important to her that her research is directly applicable to practical problems and 
has significant value-adding potential. Her research articles have been published in prestigious 
journals, including Naval Research Logistics, Production and Operations Management, and 
Interfaces. She has published several articles in the Acquisition Research Sponsored Report Series, 
GSBPP, NPS. She also has a patent pending for “SONET Ring Designer Tool,” created when she 
worked as a consultant for MCI. 
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Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, and at the Cox School of Business, 
Southern Methodist University, Dallas.  He is experienced in teaching a range of operations 
management and management science courses in the Executive and Full-time MBA, as well as the 
business undergraduate programs.  His earlier education includes a B. Tech. in Chemical 
Engineering from the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, India, an MBA from the Asian Institute 
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This paper presents the results of our ongoing research on the management of services 
acquisition in the Department of Defense.  In this empirical study, we developed and used a 
web-based survey to collect data on the acquisition strategy, procurement methods, and 
contract types used at Air Force and Navy installations.  Specifically, we studied the current 
management practices in such areas as lifecycle approach, project management, 
organization/management structure, and training provided to services acquisition personnel.   
We found that the majority of the services contracts awarded and administered 
conformed to our expectation.  For example, most service contracts are competitively bid, fixed-
priced awards without any type of contract incentive. However, we found that the Air Force and 
Navy use different contracting approaches in the following areas: organizational level of 
acquisition offices (regional versus installation), the use of project teams, leaders of the 
acquisition effort (program personnel versus contracting officers), and managers of the services 
requirement (program personnel, contracting officers, and customer organizations).  We 
analyzed the implications and impact of different approaches on the effectiveness of the 
contract management process and make recommendations for improving the management of 
services acquisition in the Department of Defense.   
Keywords: Service Supply Chain, Services Acquisition, Service Lifecycle, Contract 
Management, Project Management, Program Management 
1.0 Introduction 
Services acquisition in the US Department of Defense (DoD) has continued to increase 
in scope and dollars in the past decade.  In fact, even considering the high value of weapon 
systems and large military items purchased in recent years, the DoD has spent more on 
services than on supplies, equipment and goods (Camm, Blickstein & Venzor, 2004).  For 
example, the Department of Defense obligations on contracts have more than doubled between 
fiscal years 2001 and 2008—to over $387 billion, with over $200 billion spent just for services 
(GAO, 2009).  The acquired services presently cover a very broad set of service activities—
including professional, administrative, and management support; construction, repair, and 
maintenance of facilities and equipment; information technology; research and development; 
and medical care. 
As the DoD’s services acquisition continues to increase in scope and dollars, the DoD 
must give greater attention to proper acquisition planning, adequate requirements definition, 
sufficient price evaluation, and proper contractor oversight (GAO, 2002).  Recently, the Director 
of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) identified the inappropriate use of 
services contracts in the DoD (Director, DPAP, 2007, March 2) and is planning to take actions to 
improve contracting for services throughout the Department (Director, DPAP, 2006, August 16).   
In many ways, the issues affecting services acquisition are similar to those affecting the 
acquisition of physical supplies and weapon systems.  However, the unique characteristics of 
services, combined with the increasing importance of services acquisition, offer a unique and 
significant opportunity for research into the management of the service supply chain in the 
Department of Defense. 
We have addressed the need for research in the area of services acquisition by 
undertaking a series of research projects.  Thus far, we have completed three research projects, 
and the work on the fourth research project is currently in progress.    
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The first research project was exploratory in nature, wherein we tried to understand the 
major challenges and opportunities in the service supply chain in the DoD (Apte, Ferrer, Lewis & 
Rendon, 2006). As a part of this research study, we conducted in-depth case studies on 
acquisition of services in three different organizations: Presidio of Monterey, Travis AFB and the 
Naval Support Detachment Monterey (NSDM). 
The lack of a well-developed program management infrastructure for the acquisition of 
services was a critical research finding that warranted further study.  Therefore, our second 
research project was geared towards studying the program management infrastructure in the 
service supply chain in the DoD.  In this research, too, we conducted two additional in-depth 
case studies of innovative project management approaches—both at the Air Education and 
Training Command (AETC) and at Air Combat Command (ACC).  Based on these case studies, 
we developed a conceptual model of a service lifecycle that can be used to analyze and design 
the DoD’s services acquisition process.  In our project report (Apte & Rendon, 2007), we 
discussed the program management approach, identified basic project management concepts, 
described how these concepts are being used in the acquisition of defense weapon systems, 
and recommended how they can be adapted in the acquisition of services in the DoD. 
This paper presents the results of our third research project consisting of an empirical 
study of the management of services acquisition in the Department of Defense.  In this empirical 
study, we developed and used a web-based survey to collect data on the acquisition strategy, 
procurement methods, and contract types used at Air Force and Navy installations.  Specifically, 
we studied the current management practices in such areas as lifecycle approach, project 
management, organization/management structure, and training provided to services acquisition 
personnel. 
As mentioned earlier, the work on a fourth research project is currently in progress.   In 
this research, we are continuing with the empirical study of current management practices in the 
Army. 
2.0 Research Objectives 
The objective of the third research project is to develop a more comprehensive 
understanding of how services acquisition is managed at a wide range of military bases 
throughout the Department of Defense.  This research is focused on answering the following 
research questions: 
1. What type of acquisition strategy, procurement method, and contracts are used 
in services acquisition? 
2. How is the service acquisition process managed? What management concepts—
such as a lifecycle, a program management or a project management 
approach—are used? 
3. What training is given to contract and project/program management staff? 
4. Are there any significant differences between the way services are acquired and 
managed in different DoD departments? 
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2.1 Development and Review of Survey Instrument 
The methodology for this research involves the application of a survey instrument 
recently developed for this specific purpose.  The MBA student team of Compton and 
Meinshausen, under the guidance of Professors Apte, Apte, and Rendon, developed the survey 
instrument as part of their MBA research project (Compton & Meinshausen, 2007). This was a 
web-based survey instrument developed using the survey software “Survey Monkey.” The 
developed survey was pilot tested for its validity and was used to collect additional empirical 
data regarding the current state of services acquisition management in the Navy and the Air 
Force at the installation level. 
The services acquisition research survey begins with questions focusing on specific 
demographic data for each military department, major command, region, and military 
installation.  The survey then asks specific questions related to the approach, method, and 
procedures used in the acquisition of services for certain specific categories of services.  The 
specific categories of services targeted in this research are listed in Table 1 below.  These 
service categories are considered to be the most common services acquired by the various DoD 
departments.  Between FY99 to FY03, the DoD’s spending on these types of services increased 
by 66%; and in FY03, the DoD spent over $118 billion (or approximately 57% of total DoD 
procurement dollars) on these types of services (GAO, 2005, March). Table 1 also shows the 
individual service categories addressed in the responses received from the Air Force and the 
Navy. 
Table 1. Service Categories 
Service Category Classification Code Air Force Navy 
Professional, administrative, and mgmt. support R X X 
Maintenance and repair of equipment J X X 
Data processing and telecommunications D X X 
Utilities and housekeeping S   X 
Transportation and travel V X   
 
The survey instrument includes core questions related to the methods and procedures 
used in the acquisition of services for these five categories of services.  These core questions 
focus on the following areas (Compton & Meinshausen, 2007): 
Contract Characteristics.  The purpose of this category of questions is to gain insight 
into the dominant procurement method and contract type used in the acquisition of services at 
the installation level.  The contract characteristics examined in this section are degree of 
competition (competitively bid or sole-source), contract type (fixed-price or cost-type), and type 
of contract incentive (incentive-fee or award-fee or award-term).   
Acquisition Management Methods.  The purpose of this broad category of questions is 
to gain insight into the types of management methods and approaches used in the acquisition of 
individual services at each phase of the contract management process.  For each of the 
contract management phases, the survey asks whether the phase was conducted at a regional, 
installation, or some other organizational level.  This core question category also focused on 
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whether a project-team approach was typically used in the acquisition of the respective service 
category at the installation level. 
Project-team Approach. The purpose of this category of questions is to explore the 
installations that utilize a project-team approach in the services acquisition management method 
described above. The questions explore the position of the services acquisition project-team 
leader, such as a Program/Project Manager or Contracting Officer. This category of questions 
also explores information on the owner, generator, and approving authority of the requirement 
for a specific service being acquired.  Another purpose of this category of questions is to explore 
services acquisitions in which a project management approach was not dominantly used.  For 
this case, too, the questions explore the position of the person leading the services acquisition 
and information on the owner, generator, and approving authority of the requirement. 
Other Program Management Issues.  This last category of core questions is focused 
on the use of a lifecycle approach, length of assignments for services acquisition management 
personnel staff, use of market research techniques, level of staffing in services acquisition 
management, and level of training of services acquisition management personnel.  These 
questions use a Likert-type scale to measure the level of agreement or disagreement amongst 
the respondents’ statements.   
Finally, the survey also solicits feedback and any general comments the respondents 
may want to share regarding the topic of services acquisition. This survey instrument also 
allows the researchers to collect data that will be subsequently analyzed to answer the research 
questions.  This analysis is presented in the next section of this paper. 
3.0 Survey Data and Observations 
The objective of this study—understanding the acquisition of services at diverse military 
bases—benefits from the collection and analysis of the previously discussed survey responses. 
Although creating a validated survey instrument that can guide the data collection and help us 
answer the research questions was a challenging and time-consuming task, this survey has 
been instrumental in guiding the overall direction of the study.  
In this section, we present a summary of the survey data we gathered and present our 
observations about the data.  Specifically, the data concerning various contract characteristics 
and acquisition management methods for individual service categories will be presented using 
the logical structure depicted in Figures 1 and 2.  We begin with a description of the Air Force 
survey results (see Tables 2, 3 and 4).  This will be followed by a presentation of the Navy 
survey results (see Tables 5, 6, and 7).  Our conclusions and recommendations based on our 
study will then be presented in subsequent sections. 
3.1 Services Acquisition: Air Force Survey Results 
3.1.1 Contract Characteristics 
The data on contract characteristics prevalent in various service categories are shown in 
Table 2 below. 
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Table 2. Contract Characteristics: Air Force 
Competitive Sole Source N/A Fixed Cost N/A Award Fee Award Term N/A
Professional, Administrative, 
and Management Support
FY03 62% 6% 32% 59% 9% 32% 9% 0% 91%
FY04 59% 6% 35% 56% 9% 35% 9% 0% 91%
FY05 59% 9% 32% 62% 6% 32% 9% 0% 91%
FY06 71% 9% 21% 71% 9% 21% 12% 0% 88%
FY07 76% 9% 15% 79% 6% 15% 12% 0% 88%
Maintenance and Repair of 
Equipment
FY03 65% 6% 29% 68% 3% 29% 3% 3% 94%
FY04 65% 6% 29% 68% 3% 29% 3% 3% 94%
FY05 65% 6% 29% 68% 3% 29% 3% 3% 94%
FY06 76% 6% 18% 79% 3% 18% 3% 6% 91%
FY07 85% 6% 9% 88% 3% 9% 3% 6% 91%
Data Processing and 
Telecommunication
FY03 56% 3% 41% 50% 6% 44% 9% 0% 91%
FY04 56% 3% 41% 50% 6% 44% 9% 0% 91%
FY05 56% 3% 41% 50% 6% 44% 9% 0% 91%
FY06 62% 6% 32% 59% 6% 35% 9% 0% 91%
FY07 71% 3% 26% 65% 6% 29% 9% 0% 91%
Transportation and Travel
FY03 38% 0% 62% 38% 0% 62% 3% 0% 97%
FY04 41% 0% 59% 41% 0% 59% 3% 0% 97%
FY05 38% 0% 62% 38% 0% 62% 3% 0% 97%
FY06 47% 0% 53% 47% 0% 53% 3% 0% 97%
FY07 53% 0% 47% 53% 0% 47% 3% 0% 97%
Contract Type Contract IncentiveDegree of Competition  Service category
 
The responses from the Air Force addressed four service categories: (1) professional, 
administrative and management support, (2) maintenance and repair of equipment, (3) data 
processing and telecommunications, and (4) transportation and travel.  For each service 
category, we collected data concerning the degree of competition, contract type and contract 
incentives used.   To uncover salient trends, we requested respondents to provide annual data 
for the past five years—from FY03 to FY07.   Following are some observations about the data.  
In the interest of brevity, we refer only to the data for FY07. 
 Professional, Administrative, & Management Support Services: Based on Table 2, 
we see that a competitive approach is used 76% of the time, while sole-source is 
only used 9% of the time.  Additionally, fixed-price-type contracts are used 79% of 
the time, while cost-type contracts are only used 6% of the time.  Finally, contract 
incentives are rarely used in any capacity, only about 12% of the time.   
 Maintenance and Repair of Equipment: In Table 2, we note that a competitive 
approach is used 85% of the time, while sole-source is only used 6% of the time 
consistently.  Additionally, fixed-price-type contracts are used 88% of the time, while 
cost-type contracts are only used 3% of the time consistently.  Contract incentives 
are rarely used in any capacity, only 9% of the time.   
 Data Processing and Telecommunications: Based on Table 2, we see that a 
competitive approach is used 71% of the time, while sole-source is only used 3% of 
the time consistently.  Additionally, fixed-price-type contracts are used 65% of the 
time, while cost-type contracts are only used 6% of the time consistently.  Contract 
incentives are rarely but consistently used, only 9% of the time.  
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 Transportation and Travel: Again, Table 2 suggests that a competitive approach is 
predominantly used—53% of the time—while sole-source is not used at all.  This 
may be due to the fact that many bases do not purchase transportation within their 
Contracting Squadron.  Another answer to the high N/A (not applicable) number is 
the fact that contracting squadrons might issue delivery task orders from large 
indefinite-quantity, indefinite-delivery-type contracts; thus the respondents answered 
not applicable to this question.  Additionally, fixed-price-type contracts are used 53% 
of the time, while cost-type contracts were not used at all. Contract incentives are 
only used 3% of the time consistently.   
3.1.2 Acquisition Management Methods 
The Air Force typically employs the acquisition of the services at the installation level. 
The administrative portion of the survey focused on the respondents’ branch of service and 
MAJCOM.  All 34 respondents were from the USAF.  Out of the 34 respondents, 10 were on 
location with the Air Combat Command (ACC); 7 respondents were from the Air Mobility 
Command (AMC); 6 respondents were from the Air Education and Training Command (AETC); 
6 respondents were from the Air Force Space Command (AFSPC); 4 respondents were from 
the Air Force Material Command (AFMC), and, finally, one respondent was from the Air Force 
Special Operations Command (AFSOC).   Our team wanted this survey data to be unbiased, so 
we made the survey anonymous.  However, as a by-product of this anonymity, we do not know 
the location of the specific bases that answered the survey. 
Organizational Level 
The survey respondents were asked to state the organizational level at which the 
specific services were acquired—that is, at what level were the procurement process for the 
services conducted? The results are shown in Table 3 below. The various DoD components 
acquire services either at the major command (MAJCOM) level, regional level or installation 
level.  Below are the results of the survey.  The responses indicate that during all phases of the 
services acquisition, for a large majority of the services acquired by the Air Force (in about 70% 
cases), the procurement was conducted at the installation level. 
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Acquisition Planning 1 27 6
Solicitation 1 27 6
Source Selection 1 26 7
Contract Administration 0 27 7
Maintenance and Repair of 
Equipment
Acquisition Planning 1 29 4
Solicitation 1 29 4
Source Selection 1 27 6
Contract Administration 0 29 5
Data Processing and 
Telecommunication
Acquisition Planning 4 21 9
Solicitation 4 21 9
Source Selection 4 19 11
Contract Administration 3 22 9
Transportation and Travel
Acquisition Planning 2 19 13
Solicitation 2 19 13
Source Selection 2 19 13
Contract Administration 1 19 14
Organization Level  Service/Acquisition Phase
 
Project-team Approach 
The survey results about the use of the project-team approach (see Table 4) show that 
this approach was used in a majority of the acquisitions for all services categories (in about 65% 
of the cases).  
Table 4. Project-team Approach: Air Force 





















and Management Support 34 25 21 4 5 20 9 8 1 1 8
Maintenance and Repair of 
Equipment 34 23 17 6 4 19 11 10 1 2 9
Data Processing and 
Telecommunication 34 21 12 9 3 18 13 7 6 2 11
Transportation and Travel 34 18 16 2 3 15 16 5 11 0 16
Total No. of 
Organiza-
tions
Who leads acquisition? Who owns requirments?Who leads acquisition? Who owns requirments?
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Project-team Approach and Service Acquisition Leadership  
Regardless of whether the respondents answered yes or no to the utilization of a project-
team approach question, the respondents were asked the following two questions: 
1. Who leads the acquisition of the service category? 
2. Who owns the requirements or approves changes to the requirements?   
As shown above in Table 4, the responses to these questions were relatively similar.  In 
a majority of the cases, a contracting officer leads the acquisition process.  This clearly indicates 
that program managers are usually not part of the acquisition process of procuring services at 
the installation level.   Additionally, customers are usually responsible for owning and changing 
the requirements for services at the installation level.  
3.2 Services Acquisition: Navy Survey Results 
3.2.1 Contract Characteristics 
The data on contract characteristics for various service categories are shown in Table 5 
below.  Selected observations about FY07 data are also stated below.  
Table 5. Contract Characteristics: Navy 
Competitive Sole Source N/A Fixed Cost N/A Award Fee Award Term N/A
Professional, Administrative, and 
Management Support
FY03 80% 0% 20% 80% 0% 20% 10% 0% 90%
FY04 80% 0% 20% 80% 0% 20% 10% 0% 90%
FY05 80% 0% 20% 80% 0% 20% 0% 10% 90%
FY06 80% 0% 20% 80% 0% 20% 0% 10% 90%
FY07 90% 0% 10% 90% 0% 10% 0% 10% 90%
Maintenance and Repair of 
Equipment
FY03 80% 0% 20% 80% 0% 20% 0% 0% 100%
FY04 80% 0% 20% 80% 0% 20% 0% 0% 100%
FY05 80% 0% 20% 80% 0% 20% 0% 0% 100%
FY06 80% 0% 20% 80% 0% 20% 0% 0% 100%
FY07 80% 0% 20% 80% 0% 20% 0% 10% 90%
Data Processing and 
Telecommunication
FY03 33% 0% 67% 33% 0% 67% 0% 0% 100%
FY04 33% 0% 67% 33% 0% 67% 0% 0% 100%
FY05 33% 0% 67% 33% 0% 67% 0% 0% 100%
FY06 33% 11% 56% 44% 0% 56% 0% 0% 100%
FY07 33% 11% 56% 44% 0% 56% 0% 0% 100%
Utilities and Housekeeping
FY03 25% 25% 50% 60% 0% 40% 20% 0% 80%
FY04 25% 25% 50% 60% 0% 40% 20% 0% 80%
FY05 25% 25% 50% 60% 0% 40% 0% 20% 80%
FY06 25% 25% 50% 60% 0% 40% 0% 0% 100%
FY07 20% 40% 40% 60% 0% 40% 0% 0% 100%
Contract Type Contract IncentiveDegree of Competition
 
 Profession, administration, and management: The data showed that in FY07, 
90% of contracts were competitively awarded; 80% of contracts were fixed-price 
contracts, and 90% contracts have no incentives. 
 Maintenance and repair equipment: In FY07, 80% of contracts were 
competitively awarded; 80% were fixed-price contracts, and just one contract had 
an incentive fee attached.   
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 Data processing and telecommunication: In FY07, 33% of the contracts were 
from a competitive source; 44% of the contracts were firm-fixed contracts, and no 
incentives were offered in any contract. 
 Utilities and housekeeping: In FY07, 20% of the contracts administered were 
competitive, and 40% were sole-source; 60% of the contracts cut were firm-fixed-
priced.     
3.2.2 Acquisition Management Methods 
The data was collected from the survey at the installation level.  The data inputs were 
provided by the Navy Regions in charge of the installations in CONUS.  We received inputs 
from 6 Regions—covering 66 Navy installations, plus Naval Supply (NAVSUP) and Naval 
Medical Logistics Command (NMLC).   
Table 6. Organization Level Used in Acquisition Phases: Navy 
Regional Installation N/A Total
Professional, Administrative, 
and Management Support
Acquisition Planning 5 2 3 10
Solicitation 5 2 3 10
Source Selection 5 3 2 10
Contract Administration 3 4 3 10
Maintenance and Repair of 
Equipment
Acquisition Planning 4 3 3 10
Solicitation 4 3 3 10
Source Selection 4 3 3 10
Contract Administration 2 6 2 10
Data Processing and 
Telecommunication
Acquisition Planning 3 1 5 9
Solicitation 3 1 5 9
Source Selection 3 1 5 9
Contract Administration 2 2 5 9
Utilities and Housekeeping
Acquisition Planning 2 2 4 8
Solicitation 2 2 4 8
Source Selection 2 2 4 8
Contract Administration 2 2 4 8
Organization Level  Service/Acquisition Phase
 
Organizational Level 
The data regarding the organizational level at which the specific services were acquired 
is shown in Table 6 below.  The majority of the responses indicate that each of the services 
acquired by the Navy was procured at the regional level—specifically, 62% of the professional, 
administrative, and management services were acquired at this level.  About 68% of the 
acquisition planning, solicitation and source selection for data processing and 
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telecommunication services were performed at the regional level.  The responses for utilities 
and housekeeping services showed half of the contracts were planned, solicited, selected, and 
administered at the regional level, and half at the installation level. 
Project-team Approach 
The results of our survey (see Table 7) show that a project-team approach was used in 
approximately 50% of the acquisitions for all services categories. 
Table 7. Project-team Approach: Navy 





















and Management Support 10 6 0 6 2 4 4 3 1 1 3
Maintenance and Repair of 
Equipment 9 5 4 1 1 4 4 4 0 1 3
Data Processing and 
Telecommunication 9 2 2 0 1 1 7 3 4 1 6
Utilities and Housekeeping 7 5 4 1 2 3 2 1 1 1 1
Total No. of 
Organiza-
tions
Who leads acquisition? Who owns requirments?Who leads acquisition? Who owns requirments?
Organizations Using Project Team Approach Organizations Not Using Project Team Approach
 
Project-team Approach and Service Acquisition Leadership 
As we examine the results of our survey, we note a 50-50 split in a portion of the data: a 
program manager leads the acquisition team half the time, and a contracting officer leads the 
acquisition team half the time.  Additionally, we see that approximately 30% of the time, a 
program manager, contracting officer, or customer owns and manages the requirement in these 
services contracts.  
3.3 Program Management Issues for Both the Air Force and the Navy 
In addition to the topics mentioned above, our research objective was also to investigate 
issues related to the personnel involved in and responsible for various aspects of services 
acquisition management.  The issues include use of lifecycle approach, as well as the length, 
level, and qualifications of personnel in service acquisition management. We also explored the 
extent of market research used by decision-makers in awarding services contracts. Table 8 
below describes the responses from the survey regarding the scope and ability of personnel 
responsible for service contracts. Responses for both the Air Force and the Navy (with the 
corresponding percent of responses) are given in the same table. (Contracting officer is 
abbreviated to CO, and Quality Assurance Evaluator is abbreviated to QAE.) 
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Table 8. Scope and Ability of Personnel Responsible for Service Contracts 
 Air Force Navy 
Who writes and awards  






















Phase I and II 
36% 















The survey asked Likert-scale-based questions related to the use of a lifecycle approach 
for routine and non-routine services acquisition, the extent of the use of market research, billets 
for service acquisition management, and responsibilities of the QAE.  These are described in 
Table 9 on the next page.  Here, the answers are divided in three categories: percent of 
respondents that disagreed, were neutral, and agreed. Disagreed and agreed categories 
include those who disagreed or agreed strongly. 
Table 9. Lifecycle Approach, Market Research, Billets and Responsibility 
 Air Force Navy 
 Disagree Neutral Agree Disagree Neutral Agree
Lifecycle Approach % % % % % % 
For routine services, this was the 
dominant strategy. 
23.5 21 50 50 25 62 
For non-routine services, this was the 
dominant strategy. 
41 23.5 29 0 37.5 50 
Market Research       
Market Research was conducted for 
the acquisition of services. 
0 3 97 0 0 100 
Services Acquisition Billets       
There is an adequate number of staff 
positions. 
59 6 35 37.5 25 25 
These positions are adequately filled. 65 9 18 50 12.5 25 
These staff members are adequately 
trained. 
9 21 53 12.5 25 50 
These staff members are adequately 
qualified. 
9 26.5 65 12.5 12.5 62.5 
Responsibility of Staff Members       
Persons identifying requirement also 
write the SOW/SOO document. 
6 3 91 62.5 12.5 2.5 
QAE receive prior formal/documented 
training. 
0 0 100 12.5 12.5 75 
QAE submit written requests of 
performance and quality of work to 
CO. 
9 6 85 12.5 25 62.5 
Proper level of oversight is afforded to 
monitor contractor performance. 
15 6 79 37.5 37.5 25 
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4.0 Research Findings and Recommendations 
This research provided a first look at empirical data related to the acquisition of services 
within the Department of Defense.  The application of the survey to Air Force and Navy 
acquisition offices provided some real-world data on the characteristics of services contracts 
(degree of competition, contract/incentive type), various management approaches used 
(organizational level and project-team approach), and other program management issues (use 
of project lifecycle, length of acquisition personnel service, extent of market research, level of 
staffing, and training of staffing).  Below is a summary of our research findings.  This is followed 
by our recommendations. 
4.1 Research Findings 
Contract Characteristics 
The common contract characteristics reflect the use of competitively awarded, fixed-
priced contracts.  Additionally, contract incentives, or award fees, were typically not used in 
these services contracts.  
Acquisition Management Methods 
The Air Force and the Navy differed in terms of the organizational levels at which the 
acquisition contracts are managed.  For the Air Force, the majority of the procurements 
conducted and contracts managed are done so at the installation level.  On the other hand, the 
services contracts for the Navy are managed at the regional level.  This difference in 
organizational levels may provide additional insight into the effectiveness of the Air Force’s and 
Navy’s services contract management.  The relation of where the contracts are managed to 
where the services are actually performed may have an impact on the effectiveness of the 
contract management process. 
In terms of the use of a project-team approach, another distinction can be made 
between the Air Force and the Navy.  The Air Force used a project-team approach in managing 
its services contracts (64%) more than did the Navy (51%).  Best practices in contract 
management reflect the use of project teams—specifically cross-functional teams—in the 
management of service procurement projects.  Further analysis of the implications of not using 
a project-team approach in Navy contracts should be conducted. 
Related to the use of project teams is the issue of who is to lead the acquisition effort at 
the installation.  For Air Force services contracts in which a project team was used, 80% of the 
respondents stated that the contracting officer led the acquisition team, while only 20% stated 
that program personnel led the teams.  For Navy services contracts in which a project team was 
used, 65% of the respondents stated that program personnel led the acquisition team, while 
35% stated that contracting officers led the teams.   
These results reflect the precarious situations in which contracting officers find 
themselves as they manage the services procurement process.  Not only are they responsible 
for managing the contractual aspects of the project, they are also responsible for leading the 
acquisition team.  Most of the acquisition team members are not even part of the contracting 
organization, nor do they work for the contracting officer.  This may be problematic for the 
success of the contract management effort.  
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It is also interesting to note that at Air Force installations where a project team is not 
employed in the acquisition of services, the contracting officer is still responsible for leading the 
acquisition effort in 73% of the cases.  At Navy installations where a project team is not 
employed in the acquisition of services, the contracting officer is still responsible for leading the 
acquisition effort in approximately 100% of the cases.  This situation, in which the contracting 
officer must lead a coordinated effort (involving technical, financial, and customer personnel) in 
procuring critical services without the use of a project team, may catalyze some of the problems 
in managing services contracts that were identified by the GAO.    
Also related to services acquisition leadership is the issue of who should own and 
manage the requirement.  In this research, the requirement is the specific service that is being 
procured—for example, operations research services (a specific professional, administrative, or 
management service) for a DoD agency.  It is important to note that the contract management 
process and, more specifically, the authorities and responsibilities of the contracting officer, do 
not include requirements-management activities (such as determining the requirement, 
modifying the requirement, assessing the effectiveness of the requirement).   These activities 
belong to the requirements owner—usually the organization responsible for the function or 
service being procured.  For example, an Air Force civil engineering organization would own 
and manage the grounds maintenance and custodial services being acquired by the contracting 
organization for that specific installation.    
This research indicated that for Air Force services acquisitions in which project teams 
were employed, approximately 82% of the respondents stated that program management 
personnel owned the requirement (as opposed to contracting officers).  For Navy services 
acquisitions in which project teams were employed, approximately 41% of the respondents 
stated that program management personnel owned the requirement, while approximately 30% 
of the respondents stated that either the contracting officer or customer owned the requirement.  
In Air Force services acquisition in which a project team was not used, approximately 85% of 
the respondents stated that program management personnel owned the requirement.  In Navy 
services acquisition in which a project team was not used, approximately 67% of the 
respondents stated that customer personnel owned the requirement; approximately 33% of the 
respondents stated that contracting officers owned the requirement. 
It is interesting to note that although program management personnel owned and 
managed the requirement in these services contracts, we still see contracting officers leading 
the acquisition effort (80% with project teams and 73% without).  These situations—in which 
contracting officers are leading the acquisition teams although the requirements are owned and 
managed by program personnel—may prove problematic to the effectiveness of the services 
acquisition.  This could result in the blurring of (or at least a conflict in) the roles and 
responsibilities of authorities in the acquisition of services and the management of service 
requirements.  
Program Management Issues 
The survey responses to the program management questions provide some additional 
and interesting insight into the acquisition of services by the Air Force and the Navy.  These 
areas include responsibility for surveillance of contractor’s performance and time spent 
performing QAE duties. 
It is interesting to note that approximately 38% of the Navy respondents stated that the 
Contracting officer is responsible for providing surveillance of the contractor’s performance. This 
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differs from the Air Force respondents (91%), who stated that the QAE is responsible for 
contractor surveillance.  Surveillance of contractor performance, especially for performed 
services, requires technical expertise in the service provided.  For example, government 
information technology (IT) specialists should typically monitor the IT contractor performing IT 
support services.  The level of technical expertise in the surveillance of contractor performance 
should be a concern for ensuring effective contact administration of services contracts.  
Contracting officers typically do not have the technical expertise needed to effectively perform 
contractor surveillance.  Nor does the CO usually have the requisite expertise to develop the 
requirements documents (SOO or SOW) or the quality assurance surveillance plan. Thus, the 
question of “can the CO provide proper surveillance of the contractor” comes into discussion.  
We will further address this issue in the program management section below. 
In the program-management-related questions, for routine services, over 50% of both Air 
Force and Navy respondents stated that a lifecycle approach was used.  Of note is that only 
29% of Air Force (compared to 50% of Navy) respondents stated that the use of a lifecycle 
approach was used in non-routine services. The use of a lifecycle approach should be a 
concern for ensuring proper project management of non-routine services contract acquisition.  
Since the services being acquired are of a non-routine nature, one would expect higher levels of 
uncertainty—and, thus, higher levels of project risk—in the acquisition process for these 
services.  One method for reducing risk is through the use of a project lifecycle—with project 
phases, gates, and decision-points for monitoring and controlling the progression of the services 
acquisition process.  Without the use of a project lifecycle, the services acquisition project may 
be vulnerable to excessive risk in terms of meeting cost, schedule, and performance objectives.  
This would especially be true in the acquisition of non-routine services. 
The majority of both the Air Force and Navy respondents answered the question on the 
use of market research in the acquisition of services affirmatively.  The data—97% (Air Force) 
and 100% (Navy)—suggest compliance with the requirement in the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) to conduct market research as the first step in any acquisition.  It would be 
interesting to conduct follow-on research to analyze the extent of documentation supporting the 
market research activities of these agencies.  Recent GAO and Inspector General reports have 
suggested the lack and sufficiency of market research documentation in the DoD.  
The survey results also provide some interesting insight into the staffing of services 
acquisition management billets.  These questions focused on the number of billets, staffing of 
these billets, training of personnel in these billets, and the qualifications of the personnel in 
these billets.  Of special note is that neither the Air Force nor Navy respondents felt there were 
an adequate number of services acquisition billets; indeed, only 35% and 25% (respectively) 
responded to the question in the affirmative.  Additionally, neither the Air Force nor Navy 
respondents felt the services acquisition billets were adequately filled; only 18% and 25% 
(respectively) responded that they were.  However, both the Air Force and Navy stated that the 
services acquisition management personnel were adequately trained (53% and 50%, 
respectively) and adequately qualified (65% and 62%, respectively).     
In terms of the responsibility of the services acquisition personnel, we see some 
differences between the Air Force and the Navy.  In particular, we see strong differences 
between the Air Force and Navy in who writes the requirement document, such as the SOO or 
the SOW.  For the Air Force, 91% of respondents agreed that the person identifying the 
services acquisition requirement also writes the requirement document. On the other hand, only 
2.5% of the Navy respondents agreed to this statement. There are also differences of opinion 
(79%, Air Force, and 25%, Navy) as to whether a proper level of oversight is afforded to monitor 
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the contractor’s performance.  These results are somewhat related to the question discussed 
above: “Can the CO provide proper surveillance of the contractor?”   
The first area of difference between the two services’ respondents (the issues of 
identifying the requirement versus developing the requirements documents) may indicate a 
mixing of services acquisition roles and responsibilities.  The significance of these activities 
reflects the distinction between the services acquisition requirements process and contracting 
process. The purpose of the requirements process is to determine, define, and develop the 
service requirement that will be acquired—for example, IT support services.  Once the 
requirements agency identifies, develops, and defines the requirement, the contracting office 
performs the contracting activities to acquire the needed services.  The contracting office does 
not identify or determine the service requirement.  Contracting officers, however, may support 
the development of the requirements documents by providing business and procurement 
expertise in this area.  When these two distinct processes are mixed, blurred, or performed by 
the same organization or individual, there is a potential for unsuccessful acquisition results, a 
higher risk of not meeting project objectives, and even the potential for procurement fraud. 
The Air Force responses show a strong connection between the two activities of 
identifying the requirement and developing the requirements documents.  Thus, within the Air 
Force, the requirements organization—where the technical expertise is located—manages 
these activities.  The Navy, on the other hand, apparently separates the process of identifying 
the requirement from the process of developing the requirements documents.  Although the 
survey does not ask who develops the requirement documents (if different than the 
requirements identification organization), one may assume that it may be the contracting officer, 
based on the previous survey question of who writes and awards the services contracts.  In this 
situation, the Navy seems to have the organization with the technical expertise and 
responsibility for managing the requirement identifying the services acquisition requirement, and 
the contracting officer (who is not a technical expert) developing the requirements documents.  
Thus, within the Navy, the contracting officer not only conducts the contracting activities for the 
procured services, but also writes the requirements documents that communicate these 
services to potential offerors.  This mixing of roles and responsibilities between requirements 
and contracting organizations may lead to ineffectiveness in the services acquisition process as 
well as vulnerabilities for procurement fraud.  The question of whether the contracting officer 
has the requisite technical expertise to develop the SOW for the service requirement—IT 
support services, for example— raises a critical issue.   
This issue of technical expertise is also raised in the survey. One question asks whether 
a proper level of oversight is afforded to monitor the contractor’s performance. In response to 
this question, the Air Force (79%) differed significantly from the Navy (25%).  The strong Air 
Force response may be linked to the previous statement that the QAE, a technical expert, is 
responsible for contractor surveillance (91%), while the Navy response indicates that the 
contracting officer (37.5%) or the QAE (37.5%) is responsible for surveillance of the contractor’s 
performance.  Regardless of inference, the fact that only 25% of the Navy respondents consider 
contractor oversight to be properly monitored is a strong message regarding the effective 








The majority of the contracts administered conformed to the expectation of the 
researchers.  The surveys indicate that most service contracts are competitively bid, fixed-
priced awards without any incentive.  The researchers discovered that the Navy had 
regionalized most contracting; in such cases, the contracting officer representative (COR) at the 
installation submits requirement requests to the regional offices.  Table 8 indicates that the CO 
typically writes and awards the contracts, and the COR (or customer’s organization) is 
responsible for surveillance of those contracts.  The majority of the service acquisition personnel 
have a variety of training, from project management to DAWIA.   
This empirical study on DoD services acquisition reflects that the Air Force and Navy 
use different contracting approaches in the following areas: organizational level of acquisition 
offices (regional versus installation), the use of project teams, leaders of the acquisition effort 
(program personnel versus contracting officers), and managers of the services requirement 
(program personnel, contracting officers, and customer organizations).  Our research has 
identified some of the impacts and implications of the different approaches on the effectiveness 
of the contract management process.  Further research should investigate the reasons why the 
Air Force and Navy use these different approaches and could identify any best practices and 
lessons learned resulting from the use of these approaches. 
5.0 Current Research 
The objective of the ongoing fourth research project is to collect empirical data on the 
current management practices of services acquisition within the US Army.  To collect this data, 
an anonymous, web-based survey was employed using the survey software “Survey Monkey.”  
The survey included a total of 81 questions; however, utilizing embedded logic functionality 
within the survey, participants only provided responses to approximately 60 questions.   
The participants for this survey were selected based on the organization they worked for 
and their position within the organization.  The goal was to gather data from every organization 
within the Army Contracting Command that directly manages or oversees the contracting of 
services.  Once all of the organizations were identified, the individual personnel were selected 
based on their position within the organization.  The researchers sought to have senior 
contracting officers within the selected organizations complete the survey.  The purpose here 
was to ensure that the person completing the survey had a comprehensive view and 
understanding of how his/her organization managed services contracts.     
The only exception to the criteria above was the exclusion of the Expeditionary 
Contracting Command from taking the survey.  The researchers intentionally omitted the 
organization within this command for two primary reasons.  First, because of the uniqueness of 
contracting that takes place during contingency operations, the researchers felt the data 
provided by the Expeditionary Contracting Command would not accurately reflect or correlate 
well with contracting practices during peacetime operations.  Secondly, the researchers did not 
want to add additional work to these personnel because of the environment and existing 
workload that Expeditionary Contracting Command is already experiencing.      
The survey link was sent to 81 organizations in February 2009.  The survey remained 
available through mid-March, giving the participants sufficient time to respond.  At the end of 
this period, a total of 61 surveys were fully completed, which represents a 75% response rate.  
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The survey responses are presently being compiled and analyzed.  A report based on the 
survey results will be prepared in summer 2009.  
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Abstract 
This research builds upon the emerging body of knowledge on organizational 
assessments of contract management processes.  Since the development of the Contract 
Management Maturity Model© in 2003, several DoD, Air Force, Navy, Army, and defense 
contractor organizations have undergone contract management process assessments as a part 
of their process-improvement effort.  The assessments were conducted using the Contract 
Management Maturity Model (CMMM) as the initial step in a program of contract management 
process improvement. The purpose of this research is to use these combined contract 
management process assessment results to characterize the current state of practice of 
contract management within the Department of Defense and defense organizations.  This 
extended abstract provides the conceptual framework for the Contract Management Maturity 
Model (CMMM) and discusses the components of the CMMM.  The symposium presentation 
and resulting research report will summarize the CMMM assessment ratings, analyze the 
assessment results in terms of contract management process maturity, discuss the implications 
of these assessment results for process improvement and knowledge management 
opportunities, and provide insight on consistencies and trends in these assessment results to 
defense contract management. 
Keywords: assessments, contracting, contract management, procurement. 
Background 
Procurement and contract management have become increasingly important in the 
commercial industry as well as in the federal government. As organizations continue to focus on 
core competencies and outsource non-core, yet critical functions, these organizations are 
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relying on procurement processes as a key to achieving and maintaining a competitive 
advantage (Quinn, 2005; Patel, 2006). In addition, the federal government continues to increase 
its level of public spending for goods and services. The Department of Defense obligations on 
contracts have more than doubled between fiscal years 2001 and 2008—to over $387 billion, 
with over $200 billion just for services (GAO, 2009, February).   
The extent and amount of federal procurement spending demands that these 
procurement processes be well managed (Thai, 2004). However, recent Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) reports reflect that this is not the case. The GAO has listed contract 
management as a “high risk” area for the federal government since 1990 and continues to 
identify it as high risk (GAO, 2007a, January). Within the federal government, the procurement 
and contracting function has been elevated to an organizational core competency (Kelman, 
2001) and is receiving extensive emphasis in the areas of education, training, and the 
development of workforce competence models (Newell, 2007; GAO, 2007b, January).  
In addition to a focus on increasing individual procurement competency, organizations 
are now focusing on increasing procurement process competence through the use of 
organizational process maturity models. Just as individual competence will lead to greater 
success in performing tasks, organizational process capability will ensure consistent and 
superior results for the enterprise (Frame, 1999; Kerzner, 2001). 
The background and conceptual framework of procurement process maturity and, 
specifically, the Contract Management Maturity Model, will first be presented. The assessment 
sites will then be profiled, followed by the analysis of the assessment findings and implications 
for process improvement and knowledge management opportunities. Finally, a brief discussion 
on consistent trends in the practice of contract management throughout the federal government 
will be presented. 
Conceptual Framework 
A review of the procurement literature finds an established body of knowledge focused 
on the transformation of the procurement function from a tactical to a strategic perspective. 
Beginning with Henderson’s (1975) prediction of the purchasing revolution in 1964, to Kraljic’s 
work emphasizing the need for a strategic supply management perspective (1983) and Reck 
and Long’s research on developing the purchasing function to be a competitive weapon (1988), 
the literature reflects the use of various organizational models for the development of the 
procurement function. These development models reflect the transition of procurement from a 
tactical to a strategic or integrative function.  This discussion summarizes the most significant 
models used to measure the development of an organization’s procurement function.  
Reck and Long’s (1988) model describes a four-stage development of the procurement 
function from passive, to independent, to supportive, and finally, integrative. Leenders and 
Blenkhorn (1988) model describes the three degrees of the procurement function’s contribution 
to organizational objectives. Bhote’s (1989) model reflects four stages of procurement 
development ranging from confrontation, arms’ length, goal congruence, and finally, full 
partnership. Freeman and Cavinato (1990) present a four-stage procurement development 
model described as buying, purchasing, procurement, and supply. Burt, Dobler, and Starling 
(2003) present a four-stage progression to world-class supply management. This progression 
includes clerical, mechanical, proactive, and finally, world-class.  
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It should be noted that these procurement development models are based on the 
development of the procurement function—specifically, the procurement function’s orientation 
and support of organizational strategy and objectives. As noted in the literature, some 
organizations’ procurement functions reflect more of a tactical purchasing perspective, while 
other organizations’ procurement functions reflect a more strategic perspective. The 
development models found in the literature reflect the stage of development of the 
organization’s procurement function. These development models are not focused on the 
capability of the procurement processes or the strength and maturity of the procurement 
processes within the organization, but on the procurement function’s orientation and support of 
organizational strategy and objectives. An organization’s procurement function can be in the 
early stages of development from tactical to strategic, yet its procurement process may reflect a 
high level of maturity. On the other hand, an organization’s procurement function may be at the 
later stages of development toward strategic procurement, but may have weak or immature 
procurement processes. Thus, these procurement developmental models reflect the 
transformation of the organization’s procurement function, whereas capability maturity models 
are used to assess an organization’s processes to determine the degree of capability or maturity 
of those processes.  The next section will discuss the maturity model concept. 
Capability maturity models have been used by many organizations to assess the level of 
capability and maturity of their most critical processes. In these maturity models, process 
capability is defined as “the inherent ability of a process to produce planned results” (Ahern, 
Clouse & Turner, 2001), and maturity is defined as “a measure of effectiveness in any specific 
process” (Dinsmore, 1998). Most maturity models are built on a series of maturity levels—each 
maturity level reflective of the level of competence for that process. As the organization gains 
process competence, it moves up the maturity scale. As maturity increases, so does capability 
and predictability, while risk decreases.  Some of the more established capability maturity 
models include the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) Capability Maturity Model (SEI CMM) 
and the Project Management Maturity Model (PMMM). These will be discussed next. 
In 1986, the Software Engineering Institute (SEI), with assistance from the MITRE 
Corporation, began developing a process maturity framework intended to assist organizations in 
improving their software engineering process. The fully developed Capability Maturity Model 
(CMM) and associated questionnaire was released in 1993 (Ahern et al., 2001). The SEI CMM 
has become the most influential quality management system in the United States software 
industry (Persse, 2001). The CMM is based on five maturity levels—Level 1- Initial, Level 2 - 
Repeatable, Level 3 - Defined, Level 4 - Managed, and Level 5 - Optimizing (Persse, 2001; 
Ahern et al., 2001). 
The application of capability maturity models to the project management field has been 
the topic of recent field research—both within academia as well as project management training 
and consulting companies (Bolles, 2002; Crawford, 2001; Foti, 2002, Kerzner, 2001; Ibbs & 
Kwak, 2000; Jugdev & Thomas, 2002; Helms, 2002). This recent field research extends the 
theory of the Software Engineering Institute's CMM model and applies this framework to the 
project management discipline. There are several project management maturity models 
currently in use today. Kerzner's Project Management Maturity Model (PMMM), similar to the 
SEI CMM and the other project management maturity models, is comprised of five levels, with 
each level representing a different degree of organizational maturity in project management. 
The PMMM is based on five maturity levels—Level 1- Common Language, Level 2 - Common 
Processes, Level 3 - Singular Methodology, Level 4 - Benchmarking, and Level 5 - Continuous 
Improvement (Kerzner, 2001). The SEI CMM and Kerzner’s PMMM maturity models are 
excellent examples of how the concept of capability maturity models have been applied to the 
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software management and project management processes. The literature shows that maturity 
models are effective methods for assessing and improving organizational competence and 
maturity. The next section will discuss the application of the maturity model concept to contract 
management. 
Contract Management Maturity Model 
The maturity model concept was first applied to organizational contract management 
processes by Rendon in 2003 with the development of the Contract Management Maturity 
Model (Rendon, 2003). With the increase in importance of the procurement function and the 
procurement function’s transformation from a tactical to strategic perspective as reflected in the 
procurement literature, the Contract Management Maturity Model (CMMM) was developed to 
assess the capability and maturity of an organization’s contract management processes 
(Rendon, 2003). “Contract management,” as used in the model, is defined as the “art and 
science of managing a contractual agreement throughout the contracting process” (Garrett & 
Rendon, 2005, p. 270). “Maturity,” as defined in the model, refers to organizational capabilities 
that can consistently produce successful business results for buyers and sellers of products, 
services, and integrated solutions (2005). Thus, contract management refers to the buyer’s 
(procurement) process as well as the seller’s (business development and sales) process.  The 
structure of the CMMM is based on six contract management key process areas and five levels 
of process maturity.  The next section will discuss these components of the Contract 
Management Maturity Model. 
CMMM Key Process Areas 
The CMMM provides the organization with a detailed roadmap for improving the 
capability of its contract management processes. The model reflects the six contract 
management key process areas as well as key practice activities within each process area.   
1. Procurement Planning: The process of identifying which organizational needs can be 
best met by procuring products or services outside the organization. This process 
involves determining whether to procure, how to procure, what to procure, how much 
to procure, and when to procure. Procurement planning activities include conducting 
stakeholder analysis, conducting outsourcing analysis, determining requirements and 
developing related documents, conducting market research, selecting the 
procurement method, and selecting the contract and incentive type. 
2. Solicitation Planning: The process of preparing the documents needed to support the 
solicitation. This process involves documenting program requirements and identifying 
potential sources. Solicitation planning activities include developing solicitation 
documents such as RFPs (Request for Proposal) or IFBs (Invitation for Bid), 
developing contract terms and conditions, and developing proposal evaluation 
criteria. 
3. Solicitation: The process of obtaining information (bids or proposals) from 
prospective sellers on how project needs can be met. Solicitation activities include 
advertising procurement opportunities, conducting industry and pre-proposal 
conferences, and amending solicitation documents as required. 
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4. Source Selection: The process of receiving bids or proposals and applying 
evaluation criteria to select a provider. Source-selection activities include evaluating 
proposals, negotiating contract terms and conditions, and selecting the contractor. 
5. Contract Administration: The process of ensuring that each party’s performance 
meets contractual requirements. Contract administration activities include conducting 
a post-award conference, monitoring the contractor’s performance, and managing 
contract changes. 
6. Contract Closeout: The process of verifying that all administrative matters are 
concluded on a contract that is otherwise physically complete. This involves 
completing and settling the contract, including resolving any open items. Contract 
closeout activities include verifying and documenting contract completion and 
compliance with requirements, making final payment, disposing of buyer-furnished 
property and equipment, documenting lessons learned and best practices, and 
collecting contractor past-performance information. 
Each of these contract management key process areas includes various key practice 
activities supporting the specific process. The current state of practice of contract management 
includes various best practices in performing these key practice activities. How an organization 
performs the key process areas and the extent to which the key practices incorporate best 
practices will determine the organization’s contract management process maturity level.  The 
CMMM consist of five levels of maturity which are discussed next. 
CMMM Maturity Levels 
The CMMM consists of five levels of maturity applied to the six key process areas 
previously discussed. The five maturity levels reflected in the model allow an organization to 
assess its level of capability for each of the six key process areas of the procurement process. 
The six key process areas and related practice activities allow the organization to focus on 
specific areas and activities involved in procurement.  The five levels of maturity range from an 
“ad hoc” level (Level 1), to a “basic,” disciplined process capability (Level 2), to a fully 
“structured,” established, and institutionalized process capability (Level 3), to a level 
characterized by processes “integrated” with other organizational processes resulting in 
synergistic, enterprise-wide benefits (Level 4), and finally, to a level in which “optimized” 
processes focus on continuous improvement and adoption of lessons learned and best 
practices (Level 5). The following is a brief description of each maturity level. 
Level 1 – Ad Hoc: The organization at this initial level of process maturity acknowledges 
that contract management processes exist and that these processes are accepted and 
practiced throughout various industries and within the public and private sectors. In addition, the 
organization’s management understands the benefit and value of using contract management 
processes. Although there are no organization-wide, established, basic contract management 
processes, some established contract management processes do exist and are used within the 
organization; however, these established processes are applied only on an ad hoc and sporadic 
basis to various contracts. There is no rhyme or reason as to which contracts these processes 
are applied. Furthermore, there is informal documentation of contract management processes 
existing within the organization, but this documentation is used only on an ad hoc and sporadic 
basis on various contracts. Finally, organizational managers and contract management 
personnel are not held accountable for adhering to, or complying with, any basic contract 
management processes or standards. 
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Level 2 – Basic: Organizations at this level of maturity have established some basic 
contract management processes and standards within the organization, but these processes 
are required only on selected complex, critical, or high-visibility contracts—such as contracts 
meeting certain dollar thresholds or contracts with certain customers. Some formal 
documentation has been developed for these established contract management processes and 
standards. Furthermore, the organization does not consider these contract management 
processes or standards established or institutionalized throughout the entire organization. 
Finally, at this maturity level, there is no organizational policy requiring the consistent use of 
these contract management processes and standards on other than the required contracts. 
Level 3 – Structured: At this level of maturity, contract management processes and 
standards are fully established, institutionalized, and mandated throughout the entire 
organization. Formal documentation has been developed for these contract management 
processes and standards, and some processes may even be automated. Furthermore, since 
these contract management processes are mandated, the organization allows the tailoring of 
processes and documents in consideration for the unique aspects of each contract, such as 
contracting strategy, contract type, terms and conditions, dollar value, and type of requirement 
(product or service). Finally, senior organizational management is involved in providing 
guidance, direction, and even approval of key contracting strategy, decisions, related contract 
terms and conditions, and contract management documents. 
Level 4 – Integrated: Organizations at this level of maturity have contract management 
processes that are fully integrated with other organizational core processes, such as financial 
management, schedule management, performance management, and systems engineering. In 
addition to representatives from other organizational functional offices, the contract’s end-user 
customer is also an integral member of the buying or selling contracts team. Finally, the 
organization’s management periodically uses metrics to measure various aspects of the 
contract management process and to make contract- related decisions. 
Level 5 – Optimized: The fifth and highest level of maturity reflects an organization 
whose management systematically uses performance metrics to measure the quality and 
evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the contract management processes. At this level, 
continuous process improvement efforts are also implemented to improve the contract 
management processes. Furthermore, the organization has established lessons learned and 
best practices programs to improve contract management processes, standards, and 
documentation. Finally, contract management process streamlining initiatives are implemented 
by the organization as part of its continuous process-improvement program.  
It should be noted that the CMMM uses a purposeful survey designed to acquire data on 
organizational contract management processes. The CMMM survey is only administered to fully 
qualified contracting officers and supervisors, as opposed to lower-level and inexperienced 
contract specialists. The assessment results are used to provide a qualitative assessment of 
organizational contract management process maturity and not an assessment of an individual’s 
knowledge of contract management. Additional information on the CMMM key process areas, 
key process activities, and maturity levels are provided in Garrett and Rendon (2005). 
The CMMM is limited as an assessment tool simply by the fact that it is based on 
qualitative survey data. Thus, it is only as effective as the responses to the survey questions. 
The CMMM should be used as an initial tool in assessing an organization’s contract 
management processes. The CMMM results should be validated with follow-up assessments, 
including personal interviews based on the initial CMMM assessment results, audits of 
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procurement files, and reviews of procurement process documentation. Additionally, 
comparison of CMMM results with other procurement metrics—such as procurement 
administrative lead time, small business awards, and number of protested contract awards—will 
also provide additional back-up to the CMMM assessment.  It should also be noted that the 
CMMM assessments do not constitute a quantitative analysis nor do they provide any 
determination of statistical significance in the assessment results.  
The remaining sections of this report will profile the organizations that were assessed 
using the CMMM, summarize the assessment ratings, analyze the assessment results in terms 
of contract management process maturity, discuss the implications of these assessment results 
for process-improvement and knowledge-management opportunities, and provide insight on 
consistencies and trends in these assessment results to defense contract management. 
Editor’s Note: This is the extended abstract of this research.  The complete research report will be 
available at www.acquisitionresearch.org 
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Army Contracting Command Demographics 
Presenter: Dr. David Lamm, Professor Emeritus from the Graduate School of Business and Public 
Policy (GSBPP), served at NPS as both a military and civilian professor from 1978 through his 
retirement in January 2004, teaching a number of acquisition and contracting courses, as well as 
advising thesis and MBA project students.  During his tenure, he served as the Academic Associate 
for the Acquisition & Contracting Management (815) MBA Curriculum, the Systems Acquisition 
Management (816) MBA Curriculum, the Master of Science in Contract Management (835) distance-
learning degree, and the Master of Science in Program Management (836) distance-learning degree.  
He created the latter three programs.  He also created the International Defense Acquisition 
Resources Management (IDARM) program for the civilian acquisition workforce throughout the 
country.  Finally, in collaboration with the GSBPP Acquisition Chair, he established and served as (PI) 
for the Acquisition Research Program, including inauguration of an annual Acquisition Research 
Symposium.  He also developed the Master of Science in Procurement & Contracting degree program 
at St. Mary’s College in Moraga, CA, and served as a Professor in both the St. Mary’s and The 
George Washington University’s graduate programs. 
He has researched and published numerous articles and wrote an acquisition text entitled Contract 
Negotiation Cases: Government and Industry, 1993.  He served on the editorial board for the National 
Contract Management Journal and was a founding member of the editorial board for the Acquisition 
Review Quarterly now known as the Defense Acquisition Review Journal.  He served as the NPS 
member of the Defense Acquisition Research Element (DARE) from 1983-1990. 
Prior to NPS, he served as the Supply Officer aboard the USS Virgo (AE-30) and the USS Hector 
(AR-7).  He also had acquisition tours of duty at the Defense Logistics Agency in Contract 
Administration and the Naval Air Systems Command, where he was the Deputy Director of the Missile 
Procurement Division. 
He holds a BA from the University of Minnesota and a MBA and DBA both from The George 
Washington University.  He is Fellow of the National Contract Management Association and received 
that association’s Charles A. Dana Distinguished Service Award and the Blanche Witte Award for 
Contracting Excellence.  He created the NCMA’s Certified Professional Contracts Manager (CPCM) 
Examination Board and served as its Director from 1975-1990.  He is the 1988 NPS winner of the 
RADM John J. Schieffelin Award for Teaching Excellence. 
Author: Dr. Timothy Reed 
Abstract 
This study focuses on the demographics of contracting personnel in the newly formed 
Army Contracting Command (ACC) headquartered at Fort Belvoir in Northern Virginia.  This 
new Command has approximately 4,100 civilian contracting personnel in the 1102 (contract 
management) occupational career field, and 255 military officers and enlisted all located around 
the globe.  The new commander, Mr. Jeffrey Parsons, asked the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) to undertake an effort to understand the nature (demographics) of his contracting 
workforce as well as how it compares to other similar contracting workforces in the DoD, the 
civilian Federal agencies and, to the extent possible, private industry. 
Numerous acquisition studies and commissions have cited personnel management as 
one of the most critical factors contributing to the success or failure of buying organizations.  
Strategic human capital management and DoD Contract Management have been on the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) High-risk List for the last several years. Actions to 
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understand the nature and dynamics of the acquisition workforce are a first step toward the 
development and execution of an integrated strategic human capital management plan. 
Specific data for this study have come primarily from the Army Contracting Command 
personnel database.  Additional data were obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC) and the Defense Acquisition University (DAU).  Data at a more aggregate level have 
been obtained from the US Air Force, the Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI) and 
professional/industry associations, such as the National Contract Management Association 
(NCMA) and the Institute for Supply Management (ISM). 
Demographic data initially explored include: Age, Gender, Grade Level, Years of 
Service, Pay Plan (civilians), Educational Level, Degree Type, Certification Level in Contracting, 
and Years to Anticipated Retirement.  Other demographic data to be researched include: Year 
Certified at Current Level, Other Professional Certifications, Military Reserve Affiliation 
(civilians), Prior Military Service Organization (civilians), Prior Military Service Length (civilians), 
How Accessed in Current Position, Year Accessed into Current Position, and Professional 
Affiliation(s).  Additional demographics, such as organizational factors, will be added as the 
research progresses.  These data will be periodically extracted from the appropriate databases 
to establish trends and suggest management actions to address critical issues. 
Closely related to an organization’s demographics are the skills and competencies held 
by workforce members. Educational degrees and certification levels held by employees may be 
indicative of the ability of the workforce to perform effectively and efficiently; however, 
competency and technical/professional skill levels are also important indicators of the 
workforce’s capabilities.  The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Federal 
Acquisition Institute (FAI) have conducted competency studies that have attempted to identify 
contracting proficiency levels for various competencies generally grouped as being of either a 
business or technical nature.  Examples of some of the more critical skills in each of these 
categories includes creative thinking, problem solving, customer service, and interpersonal skills 
in the business category; and cost/price analysis, proposal evaluation, negotiation, and source 
selection in the technical category.  This research uses the OSD and FAI study results for 
comparison purposes. 
In recent years, many DoD organizations have begun to contract with private firms to 
perform contracting functions.  Several factors have led to an increased reliance upon the 
private sector to provide services, one of the most critical factors being the lack of adequate 
numbers of civil servants to perform the functions required of buying organizations.  In order to 
get a general idea of the numbers and types of contractor personnel that may be under contract, 
a questionnaire was e-mailed to the fifteen ACC Principal Assistants Responsible for 
Contracting (PARCs).  The questionnaire did not ask for names (firms/employees) or the 
specific functions contractor personnel performed.  It did ask for numbers of contractor firms and 
employees, percentage of the workforce represented by contractor employees, gender, age 
ranges, educational credentials, years of contracting experience, and prior Government 
experience, including any Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) contracting 
certifications. 
In summary, the objectives of this research are to: (1) identify, collect and maintain key 
demographics regarding the ACC contracting workforce, (2) analyze the demographic database, 
(3) establish a baseline for the training  and competencies of ACC members, (4) identify a 
process to determine the key issues involved in member decisions to join and leave the 
contracting workforce, (5) identify best practices from government and industry regarding 
incentives to enhance contracting workforce performance, and (6) provide recommendations for 
improving the capability of the ACC contracting workforce. 
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Chair: James T. Simpson, Dean, College of Business Administration, 
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Discussant: Michael Schwind, Vice President, Maritime Solutions Sector, 
Siemens Product Lifecycle Management Software 
UK Defence Acquisition Process for NEC: Transaction Governance within 
an Integrated Project Team 
Ermias Kebede, Eunic Maytorena, David Lowe and Graham Winch, 
Manchester Business School 
The Theory and Measurement of Interorganizational Collaborative 
Capacity in the Acquisition and Contracting Context 




Chair: Dr. James (Jim) T. Simpson is Dean and Distinguished Professor of Marketing in the College 
of Business at the University of Alabama in Huntsville.  Simpson received his BS and MBA degrees 
from the University of Southern Mississippi, and his PhD in Marketing and Applied Statistics from the 
University of Alabama. Prior to being appointed Dean in January 2008, Simpson served as the Chair of 
the Management and Marketing Department and for three years was the Director of the UAHuntsville 
Center for the Management of Science and Technology.  In 2005, he was elected President of the 
American Marketing Association Technology and Innovation Special Interest Group.  His research in 
the structure and behavior of supply chain systems, marketing high-technology products, and risk 
management in software development has been published in the leading US and international 
academic journals. Simpson has served as a visiting scholar and professor at some of the world’s 
leading universities in Russia, Romania, France, England, China, Ireland, and Taiwan.  In 2004, he 
received the Academy of Marketing Science National Outstanding Marketing Teacher Award. In 2005, 
the UAH business school alumni chose Simpson as the faculty member who has had the greatest 
impact on their lives.  In addition to his academic work, he has consulted with numerous military and 
business organizations in the US and abroad. Simpson retired from the US Army Reserves in 1994 
following 24 years as a field artillery officer.  
Discussant: Michael A. Schwind is Vice President of Maritime Solutions, Siemens PLM.  Schwind’s 
professional career has encompassed the engineering and manufacturing lifecycle industries.  In 1998, 
he commenced his employment as an employee of McDonnell Douglas Corporation. Since then, he has 
worked his way up through the organization and across several acquisitions (EDS, SDRC and 
Siemens).  He has consulted with numerous Fortune 100 companies such as General Electric, Ford, 
Boeing, Hewlett-Packard, Lockheed Martin, and Honeywell. In his current position as Vice President of 
Maritime Solutions, his relationships span across the Aerospace and Defense community—including 
the OEM Tier 1 Shipyards of Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding and General Dynamics Marine Systems. 
He has numerous relationships across the NAVY and Marine Corps.  Schwind has been a guest 
speaker at multiple industry events and is a current member of Surface Navy Association (SNA) and 
American Society of Naval Engineers.  
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UK Defence Acquisition Process for NEC: Transaction 
Governance within an Integrated Project Team 
Presenter: Mr. Ermias Kebede graduated from the School of Physics and Astronomy at the 
University of Manchester in 2006 with an Upper-Second Class Honours degree in Physics with 
Business and Management. He continued his education by undertaking a Master’s in Business at 
MBS, for which he received a Merit. His Master’s dissertation, “Privatising New Build,” addressed 
issues concerning the privatisation of the construction of nuclear power stations in the UK. Kebede is 
a PhD candidate in his second year at MBS, researching UK defence acquisition applying a 
transaction cost approach.    
Ermias Kebede  
Centre for Research in the Management of Projects 
Manchester Business School 
Booth Street East 
Manchester M15 6PB 
United Kingdom 
E-mail: ermias.kebede@postgrad.mbs.ac.uk  
Authors: 
Dr. Eunice Maytorena completed her PhD degree at Bartlett School of Graduate Studies (UCL) in 
2003 on the cognitive understanding of the building conversion process. An architect by training, her 
work experience includes architectural design and consultancy, research in various aspects of the 
built environment, and lecturing in project management. Maytorena worked on several research 
projects investigating risk perceptions and risk management in project forms of organisations. From 
2006-2009, she was a researcher on NECTISE (Network Enabled Capability Through Innovative 
Systems Engineering), exploring organisational aspects of Through Life Systems Management. 
Maytorena became a lecturer in Construction Project Management for MBS in 2007.  
Dr. David Lowe is a senior lecturer in Commercial Management at MBS. He is a Fellow of the Royal 
Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) and a registered practitioner of the Higher Education 
Academy. Lowe is a member of the RICS UK Education Standards Board and the International 
Association for Contract and Commercial Management (IACCM). Lowe is an editorial board member 
for the Journal of Financial Management of Property and Construction and the RICS Research Paper 
Series. His consultancy work includes benchmarking the engineering and project management 
provision of an international pharmaceutical company. His research and teaching activities 
encompass a wide-range of project-based industries.  
Prof. Graham Winch is the Director of the Centre for Research in the Management of Projects and 
the BP Managing Projects Executive Education programme at MBS. Winch is a member of the 
Comité Consultatif, Centre Scientifique et Technique du Bâtiment, France, the Comite Scientifique, 
Réseau Activités et Métiers de l'Architecture et de l'Urbanisme, the Peer Review College of the 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, and the Editorial Board of Construction 
Management and Economics. He is an advisor on construction innovation policy to the Dutch, French, 
and UK governments. He is an academic-lead in Through Life Systems Management for NECTISE 
from 2006-2009.  
Abstract 
Using a 3-tier framework for a study of the acquisition of an Advance Military Vehicle 
(AMV), we explore the shaping of the buyer-supplier relationship in the context of the UK 
defence acquisition process. This relationship encompasses the Ministry of Defence (MoD), a 
monopsonist, partnering with a monopolistic defence industry. The transition from an 
oligopolistic to monopolistic defence industry is a result of a number of government policies that 
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have created a consolidated defence industrial base. Defence industry relationships have 
historically been adversarial, making defence acquisition in the past inefficient. We identify 
Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) as being central to the institutional level aims of creating a 
collaborative industrial relation. IPTs characterise relational contracting practices at the 
governance level, which demands communication, collaboration and trust. However, difficulties 
at the process level in utilising relational contracting because of a lack of definition, 
communication and mutual gain within the day-to-day business of the IPT limit the benefits of 
this approach. This failure to create an effective partnership between the MoD and its prime 
contractors highlights the major challenge facing the UK defence sector in its transition towards 
capability acquisition, such as Network Enabled Capability (NEC). NEC demands a more 
collaborative, through-life approach to defence acquisition. 
Introduction 
Defence acquisition has undergone profound changes in recent years as the 
consolidation of the supply sector, the shift towards the acquisition of capability rather than 
platforms and the development of systems-of-systems technologies have generated major 
challenges for both demand and the supply sides. Through a case study of an Advanced 
Military Vehicle (AMV) and the Integrated Project Team (IPT) that is delivering it, we propose in 
this paper to explore these issues using a three-tier model that captures how institutional 
policies are experienced within the project team and how, in turn, those experiences shape 
institutional policies. Our conceptual framework for this analysis are drawn from Gidden’s (1984) 
work on structuration and Williamson’s (1975,1985) work on transaction cost economics (TCE) 
as a model of understanding managers’ behaviour in an economic environment characterised 
by a complex and shifting mix of market and hierarchy in relationships between organisations. 
The model framework aims to provide an analysis of the institutional, governance and process 
levels of a transaction. 
At the institutional level, we aim to understand the current acquisition policy of the buyer, 
the MoD, and how this impacts its suppliers in the defence industrial base. An historical review 
of defence industrial relations is therefore presented. It is shown that the MoD is shifting its 
acquisition policy from being platform-centric to capability-centric; coinciding with this 
modernisation programme is a gradual change in the structure of the defence sector. In the 
governance level section, we use a transaction cost approach to examine the choice of 
relational contracting, demonstrating how the IPT structure and ethos favours relational 
contracting practices. The discussions will emphasise the bidding process, contract award 
stage, and the demonstration phase, and the impact each has on the long-term relationship 
between the MoD and its prime contractor. The final level of the three-tier model is the process 
level. In the process level section, we consider the organisational structure of the IPT. We look 
closely at how the IPT works as a team, how they deliver the tasks for each phase in the context 
of the routines on the project. In our discussions, we emphasise the importance of cross-level 
interaction. We begin the paper by explaining our conceptual framework and method.    
Conceptual Framework 
Our conceptual framework for investigating the processes of the acquisition of military 
vehicles is derived from the general sociological work of Giddens (1984) on “structuration,” 
which has been more recently developed as the “tectonic approach” to organisation (Winch 
1994). Applying the tectonic approach to the management of projects identifies three levels of 
analysis that interact with each other in a recursive cycle of constraint and change (as illustrated 
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in Figure 1). In the tectonic approach, the institutional level of analysis shapes and is shaped by 
decisions made at the governance level. Decisions at the governance level select the 
organisational structures within which the project process flows, but those processes also shape 
governance-level decisions. The process level is where the project is implemented through a 
flow of information, which initiates and controls a flow of materials.  
The institutional level covers the wide range of issues around the features of the national 
and sectoral business systems, but in the defence sector, the principal institutional 
manifestation is the current defence ministry acquisition policy, and so it is this institutional 
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Figure 1. The Tectonic Model 
(Winch, 2009) 
The conceptual framework for the analysis of the governance level is derived from 
institutional economics, particularly the work of Williamson (1975, 1985) on transaction cost 
economics, as adapted for project organisations by Winch (2001). Williamson’s basic 
proposition is that total costs of supply are derived from two main components—production 
costs and transaction costs. Production costs are well understood and, in essence, involve the 
efficient transformation of inputs into outputs, where prices are used to signal the most efficient 
choice of technology. Transaction costs are the costs of co-ordinating any complex production 
process and occur when a good or service crosses a “technologically separable interface.” He 
argues that there are two basic options for co-ordinating—or governing—transactions. A market 
transaction is where independent buyers and sellers meet in the market to negotiate a price for 
the supply of a good or service in a spot contract—prices are set by what Adam Smith called the 
“invisible hand” of the market. An hierarchical transaction is on in which the transaction is 
governed internally by administrative means—prices are determined by what Alfred Chandler 
called the “visible hand” of management through an authority relation. Between these two polar 
forms of transaction governance lay a wide variety of mixed forms of relational contracts. 
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What determines the most efficient governance mode on a project? Williamson argued 
that there were three main characteristics of transactions that influenced the choice of how they 
are governed: uncertainty, frequency and asset specificity. Uncertainty affects transactions 
because it creates bounded rationality for decision-makers. This bounded rationality makes 
writing a complete and unambiguous contract between the parties impossible because of 
uncertainty regarding the precise conditions under which the contract will be executed and also 
makes it impossible to measure fully the performance of the contract. Asset specificity is the 
condition in which either the buyer or supplier is limited in its choice of transaction partner due to 
the specific nature of the resources to be supplied. This asset specificity may be pre-contract (in 
which case, the problem is one of monopoly or monopsony in the market), or it may be 
generated post-contract because contract-specific investments are made by one or both of the 
parties in the hold-up problem (Masten, Meehan & Snyder, 1991). This generates the possibility 
of opportunism on the part of one of the parties as they exploit the other’s disadvantage—which 
often takes the form of withholding information from the other party. Frequency affects 
transaction governance because one-off transactions provide no opportunity to learn about the 
other party, while repeated transactions allow learning about the behaviour of the other party 
and hence the generation of trust. Thus, the most appropriate choice of transaction governance 
mode can be thought of as occupying a three-dimensional space in the manner indicated in the 
middle level of Figure 1. 
Governance has two distinct aspects: 
 The contractual, which captures the underlying legal basis of the relationship. While 
the precise formulation of these legal relationships varies significantly between 
countries, there is a large degree of functional equivalence in all developed 
economies between these formulations. 
 The relational, which captures the interpersonal and interorganisational aspects 
(processes and behaviours) of the governance arrangements around issues such as 
trust and perceived equity in governance. 
Within this perspective, the extremes of the governance continuum can be considered to 
be tending to zero on relationship aspects at the market end (pure spot contracting) and tending 
to zero on the contractual aspects at the hierarchy end (pure autocracy). Although some have 
argued that the contractual aspects can undermine the development of the relationship aspects, 
recent research has shown that they are more complementary than antagonistic dimensions of 
transaction governance (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). 
The process level in Figure 1 is shaped by the institutional and governance levels and in 
turn shapes those levels, which shows how, for a given project mission, riding the project 
lifecycle is a dynamic interplay between routines, tasks, and teams (Manning, 2008): 
 Routines are the learned practices developed within the industry recipe that are 
carried from project to project and then adapted to meet the needs of particular 
projects (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Routines therefore 
specify the how of riding the project lifecycle; they are an essential element of 
managerial activity, yet their implementation is contradictory in that they both 
constrain and enable managerial action. 
 Teams are the human resources allocated from the resource bases mobilised on 
particular projects, providing the who of riding the project lifecycle.  
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 Tasks are the what of riding the project lifecycle—the set of tasks that has to be 
completed in order to realise the particular project mission, typically captured in the 
work breakdown structure. 
Routines, tasks and teams are negotiated and renegotiated for a particular project 
chartered by its project mission. As the project moves through the lifecycle, the tasks change, 
and hence different teams that deploy different routines are mobilised. However, prior choices of 
routines also shape which teams are selected by which criteria and which tasks are deemed to 
be in scope to the project. The coordination routines used by project managers to organise  task 
execution teams need to be continually adapted to the needs of the particular project, while 
retaining enough overt good practice to serve as a legitimation for the actions of the project 
manager. Thus, the project process is indeed a negotiated order in which “the bases of 
concerted action (social order) must be reconstituted continually; or [...] worked at” (Strauss, 
Schatzman, Ehrlich, Bucher & Shabshin, 1971, p. 104), and routines provide the raw material 
for this work in the context of governance and institutions. 
Method 
Our research method to explore the dynamics of defence acquisition is a case of the 
acquisition of an Advanced Military Vehicle (AMV) by the UK’s Ministry of Defence (MoD). Our 
data on the institutional level come largely from a review of MoD policy documents 
complemented by a number of strategic-level interviews with key informants. Our data on the 
governance and process levels come from a case study of the AMV project organisation, which 
is delivering it for MoD, and consists of 19 field interviews with project participants and the 
collection of documentary data. The informants interviewed for this research are identified in 
Figure 3. This field research is still in progress, so the data reported here represent only a 
preliminary statement of our findings. The AMV is presently at the demonstration phase of the 
CADMID process presented in Figure 2. 
The Institutional Level 
The institutional level is represented by an evolving defence sector, characteristically 
dependent on national defence policy from successive governments. The UK defence sector is 
reliant on the buying behaviour of its largest single buyer (a monopsonist), the MoD. It is the 
MoD’s buying power that enables it to “determine the size, structure, conduct and performance 
of defence industries” (Hartley, 1991, p. 79). To understand the complexity of the UK defence 
acquisition process, it is important to comprehend the specific nature of the defence industry, 
the defence business system (the defence industrial base), and the economic policies that have 
shaped the defence sector. This narrative will develop the institutional level analysis by charting 
evolutions: from privatisation to prime contracting, from a competitive industrial sector to a 
consolidated, monopolistic one, and from protectionism to liberalisation.  
We begin our analysis of the defence sector at a critical point in UK defence history—the 
era of privatisation heralded by the Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher. Of the five 
largest defence companies in 1979, four were state owned: British Aerospace, British 
Shipbuilders, Royal Ordnance Factories and Rolls Royce. The exception was General Electric 
Company (GEC) (Smith, 1990). The government favoured a free market policy in which the 
MoD could engage in competitive tendering. The newly privatised firms and new entrants in the 
defence sector would bid for defence contracts, and the invisible hand of the market would 
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 Newly privatised firms were the recipient of vital technical and managerial 
knowledge, making the playing field unbalanced for new entrants; 
 Protectionist policy that favoured domestic defence companies meant there was 
minimal competition from foreign-owned companies. 
The lack of competition on the supply-side meant that the existence of monopolies was 
common in the defence sector, post-privatisation. The bargaining positions of the monopsonist 
buyer and monopolistic supplier were levelled by the buyer having regulatory powers and the 
supplier possessing monopoly powers. Furthermore, defence contracts predominantly 
incorporated cost-plus payment terms under which the MoD retained significant levels of 
project risk (Cullen & Hickman, 2001). Because of the complexity and uncertainty evident in 
defence projects, it is difficult to assess the efficiency of a cost-plus contract. A key part of cost-
plus contracts is the cost-reimbursable aspect of the agreement, making costly investments 
attractive to contractors (Williamson, 1967) and it was, therefore, a common feature of defence 
acquisition projects.  
The early days of privatisation were fraught with conflict between the MoD and the 
defence industry. “By the early 1980s there was considerable dissatisfaction with such 
traditional procurement policies. Lack of competition had, it was argued, created inefficiency in 
the defence sector, while cost-plus contracts created little incentives to keep costs down” 
(Bishop, 1995, p. 175). The MoD recognised that it had to change the nature of its role in the 
defence sector from its traditional monitoring and auditing function to a more stringent 
administrator role. It also acknowledged a desire to transfer the risk of defence projects to 
suppliers (Smith, 1990). Peter Levene, the MoD Chief of Defence Procurement (1984-91), was 
responsible for the implementation of the MoD’s new policy of “competition and collaboration.” 
The procurement reforms, more commonly known as the Levene reforms, targeted the 
“promotion of competition and the transfer of risk from the MoD to industry” (Macdonald, 1999, 
p. 6). The MoD was able to transfer the risk in procurement by replacing the cost-plus contracts 
with firm- or fixed-price contracts let by competitive tender. “Since 1983, MoD has become more 
conscious of the need to obtain better value for money in equipment procurement. As a result, it 
has become a more demanding customer, with competition as the central element in its more 
commercial approach” (Hartley, 1991, pp. 75-76).   
As the Cold War neared its end, in the late 80s, the UK defence budget was reduced 
from its peak in 1985 by a gradual decrease of 18% in real terms between 1986-87 and 1990-91 
(McIntosh, 1993). In addition, the MoD opened up defence contracts to foreign competition in a 
partial liberalisation of the defence sector: partial because the MoD continued to implement 
protectionist policies. The UK manufacturing sector was dependent, in supporting local 
economies and employment, on the defence sector; awarding defence contracts to foreign 
companies was politically sensitive. The Thatcher Government signed up to the Independent 
European Programme Group, which was geared towards opening up the European defence 
equipment market to greater international competition. Theoretically, overseas defence 
companies could compete for procurement contracts tendered by the MoD (Smith, 1990). 
However, it was evident that the MoD was not ready to pressure the domestic defence industry 
with competition from established foreign companies. In 1987-88, the only foreign-owned 
company belonging to the top 15 companies to receive a contract worth over £100 million was 
Boeing (Smith, 1990). The argument for the continuation of protectionist policies by the MoD 
was also due to the fear that key technological knowledge would be lost to foreign-owned 
companies. The prevailing view was this would damage the domestic defence sector and make 
the UK reliant on foreign technology. 
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Foreign-owned firms entered the UK defence sector in the more “acceptable” form of 
alliances, joint ventures and, mergers: safeguarding local jobs and preserving the domestic 
defence industries. The combination of competition, divestures and liberalisation brought about 
the restructuring of the UK defence industry. The larger defence companies moved to 
consolidate their positions by acquiring smaller firms. 
1988-89 saw major changes in structure and corporate strategy in the European 
Defence Industries. The GEC-Siemens bid for Plessey, the Daimler-Chrysler acquisition 
of [Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm], the merging of Aerospatiale’s avionics interests into 
Thomson CSF, were among the most notable of a range of acquisition and divestments, 
national and international, which have tended to increase concentration. (Smith, 1990, p. 
200)  
The restructuring of the UK defence sector transformed the defence industrial base from 
oligopolies to monopolies. Contrary to its own objectives of creating competition, the MoD was 
partly responsible for the creation of “industry champions.” When GEC moved to acquire 
Ferranti and VSEL, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission recommended against the 
acquisition. The MoD, however, intervened to encourage the acquisition in an overall aim to 
protect defence industrial capabilities, to ensure domestic demands were met, and support 
defence contractors to compete in the international defence exports market (Macdonald, 1999). 
Ironically, in 1999, GEC’s board decided to divest its defence business (Alenia Marconi 
Systems) to British Aerospace, which created the UK’s largest defence company, BAE 
Systems.  
During the 1990s, competitive tendering was more evident in defence contracting. This, 
however, was counteracted by the increase in monopoly defence industries, which to a large 
extent was counter intuitively supported by the MoD. The MoD, in effect, created a defence 
sector with few players controlling their own specialist component industries. UK defence 
companies began expanding their activities internationally, e.g., BAE Systems North America, 
and reducing their reliance on their domestic market. The UK defence procurement supply-
chain relationship in the late 90s was characterised by “global market conditions (concentration) 
and increased customer (MoD) sophistication to change” (Humphries & Wilding, 2004, p. 261). 
The restructuring of the defence sector combined with the introduction of firm and fixed price 
contracts had major effects on the once cosy relationship between the defence industry and 
ministry. The MoD moved to control the monopolistic supplier by introducing greater competition 
in the tendering process and by creating strict conditions on non-competitive contracts with 
monopoly suppliers. The “No Acceptable Price, No Contract” initiative was implemented in 1992 
in non-competitive defence contracts. This initiative was introduced to ensure that contractors 
would abide by the “value for money” principles. Target Cost Incentive agreements were 
predominantly used for non-competitive defence contracts. The contracts stipulated that the 
MoD and its contractor would share the risk of cost-overruns or the savings accrued 
(Macdonald, 1999). In placing these stringent controls on their suppliers in terms of costs and 
performance, the MoD was entering into a more adversarial relationship with the defence 
industry. “There was also a decline in mutual co-operation as civil servants adopted more 
hostile attitudes during contract negotiations in order to secure the lowest prices possible” 
(Macdonald, 1999, p. 18).  
Prime contracting was introduced as the mechanism for transferring risk from the 
customer (MoD) to the supplier. In the past, the MoD was responsible for integrating the 
separate components and systems of the platform (end product). The responsibility of systems 
integration was passed onto the main supplier (prime contractor) in the supply chain, and the 
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prime contractor was responsible for overall supply chain management. In security-sensitive 
areas, the MoD maintained control over the selection of subcontractors. The prime contractor 
was given project milestones, such as technical demonstrations or systems delivery, linked to 
payment terms in either firm- or fixed-price contracts (Mathews & Parker, 1999). The allocation 
of a prime contractor to a defence project can be a complex issue.  
The challenge of allocating a prime contractor rather than retaining systems production 
in-house (make-or-buy decision) is explainable using a transaction cost approach. The aim of 
prime contracting is to minimise the project risk. The risk is not always easy to identify, or cost, 
due to the complexities and uncertainties in defence contracting. The MoD is affected by 
information impactedeness problems (Williamson, 1975), as a result of the 
uncertainty/complexity being combined with bounded rationality. “MoD does not routinely obtain 
data on which to base an assessment of comparative costs” (Mathews & Parker, 1999, p. 36) 
making it difficult to choose the most cost-effective prime contractor. For the suppliers prime 
contracting was, at the beginning, a risky venture in terms of the costs or profits that could be 
recouped. Prime contractors responded by adding premiums for risk acceptance. When 
performance and budget milestones were achieved, the prime contractors gained premium 
payments on top of their profits. If the risk of overspending was not mitigated, then the 
contractor was damaged by the costs/penalties: thus the gamble. These uncertainties and 
complexities have, over time, become manageable: “Arguably, the UK defence industry is now 
more capable of developing weapon systems, rather than individual subsystems, than was 
previously the case” (Mathews & Parker, 1999, p. 37), through the advantages of what Winch 
(2001) terms the learning effects on transaction costs.  
The introduction of prime contracting was part of the MoD’s strategy to position itself as 
an “intelligent buyer” in the defence industry. This was achieved through the transfer of project 
risk to the suppliers, the introduction of more stringent contractual agreements—such as firm, 
fixed-price and incentive-based contracts—and competitive tendering as well as non-
competitive controls. The MoD, on the other hand, needed to address the adversarial nature of 
its relationship with industry. The introduction of the Strategic Defence Review (MoD, 1998) 
commenced the process of addressing the challenges in these relationships. It highlighted three 
areas in which defence procurement was failing to achieve efficiency (despite the changes 
mentioned above): poor value for money; poor project management; and poor industrial 
relationships. In order to tackle these issues, the MoD introduced the “Smart Procurement 
Initiative.” The initiative was a joint exercise with defence suppliers to identify a new set of 
procurement processes that would improve the way the MoD procured defence equipment. The 
changes were brought about with consultation from the Defence Industries Council and the 
Trade Associations.1 The MoD restructured its organisation as a result. In 1999, the three single 
service logistic organisations for the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, and Army, were unified to 
create the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO). In the same year, the Procurement Executive 
was given agency status, and became the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA). The 
responsibilities of the DLO and DPA are shown in the lifecycle process CADMID (Concept, 
Assessment, Disposal, Manufacture, In-Service and Disposal) in Figure 2. “The CADMID cycle 
has been used since 1999, when it was devised as part of the ‘Smart Procurement’ initiative to 
                                                
1 The Defence Industries Council is chaired by the Defence Secretary and constitutes representatives 
from the defence industries and the four major trade associations (the Society of British Aerospace 
Companies, Defence Manufacturers Association, Federation of the Electronics Industry and British Naval 
Equipment Association). The purpose of the council is for the MoD to consult the defence industries on 
matters of common interest (MoD, 1998). 
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deliver equipment capability within agreed performance, cost and time parameters” (MoD, 2006, 
p. 13). The DPA was given responsibility for the procurement phase of the lifecycle (Concept-to-













The reforms within the Smart Procurement Initiative were aimed not only at restructuring 
the MoD but also at looking to create a partnership with prime contractors in which competition 
would create better value for money and customer service. “This introduces a ‘whole-life 
approach’ to acquisition, and has as one of the main tenets, the use of MoD Integrated Projects 
Teams to work closely with all contractors and their suppliers in order to identify ‘Gainshare’ 
opportunities” (Cullen & Hickman, 2001, p. 525). Gainshare is the mechanism by which the MoD 
promotes cooperation with its prime contractor and incentivises them to identify possible 
savings which can then be inserted into the contract agreement. IPTs2 were created as an 
embodiment of the collaborative relationship between the MoD and its prime contractor. “The 
overriding objective of the IPTs is to reduce the costs of procurement by developing more open 
relationships with their contractors promoting innovation and monitoring all operations within a 
‘shared data environment’” (Cullen & Hickman, 2001, p. 527). 
The Smart Procurement Initiative, while having many advantages, was restricted in 
scope. The MoD recognised that in order to reform its supply-chain strategy it needed to look 
beyond procurement and encompass the entire acquisition process. The effective acquisition 
and support of defence capability incorporates initial procurement and on-going support as 
integral parts of the overall acquisition process. The Smart Procurement Initiative was renamed 
Smart Acquisition in 2000. The aim of Smart Acquisition is “to enhance defence capability by 
                                                
2 IPTs consist of MoD personnel from key specialisations (such as finance and defence requirements 
office) working alongside business unit representatives from the prime contractor to deliver defence 
acquisition from concept-to-disposal. 
Figure 2. CADMID  
(Adapted from NAO, 2004, p. 29) 
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acquiring and supporting equipment more effectively in terms of time, cost and performance” 
(MoD, 2001, p. 4). Smart Acquisition seeks to improve the relationship between the MoD and 
the defence sector based on seven principles:   
 A whole life approach, typified by applying through life costing techniques 
 Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) with clearly identified customers 
 A better, more open relationship with industry 
 More investment in the early phase of projects 
 Effective trade-offs between system performance, through-life costs and time  
 New procurement approaches, including incremental acquisition  
 A streamlined process for project approval  
With these principles, the MoD is making an implicit change in the way it wants to do 
business with its industrial base. The MoD wants to move away from the adversarial relationship 
which has typified defence equipment acquisition and create a partnership approach (MoD, 
2002). The issue of responsibility for project risks was an important driver of the changes made 
to the acquisition process. With Public Private Partnerships and Private Finance Initiatives, 
becoming more evident in defence equipment projects (MoD, 2002), risk management has 
become central to how projects are managed and delivered. The MoD is intent on placing the 
risk on the prime contractor; however, this means that it has to relinquish the propriety rights, 
which provide the returns on risk. This affords prime contractor the chance to exploit 
opportunities in the export market (depending on regulatory rules imposed on defence exports) 
using their proprietary knowledge and products. The MoD loses the technical know-how that 
comes with development and is thus more reliant on its industrial base, making the relationship 
it has with its suppliers ever more important. Smart Acquisition attempts to apply a range of 
principles to create an efficient and effective defence acquisition process. The MoD continues to 
restructure its organisation so that it can improve the acquisition process. The latest of these 
restructures was the merger of the DLO, DPA and the DCSA (Defence Communication Service 
Agency) in April 2007 to create Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S). The DE&S has 
assumed all responsibilities of the previous departments and agency—the main aim of the 
integration being to create a coherent organisation and remove dual accountability problems 
inherent in the past configuration (MoD, 2007).  
Central to the changing nature of defence industrial relationships is the formation of 
IPTs. The structure of the IPTs has slightly changed (with the restructuring of the MoD), but the 
vision remains the same as originally conceptualised. IPTs originally were dually accountable to 
the DPA and DLO, as shown in Figure 2. In the current DE&S structure, this dual accountability 
has been removed, however the day-to-day activities and the people working in IPTs remains 
the same as before (MoD, 2007).  
Although the main function of IPTs—the delivery of equipment and support to the Front 
Line—will remain fundamentally unchanged there will be differences to the ways in 
which they fulfil this role. In fulfilling these responsibilities, team leaders and their staff 
will, as now, be required to work within the overall DE&S governance framework and in 
accordance with its key processes. (MoD, 2007, p. 16)  
The vision remains to create better engagement between the MoD and its supplier(s) 
through the IPT mechanism. This is a policy vision, which has been espoused in numerous MoD 
policy papers and publications (MoD, 1998; 2002; 2005). For example, at the institutional level, 
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IPTs possess a policy context. On the governance level, they are identified in terms of the 
relational contracting approach they engender, and in investigating the day-to-day activities of 
IPT members, we can identify the “teams, tasks and routines,” which characterise the process 
level. This does not, however, suggest that the levels are inherently synergetic. As we shall 
discuss in the following sections, there are stark differences in the vision outlined at the 
institutional level, the purpose at the governance level, and the reality at the process level. 
A major development in UK defence acquisition in the last decade has been the 
transition towards “Capability Acquisition.” IPTs are responsible for delivering the capabilities 
required by the end-use customer, the Armed Forces. As early as 1998, the UK viewed its 
acquisition policy in terms of capabilities rather than platforms. In the Strategic Defence Review, 
the MoD (1998) states its desire to change its equipment acquisition from a “one for one basis” 
towards a more collective acquisition policy offering a “new level of battlefield capability.” “While 
the concept is still at a relatively early stage, we are now describing our Military Tasks in more 
generic terms using the language of effects. This supports a future force development process 
focussed on capability—able to contribute to delivering a range of effects—rather than like-for-
like platform replacement” (MoD, 2003, p. 10). The transition towards an acquisition policy 
based on capabilities has transformed the scope of defence acquisition towards a whole-life and 
integrated systems approach. Through-life capability management (TLCM) was introduced as a 
way of managing capability acquisition.  
There is a general shift in defence acquisition away from the traditional pattern of 
designing and manufacturing successive generations of platforms—leaps of capability 
with major new procurements or very significant upgrade packages—towards a new 
paradigm centred on support, sustainability and the incremental enhancement of existing 
capabilities from technology insertions. The emphasis will increasingly be on through-life 
capability management, developing open architecture that facilitates this and 
maintaining—and possibly enhancing—systems engineering competencies that 
underpin it. (MoD, 2005, p. 19)   
TLCM provides those in charge of delivering defence capability (IPTs and DE&S) with a 
holistic way of viewing current and future capability requirements, with incremental acquisition 
being a central part of the approach (MoD, 2006).  
TLCM will consider a much wider range of options for meeting capability needs, 
examining both new and in-service equipment solutions, exploring opportunities and 
implications for trading across all DLODs [Defence Lines of Development]—Equipment 
(including Support), Personnel, Training, Logistics, Infrastructure, Concepts—while 
considering capability delivery on a much longer term, programme basis. (MoD, 2007, p. 
7) 
“At the heart of the force structure and capabilities modernising programme is Network 
Enabled Capability (NEC)” (MoD, 2005, p. 20). The changes that are being planned at the 
operational level with Network Enabled Capability (NEC) has a direct effect on the overall 
strategic relationship between the MoD and industry. The MoD has identified, on the operational 
level, that it needs to use its information communication technology capability more effectively if 
it is going to meet the changing threats to national and international security. “NEC is crucial to 
the rapid delivery of military effect. The SDR New Chapter recognised NEC as being 
fundamental in counteracting terrorism abroad, with its ability to deliver precise and decisive 
military effects, with unparalleled speed and accuracy through linking sensors, decision-makers 
and weapon systems” (MoD, 2003, p. 11). Furthermore, NEC is the main focus of the response 
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to the changing nature of warfare: “Network Enabled Capability comprises three core elements: 
sensors (to gather information); a network (to fuse, communicate and exploit the information); 
and strike assets (to deliver military effects)” (James, 2004, p. 15). The aim is to use embedded 
ICT systems to create a network which will follow C4ISTAR (Command, Control, 
Communication and Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and 
Reconnaissance) capabilities.  
Thus, the current dynamic in the UK defence sector is shaped by three different (and not 
always complementary) factors: 
 Arrangements to cope with the effective bilateral monopoly in the markets for 
individual platform types by moving from competition to collaboration; 
 Changes inherent in the transition to acquiring capability rather than platforms via 
long-term contracts 
 Adapting to the opportunities offered by NEC integration across platforms to create 
systems of systems. 
The MoD’s response to these challenges is that: 
the nature of acquisition is evolving and we face an increasingly demanding and 
complex environment. Closer collaborative engagement between us and our industrial 
suppliers will be vital if we are to continue to deliver the improvements that the Armed 
Forces and UK taxpayers demand. (MoD, 2005, p. 131)  
Our preliminary research aims to identify how these institutional dynamics shape actions 
on the governance and process level, and consequently how actions at the process level shape 
the structure of governance, and in turn, the institutional level.  
The Governance Level 
The acquisition policies at the commencement of the project shaped significantly the 
governance arrangements. The feasibility stage in the mid-1990s involved 5 consortia; they are 
now all part of a single company. Of these proposals, 2 were taken forward and competing full 
proposals were submitted in 2001; the contract was awarded to the successful bidder in 2002. 
By 2004, these two former competitors had merged. This restructuring of the UK defence sector 
is experienced from the point of view of the governance level as a significant escalation of pre-
contract asset specificities thereby increasing the risks of opportunism. As we shall see, the 
growing risk of opportunism is being mitigated by a shift towards more collaborative transaction 
governance arrangements. This is one example of the way in which acquisition policies at the 
institutional level that are based on competitive tendering—in principle, in the absence of pre-
contract asset specificities—are being reshaped by changes at the governance level as the 
sector consolidates.  
Economic theory would predict vertical integration in such a situation—see the classic 
Fisher Body/General Motors case (e.g., Klein, 1996)—but this is rendered nugatory by the low 
transaction frequency. The MoD will only purchase around 65 vehicles from a one-off design in 
a single contract. The MoD has, therefore, been trying to develop more collaborative 
relationships with its suppliers, which are institutionalised in the concept of the Integrated 
Project Team (IPT) which from the perspective of the governance level can be conceived as a 
governance mechanism.  
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In addition to rising pre-contract asset specificity due to reduced competition at the 
governance level, uncertainty is increasing because of the shift from the procurement of 
platforms to the acquisition of “capability.” Unlike the platform it replaces, the contract for the 
AMV has an expected life of 37 years. From the in-service date, the Contractor Logistic Support 
contract will run for 5 years before it is renegotiated for the subsequent period. Considerable 
uncertainties surround the operational environment for the AMV over that period. The 
renegotiation process 5 years hence will also involve high levels of asset specificity as neither 
party has a viable alternative customer or supplier. This combination of uncertainty and asset 
specificity is likely to make negotiations difficult in the absence of high trust. 
Thus, one informant argued that  
[T]he evolution will be more towards a partnering relationship. If we [company] get it right 
we get to the point where there is no competition, we are automatically seen as the 
preferred source [...] against this backdrop of technology insertion, relieving equipment 
as opposed to replacing equipment we have to place ourselves in the position where we 
do become the customers best friend [...] Ultimately [this company] are going to have to 
go to TLCM. 
In order to set out the more collaborative aspirations of the IPT from the outset, one 
informant told us that  
The thing we did very early on when we signed the contract, is we got a joined IPT 
industry-MOD, we have a joint charter with a joint set of values [...] and the statement 
that we use collectively and the Project Manager from MOD coined at the time is we are 
wedded together in this, we all stand or fall together in success, if this doesn’t work there 
are no winners. And that has been the whole mentality behind it. So everybody is striving 
to make it work. 
This charter is presented in Panel 1. 
We will 
• Develop and maintain a team focused on delivering its commitments 
• Be professional in every aspect of the project 
• Recognise and celebrate success and progress at all levels of the team 
• Develop, maintain and enhance communication 
• Promote co-operation and joint problem solving 
• Develop trust and openness at all levels of the team to build strong and honest relationships, 
eliminating secrecy and defensive attitudes 
• Share knowledge throughout the project, enabling the provision of accurate information at all 
times 
Panel 1. The AMV IPT Project Charter 
(IPT documentation) 
This approach has yielded many positive results. We were told, for instance, that  
[T]his present MoD IPT in [programme name] is probably the best I have worked with in terms 
of friendliness, appreciative of our problems, sympathetic and working with us. There is a good 
work ethic in terms of wishing to work with us and help us help them. and It is very much, let’s 
take the customer along with us, let’s have the customer involved, so when we get to the 
milestone it is almost a rubber stamping exercise. 
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However, this collaborative approach also encountered a number of difficulties. One 
important idea behind the IPT was to have a co-located project team that could take advantage of 
team working, good communication and cooperation. This notion was to be realized through 
continuous interaction enabled by prescribed tasks, teams and routines. The management of 
relationships (customer, user, suppliers) was therefore a key tactic in this programme. However, 
the original bid was won through competitive tendering, and the dynamics inherent in such a 
process have placed significant constraints upon the IPT’s ability to collaborate because of the 
constraints of a project won by competition, with “a very tight contract, budget and margins 
squeezed to win the work.” For example, the proposed shared data environment (SDE), which 
would enable improved communication and coordination between industry and customer, was 
not effectively implemented due to cost and commercial constraints. 
The customer3 expectations have their foundation on the key performance requirement 
specified by the customer as well as industry’s offer—what was in the bid proposal. A challenge 
for the IPT is closing the gap between what was originally offered (the bid proposal) and the 
technical requirements specifications (TRS). Thus it was argued that  
I think there is a need to change in relation to the relationship with the customer. I know 
industry is in business, it wants to win the contract, it wants to make profits. But 
sometimes I think defence industry will tell the MOD what it wants to hear rather than 
what it is actually capable. You know they will promise everything and then there will be 
delays to the programme, because they can’t actually quite meet it.   
And that, 
There were also occasions where [industry] didn’t challenge the customer and say, do 
you really want this, is there a compromise here, explaining that what was being asked 
for as a requirement was unrealistic or unachievable or meant compromising something 
else. Sometimes to their detriment the team sat down and busted a gut to try and deliver 
what they promised and sometimes that was to their detriment; instead of turning around 
and saying look we are putting a lot of effort into this and actually it is unrealistic and 
unachievable. 
Thus, at the governance level, there is an understanding of the need to move towards a 
more collaborative approach as advocated by the IPT governance structure. However, this is 
constrained by the lingering effects of the competitive bidding process by which the supplier for the 
AMV was selected. This led to a highly resource-constrained environment, which meant that the 
appropriate investments in collaboration such as the SDE could not be fully implemented. 
The Process Level 
The IPT has around 120 members in all. The proposed structure, new to the prime 
contractor, was a direct response to the need of moving from platform to capability delivery. The 
IPT was structured around seven “ilities” or sub-system teams (e.g., reliability, mobility, 
software, C3I, fightability, survivability, Special To Role as highlighted in Figure 3) with a 
number of specialist functions in support (e.g., finance, contracts, programme, quality, supply 
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chain and business development). Each “ility” is led by a Cost Account Manager (CAM) who is 
responsible for delivering the tasks associated with achieving each sub-system functionality and 
for ensuring they are “harmonised” when integrated into the larger project. This involves both 
project management responsibilities such as scheduling and budgeting, project controls and 
also systems engineering responsibilities. The CAMs report through the Chief Engineer, who is 
accountable for specifications and requirements, and supported by an integration team. In a 
classic project matrix, the Programme Manager supported by his own team is accountable for 
delivery against project objectives. This is illustrated in Figure 3. Commercial functions report 
outside of both of these. Thus the IPT consists of three main types of team responsible for three 
different types of tasks—engineering design focused on technical creativity; programme 
management, focused on team co-ordination; and commercial, focused on external supplier 
selection and management.  
 
Figure 3. IPT Structure as of End of 2007 
(IPT documentation) 
The key player in this structure is the CAM, liaising with the Chief Engineer on 
engineering issues and the Programme Manager on project issues. This is perceived to be 
putting considerable strain on the CAMs, while there is also a perceived lack of system-level 
systems engineering to address cross-ility issues and a need for a “stronger systems 
engineering team.” This perception is a result of two things: first, the new structure to deliver 
capability means that system level responsibility and accountability lied within each “ility” rather 
than with a programme level systems engineering team, as had traditionally been the case on 
other programmes. The challenge was for the IPT to accept, understand and realise this new 
philosophy. Second, the constraints of the budget and schedule mean that the project was 
under-resourced. This resulted in not enough systems engineering being carried out at the front 
end of the project, which eventually had an impact on design development, and in CAMs being 
overloaded with systems engineering and project management type work. 
However, we were informed of a further issue:  
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[T]he danger there is because there are different ilities, each of them then develops a 
way of working that is slightly different from the next ility, and so you carry through with 
it, it gets more entrenched. And at some point in the programme you are going to say to 
the ilities people, I’m sorry but you are going to have to align your processes now. And 
that gets painful. Yeah, this happened. It was all a jumping, because there was always 
going to be a winner and losers. There is always going to be one process in preference 
of another. And it is still going on now as we go forward. The issue was not identified 
until now. The business processes are outside the [name of the programme] team. This 
should be generated from the business. The business should be saying to us this is how 
you budget, supply and set up relationships, that is how you construct X, this is how you 
can manage the requirement. That wasn’t there, so we had to generate all that 
ourselves. And all this was unplanned work. 
The dynamics of task and team are structured around a number of best practice routines 
at both the corporate and IPT levels, yet these are perceived to be inadequate. Those at the IPT 
level are mandated by the MoD; while those at the company level are mandated by the 
corporate level. These routines are perceived to constrain the dynamics of tasks and teams but 
also provide formalised processes that offer assurance for the customer and corporate levels. 
Generally acknowledged as necessary, they are also considered to be too procedural, 
constraining new ways of thinking, and to detract focus from systems engineering type work. 
Therefore decision making processes slow down, which in turn slows the project progress:  
The process is a bit formalised, most things that are done here are very structured and 
very constrained by procedures. It is how the company has developed. I think years ago 
the company was run by people, now it seems to be run by processes. I think the 
advantage of having these processes is that everybody knows what they should be 
doing and it is not left to individuals, it cuts down the number of Mavericks in the 
business. In the old days, people ran the business and people were allowed to make 
decisions almost on the hoof. Now we have got a lot more checks and gates before we 
can go and do something else. The drawback is that it slows everybody down. It 
sometimes feels like you are just working processes rather than developing a vehicle...I 
remember in the old business...they said too many things are going wrong, so we have 
to do all these checks. We have checks in design reviews, but we are going to have far 
more of this, specific gate reviews. And we would do all that. And I remember thinking, 
wow! the pendulum has swung the other way, and eventually it is very heavily 
constrained, very procedural, much more like civil service, and suddenly everything is 
being clamped down...I thought we would find a happy medium, and I don’t think that 
has happened. 
Despite the awareness and availability of these processes and guidelines some 
processes, which would indicate how certain tasks needed to be done, were not fully developed 
or were not available at the outset. For example, statements of work or technical requirement 
documentation, systems engineering processes were not available at a business level for 
example. This meant that “ility” team members had to develop new processes when required. 
But the development of these new processes was not aligned across the “ilities.” Time spent 
defining and developing these processes detracted from the systems engineering work and in 
some cases this contributed to delays in the programme. The non-alignment of processes 
affected those “ilities” that needed to align their process with the chosen process. 
These issues are compounded by the routines within the MoD. Overcoming the impact 
of change in customer personnel is another challenge for the IPT. The MoD has a policy that 
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personnel on programmes should stay in post 2-3 years, which affects the nature of 
collaborative working. For long-term programmes, this means little continuity and stability from 
the customer, which destabilises the relationship and affects the perception of the quality of the 
relationship, which in turns affects behaviour and the propensity to work collaboratively because 
it  
[M]eans that new relationships have to be developed, and that common understanding is 
no longer there. With the change of face you have different interpretations, it can take a 
new member up to six months to get up to speed, the knowledge, experience and skills 
differ from the previous person and interpretation of written requirements can vary […] it is 
difficult to write a requirement that can only be interpreted in one way.”  
We can see, therefore, how the dynamics of tasks, teams and routines at the process 
level start to shape the level of collaboration that is possible at the governance level, while the 
lack of resources to support collaborative working is a result of the constraints imposed by how 
tendering at the governance level was organized. 
Conclusions 
Through our exploration of the dynamics of the UK defence acquisition, from policy 
initiatives to programme implementation, our preliminary research has shown how the 
institutional level dynamics shape actions at the governance and process level and how these in 
turn can potentially reshape the structure of governance and institutions. The dynamic between 
the institutional and governance level is exemplified in the way in which acquisition policies at 
the institutional level, based on competitive tendering, are being reshaped by changes at the 
governance level as the UK defence sector consolidates. Attempts by the MoD to develop more 
collaborative working relationships with its supply base have been institutionalised in the 
governance mechanism of the Integrated Project Team (IPT). This governance structure 
supports more collaborative approaches but, as we have explained, can be constrained by the 
effects of bidding process—a value for money approach at the governance level. At the 
institutional level, the policy shift from procurement of platforms to acquisition of capability 
influenced the decision for a new IPT structure at the process level. However, the opportunities 
for capability delivery offered by a new structure were only partially realised due to the highly 
resourced constrained team, a legacy of the bidding process.  
At the process level, the dynamics of task and teams were structured around routines; 
the demands on the team to implement corporate routines and the lack of resources all had an 
impact on the effectiveness of task completion. At the same time, human resource routines 
mandating rotation of staff on the client side undermined the collaborative basis of the IPT. The 
dynamics of task, teams and routines at the process level can, therefore, potentially strain or 
enhance the collaborative mindset encapsulated through the IPT at the governance level. As a 
consequence, dynamics at the process level are continually reshaping the collaborative 
approach at the governance level. 
This research contributes to our growing understanding of the UK defence acquisition 
process by using a Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) approach in a 3-tier (institutional, 
governance, process levels) conceptual framework. Through the AMV case, we have attempted 
to explore how these levels interact dynamically through time. In particular, we have shown how 
acquisition policy initiatives at the institutional level can be vitiated by operational routines at the 
process level, and how these routines then shape how the policy initiative is implemented. This 
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paper is merely a first attempt at elaborating these dynamics and a full analysis will be 
forthcoming in due course.  
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Abstract 
Interorganizational collaborative capacity (ICC) is the capability of organizations and sets 
of organizations to enter into, develop, and sustain interorganizational systems in pursuit of 
collective outcomes.  This report presents an open systems model of collaborative capacity.  
The model comprises five domains: Purpose and Strategy, Structure, Lateral Processes, 
Reward Systems, and People.  Scales have been created to assess twelve factors or 
dimensions of ICC: Need to Collaborate, Strategic Collaboration, Resource Investments, 
Structural Flexibility, Social Capital, Information Sharing, Collaborative Learning, Reward 
Systems, Metrics, Individual Collaborative Capacity, and Interagency Team Support.  This study 
discusses the factors and uses them to compare two samples: Homeland Defense and Security 
and Acquisition and Contracting.  It then demonstrates the diagnostic use of the ICC Survey by 
analyzing a major DoD Acquisition and Contracting organization’s ICC with respect to a 
“normative” sample.    
Keywords: Interorganizational collaboration, interagency collaboration, collaborative 
capacity 
Interorganizational Collaborative Capacity:  
Development of a Database to Refine Instrumentation and 
Explore Patterns 
Collaboration and the Acquisition Context  
Interorganizational collaboration comprises a system of structures and processes by 
which organizations work together to accomplish complementary or common goals and 
objectives, including a common mission.  Collaborations range from close partnerships in which 
employees throughout the organizations must work interdependently to low-level cooperation 
involving information sharing in which the focus is primarily on relatively independent actions.  
Collaboration is often used synonymously with partnering and is manifest when organizations 
form alliances.  We formally define interorganizational collaborative capacity as the 
capability of an organization (or of a set of organizations) to enter into, develop, and sustain 
interorganizational systems in pursuit of collective outcomes.   
Interorganizational Collaboration (ICC) has clear benefits, including better decision-
making as a result of shared information, enhanced coordination among dispersed units, 
innovation resulting from the cross-pollination of ideas and recombination of scarce resources, 
as well as many forms of cost savings, ranging from reduced litigation and shared resources to 
the transfer of smart practices (Hansen & Nohria, 2004; Mankin, Cohen & Fitzgerald, 2004).  
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Given such benefits, it is not surprising that defense acquisition reform has included calls for 
improved collaboration among acquisition agencies and between the Department of Defense 
(DoD) and defense contractors.  DoD Directive 5000.1 states that teaming among warfighters, 
users, developers, acquirers, technologists, testers, budgeters, and sustainers is required 
during the capability needs definition phase of the acquisition lifecycle (USD (AT&L), 2003, 
paragraph E1).  
Organizations often fall short when they attempt to develop effective collaborative 
relationships.  Documented barriers include diverse and conflicting missions, goals, and 
incentives; entrenched histories of mistrust; leaders who do not actively support collaborative 
efforts; and inadequate systems and structures (GAO, 2005).  Our research on ICC was 
initiated the summer of 2002 in response to the need to develop ICC in the emerging Homeland 
Defense and Security context.  In 2005 we began to apply our methods and knowledge to a 
quite different but still critical context: DoD Acquisition and Contracting. 
Our research program seeks to understand those factors that drive or enable ICC and 
those factors that are barriers to ICC.  The ICC model and survey are designed to be used in an 
action research tradition.  Action research is a collaborative undertaking in which the 
researchers work with organizational insiders to diagnose a relevant problem domain—in our 
case ICC—with the aim not only of increasing knowledge but also of improving effectiveness.  
Survey results, typically supported by interviews or focus groups, are a diagnostic vehicle for 
discourse, action planning and organizational development.   
Developing the Interorganizational Collaborative Capacity (ICC) 
Model 
Our team’s research has moved through several stages.  In a previous book chapter 
(Hocevar, Thomas & Jansen, 2006), we described an inductive study conducted in the context 
of the homeland defense and security community.  This study identified factors (i.e., common 
themes) that facilitated and interfered with developing ICC.  The success factors included a “Felt 
need” to collaborate, a common goal or recognized interdependence, sufficient authority of key 
participants, social capital (e.g., interpersonal networks), collaboration as a prerequisite for 
funding, effective information exchange, leadership support and commitment, trust and 
commitment.  Barrier factors were often the antithesis of the success factors; they included 
divergent goals, impeding rules or policies, lack of familiarity with other organizations, 
inadequate information sharing, competition for resources, and lack of competency.  These 
factors were organized within the five domains of Galbraith’s (2002) star model: Purpose 
and Strategy, Organizational Structure, Lateral Processes, Reward Systems, and People.    
Our inductive research, in conjunction with our literature reviews, led us to develop the 
ICC model illustrated in Figure 1.  This model represents the simplest case of ICC involving only 
two organizations—A and B—in a shared problem space.  The yellow arrows leading from each 
organization to “goals and objectives” indicate that each organization is oriented toward a set of 
common or complementary goals and objectives in a shared problem space.  They operate 
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within an interdependent relationship in which some degree of collaboration can improve their 
efficiency and effectiveness with respect to the shared problem space.1  
As with other open systems models, the ICC model emphasizes that the effectiveness of 
each organization depends on the congruence or fit (i.e., fitness) of its subsystems.  For 
example, fitness increases when an organization’s reward systems are congruent with its 
strategic goals, structure of authority, and training.  The double-sided, blue arrows within and 
between organizations indicate the dynamic processes of building and sustaining collaborative 
capacity.   
 
Figure 1. The Interorganizational Collaborative Capacity Model  
(Hocevar et al., 2006) 
The role of the interagency team is to generate ICC in both organizations.  The team 
must also develop its own collaborative capacity.  As there often are more than two 
collaborating organizations, there also may be multiple teams or task forces (e.g., tiger teams) 
focusing on and aligning specific subsystem domains (e.g., policies and procedures for sharing 
information).   
Assessing Interorganizational Collaborative Capacity (ICC) 
Our previous ICC literature review (cf. Bardach, 1998) revealed that a major stumbling 
block to advancing theory and practice is the measurement problem.  We wrote: 
Collaborative capacity is an intuitively appealing construct but currently lacks clear 
operationalization.  This deficiency is problematic for leaders and practitioners […] 
who want to identify the collaborative capacity of their agencies.  The absence of 
                                                
1 This does not mean there are not conflicts or competitive aspects to their interactions.  Ray Norda re-
introduced the term “coopetition” to describe the complex dynamics in which organizations could be allies 
in one problem space and competitors in a different problem space (Fisher, 1992). 
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measurement models also is problematic for the advancement of the social science of 
interagency collaboration. (Hocevar et al., 2006, p. 273) 
Items and Survey Development 
Following the initial inductive phase of our research, we began writing six-point, Likert 
items to measure the identified key themes that had been identified (e.g., the “felt need” theme 
or factor we had placed in the Purpose and Strategy domain.)  With the help of subject matter 
experts (SMEs), we developed two surveys: one for use with the Homeland Defense and 
Security (HDS) community and another to use within the Acquisition and Contracting (A&C) 
community2 (Thomas, Hocevar, Jansen & Rendon, 2008).  The surveys were administered to 
samples from both communities and scales were developed in an iterative process of collecting 
data, giving feedback to respondents on their results, and listening to their interpretations of 
their results.  To be accepted for a scale or factor, the items had to pass basic statistical 
hurdles, make sense in feedback sessions with our SME respondents (see sample description 
below), as well as having value in suggesting courses of action in their discussions about 
developing ICC.  This process resulted in items being deleted and added over multiple 
administrations and feedback sessions, and it accounts for the different sample sizes (different 
n’s) associated with different statistics in the research. 
Samples for Survey Development and Validation 
The HDS sample comprised 145 students in six classes in a Master’s Degree program in 
Homeland Security at the Naval Postgraduate School.  They were experienced civilians or 
military officers working for civilian, government or military organizations from around the United 
States who had on-going Homeland Security responsibilities.  Illustrative organizations (and 
positions) included: USNORTHCOM, US Coast Guard, (mid- to senior-level officers), the Center 
for Disease Control, Offices of Emergency Management, the FBI, municipal police and fire 
departments (Chiefs, Captains), and utilities (Directors). 
The A&C sample comprised 49 DoD managers, specifically program managers, 
technical/engineering managers, and contract managers.  They were in three classes pursuing 
an MS in Program Management (MSPM) though distance learning and employed full-time as 
members of the DoD acquisition workforce.  They were experienced DoD acquisition managers, 
many of whom had already achieved Level II of the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) certification program.  The students were located across the United 
States at some of the DoD's major acquisition and procurement centers.  
The A&C sample also included 79 federal employees from a DoD Research, 
Development and Fielding Organization that is responsible for engineering, technology, 
research, development, and fielding products primarily for individual military personnel.  The 
organization comprises three interdependent organizations from each of the military services 
and works with academic organizations, research hospitals, businesses, and other government 
agencies.  
The A&C sample also included 46 employees from a major DoD Contract Administration 
Organization (CAO) with the mission of improving integration of acquisition processes between 
                                                
2 This report focuses on assessing ICC with surveys, but we also developed interview questions 
to be used in individual interviews or focus groups. 
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DoD clients and contractors, improving cost efficiency, increasing process innovations, and 
ensuring compliance to standards and regulations in federal contracts.   
ICC Survey Scales 
The process of constructing scales is simultaneously a process of construct validation, of 
generating and validating a theoretical model.  That is to say, the data are a reality test that 
typically requires a re-construction of the meaning of ICC as a theoretical construct.  Our current 
conceptualization of ICC, based on our analysis, is that it comprises twelve scales or factors: 
Need to Collaborate, Strategic Collaboration, Resource Investment in Collaboration, Structural 
Flexibility, Reward Systems, Metrics for Collaboration, Information Sharing, Collaborative 
Learning, Social Capital, Individual Collaborative Capacity, Barriers to Collaboration, and 
Interagency Teams.  As illustrated in Figure 2, they can be mapped with respect to the five 
domains of Galbraith’s (2002) star model.  The specific items that make up the scales discussed 
in this paper, along with item statistics, are presented in Jansen, Hocevar, Rendon and Thomas 
(2008).   
 
Figure 2. Interorganizational Collaborative Capacity Factors (or Dimensions)  
Organized by Organizational Domain 
Table 1 presents scale statistics for the combined HDS and A&C samples for each 
scale, ranking them from high to low.  All items use a 6-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly 
Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.”  Thus, 3.5 is the scale midpoint.  Values higher than 3.5 indicate 
agreement, and values of 6 indicate unanimous agreement.  A “don’t know” response, which 
was a 7 on the scale, was re-coded as missing data.  Because the Barriers to Collaboration 
scale is the only scale where a high value indicates a lack of collaborative capacity, it has been 
reverse-coded to facilitate comparison with other scales (the reverse-coded mean for a 6-point 
scale is determined by subtracting its mean from 7).  Note also that the standard deviation is as 
important for interpreting results as the mean; focusing on a mean of 4.0, which indicates 
modest agreement, while ignoring a high standard deviation (e.g., 1.4) will lead to an under-
appreciation of how many individuals are in disagreement.   
The results in Table 1 represent a summary of individual perceptions of their 
organizations and individual interpretations of the survey items.  Because of the idiosyncratic 
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nature of individual assessments, surveys use broad-based sampling and more than a single 
item to assess any given factor.  Coefficient Alpha reliability assesses the degree to which the 
items defining the scale are internally consistent, which is evidence that they measure an 
underlying common factor.  These values, all of which are satisfactory, are discussed in Jansen 
et al. (2008).   
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations (S.D.), Sample Size (n), Number of Items,  
and Coefficients Alpha for the Collaborative Capacity Scales 




Need to Collaborate 4.7 1.3 307 3 .81 
Strategic Collaboration 4.3 1.4 251 5 .85 
Social Capital  4.2 1.3 307 2 .79 
Interagency Team 4.2 1.3 193 2 .85 
Structural Flexibility 4.1 1.2 135 4 .78 
Information Sharing 4.1 1.4 226 3 .83 
Individual Collaborative Capacity 4.1 1.2 258 7 .86 
Resource Investments  3.7 1.4 227 3 .88 
Lack of Barriers to Collaboration*    (3.7)* 1.4 136 4 .75 
Collaborative Learning 3.5 1.4 225 3 .85 
Reward Systems 3.4 1.5 268 4 .86 
Metrics for Collaboration 3.0 1.5 264 2 .83 
*The Barriers to Collaboration scale is the only scale in which a higher value represents a lower 
collaborative capacity.  It is thus reverse-coded so that it can be compared to the other scales 
and relabeled as Lack of Barriers to Collaboration. 
The Interorganizational Collaborative Scales 
In this section, we discuss the results in Table 1 in the context of the ICC model in 
Figure 2, and we include some observations from feedback sessions with HDS and A&C 
respondents. 
The Domain of Purpose and Strategy  
Three scales assess factors within the domain of Purpose and Strategy: Need to 
Collaborate, Strategic Collaboration, and Resource investments in collaboration. 
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Need to Collaborate.  Hocevar et al. (2006) used the term “felt need” to refer to a theme 
that emerged in their inductive, qualitative research as well as in their literature review.  “Felt 
need” was taken from the organizational change literature (Jick & Peiperl, 2002) in which the 
construct is used to describe the strong motivational energy and effort needed to overcome the 
inertia of the status quo and generate change in organizational structures, processes and 
behaviors.  The change literature asserts that a felt need or “sense of urgency” (Kotter, 2008) is 
a powerful factor that motivates individuals to make commitments to learning new skills and 
exploring new behaviors.  Sample items include,  
 My organization recognizes the importance of working with other agencies to achieve 
its mission. 
 People in my organization understand the benefits of collaborating with other 
organizations. 
Strategic Collaboration.  A theme that emerged for successful collaboration in our 
inductive research was having “a common goal or recognized interdependence.”  This scale 
references establishing and addressing goals for collaboration and considering the interests of 
other organizations in planning.  It assesses leaderships' role in addressing interorganizational 
goals and conferring with the leaders of other organizations.  Sample items include:   
 My organization’s leaders meet and confer with the leaders of other organizations 
about mutual collaboration.  
 My organization considers the interests of other agencies in its planning. 
Resource Investment in Collaboration.  Resource Investment in Collaboration emerged 
in the quantitative data as a theme in our inductive research.  The scale focuses on investing, 
committing or assigning various resources to collaboration.  This is placed in the domain of 
strategy and purpose because the strategic apex is where general resource decisions are 
typically made.  A sample item is, "My organization has committed adequate time, budget, and 
personnel to interorganizational collaboration.” 
As Table 1 indicates, the Need to Collaborate scale typically has the highest mean in 
our various survey administrations.  The respondents in both the HDS and A&C samples report 
that their organizations appreciate the need to collaborate.  This will perhaps remain a common 
result across organizations actively involved in collaborations; typically, we work in contexts in 
which messages from the highest levels of the chain of command and even stories in the 
national media emphasize the critical importance of collaboration.     
The Strategic Collaboration scale also typically has a relatively high mean, indicating a 
generally positive perception in the domain of strategy and purpose associated with setting 
goals and priorities and other leadership actions regarding collaboration.  On the other hand, its 
mean is considerably lower than the Need to Collaborate mean.  Lower still is the Resource 
Investments mean.  In feedback sessions discussing the results, our respondents typically 
interpret these results in terms of the challenges of “walking the talk.”  It is far easier to send the 
message out on the importance and benefits of collaboration than to engage other organizations 
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The Domain of Structure 
Structure is currently represented by a single scale or factor: Structural Flexibility. 
Structural Flexibility.  Structural flexibility is viewed as important to effectiveness in 
dynamic environments (e.g., Mintzberg, 1993) and for effective organizational processes (e.g., 
Deming, 1982).  In our inductive research, structural themes emerged but were mentioned more 
often as barriers than as success factors.  In our quantitative research, Structural Flexibility 
assesses the degree to which respondents perceive that the organization is flexible and 
responsive, quickly forming and modifying policies, processes, procedures, and partnerships.  A 
sample item is: “My organization is flexible in adapting its procedures to better fit those 
organizations with which we work” 
The Structural Flexibility scale’s positive mean reveals more flexibility than many might 
expect, given that these respondents generally work for large government bureaucracies.  As 
with the other scales, the standard deviation indicates that some individuals perceive more 
flexibility than others, but the overall distribution for these items is not consistent with 
dysfunctional rigidity as commonplace in these organizations.  When the survey is given within a 
single organization, analyzing where there are higher or lower levels of perceived structural 
flexibility can be informative for action planning. 
Metrics and the Reward Systems Domain 
In Figure 2, the Metrics factor is placed between the Reward Systems domain and the 
Purpose and Strategy domain.  On the one hand, metrics operationalize goals and serve as 
indicators of effectiveness.  On the other hand, metrics are generally part of the performance 
appraisal process and thus part of the reward system. 
Reward Systems.  The Reward Systems scale assesses the degree to which 
collaborative activities and collaborative talents lead to rewards, career advancement, and 
promotions.  In this domain, perceptions are critical: if individuals perceive collaborative actions 
go unrewarded, their behavior will reflect these perceptions.  Sample items include:  
 Engaging in interorganizational activities at work is important to career advancement 
in this organization. 
 Collaborative talents and achievements are considered when people are reviewed 
for promotion.  
The Reward Systems scale shows a relatively low score; it is one of two scores that fall 
below the Likert scale’s mid-point of 3.5.  For example, it is lower than the Structural Flexibility 
scale; some respondents argue that it is easier to reorganize and change procedures than to 
change institutionalized reward systems.  Because incentives and rewards are especially 
powerful for generating organizational culture, discussions in which people explain how reward 
systems often fail to support collaborative activities typically represent a powerful opportunity for 
action planning.   
Metrics for Collaboration.  Metrics did not emerge as a theme in our inductive research, 
but it emerged as a measure in our quantitative research.  The scale assesses the degree to 
which an organization has identified or established measurement criteria and performance 
standards to assess interorganizational collaboration efforts.  A sample item is, “My organization 
has established clear performance standards regarding interorganizational work.”   
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Metrics for Collaboration is consistently among the lowest scores, and the low values 
promote interesting discussions.  These include the issue of how important such measures 
really are, the degree to which such measures might produce counterproductive behaviors, and 
the role of leadership in assessing individuals and motivating performance.  Individuals 
sometimes note that the ICC survey is itself an attempt to develop collaboration metrics. 
The Domain of Lateral Processes 
Three scales can be placed within the domain of Lateral Processes: Social Capital, 
Information Sharing, and Collaborative Learning. 
Information Sharing.  Information sharing was a theme in the Hocevar et al. (2006) 
research.  The scale has diverse content, referring to people, the organization, and to 
organizational norms.  Sample items include:  
 My organization has strong norms that encourage sharing information with other 
organizations. 
 People in my organization share information with other organizations. 
As noted when we defined collaboration, some work relationships require low levels of 
interdependence (i.e., pooled interdependence) in which information sharing represents all that 
is required of organizational allies.  Such organizations are able to accomplish their goals and 
objectives independently if information sharing is effective.  More interdependent collaborative 
relationships (e.g., liaisons, regular task force meetings, and joint exercises) may require higher 
levels of lateral processes captured by Collaborative Learning.   
Social Capital.  “Social capital” and “interpersonal networks” emerged in Hocevar et al. 
(2006).  The scale assesses the degree to which organizational employees or members take 
the initiative to build relationships and know who to contact in other organizations or agencies.  
A sample item is: “Our employees know who to contact in other agencies for information or 
decisions.”  Some individuals see this as a pre-requisite to information sharing: how do you 
share if you don’t know who values the information?  Others emphasize information sharing as 
a means of developing social capital. 
Collaborative Learning.  When organizations face problems that require teamwork, either 
because of sequential or reciprocal interdependence, learning how to work with and adjust to 
organizational partners becomes more important (Thompson, 1967).  The collaborative learning 
scale assesses the degree to which the organization commits resources to training, works with 
other organizations to identify lessons learned, and develops strong norms for learning from 
other organizations.  They assess the degree to which the organization might be regarded as a 
collaborative learning organization.  A sample item is, “My organization works with other 
organizations to identify lessons learned for improved collaboration.” 
The Lateral Processes Domain.  Organizational theory emphasizes the importance of 
lateral processes to integrate and coordinate among differentiated units.  Such horizontal 
processes take the burden off the vertical hierarchy, preventing overload and allowing actions to 
profit from local conditions and distributed knowledge.  They are viewed as especially critical in 
ICC where vertical hierarchies of different organizations may not lead to a common boss.   
The pattern of means within this domain is interesting: Social Capital and Information 
Sharing have comparable means, but the Collaborative Learning mean lags behind.  This 
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pattern suggests that knowing who to contact and develop relationships with can function 
primarily to serve the lower collaborative demands of information sharing; this is reflected in the 
higher means for these aspects of collaborative capability.  On the other hand, the results 
suggest collaborative learning is unevenly developed and is a lagging capacity in the 
organizations.  To the degree learning represents changing habits related to how one plans, 
organizes, leads, decides, and works, it is indeed a more challenging than simply sharing the 
information with the right people. 
The Domain of People 
The domain of People is represented by a single scale, which is labeled Individual 
Collaborative Capacity. 
Individual Collaborative Capacity.  Hocevar et al. (2006) identified a number of themes 
describing the collaborative capabilities and attitudes of individuals within the organization.  
Items referencing individuals tend to fall into a single scale in our research.  The scale focuses 
on skills, capabilities and expertise; on an understanding and knowledge of how other 
organizations work; on a willingness to engage in shared decision-making, and on seeking input 
from the other organizations.  Sample items include: 
 Members of my organization understand how our work relates to the work of other 
organizations with which we need to collaborate. 
 Members of my organization are able to appreciate another organization’s 
perspective on a problem or course of action. 
Barriers to Collaboration 
All the items and scales described to this point have been facilitating factors or enablers 
that support the development and maintenance of collaborative capacity.  In contrast, Barriers to 
Collaboration items focus on the challenges or impediments to collaboration.  Agreement on 
these items is undesirable, whereas agreement on other items is desirable.  This requires that 
the item means and the scale mean must be reverse-coded to compare it to other scales, 
subtracting it from 7 so that a mean of 3.3 becomes 3.7.  This reversal is used in comparisons 
among scales (e.g., in Tables 1 and 2), and the scale is relabeled as Lack of Barriers to 
Collaboration—a double negative. 
The items composing the Barriers to Collaboration scale are diverse; they assess 
interorganizational history, individual collaborative capacity, role conflict, policies, and 
requirements that are unique to an individual’s organization.  The items cover a number of 
domains within the collaborative capacity model and cannot be placed within a single domain.  
Two sample items are:  
 A history of interorganizational conflict affects our interorganizational capability. 
 I face incompatible requirements or requests when working with other organizations. 
Interagency Teams 
HDS respondents were directed to the items in this scale if they answered “yes” to the 
statement, “My organization has a representative on an interorganizational team."  A&C 
respondents were directed to these items if they indicated they had served on one or more 
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“interorganizational special project or tiger teams.”  The scale might be regarded as assessing 
an aspect of the domain of structure.  The items are,  
 My organization gives members of special project teams (or tiger teams) adequate 
authority to speak on behalf of the organization. 
 My organization supports the decisions and recommendations of the special project 
or tiger team.   
The mean also is close in its value to the Structural Flexibility mean.   
Comparing the ICC of a Set or Community of Organizations 
The ICC results can be used to compare samples from different organizational sets, 
different communities of practice, or even different industries.  By administering surveys to 
individuals from multiple organizations, we should be able to describe the collaborative capacity 
of that organizational set.  Table 2 compares the means of two such sets: the Homeland 
Defense and Security (HDS) and Acquisition and Contracting (A&C) samples.   
Table 2. Means, Standard Deviation (S.D.), and Sample Sizes (n)  
for Homeland Defense & Security and for Acquisition & Contracting Communities 
 Homeland Defense &  
Security 
Acquisition & Contracting 
Scale Mean S.D. n Mean S.D. n 
Need to Collaborate 5.0 1.0 145 4.3 1.2 49 
Strategic Collaboration  4.4 1.0 145 3.8 1.3 49 
Resource Investments  4.0 1.2 144 3.4 1.2 49 
Structural Flexibility 4.1 1.0 145 4.1 1.1 49 
Reward Systems 3.4 1.3 145 3.1 1.2 49 
Metrics for Collaboration  2.9 1.2 141 2.8 1.2 49 
Social Capital 4.5 1.1 144 3.9 1.2 49 
Information Sharing  4.2 1.2 145 3.6 1.1 49 
Collaborative Learning   3.7 1.1 145 2.9 1.0 49 
Individual Collaborative Capacity 4.2 1.0 144 3.9 1.0 49 
Lack of Barriers to Collaboration*   (3.7)* 1.0 145   (3.6)1 .9 49 
Interagency Team 4.6 1.1 117 3.5 1.3 48 
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* The Barriers to Collaboration scale is the only scale in which a higher value represents a lower 
collaborative capacity.  It is thus reverse-coded so that it can be compared to the other scales and 
relabeled as Lack of Barriers to Collaboration. 
The means in Table 2 would seem to indicate no significant difference between 
organizational communities in terms of Structural Flexibility, Reward Systems and Metrics for 
Collaboration, Individual Collaboration, and Barriers to Collaboration.  The main differences 
appear to be that the HDS’s sample’s means are somewhat higher in the strategic domain 
comprising Need to Collaborate, Strategic Collaboration, and Resource Investments and in the 
lateral processes domain of Social Capital, Information Sharing, and Collaborative Learning.   
Figure 3 presents the pattern of results in graphic format and reveals that the profile 
patterns are generally parallel; their similarity is more dramatic than their differences.  In a 
section below, the ideas of Leading and Lagging factors in generating Collaborative Capacity 
are discussed.  Figure 3 suggests that some factors lag (e.g., Metrics and Reward Systems) 
and some lead (e.g., Need for Collaboration, Strategic Collaboration, Social Capital and 
possibly Structural Flexibility) in developing ICC.   
Caution is required in making attributions about differences in organizationsal sets as 
diverse as HDS versus A&C.  To generalize about mean differences, comparable sampling 
procedures for the two communities are required.  Even with excellent sampling, the contextual 
frames of reference used by respondents as they take the survey need to be considered when 
interpreting these differences.   
Here are a few of the contextual differences characterizing the individuals in the A&C 








Figure 3. Profiles with Means and Standard Deviations for the Homeland Defense & 
Security and the Acquisition and Contracting Samples 
A&C is relatively mature and institutionalized, and interorganizational collaboration 
through various phases of the Acquisition lifecycle has long been inherent to the mission.  By 
contrast, much of HDS has recently been reorganized to improve effectiveness through 
collaboration.  A large minority of respondents report that they do not have a mandate to 
collaborate with other organizations, and collaboration often depends on local initiatives.    
A&C comprises many functionally-focused, matrixed organizations with inherently 
conflicting intraorganizational goals and resulting role conflict.  The functional areas have 
divergent cultures and goals; for example, Program Managers (PMs) have different goals than 
contracting officers and systems engineers.  By contrast, HDS typically comprises independent 
organizations with distinct chains of command. 
A&C comprises primarily civil service members of the DoD’s acquisition workforce.  HDS 
includes a small number of military officers, federal civil servants from diverse agencies, as well 
as employees of state, county, and city governments. 
Our DHS respondents’ perceptions of the consequences or risk in the face of a failure of 
interagency collaboration were significantly higher than the perception of risk in our A&C 
samples (Jansen et al., 2008).  
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Comparing organizational capabilities of different organizations or sets of organizations 
raises the question of interpretive norms.  Norms are “descriptive statistics that are compiled to 
permit the comparison of a particular score (or mean) with the scores (or means) earned by the 
members (or groups of members) of some defined population” (Thorndike, 1971, p. 533).  
Norms in this context would allow an organization to understand its relative standing on a scale 
or profile of scales compared to a defined reference group.   
The concept of norms for organizations, in contrast to norms for people, is problematic.  
Norms can be developed and interpreted relatively easily for human beings.  However, 
developing norms for aggregates of people in diverse organizations is far more difficult and 
ambiguous.  This is because, in spite of our great diversity, there is more homogeneity among 
people than organizations that comprise people.  Organizations differ vastly in size, age, history, 
mission, technology, member demographics, and other variables.  In addition, organizations are 
nested hierarchically within other organizations, and sometimes they are matrixed; their 
boundaries are more ambiguous.  Thus, the entire concept of individual vs. organizational 
norms requires rethinking.  However, without specifically addressing these challenges, we argue 
that a wide and continuing sampling of individuals from particular classes of organizations (e.g., 
HDS or A&C) can be useful for comparative purposes.  There are commonalities within various 
organizational sets and communities, and leadership can derive some sense of their 
organization’s relative standing by cautiously comparing their results to the results of others.  By 
increasing sample size and more rigorously collecting data across the acquisition community, it 
is possible to generate information akin to norms.  We illustrate the potential value of this in the 
next section. 
An Organizational Example of ICC in the Acquisition Context 
In this section, we use the survey to do a brief, summary assessment of two units within 
a much larger organizational system.  Table 3 shows the results for two units of a major DoD 
CAO that functions in an interorganizational context (cf. Kirschman & LaPorte, 2008).  In the 
following discussion, quotations come from a teleconference interview conducted with the top 
leadership team of these units on June 22, 2007, and from comments made when the 
leadership of one unit who conducted a briefing for an NPS A&C class on August 6, 2008.   
Table 3. Means, Standard Deviation (S.D.), and Sample Sizes (n)  
for a Major DoD Contract Administration Organization 
Scale Mean S.D. n 
Need to Collaborate 4.5 1.1 46 
Strategic Collaboration  4.2 1.2 46 
Resource Investments in Collaboration 3.4 1.5 43 
Structural Flexibility 4.0 1.0 46 
Reward Systems 3.8 1.2 45 
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Metrics for Collaboration  3.6 1.4 43 
Social Capital 4.0 1.2 46 
Information Sharing  3.9 1.2 46 
Collaborative Learning   3.2 1.3 46 
Individual Collaborative Capacity 3.9 1.1 46 
Lack of Barriers to Collaboration*  (3.2)* 1.1 46 
Interagency Team 3.9 1.2 40 
* The Barriers to Collaboration scale is the only scale in which a higher value represents a lower 
collaborative capacity.  It is thus reverse-coded so that it can be compared to the other scales and 
relabeled as Lack of Barriers to Collaboration. 
Context and Mission 
The organization’s mission is to enhance the integration of acquisition processes 
between DoD clients and contractors, generating cost savings, increasing process innovations, 
and ensuring compliance to standards and regulations in federal contracts.  Prior to the survey 
administration, one manager said, “We are very much a customer support organization …and 
… in order to provide the support that our customers need, we’ve got to interact and collaborate 
with them ….  We’ve got to sit down with our customers and agree and talk and discuss what’s 
important to them.”  In this context, customers of the organization are other government 
agencies; they support these agencies with respect to contractors, typically involving major 
programs.  Executing their mission requires “selling” organizational customers on the support 
they can provide.  In order to be more effective with customers, the organization has gone 
through what one manager called a “realignment that puts us in a position where we are very 
focused on specific customers.”  The leadership team appeared to be dedicating considerable 
time and energy to generate and sustain ICC, which was congruent with their strong support in 
administering the survey. 
Respondents express modest to moderate agreement on their organization’s capacities 
with respect to most factors.  However, there is, on average, mild disagreement regarding the 
adequacy of Resource Investments and engagement in Collaborative Learning, and there is 
mild agreement that there are Barriers to ICC.  The standard deviations for two scales—
Resource Investments and Metrics for Collaboration—appear relatively high, indicating less 
consensus among the organization’s members on these dimensions.  Figure 4 presents the 
results from Table 3 in the form of a line graph.  It adds the results on multiple A&C 
organizations to serve as a surrogate for comparative norms.    
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Figure 4. Profiles with Means and Standard Deviations for a Major DoD Contract 
Administration Organization and an NPS Acquisition and Contracting Sample Representing 
an Organizational Set 
Again, we should be cautious in our interpretations, but this comparison suggests a 
somewhat more positive perspective than we gain only by viewing the organizational profile in 
isolation.  The pattern of comparisons shows the CAO as being equal to or higher than the 
normative sample (drawn from 49 different organizations) on all the enabling factors and shows 
higher ratings in the factors of Resource Investments, Reward Systems, and Metrics for 
Collaboration.  This example suggests the interpretive value of having a larger, more 
representative data set for A&C organizations.  In the next section, we discuss the subsystem 
domains and their factors, which are illustrated in Figure 5. 
The Strategic Domain 
In terms of the strategic domain, the Need to Collaborate scale and the Strategic 
Collaboration scales have relatively high values, with means of 4.5 and 4.2.  This is congruent 
with the collaborative vision and statements expressed by the top leadership.  A Deputy 
(personal communication, June 22, 2007) noted that, a “key point” for the organization was 
“bringing in the needed stakeholders, identifying what the key issues are, what the common 
ground is, and then understanding what we can do to complement each other.”  Such efforts 
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had been accelerated in the previous two years.  The survey provides evidence of the degree to 
which the message behind thas been accepted.3 
 
Figure 5. Interorganizational Collaborative Capacity Scale Means Organized by Domains 
for a Major DoD Contract Administration Organization 
The Resource Investments scale, although higher than the “normative” sample result, 
remains low, with a mean of 3.4, which suggests that this may be a barrier to collaboration 
(being perceived as such by many in the organization).  It was also raised as a primary issue or 
barrier by top leadership: 
One of the things that come to mind … is a resource situation and having the 
right talent … to be able to provide the support our customers need.  This agency 
has gone down to—I’ve been here less than two years—so I have the 20,000 
number—we are roughly a 10,000-person agency now.  So our resources have 
gone down significantly. (personal communication, June 22, 2007) 
Indeed, a commander of one of the units (personal communication, August 6, 2008) said he 
simply lacked the personnel and other resources to engage all the required tasks.  A key part of 
his job involved assessing risks to determine where lack of oversight and slippage was least 
problematic.  Thus the strategic resource picture with respect to collaborative capacity is trying 
to do more with less. 
                                                
3  In the discussion of survey results, we use quotations from a teleconference interview conducted with 
the top leadership team of these units on June 22, 2007, and from a briefing to an NPS Acquisition and 
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The Structural Domain 
The organization was created in a restructuring of service organizations into a joint 
entity.  This was motivated by the need for greater efficiency and customer service.  It allowed 
contractors building products for more than one service to simplify their interface problems with 
the DoD bureaucracy.  The organization had thus been viewed as structurally inflexible in the 
recent past.  A PowerPoint brief described this era as,  “Someone above writes the rules—
workers follow the rules—masters check to see that workers are following the rules and if they 
are, victory is proclaimed on all fronts” (personal communication, August 6, 2008).  Current 
management was working to unlearn this rule-driven, behavioral legacy, calling it “too internally 
focused.”  They sought greater responsiveness to and collaboration with customers.   
The organization had very recently reorganized from a geographic divisional structure to 
a more product-oriented structure.  Although it remains a bureaucracy with regulatory 
responsibilities, such recent changes may well support perceptions of structural flexibility, 
especially given managements’ desire to increase collaboration and customer responsiveness.  
The Structural Flexibility mean of 4.0 indicates some agreement that there is flexibility in the 
structural domain.  This result can be viewed positively given the history of rule-driven behavior. 
The Reward Systems Domain and Metrics 
In the ICC model, metrics overlap two domains: Reward Systems and Strategy.  Metrics 
relate to accomplishing strategic goals and objectives, but they also can be used to assess 
individual performance, in which case they are part of the reward system.  Leadership in the 
CAO had invested considerable time, energy and resources to develop metrics and link them to 
performance.  Leadership had invested in a tool to provide agency level visibility from the 
Director down to operational employees.  One member of the top management team said: 
We have metrics, and we have a performance commitment that we set down with our 
customers; … we’ve agreed that this is important, and this is what we are going to do 
with you.  And there’s a way to grade those, and that’s set out … and as a result of that, 
then we know … where we fall short. (personal communication, June 22, 2008) 
The Metrics for Collaboration scale’s mean value of 3.6 is no doubt less than the 
management team would like to see, but it appears to be a relatively high value for this scale in 
comparison with the “normative” sample. 
As mentioned in the discussion of Resource Investments, the organization’s efforts to 
reward and recognize individuals were made in the context of an understaffed organization with 
a mission of promoting interorganizational collaboration.  The Reward Systems mean of 3.8 
suggests somewhat positive results in a very difficult human resources context. 
The People Domain—Individual Collaborative Capacity 
Leadership reported that they sometimes lacked people with the required technical skill 
sets (e.g., engineering talent and software skills) (personal communication, June 22, 2007).  
They also asserted the importance of “critical thinking skills” and “soft skills” for dealing with 
conflict.  However, they did not express any sense that the people in their organization were 
deficient in such skills; they noted that there was “always room for improvement.”  The 
discussion was consistent with the Individual Collaborative Capacity scale mean of 3.9: 
generally positive with room for improvement. 
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The Lateral Processes Domain  
The Social Capital mean of 4.0 is somewhat positive, revealing moderate agreement 
with items indicating individuals take the initiative and know who to contact in other 
organizations.  Information Sharing is also somewhat positive, with a mean of 3.9.  Collaborative 
Learning would seem to be a more demanding level of lateral integration, and its lower mean of 
3.2 is perhaps not surprising, especially (a) to the degree that this is an under-resourced 
organizational context and (b) to the degree that developing collaborative learning systems in a 
complex network of partnerships requires exceptionally high levels of integration. 
Barriers to Collaboration 
Individuals within the DoD CAO still perceive barriers to collaboration, as the relatively 
low reverse-coded mean of 3.2 suggests.  This is an indicator of the inertia that leadership must 
still overcome as they develop ICC in this complex, under-resourced, bureaucratic context.  In 
this scale, as with others, deeper insights emerge from looking at specific items that comprise 
the scales; space constraints prevent such analysis. 
Leading and Lagging Factors in the Open Systems Organizational 
Models 
The ICC model is an open systems model; it emphasizes that organizations depend on 
the congruence or fit (i.e., fitness) of their subsystems (i.e., domains) with respect to each other 
and the larger environment.  To achieve fitness in their political, economic, social and 
organizational environments, organizations develop habitual routines and patterns of action.  
The commonality in the pattern of ICC profiles may thus reflect a systemic state of fitness and 
inertia of the public bureaucracies in our sample.    
Organizational development and change—including developing ICC—requires a 
systemic approach if it is to be sustained.  However, trying to change an organization in its 
entirety generally is not possible.  Leadership must choose which subsystem domains to initially 
develop (i.e., leading factors) and which subsystem domains will be allowed to lag (i.e., lagging 
factors) and be changed in the future (Kaplan & Norton, 1992).   
For the organizations in our sample, the Metrics for Collaboration scale has typically had 
the lowest—or one of the lowest—scores.  By contrast, Felt Need is often one of the highest 
scores.  Our feedback sessions with respondents are congruent with organizational change 
literature: generating a sense of felt need is often a lead factor in organizational change; 
managers typically begin such efforts by communicating a sense of urgency.  By contrast, our 
feedback sessions suggest that developing metrics to assess collaboration often is a lagging 
effort, delayed because of the time and skill required for development and implementation.  
However, although it might not be typical, leaders may choose to use metrics to lead change 
efforts.  The DoD CAO described in this report is consciously using a metrics management 
system as a leading factor in their change efforts.  Using the ICC survey longitudinally may 
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Continuing and Future Research 
Feedback workshops with students/SMEs (Thomas et al., 2008) combined with the item 
analysis and scale development (Jansen et al., 2008) lend considerable confidence to the 
dimensionality of the ICC model and operationalizations reported here.   
Research is currently under way to analyze how the survey is used in the context of 
specific partners.  The ICC survey described in this report diagnoses an organization’s “general 
collaborative capacity” to enter into relationships with unspecified partners; it assesses ICC with 
respect to generalized others.  By contrast, research in progress on “relative collaborative 
capacity” focuses on one specific partner; the survey questions name one specific organization 
and thus assess ICC for this one specific relationship.     
It is possible to use the dimensions in the ICC model to generate a performance 
appraisal of collaborative relationships.  In such a case, items would need to be rewritten or 
other summary scales created whereby the members of organizations judge their partner 
organizations with respect to on-going relationships.  It is even conceivable that such measures 
could become integrated into performance appraisals, thus creating a metrics to drive incentives 
and reward actions that develop and sustain ICC. 
Validation of the ICC survey requires research with dependent variables on 
interorganizational performance or alternative assessments of collaboration processes (e.g., 
nominations of extreme cases—excellent collaborators versus ineffective collaborators—by 
experts or top leaders).  This would provide an external, empirical validation for the factors 
specified in the ICC model.  This is the most challenging research to perform, requiring more 
resources and management support than previous efforts. 
Richer diagnoses of an organization’s ICC using qualitative methods in conjunction with 
the survey are also needed.  Understanding collaborative capacity processes and dynamics 
requires qualitative methods such as interviews and focus groups as well as case studies.  Such 
collaborative efforts between researchers and leaders/managers support the “action research” 
agenda of simultaneously improving organizational functioning and developing better theories 
and measurements. 
These last two issues—research with dependent variables and qualitatively enriched 
research that is used in conjunction with the survey—are the necessary next steps to furthering 
our understanding of the dynamics of collaborative capacity and simultaneously improving ICC.   
Conclusion 
At this stage of our research, we have considerable confidence in the usefulness of the 
ICC model and the ICC survey scales reported here.  The model of collaborative capacity in 
Figure 5 conceptualizes an organization’s capability to enter into partnerships as a systemic 
state.  It defines that state in terms of a set of factors (e.g., structural flexibility and metrics) 
organized into the subsystem domains of strategy, reward systems, structure, lateral processes, 
and people (Galbraith, 2002; Hocevar et al., 2006; Jansen et al., 2008).  This fits into the 
themes and constructs identified in the literature and our own inductive research.  We have 
created scales to assess the factors that define the state of ICC, and these possess internal-
consistency reliability and convergent validity.  The items composing the scales suggest action 
strategies for developing collaborative capacity.  Although continuing refinement and validation 
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is necessary, we believe our attempts are representative of the state of the art in theory and 
research on ICC.   
The problems facing DoD’s acquisitions and contracting community are extraordinarily 
complex and, given resource constraints, uncertain.  They do not fit neatly into the categories of 
academic disciplines or of single agencies or organizations.  They require collaboration among 
people, teams, and organizations from private and public sectors in a global context.  Success 
increasingly requires collaboration to bring together information, knowledge and expertise 
located in diverse organizations.  The ICC survey is designed to be a tool for leaders and 
managers who face the intellectually and emotionally challenging work of increasing their 
organizations interorganizational collaborative capabilities. 
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